- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [tor-talk] possible to identify tor user via hardware DRM?
by grarpamp 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>> can these chips be used to spying and identifying people The summary is probably... Only those with access to the chip masks, or an equally serious amount of reverse engineering gear, knows what goes into a chipset. Therefore anything is possible. And if you're not proxying the output of suspected spy systems through your own masks to validate them, well... you could very well be screwed :) The rest is documented stuff you can read in any spec sheet. Part of that material is indeed new firmware capabilities and ways to lock it down, or not. Don't run windows or closed source stuff if you're concerned about what it might phone home about. UUID's, serials, MAC's, your data, etc. If the platform + OS can't be trusted, neither can any app running on it, including Tor. Act accordingly. Nothing here related to Tor.... your questions should go to the author of that post or comp.risks. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Deadline extended to November 5th - Fourth Annual PKI R&D Workshop
by Carl Ellison 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The deadline for paper submissions to the "Fourth Annual PKI R&D Workshop: Multiple Paths to Trust" and has been extended until 5:00 PM Pacific time on Friday November 5th. <http://middleware.internet2.edu/pki05/>http://middleware.internet2.edu/pki05/ This year, the workshop has a particular interest in how emergent trust mechanisms will interact with each other mechanisms at the technical, policy and user levels. Clifford Neuman Program Committee Chair --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: FreeBSD's urandom versus random
by Perry E. Metzger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Ian G <iang(a)systemics.com> writes: > While we're on the subject of /dev/[u]random, has anyone > looked at the new FreeBSD 5.3 version? Not the 5.3 version but I have looked a bit at earlier versions. I was pretty scared, frankly. The author gave a talk at a BSDCon where he displayed both a profound set of misunderstandings about what the papers he had read meant and an extremely strong amount of arrogance. Among other things, he claimed that Schneier and Co. had proven the security of Yarrow (which of course they never had claimed), and that his changes to Yarrow made it better (very dubious). He also obviously didn't understand crypto very well. I wouldn't have minded so much if he hadn't been extremely belligerent about defending his beliefs. Anyway, after the talk I took a look at the code, and I didn't feel very comfortable with it. It has been too many years now for me to remember specifics, and it may have been changed a lot in the interim -- in any case, you may want to examine it if you are contemplating using it in something where it would be dangerous not to have very solid random numbers available. FreeBSD has some other crypto toys that I'm dubious about. It now has a crypto file system widget that uses a bunch of odd ad hoc modes invented by the author. Some quick analysis shows that most of the complexity they add does not add actual cryptographic strength and does add possible attack vectors, which is worrisome. I'm always against attempting to be clever under such circumstances, but a lot of people don't seem to have the same fear of innovating in cryptography without very careful analysis that I do. It also doesn't protect very well against brute forcing of the file system passphrase, which is (in most cases) the likely way people will break such a thing. (Actually the author claims that you would have to do tremendous disk i/o to break the passphrase, but you can do a time/space tradeoff with RAM that bypasses his hack.) None of this should say that I'm entirely comfortable with the security of, say, NetBSD's /dev/random. Even though I should have, I've never properly audited the whole thing, which is more than mildly embarrassing. Shades of the shoemaker's children and such. For all I know, we've got big flaws, too. Perry --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Hello directly from Jimbo at Wikipedia
by Steven J. Murdoch 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Sep 27, 2005 at 05:48:59PM -0400, Jimmy Wales wrote: > All I'm saying is that Tor could segregate users easily enough into two > clouds: "We sorta trust these ones, more or less, a little bit, but no > guarantees" -- "We don't trust these ones, we don't know them". This would be very difficult to do using the existing Tor design as it doesn't know anything about users or sessions. It lives at the TCP layer and all it does is shift packets from one IP address to another, giving some privacy to both ends. Adding higher layer functionality to Tor increases the chance that it will do neither job well, so here is a proposal which I think does what you want, but avoids this problem. The goal is to increase the cost for a Tor user to commit abuse on Wikipedia. It doesn't need to be full-proof, but just enough to make them go elsewhere. Wikipedia could require Tor users to log in before making