- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: <nettime> "idle no more", Re: Gone (to) Viral: Facebook Doomsday
by mp 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 20/12/12 13:57, Gita Hashemi wrote: > > i am not an advocate of facebook or other social media per se, but i do > have a facebook account, just as i have a phone line, and several email > addresses. frequently, i take a break from one or all. presently, i > login to fb 2-3 times a day as i follow the development of "idle no > more" indigenous rights movement in canada. IDLE NO MORE. > > i humbly suggest that it is possible to use fb for purposes other than > checking the latest narcissistic instagram pictures of our friends and > their lunch, cat or baby, or other time and energy draining purposeless > pursuits. and while there are many people who are not directly tied to > political, intellectual or other exalted circles but who are on fb, it > is possible to use fb as an effective communication tool to mobilize > beyond our immediate circles and usual participants. Indeed, and that is precisely what CIA/In-Q-Tel wants you to do. Generate intel and cash for them. To paraphrase indigenous activists: One minute spend on FB is one minute not spend in your flesh-and-blood community/neighbours (that is, there where political action traditionally begins). mp ------------------ http://www.corbettreport.com/meet-in-q-tel-the-cias-venture-capital-firm-pr… The publicly available record on the Facebook/In-Q-Tel connection is tenuous. Facebook received $12.7 million in venture capital from Accel, whose manager, James Breyer, now sits on their board. He was formerly the chairman of the National Venture Capital Association, whose board included Gilman Louie, then the CEO of In-Q-Tel. The connection is indirect, but the suggestion of CIA involvement with Facebook, however tangential, is disturbing in the light of Facebookbs history of violating the privacy of its users. Googlebs connection to In-Q-Tel is more straightforward, if officially denied. In 2006, ex-CIA officer Robert David Steele told Homeland Security Today that Google b has been taking money and direction for elements of the US Intelligence Community, including the Office of Research and Development at the Central Intelligence Agency, In-Q-Tel, and in all probability, both the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Armybs Intelligence and Security Command.b Later that year, a blogger claimed that an official Google spokesman had denied the claims, but no official press statement was released. Steelebs accusation is not the only suggestion of American intelligence involvement with Google, however. In 2005, In-Q-Tel sold over 5,000 shares of Google stock. The shares are widely presumed to have come from In-Q-Telbs investment in Keyhole Inc., which was subsequently bought out by Google, but this is uncertain. In 2010, it was announced that Google was working directly with the National Security Agency to secure its electronic assets. Also in 2010, Wired reported that In-Q-Tel and Google had jointly provided venture capital funding to Recorded Future Inc., a temporal analytics search engine company that analyzes tens of thousands of web sources to predict trends and events. But as potentially alarming as In-Q-Telbs connections to internet giants like Facebook and Google are, and as disturbing as its interest in data mining technologies may be, the CIAbs venture capital arm is interested in more than just web traffic monitoring. The In-Q-Tel website currently lists two b practice areas,b b Information and Communication Technologiesb and b Physical and Biological Technologies.b The latter field consists of b capabilities of interestb such as b The on-site determination of individual human traits for IC purposesb and b Tracking and/or authentication of both individuals and objects.b In-Q-Tel also lists two areas that are b on its radarb when it comes to biotech: Nano-bio Convergence and Physiological Intelligence. Detailed breakdowns of each area explain that the intelligence community is interested in, amongst other things, self-assembling batteries, single molecule detectors, targeted drug delivery platforms, and sensors that can tell where a person has been and what substances he has been handling from b biomarkersb like trace compounds in the breath or samples of skin. In the years since its formation, many have been led to speculate about In-Q-Tel and its investments, but what requires no speculation is an understanding that a privately owned venture capital firm, created by and for the CIA, in which well-connected board members drawn from the private sector can then profit from the investments made with CIA funds that itself come from the taxpayer represent an erosion of the barrier between the public and private spheres that should give even the most credulous pause for thought. What does it mean that emerging technology companies are becoming wedded to the CIA as soon as their technology shows promise? What can be the public benefit in fostering and encouraging technologies which can be deployed for spying on all internet users, including American citizens, in direct contravention of the CIAbs own prohibitions against operating domestically? If new software and technology is being brought to market by companies with In-Q-Tel advisors on their boards, what faith can anyone purchasing American technologies have that their software and hardware is not designed with CIA backdoors to help the American intelligence community achieve its vision of b Total Information Awarenessb? Rather than scrutinizing each individual investment that In-Q-Tel makes, perhaps an institutional approach is required. At this point, the American people have to ask themselves whether they want the CIA, an agency that has participated in the overthrow of foreign, democratically-elected governments, an agency that has implanted fake stories in the news media to justify American war interests, an agency that at this very moment is engaged in offensive drone strikes, killing suspected b insurgentsb and civilians alike in numerous theaters around the world, should be entrusted with developing such close relationships with the IT sector, or whether In-Q-Tel should be scrapped for good. # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: DOJ jails reporter, Ashcroft allows more journalist subpoenas
