- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

effectively prevent computer radiation
by shenzhen xiongfeng 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

In the modern society, the computer has already become an essential tool for the people to live and work. While it brings many conveniences to the people, it also brings some worries and anxieties, especially computer radiation, which does much harm to human body. Through more than one year' study and research, Xiongfeng Technology Cor., Ltd explores the first generation high-tech product -- FANGFUWANG. FANGFUWANG makes full use of its powerful absorption so that it can effectively absorb any kind of electromagnetic wave (radiation) and prevent the disease caused by radiation. The main material of FANGFUWANG is active nanometer bamboo carton. Through Chinese and Japanese experts' many years research and repeatedly proof, the nanometer bamboo carbon has the characteristics of being close and porous, and having strongly absorbable capacity. The characteristics of FANGFUWANG's design are natural, environmental protection, convenient, which is not only taken as the interior decoration, but also used extremely convenient. If you want to know more details, you can open the Xiongfeng Technology's website at www.hkxf.com. In our website, there are our product detailed instructions and test experiment, welcome to watch. Now our company is looking for agents in the world who are interested in our products, and we are looking forward to your sincere cooperation. SHENZHEN XIONGFENG TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD Add: 2-9F,Shenzhen Wanpan Garden, Nanshan Area, Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, China. Tel:86-755-26000105 Fax:86-755-26000144 -----

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[i2p] weekly status notes [apr 5]
by jrandom 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi y'all, time for the weekly update * Index 1) 0.5.0.5 2) Bayesian peer profiling 3) Q 4) ??? * 1) 0.5.0.5 Last week's 0.5.0.5 release has had its ups and downs - the major change to address some attacks in the netDb seems to work as expected, but has exposed some long overlooked bugs in the netDb's operation. This has caused some substantial reliability issues, especially for eepsites. The bugs have however been identified and addressed in CVS, and those fixes among a few others will be pushed out as a 0.5.0.6 release within the next day. * 2) Bayesian peer profiling bla has been doing some research into improving our peer profiling by exploiting simple bayesian filtering from the gathered stats [1]. It looks quite promising, though I'm not sure where it stands at the moment - perhaps we can get an update from bla during the meeting? [1] http://forum.i2p.net/viewtopic.php?t=598 http://theland.i2p/nodemon.html * 3) Q There is lots of progress going on with aum's Q app, both in the core functionality and with a few people building various xmlrpc frontends. Rumor has it we might be seeing another Q build out this weekend with a whole slew of goodies described on http://aum.i2p/q/ * 4) ??? Ok, yeah, very brief status notes, as I got the timezones mixed up *again* (actually, I got the days mixed up too, thought it was Monday until a few hours ago). Anyway, there is lots of stuff going on not mentioned above, so swing on by the meeting and see whats up! =jr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFCUvNtWYfZ3rPnHH0RAlzmAKCAX5PQP8s2wWIxhWnHWG6eeps1nQCffkNC Li2s44HU5EehnMoCMxIOZlc= =WNZp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ i2p mailing list i2p(a)i2p.net http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[IP] Proposed Surveillance Bill Would Sweep NSA Spying Programs Under the Rug
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Electronic Frontier Foundation Media Release For Immediate Release: Friday, July 14, 2006 Contact: Kevin Bankston Staff Attorney Electronic Frontier Foundation bankston(a)eff.org +1 415 436-9333 x126 Kurt Opsahl Staff Attorney Electronic Frontier Foundation kurt(a)eff.org +1 415 436-9333 x106 Lee Tien Senior Staff Attorney Electronic Frontier Foundation tien(a)eff.org +1 415 436-9333 x102 Proposed Surveillance Bill Would Sweep NSA Spying Programs Under the Rug Bill Threatens Future of EFF Case and Other Legal Challenges San Francisco - Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter said today that he has negotiated a proposed bill with the White House regarding the NSA's illegal spying program. While the final bill is not public, a draft of the bill obtained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a sham compromise that would cut off meaningful legal review -- sweeping current legal challenges out of the traditional court system and failing to require court review or congressional oversight of any future surveillance programs. "This so-called compromise bill is not a concession from the White House -- it's a rubber stamp for any future spying program dreamed up by the executive," said EFF Staff Attorney Kevin Bankston. "In essence, this bill threatens to make court oversight of electronic surveillance voluntary rather than mandatory." Although the bill creates a process for the executive branch to seek court review of its secret surveillance programs, it