- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Postal Inspection (was Common Carriers...)
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May says- > Package delivery services like UPS and Federal Express *do* have > immunity from prosecution based on what they carry, but this is in > exchange for allowing inspection of packages under specified > circumstances. Thus, if the DEA suspects a package contains cocaine, > it can be inspected, and the shipper will most likely cooperate in > resealing the package and continuing the shipment. That reminds me. I once got a conference announcement from Europe in the mail. Printed on the envelope was a little icon showing a profile of the head of a guy wearing a hat (like a policeman or mailman's hat), and an arrow pointing from about his eye level to a picture of an open envelope. This looked like the original envelope, untouched, and the icon seemed to have been there from the start. Anybody know what it means? -fnerd - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - nutritional information per serving: less than one (1) bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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TOMMY THE TOURIST IS COMPROMISED DON'T USE IT
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tommy the Tourist is compromised, it is possible to trace who sent the message from the anonymous remiler called "Tommy the Tourist" Anonymity cannot be assured, please direct anonymous traffic through other anonymous remailers. ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 8 lines: :: Response-Key: the-clipper-key ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%Q^&2?(E<U9BPG1]W7L'=6KH_SN(JMX.Q@RG7^7D(SA%FB(8Q2K4A!M M*VFU=N2XN6?V.C4S.N7*XRQ"*_P0<S5^+Z$37-UG%HN:!,.D5QTC_#9^S][: '.U5H*[Z8-P`` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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e$ barter & sub(parasites)
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My congraulations to Hal for his contribution to the e$... thread with his barter text. My congradulations to Peace for his contributions to the e$ thread with his barter & parasite text. Hal says: ---------------------------------------------------------- >The second problem is the regulation of "scrip" and barter systems. Ths >was pointed out on the list last year by someone who had actually been >involved in a private barter or scrip system which was shut down by the >government, at great cost to all concerned. These regulations can be >found at 26 CFR 1.6045-1. From subsection (f)(5)(ii), "Scrip is a toke >issued by the barter exchange that is transferable from one member or >client, of the barter exchange to another member or client, or to the >barter exchange, in payment for property or services". I think this on >will eventually get the "NetBank" people in trouble. (You call a 900 >number and in exchange for a charge on your phone bill they give you a >digital token you can exchange for property or services by participatin >merchants.) Barter exchanges are required to get the names and SS numbrs >of all participants and report their transactions to the IRS. This woud >be inconsistent with the privacy we seek from ecash. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Peace says:******************************************************* >I can recall that many years back the casinos in Las Vegas all >accepted the chips from the other ones and then had a great >exchange each day where the accounts were settled up. Even the >gift shops took chips in place of cash. The US Treasury put a stop >to this as it was considered to be a replacement for cash. >Also I hear a lot about bearer bonds, but never in the US. OTOH >the NYC subways have started a cash card that they expect merchants >to accept in lieu of coins. It would be nice to know what the Feds >will or won't accept. BTW, does it matter if the e$ are US denominated >Could e$ be presented as travelers checks? The possibilities here are >extremely interesting. - - - >Bob said>> However, it's a stupid parasite which >>kills it's host, and that's what I'm counting on here. >Not really true. All parasites kill their host or they would not >be considered parasites (ie. live at the EXPENSE of the host). The >only question is how quickly the host dies. There is an entire >epidemiology of parasitism, ie. which strategies are best for the >parasite. The virulent ones must be able to find a new host quickly, >the ones that can't exit quickly rely on the host living for a long tim. >There was a good article in SciAm on this a little while back. >Also remember, it is the US Supreme Court which ruled that the >power to tax is the power to destroy. Sounds like as good a >definition of parasitism as any. ******************************************************************* They have demonstrated that the Fed state will not tolerate an alt- ternate cash system & repeatedly kill them. This is because they know that an alternate cash system could be easily fashioned to kill them. - as though there was any benefit to keeping the giant Federal parasite alive. They have also demonstrated that the only in-US alternate cash system that will survive is an alternate cash system that will florish without the Feds permission. This implies anonymous e$ with encryption & remail- ers. Chaum's e$ with an offshore clearinghouse comes to mind. I thought Peace'es more accurate description of a parasite & his characterization of the Fed State as a parasite were particularly NICE:- :-) : -) :-) :-) There are other evils of this monocash system. 1. It allows elite in- siders to profit from secret Federal Reserve moves. 2 It allows a privat organization (the Federal Reserve) to manipulate the US'es money system. 3. It is an anti-freedom monopoly of cash. 4. It kills experiments with superior cash systems that would proliferate otherwise. & 5.It supresses script driven barter systems that circumvent the frequent low volocity problems with other instruments that is in conventional systems.-Some- times most people hold their cash & wait for a buyer (with cash) before they spend. That way everybody is waiting for someone to buy from them before they buy. With script driven barter systems, you make script by providing something. To restate this more clearly, in barter systems business activity is encouraged. - The increased volocity of "cash" is encouraged. Deals are more fluidly made & business (tranactions) are encouraged. PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