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Politechnicals may remember that Attorney General Ashcroft personally approved my subpoena in the Jim Bell case. Federal prosecutor Robb London threatened to subpoena other reporters writing about developments in U.S. v. Bell (such as interviewing the defendant) in an apparent and reprehensible attempt to dissuade them from covering the trial. Background: http://www.mccullagh.org/subpoena/ Other coverage of this case: http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/0725inregr.html Excerpt from USA Today article: >The hearing was closed to the public at the government's request. The >transcript remains sealed. Even the name of the judge who sentenced her >for contempt of court has not been made public. --- Declan, I thought that the politech mailing list would be interested in this. If you have already discussed please disregard. Also please keep this mailbox anon if you post it. Thanks for your great work! http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/july01/2001-07-27-ashcroft-journalists-… ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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<nettime> PlayFair > Sarovar
by kevin lahoda 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Sarovar.org is India's first portal to host projects under Free/Open source licenses. It is located in Trivandrum, India and hosted at Asianet data center. Sarovar.org is customised, installed and maintained by Linuxense as part of their community services and sponsored by River Valley Technologies. From Sarovar's < http://sarovar.org/ > Latest News: "After a short "vacation" thanks to a Cease and Desist letter from Apple, we're back online. Many thanks to Sarovar for hosting us.. -PlayFair " Sarovar now hosts The PlayFair project < http://playfair.sarovar.org/ > which SourceForge has declined in order to avoid tangling with Apple's decision to go DMCA on their ass < http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/04/09/1554203 >. Like something from a Gibson novel, I wouldn't doubt if Sarovar rises to meet more than another of these occasions in the near future. And so, we have more contentious open source code hosted outside of the US in order to circumvent unfavorable legal processes. Offtshoring in itself is not all that new (another example: < http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/honeyd/ >). Here is how this one gets interesting: A big guy - Apple, goes a little sour, another (kind of) big guy - SourceForge, takes the easy route, and then an offshore repository stands in. With all of this, one thing that should not be ignored is that SourceForge should be shamed for not holding itself stronger. In a way SourceForge's decline of PlayFair and non-usage of the Safe Harbor Provision Act < http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/ > is an admit of defeat and a failure to stand up for one's (community's) rights. What comes out of this? Well, maybe Apple wins because they avoid a chance of being tarnished. Imagine what consumer level acknowledgment of the reality of Apple marketing a clean yet gritty 'Garage Band' motif (with all that punk rock implies) while at the same time sleeping with DRM, recently RIAA, and now DMCA, could entail... One can easily see that Apple is dancing itself into a bit of a gamble. But then again, what does an Ipod zombie care about these acronyms anyway? What does SourceForge get? Not much. This only makes it easier for them to weasle out of the next situation that comes up. Not to mention they also missed a good chance to join PlayFair in telling Apple what's what. k http://sarovar.org/ http://sarovar.org/projects/playfair/ http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/04/09/1554203 http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/ http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/honeyd/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/09/playfair_dmca_takedown/ # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo(a)bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)bbs.thing.net --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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1984 Comes To Boston
by brian-slashdotnews＠hyperreal.org 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/07/18/1821223 Posted by: timothy, on 2004-07-18 18:47:00 Topic: 158, 83 comments from the panopticonjob dept. walmass writes "In preparation for the DNC in Boston, [1]75 cameras monitored by the Federal government will be operating around the downtown Boston location. There are also an unspecified number of state police cameras, and 100 cameras owned by the Metro Boston Transit Authority. Quote: 'And it's here to stay: Boston police say the 30 or so cameras installed for the convention will be used throughout the city once the event is over. "We own them now," said police Superintendent Robert Dunford. "We're certainly not going to put them in a closet."'" [2]Click Here References 1. http://www.boston.com/news/politics/conventions/articles/2004/07/18/surveil… nce_targeted_to_convention?mode=PF 2. http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=4121&alloc_id=9746&site_id=1&request_id=7686742&… =click&page=%2farticle%2epl ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Re: [p2p-hackers] p2p in some place or other
