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(no subject)
by ira 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Saw this on CNN: Anonymous Stock tips over IRC as bad???
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:30 PM 6/2/96, Martin Minow wrote: >> >>One of the oldest tricks for running a stock up (or down) is >>to put rumor teams on elevators in the financial district of >>major cities. > >It would be more efficient to talk about the rumor on a cellular >phone. Probably make a nice sting scenario, too. An interesting example, but I'm having a hard time figuring out who has committed a crime, even by SEC rules. Namely, are the people "talking up" a stock committing a crime? Even if the SEC forbids this (under defined circumstances and for defined persons, as most of us are not covered by any such laws), how can talking over a "putatively secure" cell phone be construed as talking up a stock? And, how can someone who acts on overheard information--as in the elevator example Sandy cited--be charged with any crime? Unless they are "insiders," covered by SEC rules about trading, they are free to act on essentially anything they hear. "He who hesitates to act on inside information is lost." (To elaborate on this: I was never classified as an "insider" during my time at Intel, and I certainly bought and sold the stock based on what products and news I knew was coming out or what rumors I'd heard. Only a select group of executives and staff in the specific departments generating earnings announcements, auditing, etc., were covered. And senior executives are covered by various rules about trading stocks. And family members and friends may be covered, if they learn of "inside" (in the SEC sense) information. But ordinary people, even employees of a company, are not considered to be "insiders" and hence are not covered by insider trading laws.) So, the only way I can imagine the cell phone case leading to an insider trading charge is if the cell phone users _knew_ that the cell phones were not secure, and _planned_ to have their conversations overheard. The people doing the intercepting could be charged under one of the laws covering unauthorized interception of cell phone conversations, but probably not for insider trading. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Insider Trading and Inside Information
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: > And, how can someone who acts on overheard information--as > in the elevator example Sandy cited--be charged with any > crime? Unless they are "insiders," covered by SEC rules > about trading, they are free to act on essentially anything > they hear. "He who hesitates to act on inside information is > lost." > (To elaborate on this: I was never classified as an > "insider" during my time at Intel, and I certainly bought > and sold the stock based on what products and news I knew > was coming out or what rumors I'd heard. Only a select group > of executives and staff in the specific departments > generating earnings announcements, auditing, etc., were > covered. And senior executives are covered by various rules > about trading stocks. And family members and friends may be > covered, if they learn of "inside" (in the SEC sense) > information. The SEC, in cooperation with the courts, has been gradually shifting the definitions of "insider" and "inside information" to more all-encompassing ones. It used to be that an insider was an officer of the company, or someone with a fiduciary relationship to the firm, such as a auditor or investment banker with which the firm did business. Inside information was also similarly limited to a narrow collection of material subject to regulatory restrictions on its disclosure. Nowdays "inside information" has been expanded to include anything that the general public is not privy to, and "insiders" can be almost anyone as well. Indeed, the current definitions can subject to criminal sanctions low level employees trading their company's stock on the basis of rumors, or newspaper columnists trading in anticipation of reaction to their published speculations. It's not even safe to trade on what formerly would have been known as "hot tips" any more, unless the average person in the street had a mechanism to access the information. The legal theory behind all this is that anyone, no matter who they are, trading on any publicly unavailable information, no matter what it is, might be perceived as profiting at the expense of the zillions of ordinary investors, whose continued playing of the Stock Lottery^H^H^H^H^H^H^H Market the govermment and big business definitely want to encourage. Not to mention the huge public support for the prosecution of anyone who the public thinks has "gotten away with something" that Joe Six-Pack didn't have the opportunity to do, and made a few bucks in the process. If this trend continues, I won't even be able to take an Intel janitor to lunch, and trade the stock based on his impression that Andy Grove looked particularly happy while having his office cleaned, without risking an "insider trading violation" should the stock go up. A new and interesting manifestation of the "Surveilance State." -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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penet to be compromised again? More Scientology lawsuit crap
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just received some information on IRC channel #scientology that Julf Helsinghuis is being sued by $cientology *yet again* for a name. Apparently this has to do with the deposition request to Homer Wilson Smith (lightlink.com) Scamizdat #3 was posted through lightlink.com and the $cientologists have wanted for a long time to figure out who did it. (Which is why they sued Grady Ward.) Homer, in response to the deposition request, consulted his logs, and said that the original post came from penet.fi. So $cientology has apparently gone to the Finns again to ask that Julf be forced to give up the name. I'm appending a copy of the IRC log, as I'm too lazy to edit it down to particulars. It includes the name of the police officer involved (Kaj Malmberg) as well as a Finnish newsgroup and article id for the whole story. If someone knows Finnish and can give a rough translation, it would be terribly appreciated by a lot of people. <enclosed IRC transcript> <Ignatius> hi guys... do you have the latest news on Julf Helsingius' case? > Ig: what do you mean, latest news? <Sherilyn> The julf case? * Sherilyn didn;t know there _was_ a julf case... <Ignatius> ok... copyright offences are crimes under Finnish law, not torts. <Ignatius> Kaj Malmberg, the Finnish police officer who handles the investigation of the copyrighted material through penet.fi, posted an article to a domestic newsgroup today. <Sherilyn> Do you have the message-id and group name? <Ignatius> the scienos have filed a motion at a local court in Helsinki to force Julf Helsingius to give out the name of the poster. <Ignatius> sherilyn, are you good at Finnish? <Sherilyn> ig: lol! <skaplin> Who posted what through penet?? <Ignatius> the hearing is scheduled for the beginning of next week... perhaps already tomorrow. <Sherilyn> So was penet the server before lightlink in the scamizdat case? <Sherilyn> Homer gave them the name of the prior server, or was going to *** skaplin changes topic to "Penet under attack...Again!" <Sherilyn> Well this needs to be put out loud on groups where people use penet <skaplin> Ignatus: How good are you at translating? <Sherilyn> Last attack on penet got the scientologists a very bad rep > Ig: We need that post. > IN ENGLISH > ASAP! > even if it's a lousy translation. <Sherilyn> This cop guy speaks English <Sherilyn> Didn't he post in English to a.r.s.? > Sheri: he may not want to post it on a.r.s <Sherilyn> It's true, skap <Ignatius> i don't know more than what I already mentioned. The police officer didn't even mention Scientology; he just mentioned that he was investigating a copyright offence. <Sherilyn> She would make a lovely domina > sheri: you should see what I'm reading now :) <skaplin> We're sure penet is under attack for a name though... <Sherilyn> Bloody hell fire! <Sherilyn> I have 6440 posts downloading! <Ignatius> i'm writing an article to post to the ng:s, but it's obvious we don't have all the bits of the puzzle yet. <skaplin> Want some kippers with your spam sheri?? :) <skaplin> Ignatus: What newsgroup was it in? > ig: please post it asap. > also, send it to rnewman(a)cybercom.net. <Ignatius> skap, sfnet.keskustelu.laki; <4os5bu$flp(a)idefix.eunet.fi> <Ignatius> the police officer, Kaj Malmberg, is at kaj.malmberg(a)helsinki.poliisi.fi <end of transcript> Deana Holmes mirele(a)xmission.com