doesn't actually require the government to do so. The bill would, however, require that any lawsuit challenging the legality of any classified surveillance program -- including EFF's class-action suit against AT&T -- be transferred, at the government's request, to the FISA Court of Review, a secret court with no procedures for hearing argument from anyone but the government. The bill would further allow the government to prevent the court from disclosing any information about the government's surveillance programs to opposing counsel, regardless of the court's strict security procedures. "When the privacy of millions of Americans is at stake, we deserve more than a closed hearing by a secret court," said EFF Senior Staff Attorney Lee Tien. For the draft of the Specter bill: http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/NSA/specter_draftbill_071306.pdf For this release: http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2006_07.php#004824 About EFF The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading civil liberties organization working to protect rights in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF actively encourages and challenges industry and government to support free expression and privacy online. EFF is a member-supported organization and maintains one of the most linked-to websites in the world at http://www.eff.org/ -end- _______________________________________________ presslist mailing list https://falcon.eff.org/mailman/listinfo/presslist ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: Verizon FiOS - is BGP an option?
by Owen DeLong 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Aug 3, 2012, at 12:31 , William Herrin <bill(a)herrin.us> wrote: > On Fri, Aug 3, 2012 at 8:51 AM, Seth Mattinen <sethm(a)rollernet.us> wrote: >> On 8/3/12 8:56 AM, William Herrin wrote: >>> It >>> seems the telcos and cable companies don't consider the commodity >>> Internet part of their equipment to be something which needs >>> electricity during an extended grid outage. Cox. Verizon. I'm looking >>> at you. >> >> Most don't, and for the price being paid on commodity connections I feel >> indifferent about it. > > Back in the day they kept my land line phone on during extended power > outages. And that was when they had to power the phone. Now all they > have to do is power the equipment on their end of the line. My phone's > out because hey, voip. My Sprint cell phone's out because the fools > can't power their towers. It's 105 degrees out and I'm screwed if > someone has a heat stroke because we can't even call 911. > 48vDC battery to power your phone up to 3 ringer equivalences was a pretty light load overall, compared to PON aggregators for all those neighborhoods. Further, as noted above the PON equipment is much more widely distributed than powering your phone. Powering your phone was straight DC down the same copper wire as your service. Powering the PON aggregators, well, unless you've got some magic new technology for powering them via fiber is a bit more involved and quite a bit more amperage per conductor than POTS. > >> The central plant days are mostly gone; there's >> fiber huts everywhere and not enough trucks/manpower (in my area a >> lineman sits in his truck and reads a book while tethered to the power >> kiosk) to run them all if the outage is too widespread for too long. > > They put a quarter million dollars into the fiber hut. They can't put > a $500 gasoline generator in a warehouse 50 miles away and go pick it > up when there's an extended outage? That's a lot of generators and a lot of people to go pull them out and make sure they don't walk off during said extended outage. > I'll give Verizon a little credit. They restored service after about > 12 hours of outage. Cox didn't restore service until 12 hours *after* > my power came back on. > Seems pretty reasonable to me given the scale of the outage. > Could be worse. I could have Pepco instead of Dominion. But it could > be better. And 20 years ago the reliability was. 20 years ago you didn't have a megabit to your home let alone many megabits. 20 years ago, POTS was much simpler than the converged networks we have today. There is something to be said for the simplicity of POTS. If you're that concerned about calling 911 for a heat stroke, why don't you maintain a POTS line? Owen ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution
by D. J. Bernstein 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Zack Weinberg writes: > I've seen claims that quantum key agreement lets both parties detect a > man in the middle with no prior communication and no trusted third party. Nope. The security of QKE relies on the parties both knowing a shared secret key to authenticate messages. This begs the questions of (1) how the parties communicated this secret---this doesn't have to be a _prior_ secure channel but it does have to be a separate secure channel; (2) why the parties are bothering to use QKE to generate randomness when they can much more cheaply generate local randomness and send it through the separate secure channel; and (3) why the parties are bothering to generate so much randomness in the first place when they can much more cheaply use the key as an AES key to encrypt and authenticate messages. See http://cr.yp.to/talks/2009.10.06/slides2.pdf for a more detailed cost-benefit analysis. ---D. J. Bernstein Research Professor, Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Secret Government Document Reveals: German Federal Police Plans To Use Gamma FinFisher Spyware