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FWD>Health Care Privacy Ale
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date 8/8/94 Subject FWD>Health Care Privacy Ale From Dave Banisar To Interested People CC Beverly Woodward >From CPSR FWD>Health Care Privacy Alert FYI, pls respond directly to the address below. Date: Sun, 7 Aug 1994 12:43 EDT From: WOODWARD(a)BINAH.CC.BRANDEIS.EDU (Beverly Woodward) Subject: Health Care Privacy Alert ALERT The health care legislation proposed by Gephardt in the House and Mitchell in the Senate contains provisions which would establish a national health care data network and override most state medical confidentiality laws. All health care providers, whether paid by insurance or not, will be required to provide the network with data from the patient medical record after every clinical encounter. (The data elements will not be limited to what is necessary for billing purposes.) A very weak "privacy" (or "fair information") code will regulate the redisclosure of such patient-identified information. The law will permit person-identified information to be made available in various circumstances to law enforcement officials, medical and social studies researchers, and government authorities without the knowledge or consent of the patient. These legislative provisions are being promoted as administrative simplification and cost-saving measures, but they will seriously erode patient privacy. Unfortunately the general public has not been informed about these sections of the health care reform bills. Legislation of this kind requires intensive debate and should not be folded into a bill to extend insurance coverage and reform health care financing. Contact your Representative and your Senators to urge that the "Administrative Simplification," "National Health Care Data Network," and so-called "Privacy" and "Fair Information Practices" sections of these bills be deleted. The general telephone number for Capitol offices is 202, 224-3121. Watch for further updates! You may contact us at 617, 433-0114. Coaltion for Patient Rights, Massachusetts

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RemailerNet v0.2
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RemailerNet v0.2 (RN0.2 for short) 1.0 a number N of RN gateways exist 1.1 these communicate using encrypted packets of a fixed length L 1.2 messages may originate from gateways or from outside the network 1.3 messages are passed across the network in packets 1.4 a packet may contain data from 0, 1, or more messages 1.5 routing of the packets is randomized (this does not mean that the probability of a route being chosen is equal for all routes, it means that if N>2, there is no route for which the probability is 1) 1.6 the order of dispatch of packets is randomized 1.7 on average, all gateways are required to send and receive the same number of packets per unit of chronological time 1.8 the dispatch randomization function adjusts the average latency and the distribution of latencies so that the preceding commitment is met, introducing noise packets as required 1.9 mechanisms allow the traffic level to rise quickly but constrain them to fall slowly 1.10 gateways are required to exchange the same number of packets in any session 1.11 inter-gateway connections may be either open at all times (in which case sessions begin only when the connection has gone down by accident) or they may be established periodically 2.0 any message has a source gateway and a destination gateway 2.1 message fragmentation takes place at the source gateway 2.2 message reassembly takes place at the destination gateway 2.3 all packets are acknowledged 2.4 message delivery is reliable, in the sense that the destination gateway will report delivery of incomplete or damaged messages to the gateway 2.5 messages may be sent to a gateway for forwarding to another gateway 2.6 message delivery time can be specified 2.7 message delivery policy can be specified 2.8 delivery policies include (a) hold until picked up, (b) hold for a specified period of time, (c) discard if not received immediately 2.9 gateways should always destroy mail after delivery is acknowledged [unless the mail is to an as-yet-unspecified persistent store] 3.0 gateways frequently exchange routing information 3.1 that routing information has an expiration date 3.2 gateway operators can choose who they announce routing information to and accept routing information from 3.3 gateways can settle accounts with one another periodically 4.0 level 2 gateways will communicate with one another using RN protocols using IP datagrams 4.1 level 1 and 2 gateways will communicate using the same protocols using email (SMTP) datagrams 4.2 where gateways are operated by users, the requirement that gateways should exchange the same number of packets per unit time would be weakened in