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Amending the Constitution
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, It is of some import to note that the legaly amend the Constitution takes considerably more than the 51% that those happy go lucky anarchists are so fond of quoting...it actualy takes 75%. ARTICLE V. [Constitution: how amended; proviso.] The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions of the three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which shall be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suffrage in the Senate. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Congress' *real* job...
by lcs Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Congress' real job should not be passing laws providing funding, prohibiting >activities, etc. It *should* be in creating and passing Constitutional >amendments per the 10th that re-define the responsibilities and duties of >the federal government within the changing millieu of the current society. >This way the people via their state representatives have a much closer input >into what the feds are actualy enpowered to do and to who. Be careful what you wish for. This Congress is far more likely to pass amendments nullifying the 2nd, the 1st, the 6th, the 4th, and others. And they'll probably rewrite the 13th to read "no involuntary servitude...unless we say so."

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Distributed stock trading system
by ichudov＠Algebra.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to hear your feedback on a project that I have just thought about. It is called a Distributed Asset Trading Network. It consists of Traders and Nodes. They trade Products (asset classes). A Product may be an Intel share, or a bond, or an option on S&P 500, or whatever. Who and how defines what the Product unit is is beyond the scope of this document. Each Node in the Network is a clearing corporation that is supposed to be a legitimate operation. To cover possible liabilities, Nodes can post [ecash] bonds to each other. They are ultimately liable for all counterparty defaults in Trades. Traders are clients of Nodes. They have Accounts. To buy or sell Products, they place Orders to these Nodes. The Nodes broadcast the Orders and collect Potential Trades (opposing orders that have not been filled yet). Nodes may have Policies that require Traders to meet certain requirements, in order to avoid potential liability. (ie, to sell stock, you have to have it on your Account, or have enough equity to cover the short sale liabilities, etc). The receiving Node has a short period of time (seconds) to decide which counterparties and which amounts to choose. The sending Node acquires Locks on the submitted Potential Trades and is liable to produce the Asset (or Cash) if the positive response comes back within that time period. This architecture can create a trading environment that is a) independent of borders and national laws, at least to some extent and b) eliminates certain forms of arbitrage, and c) more resistant to denial of service attacks (??), and possibly eliminates the bid-ask spreads and a whole lot of highly-paid intermediaries, and c) potentially increases privacy for transactions. The technical issues that are open, at the moment, are 1) clock synchronization, 2) the need for a central authority to clear liability issues and 3) potential denial of service attacks through acquiring too many locks (again, maybe with the proper liability agreement, it is not an issue). I think that such a system is not all that impossible to develop. Whether it will, or can be made to, work in the technical and social environment that we have is another question. I am curious if something like this has aleready been implemented. Thank you. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- char*p="char*p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);} \=/, _-===-_-====-_-===-_-==========-_-====-_ | @___oo ( )_ /\ /\ / (___,,,}_--= ) ) /^\) ^\/ _) =__ Anything is good and useful if ) ) /^\/ _) (_ ) ) _ / / _) ( ) /\ )/\/ || | )_) (_ it's made of chocolate. ) < > |(,,) )__) ( ) || / \)___)\ (_ __) | \____( )___) )___ -==-_____-=====-_____-=====-___== \______(_______;;; __;;;

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Re: British Ministers Adopt Unbreakable Crypto
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >LONDON (AP) -- It's a briefcase even James Bond could love. > >Britain's more adventurous Cabinet ministers soon will be spiriting >laptop computers inside their signature ``Red Box'' briefcases, >complete with fingerprint recognition systems and silent alarms. > [.....] > >``There is even a duress finger,'' Rushworth said. ``That is for if a >terrorist or gunman has a gun to the minister's head forcing him to >open the computer. It will appear to function normally but doesn't, >and sends a silent alarm to the Cabinet Office.'' This is INSANE. How could someone be so stupid as to announce such a feature in a newspaper. I guess this means that if a terrorist sees a Cabinet minister with such a computer, he had better shoot to kill. The whole point of a feature like this is that its existence is secret. Someone is NOT paying attention. Bruce ********************************************************************** Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098 101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis,MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590 http://www.counterpane.com