by Alen Peacock 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 12/13/05, Michael Rogers <m.rogers(a)cs.ucl.ac.uk> wrote: > > Then how about internal motivation: the faster you upload, the faster > you can download, and the more files you share, the more likely you are > to be able to upload. I've come up with a half-baked incentive mechanism > for Gnutella based on these principles: > > http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/M.Rogers/gnutella-incentives.html > > No identity mechanism required I'm afraid ;-) Neat ideas. Like you, I'm a big believer in incentive-based decisions. I just peaked at your "Cooperation in Decentralized Networks" paper, and I notice that you do require exchange of public keys, authentication with those keys, and some sort of history of reciprocation, no? This is what I'm talking about when I say 'identity' and 'trust'. Each node has to be able to positively certify the identities of other nodes, and what you seem to be building is essentially a trust system built on top of those strong identities. Without the ability to certify node identities, you'd have a system that was very susceptible to imposter nodes leeching resources (in the form of reciprocation) that they hadn't earned, right? Perhaps I confused the issue by using the word 'identity,' which in some circles is used only to talk about the concept of linking a virtual presence to a meatspace entity. That isn't what I intended. What I meant was exactly what you describe: use of assymetric keys to establish and prove peer IDs, use of those IDs to learn something about the behavior of other agents in the network, and use of that knowledge to make appropriate incentive-based decisions. > > But, isn't it more interesting to think about building systems that > > have some fairness guarantees than building ones that don't? > > Define fairness :-) I'm more interested in mutual benefit. Well, I don't know if my semantics are standard, but the concept of 'fairness' I was thinking of was one that was purposely broad -- an umbrella under which 'mutual benefit' is certainly an essential piece. Alen _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)zgp.org http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers _______________________________________________ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[gsc] Loom folder interface now supports arbitrary asset types
by Patrick Chkoreff 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The Loom folder interface now supports arbitrary asset types. Just click the "Types" link in your folder to add, edit, and delete asset types at will. Issue digital doughnuts if you like. I did this as a fun exercise. This is by far the most important milestone in Loom to date. It makes Loom a powerful and completely generic accounting utility. -- Patrick P.S. This is version 43 of the Loom code. --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[silk] Virtual prisons: how e-maps are curtailing our freedom
by Udhay Shankar N 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I must admit I'm curious about what Eugen and Cory (among various others on this list) will say in response. Udhay http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20727670.900-virtual-prisons-how-emap… Virtual prisons: how e-maps are curtailing our freedom * 06 July 2010 by Mark Monmonier ELECTRONIC maps are arguably the quintessential innovation of 20th-century cartography. Although a few academic cartographers accord the map mystical powers, it is merely a tool, useful for good, evil or both, which citizens can resist or constrain - up to a point. The question is not whether e-maps will restrict where we go and what we do, but to what extent. What I call "restrictive cartography" is not in itself new. Property maps are at least as old as Roman times, and boundary maps no younger than kingdoms and nation states. What is new, however, is the substantial increase in both the number and diversity of restrictive maps. A comparison of mapping in 1900 and 2000 underscores my point. Since 1900, we have used maps to exclude industry from residential neighbourhoods, ban new construction on floodplains, help delineate "historic" districts that constrain a homeowner's choice of paint colour or replacement windows, put limits on where and with what weapons we can hunt game, restrict travel by foreign diplomats and journalists, prevent sex offenders from living near schools and playgrounds, and keep aircraft a nautical mile away from a vice-president's weekend retreat. The public tolerates these cartographic restrictions because many, if not most, are not only benign but essential. Environmental protection, for instance, relies on mapping as a regulatory instrument to safeguard water resources and wildlife habitat. Maps delineating rights of way for gas lines and other underground facilities guard against accidental breaches by a digger arm, at least by conscientious contractors. "Call before you dig" is a mantra of restrictive cartography. Property maps show rights of way that might thwart a buyer's plan to enlarge a home or re-configure an access road, and maps of quarantine areas aimed at farmers stem the spread of fruit-fly infestations. Government officials publish restrictive maps because they assume the boundaries will be heeded. In 2010, however, restrictive cartography is on the verge of more invasive applications as electronic technology replaces graphic lines requiring conscious interpretation with invisible fences, erected by proactive, self-enforcing geographical restrictions. The most impressive examples, and the most frightening, reflect the integration