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No subject
by an633169＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

replying to ping --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Class III InfoWar: TST Article
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the article Winn Schwartau cited to last night: ---------- The Sunday Times (London), June 2, 1996, pp. 1, 24. City surrenders to L400m gangs [Insight column] City of London financial institutions have paid huge sums to international gangs of sophisticated "cyber terrorists" who have amassed up to L400m worldwide by threatening to wipe out computer systems. Banks, broking firms and investment houses in America have also secretly paid ransom to prevent costly computer meltdown and a collapse in confidence among their customers, according to sources in Whitehall and Washington. An Insight investigation has established that British and American agencies are examining more than 40 "attacks" on financial institutions in London and New York since 1993. Victims have paid up to L13m a time after the blackmailers demonstrated their ability to bnng trading to a halt using advanced "information warfare" techniques learnt from the military. According to the American National Security Agency (NSA), they have penetrated computer systems using "logic bombs" (coded devices that can be remotely detonated), electromagnetic pulses and "high emission radio frequency guns", which blow a devastating electronic "wind" through a computer system. They have also left encrypted threats at the highest security levels, reading: "Now do you believe we can destroy your computers?" The authorities have been unable to stem the attacks, which are thought to onginate from the United States. In most cases, victim banks have failed to notify the police. "They have given in to blackmail rather than risk a collapse in confidence in their security systems," said a security director at one blue-chip merchant bank in the City. A senior detective in the City of London police said: "We are aware of the extortion methods, but the banking community has ways of dealing with it and rarely reports to the police." European and American police forces have set up special units to tackle the cyber criminals, who, Ministry of Defence sources believe, have netted between L200m and L400m globally over the past three years. But law enforcement agencies complain that senior financiers have closed ranks and are hindering inquiries. Experts in the field of information warfare met in Brussels last month to discuss defensive measures. Representatives included Captain Patrick Tyrrell, assistant director of computer information strategy at the Ministry of Defence; General James McCarthy, professor of national security at the US Air Force Academy; General Jean Pichot-Duclos, director of the economic intelligence department of the French Defence Council, and senior figures from the civilian computer industries. A separate closed meeting involving representatives from Whitehall and the intelligence community was held to analyse the 40 attacks on British and American financial centres since 1993. A further secret seminar took place in Washington this weekend. Kroll Associates, the international investigating firm, confirmed last week that it had acted for financial institutions that have been blackmailed. "One of the problems we face is that the potential embarrassment from loss of face is very senous," said a spokesman in New York. Kroll had evidence that firms in London and New York had been targeted. "The problem for law enforcement is that the crime is carried out globally, but law enforcement stops at the frontier," he said. Yesterday a Bank of England spokesman acknowleged the threat from the extortionists: "We are aware of this. It does exist. It is extortion and fraud." But the spokesman also insisted: "It is not the biggest issue in the banking market." Scotland Yard is now taking part in a Europe-wide initiative to catch the cyber criminals and has appointed a senior detective from its computer crime unit to take part in an operation codenamed Lathe Gambit. Such is the secrecy that few details about the inquiry have emerged. In America, the FBI has set up three separate units to investigate computer extortion. The NSA believes there are four cyber gangs and has evidence that at least one is based in Russia. The agency is now examining four examples of blackmail said to have occurred in London: + January 6, 1993: Trading halted at a broking house after blackmail threat and computer crash. Ransom of L10m paid to account in Zurich. + January 14, 1993: a blue-chip bank paid L12.5m after blackmail threats. + January 29, 1993: a broking house paid L10m in ransom after similar threats. + March 17, 1995: a defence firm paid L10m in ransom. In all four incidents, the gangs made threats to senior directors and demonstrated that they had the capacity to crash a computer system. Each victim conceded to the blackmailers' demands within hours and tranferred the money to offshore bank accounts, from which it was removed by the gangs within minutes. The techniques have varied. In London, criminals posing as marketing firms have gained detailed knowledge of a target's system by interviewing the heads of information technology departments. In some cases, they have even issued questionnaires to unsuspecting officials. Armed with this information, they have been able to breach security and leave encrypted messages warning of their capability. The gangs are believed to have gained expertise in information warfare techniques from the American military, which is developing "weapons" that can disable or destroy computer hardware. Some are also known to have infiltrated banks simply by placing saboteurs on their payroll as temporary staff. Little is yet known about the identities of the gangs but, according to the NSA, America is the main source of the attacks. It believes that at least one other group originates from Russia and has followed the movement of money to the former Soviet states. A spokesman for the Metropoiitan poiice said: "There is potential for extortion from those purporting to know how to damage computer systems. "The computer crime unit liaises where necessary with its Euro counterparts to discuss cross-frontier crimes." One merchant bank director said yesterday: "You will never get a financial institution to admit it has an extortion policy, let alone that it has paid money to blackmailers." ----- Additional reporting: Peter Warren [End]