by ilf 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

https://netzpolitik.org/2013/secret-government-document-reveals-german-fede… The German Federal Police office has purchased the commercial Spyware toolkit FinFisher of Eleman/Gamma Group. This is revealed by a secret document of the Ministry of the Interior, which we are publishing exclusively. Instead of legitimizing products used by authoritarian regimes for the violation of human rights, the German state should restrict the export of such state malware. In October 2011, German hacker organization Chaos Computer Club (CCC) analyzed a malware used by German government authorities. The product of the German company DigiTask was not just programmed badly and lacking elementary security, it was in breach of German law. In a landmark case, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled in 2008 that surveillance software targeting telecommunications must be technologically limited to a specific task. Instead, the CCC found that the DigiTask software took over the entire computer and included the option to remotely add features, thereby clearly violating the court ruling. Since then, many German authorities have stopped using DigiTask spyware and started to create their own state malware. For this task, a b Center of Competence for Information Technology Surveillance (CC ITC )b was established, sporting a three million Euro budget and a team of 30 people. Today, the Federal Ministry of the Interior is informing the Federal Parliament Bundestag about the centers progress and work. Members of the Finance Committee of the German Parliament are receiving a classified document, that we are now publishing. (text) According to the document (in German only) dated December 7, the Federal Criminal Police Office plans to finish the development of their own surveillance malware until the end of 2014. There is no word on the progress or even how many developers have applied for the job, which seems to be frowned upon by many German hackers. In the meantime, the Federal Police plans to continue using commercial software. In a b market surveyb, they have assessed b three products as generally suitableb. The result: > The Federal Criminal Police Office has acquired, for the event a use is > necessary, a commercial product of the company Eleman/Gamma. The Gamma Group of Companies, a network of companies linked to offshore secrecy, is behind the infamous FinFisher/FinSpy IT intrusion software kit developed in Germany and used by authoritarian regimes across the world to spy on political activists. The software is highly sophisticated and can completely take over a veriety of devices, including Windows, OS X, Linux, iOS, Android, Symbian, Blackberry and Windows Mobile. A promotional video advertises the ability of b remote intrusionb via fake updates from mobile carriers and Internet providers. The experienced team behind FinFisher/FinSpy is less likely to implement b significant design and implementation flawsb, as the CCC diagnosed for DigiTask. But with strong clues that authoritarian regimes such as Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Ethiopia, Mongolia and Turkmenistan are using those products, the German state is sending a dangerous political message by using exactly the same software itself. In Britain, the Secretary of State put FinSpy software under export restrictions, requiring the Gamma company to acquire a licence to export these tools. In Germany, we are also calling for export restrictions to stop the sale of western surveillance technology to regimes known for their violation of human rights. Besides this fundamental criticism, it also remains unclear if this spyware developed for international customers can meet the high standards set by the Constitutional Court for the use of such software in Germany. As discovered by the CCC, DigiTask was breaking the law by allowing to update installed malware and adding new features from remote. Although Gamma keeps its software secret, current research suggests that the FinFisher/FinSpy toolkit consists of a basic module (the trojan) that can also remotely load additional b feature modulesb, for example a module for recording Skype conversations. Analysts who have looked at FinFisher parts told netzpolitik.org that they have not seen limits on what additional modules can be loaded or even a signature verification of additional modules. If this is indeed the case, this would clearly violate German law. Since the CCC analysis showed that the current German state trojan was able to do more than allowed, it should be obvious that all future spyware must be verified before use. According to the document, both the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information and the Federal Office for Information Security are not able to audit the source code of the program to check if it complies with the legal requirements. For this reason, the German part of IT corporation Computer Sciences Corp was tasked with the review, which was supposed