- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

spyproofing your house/work building
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm curious about how one would go about spy-proofing one's house.. I suppose the 1st few steps would be to make each room a Faraday cage... What kind of sheet metal would be good to use for this? Would somet thin metal suffice? In terms of isolating the windows from ir-laser pickups, I thought I could attach speakers to every window and tune them to some radio station that doesn't exist, or better yet a RNG so that audio-substraction wouldn't work. (One of the ways of spying is to bounce a laser off a window. The vibrations from the window would cause vibrations in the reflection of the laser beam, so the spy can listen in on your conversation. However if there's a lot of noise outside your house, they would simply hang a mike aimed at the source of the noise and substract the two signals to filter out everything but what they're trying to spy on...) Another thing I've heard is some stuff about the US Embasy refusing to move into a building that was full of bugs in the now defunct USSR, and one of the reasons is that they were detecting lots of micro-wave-emmisions. The article stated that this was a health risk, but someone on here(???) stated that microwaves can be used in place of bouncing an ir-laser beam off a window because any metal objects in the target room would also vibrate with sounds... So as a summary, I would make the room a faraday cage with speakers on it every few feet fed into individual RNG's, then use some of that sound isolation foam all around the metal slabs, then set up the dry wall/floor/ceilings on top of all that... Of course phone taps are still a problem, but hopefully with the PGP-phones.... Have I forgotten anything?

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Re: Books, Loompanics, and other weird stuff
by cfrye＠ciis.mitre.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May said: >- I also showed a book on American Intelligence agencies (NSA, NRO, >DIA, State Dept., etc.) by Jeffrey Richelson, but Whit Diffie has >already borrowed it, so I can't provide the relevant info right now. >Richelson has written several books on foreign intelligence agencies >(BND, Mossad, MI5 and 6, etc.) and U.S. intelligence agencies, and is >a good "post-Bamford" source. Richelson, Jeffrey T. _The U.S. Intelligence Community_. 2nd ed. Harper, New York. 1989. ISBN 0-88730-226-2. This book is a required text for at least one class at George Washington University and can be found in their bookstore in D.C. I would imagine the book is still in print and could be ordered if not found in your local (well-stocked) bookstore. -- Best regards, Curtis D. Frye - Job Search Underway!!! cfrye(a)ciis.mitre.org or cfrye(a)mason1.gmu.edu "MITRE's in the past, now. Time to move on!"

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pgptools app wanted
by nates＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello punksters... I am almost done with some remailer software and I need something: an app that takes input from a specified file and sends output to anothe specified file (all on command line) and asks for the key from stdin or from an environment variable. This I need since PGP will not take environment vars or stdin for getting the key for a conventionally encrypted file. I would also like a program that will do nothing but encrypt a file specified on the command line and dump ascii-armoured output to another file, and ask for the password from an environment variable or from stdin. I am asking this since I hope someone else will have already done this or learned pgptools well enough to do it quickly. I thought about modifying PGP, but I also thought that many people would not want to use my remailer if I had to hack PGP to make it work ;-) My remailer implements the following features: :: Latency: ## MINUTES (where ## is an integer or the word "RANDOM") :: Request-Remailing-To: username@machine (of course) :: PleaseDontPad (keeps the mailer from padding the message) :: Encrypted: PGP (message is encrypted with the remailer's pubkey) :: SubjectEnclosed (if message is encrypted, the subject can be hidden inside the encryption envelope, on lines 1-5) :: SuperEncrypted (if the messge is encrypted, it looks for a line in the decrypted message that looks like: (on lines 1-5) SuperEncryptionKey: cjkdsancuiabcdsbakjcdsabkjcdsa and uses that key to decrypt the message again. ) In a configuration file, the owner can specify a few options, also: here's an example: # debuglevel sets the degugging level, 0 = off, 1 = on and 2 = picky. debuglevel 2 # loglevel sets the resolution of logs: # 0 = off. No logs at all. # 1 = Log Synopsis of message (from, to, subject, size, etc... not content) # 2 = Log Full message to the mailbox specified in logmbox # 3 = Log Full text and synopsis loglevel 3 logmbox ./log/mbox logsynopsis ./log/synopsis # This is the directory that all tempfiles, etc are set relative to homedir /staff/nate/dev/perl/remail # set the maximum number of latency minutes for random latency requests maxlatmin 20 # the process number will be appended to this name tempfile ./remailer-temp # defaultsubject specifies the subject to use if none is given, omit to # forward no subject at all. defaultsubject There is no subject. # The mailbox that diagnostic mail and non-remialer mail is sent to. mbox ./mbox # Passphrase for PGP decryption. passphrase nckldanjcsancjkndsakjcdsajk # sourceblock blocks mail coming FROM this address sourceblock detweiler(a)detweiler.org # destblock blocks mail addressed TO the address. destblock nate(a)vis.colostate.edu # netblock will block all mail going to that subnet. netblock whitehouse.gov In addition to this, the owner can change the number of padding sizes and their individual sizes... the remailer strips out the padding when it gets a message and adds it to the end when it's about to leave. -nate -- +--------- | Nate Sammons <nates(a)netcom.com> PGP Key and fingerprint via finger. | Clipper == Big Brother Inside. Question Authority. Encrypt everything. +---------