of geographical information systems (GIS), the Global Positioning System (GPS), and wireless telecommunications. A tracking device can instantly report its location to a GIS that determines whether the person, car or ship under surveillance has entered a prohibited area. Depending on circumstances and severity, a future system might be able to debit an offender's bank account, transmit a vocal warning or electronic pinch, notify the police or military, disable an engine, or even release a soporific drug into the violator's bloodstream. Electronic tagging and tracking on an unprecedented level is virtually certain - and could happen very soon. Motorists who appreciate the convenience of paying road tolls and parking fees automatically are unlikely to resist mandatory RFID tags - what's the use if electronic scanners can collect the same information from licence plates or bar-coded registration stickers? Electronic tracking makes it easy to limit access to congested areas and keep heavy trucks off residential streets, while adding a transponder that reports location enables automatic enforcement of traffic regulations. Smart algorithms are likely to be built into the software controlling the transponders, which could detect erratic driving characteristic of drunkenness or aggression, perhaps. Minimal resistance to cameras mounted above traffic lights attests to creeping acquiescence. An unprecedented level of electronic tagging and tracking is virtually certain Because the public is willing to trade control over their lives for convenience, the cellphone already doubles as a tracking device, and raises the possibility of "spatial micromanagement": of employees by employers, of children by parents, of elderly parents by grown children, and of suspected subversives by the authorities. Meanwhile, strategies for encouraging cooperation include GPS wristwatches, security badges, ankle bracelets and even subdermal chips. Threats to privacy and personal freedom are well known and obvious. In the spring 2003 issue of the IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, geographers Jerome Dobson and Peter Fisher warned of "geoslavery" by obsessive husbands or boyfriends, poised to punish perceived transgressions. The fact that geospatial tracking might be equally efficient for enforcing restraining orders on those who abuse their partners underscores an inherent ambiguity that impels acceptance, especially in the name of public safety or national defence. If the tracking of sex offenders, stalkers and people with Alzheimer's is acceptable, why not the tracking of thieves and drunk drivers? Once in place, a national geospatial surveillance administration can accommodate an ever-wider variety of electronic boundary lines, and offer disgruntled taxpayers an alternative to costly incarceration. For many crimes, an electronic map makes more sense than a prison, which may well only reinforce antisocial behaviour and allow criminals to exchange tricks of the trade. Efficient, but hardly fail-safe. Electronic cartography is vulnerable to incompetent technicians, malevolent hackers, cyber-terrorists and lobbyists for "special interests". Like traditional maps, e-cartography invites manipulation by government or corporations, often in the guise of national defence or free-market capitalism. While maps on the internet can advertise prohibitions and justify new delineations, this apparent openness is easily compromised. Particularly portentous is the way online mapping blurs details presumed useful to saboteurs but which are in fact easily viewable, after a little research, elsewhere on the internet. Boundaries developed for one purpose are too easily adopted for another, as when postal codes (designed merely to speed up mail delivery) are used to set rates for car insurance. More troubling are the incongruities that might arise from mixing maps compiled from different sources. For example, it's risky to transfer boundaries from a detailed property survey onto a generalised highway map on which curves have been smoothed out or symbols shifted to avoid clutter. And consider the electronic maritime navigation system that combines satellite positioning with a visual display derived from conventional, less geographically precise maps: quite likely the maps scanned into the system were made by hydrographers who had a less accurate sense of where they were than the 21st-century mariner's GPS. Although a skipper might snicker when a screen shows the ship on the beach when it's clearly offshore, only a fool would surrender all control to an electronic navigator. But it would be a mistake to portray this new brand of restrictive mapping as Orwellian: it is a natural part of social, political and cartographic evolution. In the end, then, we must hope that fear of litigation or other pragmatic issues may prove more influential than concerns over privacy in limiting the growth of restrictive cartography in an electronic age. We shall see. Profile Mark Monmonier is distinguished professor of geography at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, New York. This essay is based on his new book No Dig, No Fly, No Go: How maps restrict and control, which builds on his How to Lie with Maps, both published by University of Chicago Press -- ((Udhay Shankar N)) ((udhay @ pobox.com)) ((www.digeratus.com)) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[silk] Virtual prisons: how e-maps are curtailing our freedom