to be finished in December. The document does not mention the progress or results of such an audit. There are also no mentions of a amount which the Federal Police is paying to Gamma, the terms of a sale or licensing, or whether German officials have already used the software. Gamma spokesperson and developer Martin J. MC<nch has not answered questions sent by netzpolitik.org. CCC spokesperson Frank Rieger states: > With the purchase of Gamma FinFisher, the Federal Criminal Police > Office has chosen a vendor that has become a symbol for the use of > surveillance technology in oppressive regimes worldwide. FinFisher also > consists of various components, which can be loaded when needed, > thereby allowing the installation of spying capabilities that go far > beyond the already questionable b wiretapping at the sourceb . -- ilf C ber 80 Millionen Deutsche benutzen keine Konsole. Klick dich nicht weg! -- Eine Initiative des Bundesamtes fC<r Tastaturbenutzung -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: Democrats' new "bio" bill links police to SABRE, Amtrak systems
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

A more detailed summary of the Bioterrorism Protection Act is available here --- final bill has not been written yet -- though the pages are not sequential, so it's only for the brave: http://vorlon.mit.edu/~declan/biobill/ Excerpts from that summary: * "Evaluate need to vaccinate first responders against smallpox" * "Utilize biometric techniques to identify suicide-biological-bombs" * "Increase surveillance through development of sentinel strain. Create a network of interconnected databases for near-real time integration of threat indicator data" * "Establish a perception management and economic market mitigation plan and resources" * "Ensure isolated, genetically diverse pools of seed and livestock to replenish stocks destroyed in disease containment" * "Assess and harden physical security of water-bottling facilites" * "The handoff between intelligence and law enforcement agencies must be made smoother" * "Use GPS and wireless identification systems to monitor commercial traffic in high-risk and border areas" * "Ensure that private databases (SABRE, Amtrak reservations, etc.) are able to interface with law enforcement information stores immediately" -Declan ******** http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47898,00.html Dems Ready Bioterrorism Bill By Declan McCullagh and Ben Polen 2:00 a.m. Oct. 26, 2001 PDT WASHINGTON -- In an attempt to differentiate themselves from their GOP counterparts, House Democrats are preparing legislation they say will shield America from biological terrorism. As anxieties about anthrax mushroomed on Capitol Hill -- with the deadly bacteria discovered in five congressional office buildings so far -- House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Missouri) said Thursday that new spending and police powers are necessary to protect the public. At a press conference held in the open air away from any of the polluted buildings, Gephardt said his "Bioterrorism Protection Act" would earmark $7 billion for homeland security -- including $1.4 billion on vaccines and antibiotics -- and provide police with instant access to private databases such as the airline's SABRE system and Amtrak reservations. [...] ******** http://menendez.house.gov/speaks/viewrelease.cfm?id=337 HOMELAND SECURITY TASK FORCE CHAIRMAN MENENDEZ ANNOUNCES BIOTERRORISM LEGISLATION WASHINGTON, DC - Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Vice Chair of the Democratic Caucus and Chairman of the House Democratic Task Force on Homeland Security, joined by Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt and Members of the Task Force, today announced the Democratic proposal to protect communities throughout America against future bioterrorist threats or attacks. The Democratic Bill, the Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPAct) of 2001, seeks to eliminate biological threats, secure our borders on land and at sea, protect our food and water, equip our communities with the resources to prevent and respond to bioterrorism, and strengthen our Intelligence through full coordination, using our most advanced technology to fight bioterrorism. Menendez made the following remarks: "I'm Bob Menendez, the Chairman of the House Democratic Task Force on Homeland Security, and I first want to thank the chairs and vice chairs of the working groups that helped write this plan: Bill Pascrell, Sanford Bishop, Bobby Scott, Jane Harman, Ike Skelton, Bob Borski, Lucille Roybal-Allard, Ellen Tauscher, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Mike Honda, Jim Turner, and Jerry Costello - and I want to thank the incredible work of over 80 Members of our Task Force on this bill. These aren't just Members of Congress, they're husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, working to make our country and their communities safe and secure. And I think they've done a great job. "What we've learned in the last few weeks is that no matter what we as a people are confronted with, we will overcome and defeat our adversaries. No attack, no threat, no evil will undermine our resolve and our strength. America stands proud and firm - our country and our people have served