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Re: OpenPGP WG meeting minutes
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hironobu Suzuki <hironobu(a)h2np.suginami.tokyo.jp> writes: > > > Miscellaneous: (Comments not recorded) > ... > > We should not just put in everyone's pet algorithms. > > I agree. > > But I want new algorithm id for MISTY1 when this document become > RFCXXXX. MISTY1 which was designed by Matsui-san looks so good. I > believe an algorithm which is described in RFC is not a `pet' one. > > > ----MISTY1 INTERNET DRAFT---- > INTERNET-DRAFT H. Ohta > Expires in six months M. Matsui > Mitsubishi Electric Corporation > December 1997 > > > A Description of the MISTY1 Encryption Algorithm > > <draft-ohta-misty1desc-00.txt> > > > --- > Hironobu SUZUKI Independent Software Consultant > E-Mail: hironobu(a)h2np.suginami.tokyo.jp > URL://www.pp.iij4u.or.jp/~h2np To learn some English, chop-chop. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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RC1 and RC3 ??
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why doesn't it have RC1 and RC3 though there are RC2, RC4 and RC5 of RSADSI RC series ? ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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PipeNet description
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just got a couple of requests for information about PipeNet and I realized that I never did make my final description of it public. The attached informal write-up was done shortly after Crypto '96 as a result of discussions with Hal Finney, David Wagner, and Eric Hughes. I haven't worked on it since then, mostly because the Onion Routing project is doing similar work and appears to be much better funded (I did send them a copy of this write-up per their request). --- The Model Consider a network of processors which send messages to each other asynchronously. We assume that each node is identified by its public key, and that links between nodes are secure. The adversary may control a fixed subset of the nodes. However all messages between any two honest nodes are confidential and always arrive (unmodified) in the order sent (this can be achieved with a standard transport level security protocol). The Protocol The protocol is based on the idea of virtual link encryption. After an anonymous connection is established, the originating node sends a constant stream of (constant size) packets to a second node at a fixed rate. The second node shuffles the packets it receives during a time unit and forwards them in random order to others. A connection is a path in the network. The first node in the path is the caller, and the last node is the receiver. The rest are called switches. Anonymity in this scheme is asymmetric - the caller is anonymous, but not the receiver. Each node in the path shares a key with the caller and knows the nodes immediately in front of and behind it. Every pair of adjacent nodes shares a link id. Each switch in the path therefore has a key and two associated ids. Call the id that it shares with the previous node (the one closer to the caller) type A, and call the other id type B. For each id, the switch expects exactly one packet tagged with that id in each time unit. When it receives a packet tagged with a type A id, it decrypts that packet with the associated key, tags it with the corresponding type B id, and forwards it to the next node. When it receives a packet tagged with a type B id, it encrypts the packet with the associated key, tags it with the corresponding type A id, and forwards it to the previous node. The forwarding is always done at the end of the time unit, and the order in which packets are sent is random. For each packet going from the caller to the receiver, the caller must multi-encrypt it with the keys it shares with each of the nodes in the path, starting with the receiver. It then sends the packet to the first switch tagged with the appropriate link id. Each switch will strip a layer of encryption and forward the packet to the next node. For a packet going from the receiver to the caller, the receiver encrypts it with the key it shares with the caller and sends it to the last switch in the path. Each switch will add a layer of encryption and forward the packet to the previous node. To establish a connection, the caller (N0) performs the following steps: 1. Select a node (N1) at random and establish a key (K1) and link id (S1) with N1. 2. Select another node (N2) at random. 3. Request that N1 establish a link id (S2) with N2. 4. Establish a key (K2) with N2 through N1. 5. Request that N1 use K1 to decrypt all messages tagged with S1, tag the decrypted message with S2 and forward them to N2. Also request that N1 use K1 to encrypt all messages tagged with S2, tag the encrypted messages with S1 and forward them to N0. 6. Repeat steps 2 to 4 l-2 times. (Name the i-th node, key, and id Ni, Ki, and Si respectively.) 7. Repeat steps 2 to 4 a final time, but with the receiver node (Nl) instead of a random node. Timing We assumed earlier that communications links between honest nodes are vulnerable to delay attacks. Therefore we must ensure that link delays do not reveal traffic information. Each node expects one packet from each link id in each time unit. Extra packets are queued for processing in later time units. However, if it does not receive a packet for a link id in a particular time unit, it stops normal processing of packets for that time unit and queues all packets. This ensures that any delay is propagated through the entire network and cannot be used to trace a particular connection. The process of making and breaking connections must also not leak information. This can be done by using a protocol analogous to mix-net. Link forming/destroying requests are queued and performed in batches in a way similar to queuing and mixing of e-mail in a mix-net.

