- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: washington post notices archives
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:38 PM 4/14/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > In addition, what if the material is edited down to try to conform to >fair use, as I do? First, you're still going to find it using the search >engines - and will have to filter it out. Second, the hoster of the data, if >locatable, will have to decide whether to respond to a legal threat and delete >something that may be within such guidelines. Third, such guidelines may vary >from country to country. "Fair use" is very tricky. The Church of Scientology files lawsuits against even those that mention that Saint Ron believed the Key to Becoming Clear lay in communicating with plants. And if the editors of a newspaper want to file suit, they can. In fact, newspapers don't necessarily have more copyright rights than others do. What if a person like me demands that an archive site remove articles by me? I have not signed any waivers authorizing an archive site to distribute, sell, trade, or otherwise disperse my articles! (Recall the controversy some years back when a compilation of jokes from rec.humor.* was sold, without compensation to the joke authors. Changes are being proposed in copyright law. Maybe good, maybe bad. I don't follow the controversy. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: [fwd] Undeliverable Message
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's not encrypted - it's just Unix :-) The "begin 600 attach.Z" tells you it's uuencoded, which is a way of representing binary data in ASCII to make it safe for mailing, and that the resulting file is named "attach.Z". This looks very much like something compressed with the Unix compress program, so you can use uncompress or gunzip to uncompress it. Inside that is a binary file, starting off with characters that look like a Unix "tar" archive format; there are some headers including filenames and nulls, followed by ASCII files. So use a tar program to unpack it. Bill At 11:59 PM 4/14/96 +0200, Clemens Stiglechner <a9401816(a)unet.univie.ac.at> wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >It seems that mailer-daemon(a)usafa.af.mil is running amok; it has >sent 64 *different* *encrypted* messages to the Hemingway List within >6 hours until now. I just wonder which kind of encryption _they_ might >use. Here is the first one: .... >begin 600 attach.Z >M'YV0:=R,>7/&31HZ;URTF7,&@,.'$"-*G$BQHL6+&"N"V&@#!@P0`#:"B$&# # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-04-14 15:10:21 EDT, you write: >I see no legal reason why wiretaps should have the "features" listed above. >There is a certain practical reason they can: Due to the nature of >wiretapping, it is not physically necessary to show up to do the tap, or >tell those targeted, or tell them after the tap has been disconnected. >However, it seems very unlikely that the mere fact that an invention allows >a kind of search that was possible before, should automatically change the >interpretation of the Constitution to allow that search. > >If a new invention allowed the cops to walk through walls untraceably, would >that automatically mean that the normal protections that search warrants are >supposed to provide are no longer valid? I don't think so! Mandating that phone companies allow wiretaps is analogous to mandating that all houses be constructed of Plexiglas, with the shades on the outside, so the gov't can look in at their leisure.

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Re: X.25 [NOISE]
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:45 PM 4/14/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >And, yes, it's [X.25] a lousy environment to do full-duplex character >echo over. I implemented and have been supporting a system with full-duplex character echo over X.25. I can only agree with Bill Stewart's assessment, but you hold your nose and do it. I have learned that an X.25 "standard" network is about as standard as a K&R C compiler. Sure you can talk to the network, but each network is different in what you have to do to get it to send you the ASCII characters so you can echo them. Many times you have to use non-standard, network specific extensions. I am also responsible for getting Zmodem style data transfers to work. To make it work means the network must be fully 8-bit transparent, AND send the last chunk of data eventually (within a few seconds) to complete the transfer. Don't even ask about getting Zmodem transfers working thru X.25 to various "Unix" systems. Now you know why I claimed the title, "Wizard of Trailing Edge Technology" in Dogbert's New World Order. Regards - Bill [To be complete, I also do work in electronic commerce, Java and other things you see on this list.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: RC4 licensening
by Tim Dierks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:08 PM 4/14/96, Jack Mott wrote: > Anyone know how much it costs to license RC4 or how RSA has been >handling the whole situation? If, for whatever reason, you decide to license RC4 from RSA, you have two options: you can license BSAFE from RSA, or you can license RSAREF from Consensus Development, which will soon be available with an RC4/RC2 implementation. Costs vary. It's my understanding that RSA has threatened legal action against anyone shipping RC4 without a license, but I don't know of any lawsuits that have been filed. - Tim Dierks Disclaimer: I am an employee of Consensus Development. Tim Dierks -- timd(a)consensus.com -- www.consensus.com Head of Thing-u-ma-jig Engineering, Consensus Development