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A "standardized" remailer syntax
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In writing my client-end software for my anonymous server I came across the difficulty of building remailer paths because I was unsure that the cypherpunks remailers all act in a similar fashion, with a certain set of syntax. I've been out of touch with the list lately so maybe I missed something, but some sort of standard would be a good idea so that even though the underlying guts of the remailers, and even the latency, padding, and special features of remailers are different, there is a standard set of commands and actions which will make it easier to build tools for the user to make remailing easier. Here's my suggestion.. Header pasting: The '::' header pasting syntax should be available-- i.e. when a message comes into a remailer with a body starting with '::' the lines following until a blank line are pasted into the header. The '##' header pasting syntax-- when a remailer is sending out a message, if the body begins with a '##' line then the lines following that are pasted into the header of the outgoing message. Header commands: "Anon-To","Request-Remailing-To": strips headers and sends the message to the specified recipient. "Encrypted: PGP": The message has a pgp block encrypted with the remailer's key. The remailer will decrypt the pgp block before acting furthur upon the message. I *think* that this is the scheme that all the remailers are using, but I can't be sure. All remailers should have at *least* this functionality. Furthur features can be added-- commands for those could be standardized as well, but I can't think of anything. Comments? I can put this standard up on the ftp site, after some discussion. -Sameer

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LEAF field encryption
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As promised, I asked Steve Kent -- a member of the review panel -- about how the LEAF is encrypted. Here's his answer, reposted with permission. ------- Forwarded Message To: smb(a)research.att.com Subject: Re: Key escrow review In-reply-to: Your message of Mon, 14 Mar 94 15:54:22 -0500. Date: Mon, 14 Mar 94 17:03:18 -0500 From: Steve Kent <kent(a)BBN.COM> Steve, You are right.... SKIPJACK is used to encipher the LEAF, but employing a complex mode. The FBI can decode the "outer layer" of the LEAF to get the chip ID, by using the "family key" but it cannot get at the traffic key which is encrpted using the device unique key, the splits for which are held by the escrow agents. Steve ------- End of Forwarded Message

