- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Weak IDEA keys...
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, I re-read the article, and here is the real dope. In Crypto '93 Joan Daemen, Rene' Govaerts, and Joos Vandewalle write: Abstract. Large classes of weak keys have been found for the block cipher algorithm IDEA, previously known as IPES [2]. IDEA has a 128-bit key and encrypts blocks of 64 bits. For a class of 2^23 keys IDEA exhibits a linear factor. For certain class of 2^35 keys the cipher has a global characteristic with probability 1. For another class of 2^51 keys only two encryptions and solving a set of 16 nonlinear boolean equations with 12 variables is sufficient to test if the used key belongs to this class. If it does, its particular value can be calculated efficiently. It is shown that the problem of weak keys can be eliminated by slightly modifying the key schedual of IDEA. [Typo's are probably mine :)] So, it isn't as bad as I thought. Chances are about 2^51/2^128 == 1/2^77 that you will get a bad key if you choose keys at random with even distribution from the IDEA key space. PGP tries to do exactly this. Once again, though, let me ask: has any one done anything about implementing the _very_simple_ patch the authors describe? PGP 2.5, or 2.6 anyone? I am not _really_ paranoid, but I would hate it if a critical message about the March 15th assassination plot were to fall into the wrong hands because of a bad choice of IDEA keys. A related technical question: are there other easy to compute 2^n x 2^n -> 2^n 'invertable' functions than the three used in IDEA? (namely (1) xor, (2) sum mod 2^n and (3) product mod (2^n)+1 with 0 taken to represent 2^n.) j'

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Digital_Auction
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> X-From: Sameer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> >> In that case one of us (who owns a machine directly plugged into the net) >> should set up an anon server that doesn't check for user/host names, or > Well starting sometime this summer I'm going to start selling shell > accounts, and I don't plan on spending much time verifying that there is a > TrueName associated with any given account. All I will care is that I get > my money and that the account isn't used to violate any security. What is the smallest unit of access? We should use that for digital cash. Let's say I purchase 100 units of access on your system. You issue a certificate that I have this access on demand. Then when we have an IRC digital auction for the blueprints of Megacorp's new xray laser, I can display my certificate and make a bid. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCVAi2/ZzEAAAEEOQGMwT6H90aJMTmkf3bLdMVyJ3hyBDoh8ruQfa2x/8tTEPhs 0dyOMroWwMMFQHY5Gdc7etULE6G3W8Q8CGotwFIEUMCXEc9UBeePv3WaU3ovZ/Dz bdvnTeH8KYpQhV68bi1jvX3ahM2tk5jRwK8zP9+YHv5ZpbQlubVI6pRIYxGNuGfP zntP48UABRG0CG5lb24gPEA+ =CTOG -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: spooks on cypherpunks
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some anonymous "contributor" informs us, without benefit of evidence, that > >NetSurfer <jdwilson(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> >Robert Mathews <mathews(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> are "spooks" and advises us to > >be aware to which the ever-popular Jeff Davis replies > >Thanks for the hot fucking tip, Sparky. What was your first clue? I can only suppose that you're asking this out of the sudden realization that you're in desperate need of one. >Use it or loose it slick. Imagine some spook taking a shit in a public >restroom. They're human. And they fuck up regular as well. Presumably this is as distinguished from taking a shit on a public mailing list. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: Clipper hearings rescheduled - May 3 1994!
by an52210＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mech(a)eff.org (Stanton McCandlish) once said: [duff steleted] ME> ejk(a)c-span.org is a real user, and doug(a)c-span.org might be (did not ME> produce a no-user message, but also did not provide an "In real life:" ME> answer, nor did it mention mail status or presence of a .plan, which it ME> did do for ejk. There's a c-span gopher also, that gives rather cryptic ME> schedules, look on the "All the Gophers in the Whole Wide World" thing you ME> find on most larger gopher servers, and it should turn up. Try 'telnet c-spac.org 25', 'HELO <your system>', 'VRFY doug'. Patrick ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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ILF: Computers abort Titan launching
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front (Reuters) CAPE CANAVERAL - Computers detected potential trouble and aborted Tuesday's launch of a Titan rocket and its military cargo in the final seconds of countdown, the Air Force said. It was the second attempt in three days to get the powerful booster off the ground and into orbit with what is said to be the world's largest and most sophisticated eavesdropping satellite, called the Aquacade. Air Force officials said the rocket would not be ready for a third blastoff try before Thursday.