as an example to all of humanity. America has reacted to this unspeakable inhumanity with resiliency & humanity - humanity in the face of evil. "We call the Bioterrorism Protection Act "BioPAct" because we know that every American needs to be a part of the fight, part of a pact to protect our Homeland. And if we're asking the public to be 'vigilant', then they need and deserve to be informed in full and given the chance to be a part of a dialogue with the officials who work for them. This bill does that. (more) "BioPAct is a pact between the American people and their government, working together, called to national service, marshaling our vast resources, to keep America safe from bioterrorism. The plan doesn't just draw on government programs, but on the American spirit, intellect & creativity, breaking new frontiers, setting an example the world can follow in this new age. "We're here to tell our fellow citizens that we can beat this foe - and we can protect our Homeland. "The BioPAct will proactively assess the new threats and risks we face, so we make sure we target our funding where it's needed most. It will eliminate biological threats at the source, by helping countries like Russia and the other former Soviet states prevent their biological agents from getting into our enemies' hands. We will secure our borders on land and at sea by adding thousands of new border agents and by putting our most advanced technology at work to screen out terrorists and the weapons they might try to bring with them - whether they try to enter our nation at airports, on ships, by foot, or in a car. And BioPAct will keep our food and water supply safe and secure by putting a comprehensive new inspection protocol in place. "We will make sure our local communities have all the resources they need - from greater hospital capacity, to police and firefighters trained in counter-terrorism. "We can prevent disease outbreaks through early and rapid detection; and can save lives by making sure we have the vaccines and medicines to treat people - and a plan in place to get them where they need to go on a moment's notice. This bill does that. And BioPAct strengthens our Intelligence by ensuring our many government agencies coordinate information and planning. We need one comprehensive strategy - not a dozen different ones. "This bill is a commitment to do all this, and a lot more - because we know there is nothing more important than keeping American families safe. "This is the first in a series of proposals this Task Force and we Democrats in the House are putting forward to address Homeland Security. My colleagues and I look forward to working with the President and the Republicans to get the job done - in fact we met with Director Ridge yesterday, and I'm confident we can work together as one American team. "And as part of that team effort, we also call on the President to use the funding already allocated to fight terrorism to begin a national threat assessment; to help local communities cover the unexpected overtime costs they have already borne in response to the new threat environment since September 11th; and to rapidly dedicate new resources to our Coast Guard, our border security, and our postal service. We can and will protect our Homeland. "I'm now proud to introduce our Democratic Leader, Dick Gephardt, who had the foresight early on to work with our Caucus Chairman, Martin Frost, to create this Task Force - bringing so many Members together to work on an issue that's on the mind of every American. He's been an inspiration to this Congress and to our nation - Ladies and Gentlemen: Dick Gephardt - "Thank you." Executive Summary of the BioPAct: HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS HOMELAND SECURITY TASK FORCE THE BIOTERRORISM PROTECTION ACT (BioPAct) of 2001 A $7 Billion Pact with America Public Health Infrastructure and Response to Bioterrorism ($3.5 billion) Improving Community Emergency Response Capacity and Preparedness -- $1 billion Increasing hospital capacity, educating medical personnel, increasing nursing and clinical lab personnel, and providing training to first responders. Ensuring an Adequate Supply of Vaccines and Treatments for All Americans -- $1.4 billion Increasing the national stockpile of anthrax antibiotics, developing and acquiring additional doses of smallpox vaccines, researching and developing new vaccines and antibiotics, training and equipping health professionals to provide antibiotics and vaccines, and expediting FDA approval of new products. Enhancing Community Planning and Intergovernmental Coordination -- $600 million Providing planning grants to local communities and health care providers to develop emergency response plans that meet certain minimum federal guidelines, requiring states to submit medical response plans to the federal government, funding state trauma care systems, and strengthening intergovernmental coordination. Enhancing Surveillance, Improving Communications, and Strengthening Technology Infrastructure -- $500 million Improving state and local surveillance, training health care personnel in the detection of illnesses related to biological attacks, upgrading laboratories, ensuring a 24-hour public health system is available to local providers, improving and expanding CDC