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NY UNIX Clipper Article
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vice President Says Clipper Chip Controls Inadequate Gore Indicates Administration's Position is 'Not Locked in Stone' By Jay Levin (C) 1994 >From New York Unix Vol 4 #3. For private use only. WASHINGTON, Feb 11 -- Vice President Gore said controls recently adopted by the Clinton administration that authorise two government agencies to safeguard the electronic "keys" in an encoding device called the "Clipper Chip" are inadequate. Under the Clipper plan, the keys would be stored at the Treasury Department and the National Insitute of Standards and Technology (NIST), whic is part of the Commerce Department. Both Treasury and Commerce are from the same branch of government, the executive branch. "When I saw that I said 'Wow. That is not right,' and I raised hell about that," Gore said in an interview Thursday. Having the key holders from the same branch of government raises concern because there is no systems of checks and balances, Gore said. "That's going to be changed," he said. Clipper gives law-enforcement agencies a key to eavesdrop on computer comunications under a court order. The selection of NIST and Treasury "was spun out of the process at the low level and was not vetted at the top," Gore said. Gore's comments were made after appearing before the first meeting of a private sector advisory panel on the development of a "national information infrastructure" in Washington, D.C. The administration announced Feb. 4 that it intends to push ahead with the voluntary Clipper Chip encryption scheme, despite vehement opposition from computer companies and watchdog groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsability. But Gore indicated Thursday that the administration's position is "not locked in stone." "Our determination to solve the problem is locked in stone, and our determination to proceed with this in the absence of of a better solution is locked in stone," he said "...the burden is on those who say there is a better solution because no solution for the national security dimention of the problem is acceptable to us." Mitch Kapor, EFF chairman and a member of the advisory comittee, said he was "encouraged" by the vice president's remarks. "This signals to me that [the administration] is very ready and willing to look at alternatives... both to the administrative procedures and the technology." Computer manufactures, telecomunication companies and civil rights groups argue that Clipper would undermine individuals' rights to privacy and cripple U.S. exports of computer products. "If I'm going to conduct business... engage in confidential conversations... send money and credit card numbers over this infra- structure, I want some guarantee that my communications are private and that some rogue law enforcement officer can't go in and compromise my information," said Esther Dyson, president of EDventure Holdings, Inc. and a panel member.

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REQUEST FOR FTP INFO
by THOMAS E. KADISH--WILSHIRE II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'M NEW TO THE INTERNET AND FTP. PLEASE REPLY WITH INFO TO COMPLETE THE DOWNLOAD OF INFO CONTAINED IN THE SCI.CRYPT FAQ. I CAN GET INTO THE COMPUTER AT MIT BUT CAN'T GET PAST THE BLOOM-PICAYUNE.MIT.EDU PROMPT. HELP WOULD BE APPRECIATED. TERRORIST

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Re: Super Bills and the US gov.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This message is in response to the person who implied that the "Super Bills" were created by the US government as a device to get Clipper implemented. I just thought I should put things in perspective. I refuse to beleive the US government would do such a thing for several reasons. <- I thought the implication was that the government had ANNOUNCED such a thing at an appropiate time to lay the seeds. Consider the most recent CIA scandal. The crime bill and digitel go through the pipes pretty easy after that. It's reason enough to think that if our skill-less spy had used IDEA or TDES, government would be shouting to high heaven about how we NEED CLIPPER NOW to get this crime scourage UNDER CONTROL. The contention that the federal government would mint billions of dollars of "bogus" money to implement an admittedly important but less than crucial scheme is just silly. -uni- (Dark)

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Re: Hey...
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> well-placed explosive device that destroys even one of the two escrow > databases, and suddenly the government has supplied us with > secure encryption that even they can't break. > Of course, that is assuming that the government didn't lie and make > extra backup copies (just for safety's sake, you understand, against just Any reasonable information-escrow agent *would* take reasonable precautions against disasters like fires, floods, power problems, etc., and the fact that what the government agencies are doing with the wiretap keys isn't escrow, just storage, doesn't change that. Doesn't require any lying, because that's proper care of information and thet'd be criticized very stongly for failing to do so. On the other hand, if there's a mysterious narco-terrorist fire and they *claim* that all the copies were burned up, the little shreds of belief that get past my normal skepticism will have no chance at all..... Bill

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No Subject
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ECHOING ECU'S anyone? After a lecture on cosmology, William James was accosted by a little old lady. "Your theory that the sun is the center of the solar system, and the earth is a ball which rotates around it has a very convincing ring to it Mr. James, but it's wrong. I've got a better theory," said the little old lady. "And what is that madam?" inquired James politely. "That we live on a crust of the earth which is on the back of a giant turtle." Not wishing to demolish this absurd theory by bringing to bear the masses of scientific evidence he had at his command, James decided to gently dissuade his opponent by making her see some of the inadequacies of her position. "If your theory is correct, madam," he asked, "what does the turtle stand on?" "You're a very clever man, Mr. James, and that's a very good question," replied the little old lady, "but I have an answer to it. And it is this: the first turtle stands on the back of a second, far larger turtle, who stands directly under him." "But what does this second turtle stand on?" persisted James patiently. To this the little old lady crowed triumphantly. It's no use, Mr. James--it's turtles all the way down."

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