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Fate of Ecash if RSA is cracked?
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, After reading Comm. of ACM and Schneier's book about ecash, a question arose: what if the underlying public key cryptographic scheme gets broken somehow? Suppose, for example, that someone discovers an ultra-fast factoring algorithm or something like that. What would happen with all ecash that's been issued? Of course criminals would be able to forge large amounts of authentic-looking ecash, so banks should not be honoring requests to convert e-cash into real cash. I apologize in advance is this question is silly, and will appreciate your corrections. - Igor.

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RE: Fate of Ecash if RSA is cracked?
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

but probably not for decent RSA key lengths -- more probably the hashing algorithm used will fall, with much the same consequences. mattt >---------- >From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com[SMTP:dlv@bwalk.dm.com] >Sent: Sunday, June 02, 1996 6:49 PM >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: Fate of Ecash if RSA is cracked? > >ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes: >> scheme gets broken somehow? Suppose, for example, that someone >> discovers an ultra-fast factoring algorithm or something like that. > >This'll happen, probably sooner than later. > >--- > >Dr. Dimitri Vulis >Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, >14.4Kbps >

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Reminder on PBS Show
by MELODYJAMES＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CYBER SECRETS (This week on Life on the Internet) Law enforcement agencies say that in the wrong hands, email encryption software called PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) threatens the public good. Check out the online transcript, hyperlinks and live video stream of this week's feature "Cyber Secrets" on the Life on the Internet web site. <http://www.pbs.org/internet/> The program *Life on the Internet* is broadcast on Saturday mornings in some areas. Check your listings.

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"Insider Non-Trading" (Re: Insider Trading and Inside Information)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:15 PM 6/2/96, Mike Duvos wrote: >The SEC, in cooperation with the courts, has been gradually >shifting the definitions of "insider" and "inside information" to >more all-encompassing ones. ... >Nowdays "inside information" has been expanded to include >anything that the general public is not privy to, and "insiders" >can be almost anyone as well. ... Indeed, the recent changes to U.S. Code 18503-666, have been dubbed the "Insider Non-Trading Law." What, you may ask, is "insider non-trading"? Just as inside information may affect decisions to engage in a stock trade, so too can insider information cause a decision _not_ to engage in a stock trade! Imagine that Trader Joe was planning to sell Security Dynamics short. Perhaps with a direct short sale, or purchase of puts, or other variants. However, he learns from his golfing partner, Jim Bidzos, that RSA Data is about to be sold to SD for $250 million. Returning from his golf game, he cancels his short plans. Voila, "insider non-trading." The SEC tumbled to this some time ago, and now demands that all those who are insiders, or who are married to insiders, or who are golfing buddies of insiders register their trading intentions 90 days in advance of any transaction. (This will increase to 120 days in 1997, and 180 days the following year.) This form of "intention escrow" ensures that insider information cannot be used to cancel trades which were planned and then not pursued. Key escrow, signature escrow, identity escrow, position escrow, and, now, intention escrow. Welcome to the Escrow Society. --Tim May (P.S. Stu Brownstein, a Bay Area friend of mine, came up with this "insider non-trading" joke several years ago. He once thought about writing a letter to the "NYT" pointing out how insider trading laws must also imply insider non-trading laws, but a Washington friend of his, he claims, told him not to. "It may give the SEC ideas," he said.) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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