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Re: [Political Rant] Was: examples of mandatory content rating?
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:52 4/14/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >I'm not sure if the major use for ratings may not be searching for >material that the raters don't like. I'd be interested in many things the >fundys don't like, for instance. One could even do this via one of the >"services" that mails out listings of places to be locked from kids - just >sign up one of your anonymous employees, and get the data and put it on your >anonymous web access site. Doing so - if you don't admit you've done it - may >be cheaper than doing the research yourself. Of course, you'll need to check >out each such site to make sure that it isn't a decoy that they've inserted. When you do the checking, make sure it is from an IPN that does not point back at you (or at least only points to a Server Supplied not a Dedicated IPN). You might also want to watch out for "Canary Trap" Decoys (where each list has an unique set of Decoys [or at least one unique Decoy] so they can tell which copy was compromised). I'm assuming that the Decoy is a "valid" [possibly virtual] domain address which is being logged.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'cubed'} = '<alias(a)alias.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> mix cpunk latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono nymrod) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 15 Apr 96 6:47:58 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -++++------ 2:33:23 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com +***+*+++*** 5:41 99.98% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ####+*####*# 1:58 99.96% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -++-----+--- 2:32:50 99.96% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net --.-*.-*++** 2:41:08 99.95% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -..-+.---+-+ 4:27:26 99.93% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org #+####**+--* 1:08:04 99.93% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com -***-..+*##* 2:28:26 99.89% ncognito ncognito(a)gate.net **#*##+ *### :59 99.81% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ++++++++ *+* 41:19 99.74% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net +-.--*-+*# + 1:08:56 99.52% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu # ##+#* ## * 6:51 99.41% c2 remail(a)c2.org ++++++++++++ 45:38 99.31% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl **** +**+* + 11:03 98.93% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net --. *-+**+** 1:55:40 98.91% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---.------ 5:38:19 98.22% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi -.--.__-_ 32:46:03 97.87% replay remailer(a)replay.com -*** **+* 10:15 97.83% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net -## ++#*#++ 12:46 95.67% cubed alias(a)alias.alias.net ********* +* 18:13 95.06% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net +*****+++ ** 29:30 94.97% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ---------- 3:57:11 94.82% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++++++ 41:35 93.39% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com 2:39:59 1.03% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: CryptoAnarchy: What's wrong with this picture?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:44 PM 5/6/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > >On Sun, 28 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: > >[...] > >>While strong cryptography is powerful, and secure communications >>liberating, unplugging the phones would about cripple that 'weapon' for a >>while. Any group rebelling based only on high technology communication is >>an extremely vulnerable group, both to widespread denial of service, and >>more specific 'surgical' attacks. (Motorola stock anyone?) > > Wouldn't that partially depend on: > A. the level of backups - packet radio as a backup for phones, >for instance... a reason I've been forwarding the stuff on radio to here. > B. the necessity to the government of keeping what else may >depend on those phones - the economy - going. > -Allen The attribution above is in error. I didn't type those lines above.Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: misunderstandings of PICS
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:40 PM 5/6/96 -0400, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 16-APR-1996 20:19:13.88 >>From http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/iacwc.htm >>The second method is for a client to ask an http server to send labels along >>with the documents it requests. The server would most likely offer the >>publishers' labels, but a server could also redistribute labels from third >>parties that it cooperates with. [Client sends URL of label service to browser >>which responds with that service's label. bf] OBCRYPTO: PICS envisions that ratings distributed by this second method will be digitally signed by the 3rd party rating service. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: PICS & CyberAngels
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"vznuri(a)netcom.com" "Vladimir Z. Nuri" 4-MAY-1996 11:59:26.15 >this seems to suggest a misunderstanding of PICS either by you or >the "CyberAngels". PICS does not require any particular action by page owners >and is entirely based on that principle (there is a pretty good >argument it would be unconstitutional, impractical, idiotic, etc. if >it didn't). it defines a standard by >which ratings servers and queries are constructed and formatted. >anyone can rate any information. if the CyberAngels want to rate >all kinds of pages in cyberspace and set up their own rating service, >more power to them. the ratings do not restrict those who do not >choose the restrictions. The instructions in question, at http://www.safesurf.com/cyberangels/#look, are for their "volunteers" to report - including to both the page's ISP and to government - any page with sexual content that doesn't have a PICS such that it can be censored. In other words, they want to try to kick off systems - including potentially via legal action such as nonsense like "corrupting a minor" or whatever - any pages that don't set themselves up to be censored. That would include by government such as China, as well as by fundamentalist parents. Given their approval of Detweiler, you're making it more and more likely that you're him.... -Allen

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