by Udhay Shankar N 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I must admit I'm curious about what Eugen and Cory (among various others on this list) will say in response. Udhay http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20727670.900-virtual-prisons-how-emap… Virtual prisons: how e-maps are curtailing our freedom * 06 July 2010 by Mark Monmonier ELECTRONIC maps are arguably the quintessential innovation of 20th-century cartography. Although a few academic cartographers accord the map mystical powers, it is merely a tool, useful for good, evil or both, which citizens can resist or constrain - up to a point. The question is not whether e-maps will restrict where we go and what we do, but to what extent. What I call "restrictive cartography" is not in itself new. Property maps are at least as old as Roman times, and boundary maps no younger than kingdoms and nation states. What is new, however, is the substantial increase in both the number and diversity of restrictive maps. A comparison of mapping in 1900 and 2000 underscores my point. Since 1900, we have used maps to exclude industry from residential neighbourhoods, ban new construction on floodplains, help delineate "historic" districts that constrain a homeowner's choice of paint colour or replacement windows, put limits on where and with what weapons we can hunt game, restrict travel by foreign diplomats and journalists, prevent sex offenders from living near schools and playgrounds, and keep aircraft a nautical mile away from a vice-president's weekend retreat. The public tolerates these cartographic restrictions because many, if not most, are not only benign but essential. Environmental protection, for instance, relies on mapping as a regulatory instrument to safeguard water resources and wildlife habitat. Maps delineating rights of way for gas lines and other underground facilities guard against accidental breaches by a digger arm, at least by conscientious contractors. "Call before you dig" is a mantra of restrictive cartography. Property maps show rights of way that might thwart a buyer's plan to enlarge a home or re-configure an access road, and maps of quarantine areas aimed at farmers stem the spread of fruit-fly infestations. Government officials publish restrictive maps because they assume the boundaries will be heeded. In 2010, however, restrictive cartography is on the verge of more invasive applications as electronic technology replaces graphic lines requiring conscious interpretation with invisible fences, erected by proactive, self-enforcing geographical restrictions. The most impressive examples, and the most frightening, reflect the integration of geographical information systems (GIS), the Global Positioning System (GPS), and wireless telecommunications. A tracking device can instantly report its location to a GIS that determines whether the person, car or ship under surveillance has entered a prohibited area. Depending on circumstances and severity, a future system might be able to debit an offender's bank account, transmit a vocal warning or electronic pinch, notify the police or military, disable an engine, or even release a soporific drug into the violator's bloodstream. Electronic tagging and tracking on an unprecedented level is virtually certain - and could happen very soon. Motorists who appreciate the convenience of paying road tolls and parking fees automatically are unlikely to resist mandatory RFID tags - what's the use if electronic scanners can collect the same information from licence plates or bar-coded registration stickers? Electronic tracking makes it easy to limit access to congested areas and keep heavy trucks off residential streets, while adding a transponder that reports location enables automatic enforcement of traffic regulations. Smart algorithms are likely to be built into the software controlling the transponders, which could detect erratic driving characteristic of drunkenness or aggression, perhaps. Minimal resistance to cameras mounted above traffic lights attests to creeping acquiescence. An unprecedented level of electronic tagging and tracking is virtually certain Because the public is willing to trade control over their lives for convenience, the cellphone already doubles as a tracking device, and raises the possibility of "spatial micromanagement": of employees by employers, of children by parents, of elderly parents by grown children, and of suspected subversives by the authorities. Meanwhile, strategies for encouraging cooperation include GPS wristwatches, security badges, ankle bracelets and even subdermal chips. Threats to privacy and personal freedom are well known and obvious. In the spring 2003 issue of the IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, geographers Jerome Dobson and Peter Fisher warned of "geoslavery" by obsessive husbands or boyfriends, poised to punish perceived transgressions. The fact that geospatial tracking might be equally efficient for enforcing restraining orders on those who abuse their partners underscores an inherent ambiguity that impels acceptance, especially in the name of public safety or national defence. If the tracking of sex offenders, stalkers and people with Alzheimer's is acceptable, why not the tracking of thieves and drunk drivers? Once in place, a national geospatial surveillance administration can accommodate an ever-wider variety of electronic boundary lines, and offer disgruntled taxpayers an alternative to costly incarceration. For many crimes, an electronic map makes more sense than a prison, which may well only reinforce antisocial behaviour and allow criminals to exchange tricks of the trade. Efficient, but hardly fail-safe. Electronic cartography is vulnerable to incompetent technicians, malevolent hackers, cyber-terrorists and lobbyists for "special interests". Like traditional maps, e-cartography invites manipulation by government or corporations, often in the guise of national defence or free-market capitalism. While maps on the internet can advertise prohibitions and justify new delineations, this apparent openness is easily compromised. Particularly portentous is