surveillance capabilities, building local technology and communication systems, enhancing communications among agencies, and requiring state and federal agencies to share with first responders important information about the potential dangers of an emergency site. Protecting Our Food And Water ($800 million) Keeping Our Food Safe -- $725 million Protecting crops and livestock through increased surveillance and research, strengthening both physical and information security at key agricultural facilities, increasing inspections of imported food shipments with additional inspectors, increasing the inspections of domestic production plants, coordinating and testing federal emergency response plans, and helping states track foodborne agents. Keeping Our Water Supply Safe -- $75 million Reviewing emergency preparedness and vulnerabilities of water systems, providing resources to address deficiencies in security, developing improved monitoring systems to track water quality, improving security of information systems, improving security of water-bottling facilities, and implementing background checks for quality testers at treatment plants and bottling facilities. Enhancing Law Enforcement's Ability to Protect the Nation ($870 million) Providing the right tools to law enforcement agencies -- $275 million Expanding federal authority over biological agents and toxins; establishing new criminal offenses involving the possession and unsafe handling of biological agents; developing and deploying new screening hardware, software, computer infrastructure, and training to support biometric technology; creating new COPS grants to local communities for counter-terrorism training and equipment; giving grants to local governments for strategic planning and intergovernmental coordination related to terrorism preparedness and response; providing funds to eliminate the backlog of convicted offender DNA samples yet to be entered in the FBI database. Securing Our Borders at Land and Sea -- $345 million Increasing the size of the United States Border Patrol Force and the number of INS and Customs Inspectors at ports of entry; implementing biometric scanning techniques at border checkpoints; funding development and deployment of scanning technology capable of detecting explosive devices, biological and chemical contaminants; mandating better INS tracking of visas and integrating visa monitoring with federal watch lists; providing Coast Guard with enhanced training and equipment. Addressing Threats to Mail Delivery Services -- $250 million Developing and deploying faster scanning technologies, implementing improved mail tracking abilities to track suspicious packages to their source, and investigating procedures to treat mail and mitigate threats posed by contaminated mail. Strengthening Our Intelligence Through Full Coordination ($1.1 billion) Improving Organization and Coordination of Intelligence Community -- $270 million Conducting a threat assessment to identify vulnerabilities and provide a basis for a national strategy for homeland security; removing barriers to efficient information sharing between intelligence collection and information use by law enforcement and first responders; conducting a public education campaign to alert Americans to the threat and appropriate responses for biological weapons. Improving Intelligence Capabilities -- $850 million Deploying biological and chemical detectors for site analysis, continual surveillance of fixed sites, and improved identification of foreign biological agent possession; increasing language translation skills and improving usage of language resources across agencies; increasing human intelligence assets. The Military: Preparing, Responding & Assisting Communities ($720 million) Initial Crisis Response and First Responder Support -- $420 million Increasing military domestic crisis response teams, creating and training additional Civil Support Teams, and training and equipping military and civilian emergency responders with interoperable communications equipment. Interagency Crisis and Consequence Management Exercises -- $100 million Implementing a uniform government-wide evaluation system to ensure proficiency and achievement of military domestic crisis response, increasing training of military personnel for response to weapons of mass destruction incidents, and increasing resources for military involvement in consequence and crisis management exercises. Research and Development -- $100 million Accelerating technology development in chemical and biological research (prevention and treatment), advanced sensors, and other promising technologies. Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) -- $100 million Securing the supply of biological and chemical weapons-grade material from the former Soviet Union, improving Russian and former Soviet Union border and export controls, and increasing support for the Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program. ### ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. Declan McCullagh's photographs are at http://www.mccullagh.org/ To subscribe to Politech: http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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[p2p-research] Never Mind the Policy: Can Filtering Technology Stop p2p?