edits, and ban accounts if they do something bad. However the cost of creating new accounts is not very high. The goal of this proposal is to impose a cost on creating accounts which can be used though Tor. Non-Tor access works as normal and the cost can be small, just enough to reduce the incentive of abuse. Suppose Wikipedia allowed Tor users to only read articles and create accounts, but not able to change anything. The Tor user then goes to a different website, call it the "puzzle server". Here the Tor user does some work, perhaps does a hashcash computation[1] or solves a CAPTCHA[2], then enters the solution along with their new Wikipedia username. The puzzle server (which may be run by Wikipedia or Tor volunteers), records the fact that someone has solved a puzzle along with the username entered. The puzzle server doesn't need the Wikipedia password as there is no reason for someone to do work for another person's account. Now when that Tor user logs into their Wikipedia account to edit something, the Wikipedia server asks the puzzle server whether this account has ever solved a puzzle. If it has, the user can make the edit, if not then the user is told to go to the puzzle server first. This check can be very simple - just an HTTP request to the puzzle server specifying the Wikipedia username, which returns "yes" vs "no", or "200" vs "403". For performance reasons this can be cached locally. There is no cryptography here, and I don't think it is needed, but it can be added without much difficulty. If the Tor user starts committing abuse, his account is cancelled. The puzzle server doesn't need to be told about this, as Wikipedia will not let that user make any edits. The reason this approach avoids the usual problems with proof-of-work schemes[3] is that good Tor users only have to solve the puzzle once, just after they create the account. Bad Tor users will need to solve another puzzle every time they are caught and had their account cancelled. So my question to Jimbo is: what type of puzzle do you think would be enough to reduce abuse through Tor to a manageable level? The difficulty of the puzzle can be tuned over time but what would be necessary for Wikipedia to try this out? Hope this helps, Steven Murdoch. [1] http://www.hashcash.org/ [2] http://www.captcha.net/ [3] "Proof-of-Work" Proves Not to Work by Ben Laurie and Richard Clayton: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rnc1/proofwork.pdf -- w: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/sjm217/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Tracking Anonymous Peer-to-Peer VoIP Calls on the Internet
by Kurt Albershardt 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

ABSTRACT Peer-to-peer VoIP calls are becoming increasingly popular due to their advantages in cost and convenience. When these calls are encrypted from end to end and anonymized by low latency anonymizing network, they are considered by many people to be both secure and anonymous. In this paper, we present a watermark technique that could be used for effectively identifying and correlating encrypted, peer-to-peer VoIP calls even if they are anonymized by low latency anonymizing networks. This result is in contrast to many people's perception. The key idea is to em- bed a unique watermark into the encrypted VoIP flow by slightly adjusting the timing of selected packets. Our analysis shows that it only takes several milliseconds time adjustment to make normal VoIP flows highly unique and the embedded watermark could be preserved across the low latency anonymizing network if appropriate redundancy is applied. Our analytical results are backed up by the real-time experiments performed on leading peer- to-peer VoIP client and on a commercially deployed anonymizing network. Our results demonstrate that (1) tracking anonymous peer-to- peer VoIP calls on the Internet is feasible and (2) low latency anonymizing networks are susceptible to timing attacks. <http://ise.gmu.edu/%7exwangc/Publications/CCS05-VoIPTracking.pdf> ------------- End Forwarded Message ------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- I am perfectly capable of learning from my mistakes. I will surely learn a great deal today. "A democracy is a sheep and two wolves deciding on what to have for lunch. Freedom is a well armed sheep contesting the results of the decision." - Benjamin Franklin "The best we can hope for concerning the people at large is that they be properly armed." --Alexander Hamilton

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[IP] Tracking Anonymous Peer-to-Peer VoIP Calls on the Internet
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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forget "your license, please"; now it will be "your DNA,
by Jim Warren 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