some as yet unspecified way 5.0 end users may either operate gateways or communicate with a level 1 or 2 gateway using email 5.1 in either case, users may have accounts with gateways and may be charged for usage 6.0 RN gateway software should be available only from trusted sites by FTP 6.1 RN bootstrap software should be available on diskette 6.2 the bootstrap software should allow the secure downloading of system updates over RemailerNet 7.0 an alt.? group could be used to announce new gateways 7.1 established gateways would be encouraged to rate new gateways 7.2 software updates would be announced in the alt.? group 7.3 a FAQ would be published in the alt.? group every ten days or so 8.0 users would be encouraged to use gateways in geographically distant locations -- Jim Dixon [adding the notion of a persistent store would allow the creation of electronic safety deposit boxes]

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ANNOUNCE: the TAZONO is here
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm flying to New York this week to go to the HOPE conference put on by 2600, so I've arranged to throw a party. Here's the announcement. HOPE is the two days after this, so if you're planning on that, come a day earlier. You're all invited, but I only expect those in range of New York to actually attend. And I would like to meet all the NYC cypherpunks, or at least as many as I can. So show! Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Blazin' Cypherpunks present a T.A.Z.O.N.O. Temporary Autonomous Zone One Night Only (perhaps also to be known as just a party) Friday, August 12, 1994 8:00 p.m. EDT until whenever almost in New York City, but not quite with the theme of Bring Your Own Everything (or) The Creation of Anarchy out of a Cipher Eric Hughes, cypherpunks founder, and Matt Blaze, swIPe'r of Tesserae security, are throwing a party, and Eric, who lives somewhere other than the East Coast, will be in town for it. We've managed to liberate, through completely legal means, an almost completely empty apartment for the purposes of joy and frivolity and much talking. Join us! Special Event: Midnight Impromptu Two-Minute Rant Contest. A suitable theme will be chosen by shout-outs, and judging will progress by catcall and heckling volume. Real Prizes! Given the manner of acquisition of space, there will be nothing there when the party starts. It's Bring Your Own Everything. We need all of the following: Your Friends and other Diverse People Furniture (street discards accepted, as long as _you'd_ use it) Music (live and recorded) Drink (as always) an Internet connection Food (whatever you like to eat) a Gong Stimulants (my favorite being Neitzsche) as many copies of the game Twister as we can get Pillows and Cushions a Roll of Butcher Paper a Constitutional Amendmend Guaranteeing Freedom of Cryptography and Anonymity Special Prize for the "Most Creative Use of Scavenged Material in Furtherance of the Ludic Atmosphere of the TAZONO." So, uh, where is it? It's in Jersey City, at an address we're not going to tell you just here. We just thought it best not to post the address to the world. But we'll give you a clue; it's near the Pavonia-Newport Path Train station. In fact, if you just show up there, there may be more clues. And I'll send you the address if you send me, Eric Hughes, email at the address hughes(a)ah.com. You can also call me at 510-849-4729 (I'm in the phone book, so this is no big deal). Rules of Invitation: If you see this, you're invited. It's the day before 2600's HOPE, so any of you that are in town the night before can stop by. Please print out copies and get them to your non-Internet friends who'd be interested. Please feel free too forward this by private email as well. THE SECRET WORD IS "PLUGH". REMEMBER THE SECRET WORD.

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RE: Remailer ideas
by John Douceur 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >From: Eric Hughes <hughes(a)ah.com> >Date: Saturday, August 06, 1994 4:02PM >Hal's random-send spool has an expected value of latency which is >approximately the size of the spool but has no deterministic upper >bound for that latency. Fine. Great. No problem. There should be >zero hesitation here, because the expected value -- the probabilistic >average -- is what you want. There is an important distinction between systems for which the only observable behavior is the probabilistic average and those for which the observable behavior is that of the individual actions. An example of the former system is a hash table with open addressing: The absolute worst case for a lookup is as bad as that in an unsorted list; however, this is not usually a problem, because programs generally perform large numbers of lookups, and the performance that the user observes is therefore equal to the probabilistic average. An example of the latter system is the case in point, a remailer: If a message is delayed unduly, the sender is unlikely to be contented by the fact that many other users' messages were serviced with considerably greater promptness. Therefore, the probabilistic distribution of service times is as important a metric of a remailer's performance as the probabilistic average service time. It may thus be quite reasonable to build in a hard cutoff in service time, such that any message that has been delayed by more than a set amount will be guaranteed to be sent on the next transmission. For some user of the remailer, this will make an observable improvement in performance; and since the extreme delay which triggers the expedited transmission is an unpredictable and infrequent event, it will not make cryptanalysis of the remailer any easier. JD -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLkaHjEGHwsdH+oN9AQGOjAP/eCDAPlVfsdzB7HsBO5FLmFaxt5udMAPE UrFYw1EvrFP8gbMd6976dU6+o/A6xtDbZXCN8UOX5SYsY4+ixWxR3X5x86f4VAPi BowglJWs9hrGH/iSGH1tk2+ehbpFNKA4vUlvRtjKfX5vudYr5+fHWjCndFiVTo6K VXy0N2iQI4U= =uTv6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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legal hacking