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questions.
by sis2209＠sisvax.sis.port.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date sent: 28-APR-1994 I am currently getting together resources for a research paper on the growth of encryption systems, from enigma to present day. Part of the paper will examine the direction taken by encryption schemes in the future (with particular reference to the likely acceleration of computing power, greater need for personal privacy, etc etc) The paper will be written from the viewpoint of an encryption-aware programmer, rather than that of an expert cryptanalyst! Plenty of example code and practical applications will form the backbone of this study, not pages of mathematics. Are there any papers currently circulating dealing with the future of encryption? Has anyone else on this list already investigated this area, I'd appreciate any information you can submit (ftp addrs?), via this mailing list or private email if you wish. Nick =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= System Operator of Psycho BBS, +44 483 418467 HST/v32bis Archimedes and PC shareware sis2209(a)sisvax.sis.port.ac.uk 885Mb online huttonnc(a)axpvms.pa.dec.com

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Re: AT&T, Clipper, & Saudi Arabia
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dear AT&T: If you'll roll over for us on Clipper, we will suitably incentivize yo u. /s/ The Clinton Administration I suppose most of us would consider a $4B contract a "suitable incentive." While there's probably no direct evidence of a quid pro quo, it strikes me as a bit odd that the President is personally intervening in a purely commercial deal. OTOH this is the second time Clinton has intervened in a deal with the Saudis. On the gripping hand, I don't recall anyone intervening to get business for Boeing (Peace Shield, the Saudi C3I network), McDonnell (F-15s), and so on. Can we please confine paranoia to reasonable areas -- like AT&T's sales of secure phones to the government? The U.S. government has a very long record of pushing American products against foreign competitors, such as Boeing versus Airbus. Of course, there is a quid pro quo here -- but it's Clinton reminding the Saudis about Desert Storm. --Steve Bellovin P.S. It goes without saying that I'm speaking for myself, not AT&T.

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Re: DId you ever think...
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: uri(a)watson.ibm.com > Date: Thu, 28 Apr 1994 15:10:39 -0500 (EDT) > > jpp(a)markv.com says: > > Wasn't there some concern on IBM's part about liability -- > > Thus the US Governments participation, including the 'secret' changes > > to DES? > > Liabilities? To who and about what? Since it became a standard, the > US Gov't assumed the responsibility... Oh, for instance, say liability to the banks who's electronic fund transfers were stolen or forged. But yeah, my understanding was that IBM wouldn't release the cipher for general consumption unless some Gov't would 'standardize' it and take the liability heat. Even the smaller 56 bit key was IBM's idea? Why!??!? Weren't they in the business of making a _strong_ cipher? j'

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Re: Gee...
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:21 PM 4/27/94 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >Wrong on both counts. Getting it out legally would be nice--it's a great >*fallback* position--but that's not the object of the game. The idea is >to get it out and make it widely available. Period. Maybe of your game. My game is to get cryptography available to all, without violating the law. This mean fighting Clipper, fighting idiotic export restraints, getting the government to change it's stance on cryptography, through arguements and letter pointing out the problems (I love Phil Karn's CJ request, because it points out some of the idiocy behind some of the regulations). This means writing or promoting strong cryptography. By violating the law, you give them the chance to brand you "criminal," and ignore/encourage others to ignore what you have to say. >The Constitution and other laws are not magic talismans. It is fantasy >thinking that technical compliance with the government's laws renders >them "completely powerless." A Smith & Wesson beats four-of-a-kind. I'm not sure I understand what you are saying here. Them being the laws or the government? Bob -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu finger for RIPEM public key When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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Re: spooks on cypherpunks
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks for the hot fucking tip, Sparky. What was your first clue? I suggest you not only learn to live with it, you learn to compete at their level. You can ftp my Psychological Warfare Primer for Online Activists at ftp.eff.org /pub/EFF/Issues/Activism/psychwar.primer You have the right to free speech, and you have the right to dissent. Use it or loose it slick. Imagine some spook taking a shit in a public restroom. They're human. And they fuck up regular as well. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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