please" One small step for man; one [more] giant step for Big Brother. (Or ... if you don't have anything to hide, you shouldn't mind giving your DNA. And you don't need a lawyer; you shouldn't object to having your home searched; etc., etc.) - --jim http://www.legitgov.org/index.html#breaking_news U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling 05 Feb 2007 The Justice Department is completing rules to allow the collection of DNA from most people arrested or detained by federal authorities, officials said, a vast expansion of DNA gathering. The new forensic DNA sampling was authorized by Congress in a little-noticed amendment to a January 2006 renewal of the Violence Against Women Act, which provides protections and assistance for victims of sexual crimes. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/05/washington/05dna.html?_r=1&oref=slogin U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling By JULIA PRESTON Published: February 5, 2007 The Justice Department is completing rules to allow the collection of DNA from most people arrested or detained by federal authorities, a vast expansion of DNA gathering that will include hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants, by far the largest group affected. The new forensic DNA sampling was authorized by Congress in a little- noticed amendment to a January 2006 renewal of the Violence Against Women Act, which provides protections and assistance for victims of sexual crimes. The amendment permits DNA collecting from anyone under criminal arrest by federal authorities, and also from illegal immigrants detained by federal agents. Over the last year, the Justice Department has been conducting an internal review and consulting with other agencies to prepare regulations to carry out the law. The goal, justice officials said, is to make the practice of DNA sampling as routine as fingerprinting for anyone detained by federal agents, including illegal immigrants. Until now, federal authorities have taken DNA samples only from convicted felons. The law has strong support from crime victims' organizations and some women's groups, who say it will help law enforcement identify sexual predators and also detect dangerous criminals among illegal immigrants. "Obviously, the bigger the DNA database, the better," said Lynn Parrish, the spokeswoman for the Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network, based in Washington. "If this had been implemented years ago, it could have prevented many crimes. Rapists are generalists. They don't just rape, they also murder." Peter Neufeld, a lawyer who is a co-director of the Innocence Project, which has exonerated dozens of prison inmates using DNA evidence, said the government was overreaching by seeking to apply DNA sampling as universally as fingerprinting. "Whereas fingerprints merely identify the person who left them," Mr. Neufeld said, "DNA profiles have the potential to reveal our physical diseases and mental disorders. It becomes intrusive when the government begins to mine our most intimate matters." ...<SNIP>... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.5.3 (Build 5003) Charset: US-ASCII wsBVAwUBRceor2nfFhwmXlFCAQiZBwf6A0ij0S8Vk02xzqT13h2iU8QoYOdNIvhY x8p7zVHRTXnXt5NIUPElen2iLsOW6Ipf3n1z/hTgCVX2lpm8AZSKZ5ksK4Ky0hsG IxLJJgsJVrdpbwBlftod1OOd7cQsMorOe6dscpqipOl+dDO9Qj4GEhMJX/CMaBNC fcASlkPb9ZUh2gLfhVI5JnYtJvV0Wg85W0myALrrIBIk4KX44RTaaLTi94WdbwpS xYAW5JeC7YYO4fBYxNzZAvSGbRuFglcIkCA3mUAsVPouXyczDUHqR4dfEbWCsoG+ 0bSAIlQhmeBOmTImEtQHZVy9eQIKPAKW3GKZ8ZsB2C14z/5UcfdS0g== =MZrQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://archives.listbox.com/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] forget "your license, please"; now it will be "your DNA, please"
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [tor-talk] possible to identify tor user via hardware DRM?
by grarpamp 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>> can these chips be used to spying and identifying people The summary is probably... Only those with access to the chip masks, or an equally serious amount of reverse engineering gear, knows what goes into a chipset. Therefore anything is possible. And if you're not proxying the output of suspected spy systems through your own masks to validate them, well... you could very well be screwed :) The rest is documented stuff you can read in any spec sheet. Part of that material is indeed new firmware capabilities and ways to lock it down, or not. Don't run windows or closed source stuff if you're concerned about what it might phone home about. UUID's, serials, MAC's, your data, etc. If the platform + OS can't be trusted, neither can any app running on it, including Tor. Act accordingly. Nothing here related to Tor.... your questions should go to the author of that post or comp.risks. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Deadline extended to November 5th - Fourth Annual PKI R&D Workshop
by Carl Ellison 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The deadline for paper submissions to the "Fourth Annual PKI R&D Workshop: Multiple Paths to Trust" and has been extended until 5:00 PM Pacific time on Friday November 5th. <http://middleware.internet2.edu/pki05/>http://middleware.internet2.edu/pki05/ This year, the workshop has a particular interest in how emergent trust mechanisms will interact with each other mechanisms at the technical, policy and user levels. Clifford Neuman Program Committee Chair --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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