by jkreznar＠ininx.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric says ``... legal hacking is almost a necessity.'' Perry says ``You can't do legal hacks in an environment like this. It doesn't work.'' Delicious dichotomy. Here are the more extended contexts: At Wed, 18 May 94 12:13:28 -0700 hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) wrote > Legal hacking is a lot of fun. Prerequisites are a humility to learn > the structure of legal argument and access to legal materials. The > study guides for law students are generally excellent introductions to > the subject. Access to a law library is also useful for looking up > statute and decisions, but not essential, although reading at least a > few decisions is necessary for ensuring an understanding of the social > process involved in the creation of law. > And if what you want to accomplish with your computer hacking > requires, for implementation, something outside the computer hardware > and networks, legal hacking is almost a necessity. But at Sun, 07 Aug 1994 08:24:57 -0400 "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> wrote > The bureaucrats aren't > going to want digicash, so they are going to find plenty of excuses to > prohibit it. You can't do legal hacks in an environment like this. It > doesn't work. If the bureaucrats don't like you, they shut you down, > and there is not a damn thing you can do about it, period. > True, you can leave the country and do your business there -- I know > several hedge funds that already refuse to take any customers from the > U.S. because they don't want the headaches, and there are other > similar things happening in lots of other parts of the financial > industry. However, don't think you can finesse the folks at the Fed, > the IRS, the Treasury, and the SEC -- they are monsters, and they > won't be stopped by the courts. What differing views of ``legal hacking''! It would be wonderful if society's response to legal hacking had more of the predictability of computer hacking. But there are a hundred million constituents out there (the power behind Perry's ``monsters'') who gratuitously accept government benefits. Such a person doesn't gladly suffer any legal technicality standing between him and the pound of your flesh to which he thinks he's entitled. If you can prove that the law permits you to keep your pound, then he and his majority allies will simply change the law, requiring the IRS to collect it from you after all. This inclines me to accept Perry's cynical skepticism that legal hacking can do any good. On the other hand, Eric demonstrates time and again that his remarks are not made lightly. In this case, they bear on the prospects for the ``State Citizen'' movement that seems to be so emergent these days. I wonder how he would respond to Perry here. John E. Kreznar | Relations among people to be by jkreznar(a)ininx.com | mutual consent, or not at all. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLkdKgcDhz44ugybJAQFj5gP+IMMUdQLMY8vqG4pcmNGAroSNIxvkXlbE rSIIbR3wZddeWLxNBsK+pMT8Le3RLRqQa7bRI8MVgEed23VAmpccAn8tiLsQOzSq MdUbuFIrI7MY/t3ov0fE6pWBvoZb345g0ZH83F5EZcU9NARNp6wsVDBA2bs9aQ9d 7cz/P4kxJHQ= =JBcR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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forwarded message from System Daemon
by Daniel Carosone 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Another one.. *sigh* it's still going on? please remove this anon id, I won't be using it. ------- start of forwarded message (RFC 934 encapsulation) ------- Message-Id: <9408090808.AA14325(a)anon.penet.fi> From: daemon(a)anon.penet.fi (System Daemon) To: danielce(a)ee.mu.oz.au Subject: Anonymous code name allocated. Date: Tue, 9 Aug 94 11:08:40 +0300 You have sent a message using the anonymous contact service. You have been allocated the code name an120044. You can be reached anonymously using the address an120044(a)anon.penet.fi. If you want to use a nickname, please send a message to nick(a)anon.penet.fi, with a Subject: field containing your nickname. For instructions, send a message to help(a)anon.penet.fi. ------- end -------

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RE: CreditCard info
by Garth Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- | From: Brian Lane <blane(a)squeaky.free.org> | It's unbelieveable (to me anyway) that people would give this kind of | information out and trust that it can't be abused. It's bad enough that | we're asked to hand out our SS number for everything. It's my understanding that it's technically illegal for anyone to require your SSN for anything if they are not using it for SS related purposes. I had heard that congress passed a law when SSNs were issued to this effect. Am I hallucinating, or has someone else heard this too?! garthB> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------- Garth S. Brown, Semaphore Corporation 122 South Jackson Street, Suite 350 garthb(a)semaphore.com Seattle, Washington 98104 InterNIC WHOIS: GB(31) -Public key available via finger of garthb(a)semaphore.com -PGP2.6 Key fingerprint = 65 0E 48 A1 F7 38 DB 03 3F 77 77 9E B5 53 2E 96 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------- All problems can be solved with the proper application of high explosives.

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