by Tomas Rawlings 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Source: http://blog.catbot.org/content/never-mind-policy-can-filtering-technology-s… There is another story in the media about the ongoing debate about what (if anything) the government should be doing in response to online piracy; A rift has opened between music's creators and its record labels, with a broad alliance of musicians, songwriters and producers fiercely criticising the business secretary Lord Mandelson's plans to cut off the broadband connections of internet users who illegally download music. What I find interesting about the coverage is that there is little to no discussion about if such measures are possible. By that I mean, is the technology there to accurately stop piracy b so, assuming you had robust legislation giving a clear definition of what was to be done b is the tech there to do it? There is no doubt that some technologies exist, but I suspect that there are serious limits to what it can achieve. For starters, any technology solution would need to have some or all of the following to be practical: * Easy to implement b The network ecology that this technology is coming into is dynamic, thus if the technology takes time to implement, then the conditions may have changed and rendered the tech obsolete. * Low bandwidth b if the process of checking all the traffic is taking too much out of the network, it is going to impact on the service that people will have paid for b as well as penalising all users, regardless of if they are indulging in non-legitimate uses. * Discriminatory - Able to discriminate between legitimate and non-legitimate traffic accurately. If it targets the wrong people, it is going to cost time, money and reputation for the ISPs involved. * Decryptory b There has been marked rise in encrypted p2p technology of late. This means that any system will need to deal with not only encrypted peers, but also encrypted packets of data. Now those are the 'easy' points b the obvious ones that the technology would need. From the p2p research I've been doing, I would suggest that there are a couple of other ones of note too: * 100% Effective b One key thing about internet ecology is that it is very, very easy for users to change p2p software. Users can also communicate virally, so can pass information on about holes in any system rapidly. The exploitation of the loop-holes will also be viral. This means a 99.9% effective system upon implementation will rapidly become a 0% one. * Psychic b The other issues is that once a flag goes up, there will be many, many people trying many many methods to by-pass the system. This will be continuous and will consist of lines of attack from new directions. The system implemented need to anticipate and head-off these attacks to stay in-the-game. I am being a little provocative in the points above, but I feel they are valid. I think you see what I am saying b stopping online piracy is very, very difficult. Some may point to the Great Firewall of China as a successful example of internet control b forgetting that it is backed by an authoritarian state and might not be effective for all we know b became its failings are not going to be publicised either by the government there or the users who've found a way though. - Tomas ----------------------- Tomas Rawlings Development Director, FluffyLogic Development Ltd. web: www.fluffylogic.net tel: 0117 9442233 - Also see: blog on film & interweb: www.plugincinema.com blog on p2p, media ecology & evolution: blog.catbot.org tweet: www.twitter.com/arclightfire _______________________________________________ p2presearch mailing list p2presearch(a)listcultures.org http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[p2p-hackers] [Fwd: [Planetlab-users] Announcing: TCP NAT Traversal/Hole-Punching Library]
by Michael Parker 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I just got this by way of the PlanetLab mailing list... Definitely thought it would be of interest! - Mike ---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- Subject: [Planetlab-users] Announcing: TCP NAT Traversal/Hole-Punching Library From: "Saikat Guha" <saikat(a)cs.cornell.edu> Date: Wed, September 28, 2005 3:46 am -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hi all, (apologies if you get multiple copies of this) I am pleased to announce the availability of our open-source TCP NAT Traversal/Hole-Punching library based on our research published in [1]. [1] "Characterization and Measurement of TCP Traversal through NATs and Firewalls", S. Guha and P. Francis. IMC 2005. http://nutss.net/pub/imc05-tcpnat.pdf The key result of the paper is: TCP NAT traversal can work 85%-90% of the time today (without any special assumptions about NATs), and 100% of the time between pairs of certain popular, well-behaved NATs. See [1] for more