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$50 encryption policy contest
by Dr. Alan Sherman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

$50 www Contest I will pay $50 to the best www page created by 12noon EST, February 15, 1998, meeting the enclosed specifications. In short, the page must have a form through which anyone may enter a question, which will be automatically entered onto a list of submitted questions displayed on another page. I will use the winning entry to collect questions for the upcoming March 6 talk on encryption policy by Barry Smith (FBI). How to enter: email a url of your entry to sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu include the phrase "Barry Smith Contest Entry" in the subject header. All URL's for all entries will be listed from http://www.cs.umbc.edu/events/spring98/crypto2.shtml Rules: 1. The page must work from the CMSC computing environment, but initial judging will take place on the designer's server. 2. Anyone in the world may enter. 3. If no one submits an adequate entry by February 15, a $20 prize will be awarded to the best entry that meets a restricted set of specifications. In this case, the contest will be extended for one more week, with a reduced prize of $30 for the best full entry received by 12noon EST, February 22, 1998. 4. Entries will be judged on the basis of satisfying the specifications, robustness, creativity, ease of use, and visual appeal. 5. Group work is allowed and encouraged. 6. I will be the sole final judge of the winner. Specifications: A. $20 Restricted Specifications 1. The form must include entries for a restricted-length question (at most 500 ascii characters), an email address, and optionally a name. 2. The form must include a submit button, which when clicked, will automatically append the question to a list of questions on a separate www page. Each displayed question must include the author's email and name (if provided). B. $50 Full Specifications In addition to the $20 specifications, the forum must also meet the following sp[ecifications: 3. (**important**) The page of submitted questions must have a means by which anyone can score the quality of the question on a scale of 1 to 5 (say, by clicking on the appropriate score button), with 5 being the highest score. For each question, its median score must be displayed. Questions must be listed in order of decreasing median scores. 4. The form must have an entry for optional URLs. These URLs must be posted with the question in such a way that they are active. 5. There must be an entry for sender status (selection from a list of options, such as cypherpunk, NSA employee, UMBC student, other student, government employee, faculty, industrial engineer, ...) 6. (optional) For each question, also list the number of votes entered for each score in addition to the median score. 7. (optional) Reject any question containing a vulgar word. 8. (optional) Feel free to add other appropriate constructive functionality.

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Ultra computer
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ultra computer which NEC had the calculation speed of the world maximum of about 1000 times of the super computer to was decided to be developed. Ultra computer will be completed in 2001. It has the performance that the calculation which takes 10000 years with the personal computer is made of 3, 4 days. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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API Specification for the AES
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Fri, 16 Jan 1998 14:59:37 -0500 >To: smid(a)csmes.ncsl.nist.gov >From: Jim Foti <jfoti(a)nist.gov> >Subject: API Specification for the AES > >Hello- > >As promised, we have placed on our AES Home Page a specification of the API >to be used for AES submissions (for both Java and ANSI C implementations). >It is available at <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/api/api.htm>. > >As with past messages, this is being sent to all persons who have expressed >an interest in the AES development effort (one way or another) within the >last year. > >Regards, >Jim > > >******************************************************************* >Jim Foti > >Security Technology Group >Computer Security Division >National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) > >TEL: (301) 975-5237 >FAX: (301) 948-1233 > >******************************************************************* > >

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