the way online mapping blurs details presumed useful to saboteurs but which are in fact easily viewable, after a little research, elsewhere on the internet. Boundaries developed for one purpose are too easily adopted for another, as when postal codes (designed merely to speed up mail delivery) are used to set rates for car insurance. More troubling are the incongruities that might arise from mixing maps compiled from different sources. For example, it's risky to transfer boundaries from a detailed property survey onto a generalised highway map on which curves have been smoothed out or symbols shifted to avoid clutter. And consider the electronic maritime navigation system that combines satellite positioning with a visual display derived from conventional, less geographically precise maps: quite likely the maps scanned into the system were made by hydrographers who had a less accurate sense of where they were than the 21st-century mariner's GPS. Although a skipper might snicker when a screen shows the ship on the beach when it's clearly offshore, only a fool would surrender all control to an electronic navigator. But it would be a mistake to portray this new brand of restrictive mapping as Orwellian: it is a natural part of social, political and cartographic evolution. In the end, then, we must hope that fear of litigation or other pragmatic issues may prove more influential than concerns over privacy in limiting the growth of restrictive cartography in an electronic age. We shall see. Profile Mark Monmonier is distinguished professor of geography at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, New York. This essay is based on his new book No Dig, No Fly, No Go: How maps restrict and control, which builds on his How to Lie with Maps, both published by University of Chicago Press -- ((Udhay Shankar N)) ((udhay @ pobox.com)) ((www.digeratus.com)) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] The Indian government circumvents telcos to tap phones
by Samujjal (Shayan) Purkayastha 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>From http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2920844.ece?homepage=true Centre can directly access your phone chat soonSandeep Joshi Secure tapping mechanism ready; sequel to Radia tape leak Soon the Centre would have direct access to all your telephone conversations as the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has developed capabilities to intercept phones without keeping your operator in the loop. Currently, trials are on in Delhi and Haryana through a main server established in the national capital. It would take another 12 months before the system is officially operational.Alarmed by the leak in the corporate lobbyist Niira Radia phone-tapping case, the Centre at the highest level decided to set up a Central Monitoring System (CMS) to tap calls without the interference of telecom service providers. Subsequently, the DoT's Telecom Enforcement, Resource and Monitoring (TREM) Cell along with the Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DoT) was asked to develop the project for which Rs.170 crore was earmarked. After almost one year, the CMS is ready and being tested. *Exclusive facility* b This is the DoT's exclusive facility that would assist intelligence and security agencies, besides strategic government departments in phone-tapping,b a senior DoT official said. The DoT would be required to set up separate servers in each State, depending upon the requirements and the number of subscribers. While the facility in Delhi and adjoining States are likely to be ready by year-end, it might take at least another couple of years before servers are established across India. *Complex system* The present system of phone-tapping is a complex one as eight intelligence and investigating agencies wanting to snoop on anybody's phone are required to approach the Union Home Ministry for clearance with specific reasons. Armed with necessary clearances, the department officials would then approach the telecom operators for tapping phones. It is feared that the loopholes in the current process led to the leakage of the Radia tapes. *Total control* However, in the new mechanism, the DoT will have total control of a tapped line, giving telecom firms no access to the intercepted line. Another important aspect of the new centralised system is that irrespective of operators, lines would be tapped at one location, which will be manned round-the-clock by officials of the government agencies. _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: DOJ jails reporter, Ashcroft allows more journalist subpoenas
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Politechnicals may remember that Attorney General Ashcroft personally approved my subpoena in the Jim Bell case. Federal prosecutor Robb London threatened to subpoena other reporters writing about developments in U.S. v. Bell (such as interviewing the defendant) in an apparent and reprehensible attempt to dissuade them from covering the trial. Background: http://www.mccullagh.org/subpoena/ Other coverage of this case: http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/0725inregr.html Excerpt from USA Today article: >The hearing was closed to the public at the government's request. The >transcript remains sealed. Even the name of the judge who sentenced her >for contempt of court has not been made public. --- Declan, I thought that the politech mailing list would be interested in this. If you have already discussed please disregard. Also please keep this mailbox anon if you post it. Thanks for your great work! http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/july01/2001-07-27-ashcroft-journalists-… ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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