details. An open-source Java library for TCP NAT Traversal is now available: webpage: http://nutss.net/stunt.php faq: http://nutss.net/jstunt-faq.php library and example: http://nutss.net/jstunt-examples.php The above library has been tested for pair-wise connectivity across 11 brands of NATs from Windows and Linux hosts. NATs tested were Linksys, DLink, Netgear, Belkin, 3Com, Netopia, Allied Telesyn, SMC, Trendnet, USR, Buffalo Tech. Out of the 121 possible pair-wise combinations, 113 connections are successful. The only ones that failed are when both the endpoints are behind the _same_ NAT device that does not support TCP hairpin-behavior yet (see [1]). The java library is released under LGPL; contact me if this does not meet your needs. Feel free to extend it/port it etc. Q: I am a P2P developer/researcher. How does this help me? A: The library adds TCP NAT traversal out-of-the-box. This increases the connectivity in your P2P network since two users behind their NATs can now exchange data without having to go through an intermediary node. You can: - Use this library as is (for development of P2P software, research, small deployments, etc in java) - Study it to provide TCP NAT Traversal in your existing P2P applications in your language of choice. - etc. If you have any questions, comments, suggestions, or problems, do not hesitate to contact me. Cheers, -- Saikat _______________________________________________ Users mailing list: Users(a)lists.planet-lab.org https://lists.planet-lab.org/mailman/listinfo/users ----- End forwarded message ----- _______________________________________________ Gnucla-devel mailing list Gnucla-devel(a)starsky.ee.ucla.edu http://starsky.ee.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gnucla-devel _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)zgp.org http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers _______________________________________________ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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DC speaking event: Bruce Schneier on "The Future of Privacy"
by Stanley, Jay 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave, Washington, DC-area IPers may be interested in attending this talk we're sponsoring by Bruce Schneier on "the Future of Privacy" on Tuesday. Our invite is below. Best, Jay ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jay Stanley Public Education Director, Technology and Liberty Project ACLU Bruce Schneier to speak on "The Future of Privacy" Tuesday You are cordially invited to an exciting opportunity to hear the renowned security expert, technologist, cryptographer, author and thinker Bruce Schneier discuss "The Future of Privacy," sponsored by the ACLU. The recent NSA spying scandal is just the latest sign of our times - how rapidly evolving technology is opening up new possibilities for surveillance, and how governments and companies are rushing to exploit them. With his unique background, Bruce Schneier is positioned to offer a fascinating and insightful perspective on the future of privacy in America at a time of churning technological change. This talk and discussion also kicks off of an exciting new ACLU speaking series, The Forum on Technology & the Future, which will feature experts discussing and debating cutting-edge technologies and their implications for the future of civil liberties. Events will be held on a roughly bi-monthly basis in Washington DC (a schedule is available on the ACLU website at www.aclu.org/future) Looking forward to seeing you there, Barry Steinhardt ---------------------------------------------------------- Bruce Schneier, "The Future of Privacy" Sponsored by the ACLU's Forum on Technology and the Future Tuesday, May 23 9:30 AM Coffee and muffins served starting at 9:00 915 15th St. NW, Washington DC, 6th Floor It is requested but not required that you RSVP to futurefreedom(a)aclu.org Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, referred to by The Economist as a "security guru." He is the author of eight books - including the best sellers "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World," "Secrets and Lies," and "Applied Cryptography" - and hundreds of academic articles and papers. His influential newsletter, Crypto-Gram, is read by over 120,000 people. Schneier is regularly quoted in the press, and his essays have appeared in national and international publications. He is the CTO and founder of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., and the author of the popular Blowfish and Twofish encryption algorithms. He is also a frequent guest on television and radio, has testified before Congress, and is a frequent writer and lecturer on issues surrounding security and privacy. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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