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Financial Relief
by que11331236＠compuserve.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Snuffle Snuffed
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those not on the cypherpunks@toad list, there have been a few messages on the Bernstein decision which seem not to have been forwarded to the other lists, apparently because they were sent directly by "bernstein-announce(a)toad.com." We've put them on our site and can be browsed at: http://jya.com/crypto.htm The latest last night from Bernstein's attorney is that the USG has gotten a stay from Patel's on her August 25 decision (see PGP Inc. message below). The stay removes protections from those who may have posted Snuffle to the Web (as JYA did). Hence, we've removed the two versions of Snuffle we had hosted. After, we note, DoJ and Commerce had downloaded the evidence and our vitae. DoJ's Anthony Coppolino would not discuss the stay when I called him at 202-514-4782. However, we would like to offer lieu of the Snuffle files links to offshore sites if there are any who wish to host the US national security threats. Adam Back posted one version here a few days back, and Purdue has Dan's 1990 original offer to sci.crypt. For leads to the two see: http://jya.com/snuffle-c.htm http://jya.com/snuffle-txt Here's a the message from PGP, Inc.: ---------- Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> X-Sender: kohn(a)mail.pgp.com Date: Fri, 29 Aug 1997 01:06:00 -0700 To: Cindy Cohn <Cindy(a)mcglashan.com> From: Bob Kohn <kohn(a)pgp.com> Subject: Re: Stay issued; modified stay to follow Cc: sadams(a)forbes.com, telstar(a)wired.com, plotnikoff(a)aol.com, Ewasserman(a)sjmercury.com, dang(a)cnet.com, steven(a)echo.net, abate(a)ccnet.com, wendyg(a)cix.compulink.co.uk, amy(a)netcom.com, courtm(a)cnet.com, alan.boyle(a)MSNBC.COM, declan(a)well.com, sep(a)cbsnews.com, kenc(a)cwi.emap.com, arb(a)well.com, exp(a)mk.ibek.com, bransten(a)interactive.wsj.com, TomBemis(a)pacbell.net, sam.perry(a)reuters.com, jimevans(a)aol.com, ljflynn(a)aol.com, wendyl(a)ljx.com, bernstein-announce(a)toad.com Reply-To: Bob Kohn <kohn(a)pgp.com> Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Too bad. Prof. Bernstein was perfectly positioned to become a great -- and the only legal -- exporting reseller of PGP software. (no, this is not off the record) Bob At 06:21 PM 8/28/97 -0700, Cindy Cohn wrote: >During a conference call with counsel today, Judge Patel issued a stay of >the injunctive relief issued in her Opinion of August 25, 1997, effective >until September 8. > > On September 8 (or sooner if we get the papers to her) the Court she will >issue a formal Stay Pending Appeal which will stay the injunctive relief >issued in her Opinion of August 25, 1997, except that an injunction shall be >reinstated to prevent the prosecution of Professor Bernstein for the >"unlicensed export" of Snuffle 5.0 (which includes Snuffle and Unsnuffle) >and any later versions of that program which he has developed. > >This eliminates, at least for the meantime, the injunctive relief granted to >Bernstein as to any other computer programs which he may have developed or >otherwise wished to publish. It also eliminates the protections for persons >other than Professor Bernstein. > >The government has said that it may still challenge this more limited stay >in the 9th Circuit. Professor Bernstein may also seek relief from the stay >from the 9th Circuit. > >Cindy >************************ >Cindy A. Cohn >McGlashan & Sarrail, P. C. >177 Bovet Road, 6th Floor >San Mateo, CA 94402 >(415) 341-2585 (tel) >(415)341-1395 (fax) >Cindy(a)McGlashan.com >http://www.McGlashan.com > > > Robert H. Kohn Vice President, Business Development PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY, INC. 2121 S. El Camino Real, 9th Floor San Mateo, California 94403 Direct: (415) 524-6220 Cellular: (415) 297-6527 Main: (415) 572-0430 Fax: (415) 572-1932 kohn(a)pgp.com PGP Home Page: http://www.pgp.com Personal Home page: http://www.kohnmusic.com/people/bkohn.html "If all the personal computers in the world - ~260 million computers - were put to work on a single PGP-encrypted message, it would still take an estimated 12 million times the age of the universe, on average, to break a single message." -- William Crowell, Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, testifying before the U.S. Congress on March 20, 1997

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Update on "news rating," Internet Content Coal mtg, from Netly (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 29 Aug 1997 05:02:01 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Update on "news rating," Internet Content Coal mtg, from Netly ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 28 Aug 1997 18:48:22 +0000 From: Noah Robischon <noah(a)pathfinder.com> To: declan(a)well.com Subject: ICC UPDATE The Netly News http://www.netlynews.com Afternoonline August 28, 1997 ICC You Later The Internet Content Coalition has rolled over, but it's not dead yet. In today's closed-to-the-press meeting, most of the two dozen news organizations in attendance opposed the rating of news sites on the Web -- whether from third parties or from the Coalition itself. This sharp turnabout followed criticism of the Coalition's attempts to establish voluntary ratings guidelines for the industry. "Everyone in the room agreed to a general statement that as news organizations we will not rate our content and we oppose the efforts of others to rate our content," said Dan Okrent, Time Inc. New Media's Editor In Chief. But self-labelling is not totally dead: today's membership was divided between those who still want to work with filtering software and browser companies and hardliners such as Times-Mirror who don't want to negotiate with Microsoft and Netscape at all. Such divisions lead to questions about the structure of the ICC, which is still struggling to define its membership, its mission and even its ability to speak on behalf of the world's media giants. Members of the press were barred from today's meeting, a semmingly paradoxical move given the nature of the discussion. Acting president Mark Bailey told The Netly News that reporters were barred from the proceeding so that an open and broad-based debate could take place. "We also have not invited ratings people and we also have not invited a lot of browser people," he said. "We really wanted this to be a news publisher meeting." -- By Noah Robischon

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Re: hello
by Feanor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Aug 28, 22:22, Alexis wrote: } Subject: hello > hello, > > Can anybody teach me the abc's on Hacking, Cracking, Phranking, > Cryptomography, I know that to be a good hacker you have to know all, > but speciallize on one. Or do any of you are in the LA area that > willing to teach me face to face. Boy, you're a fucking loser. Hacking = expert/geeky computer usage. Cracking = breaking into computer systams. Phranking = some stupid fucking word you made up. Cryptomography = some other stupid fucking word you made up. So, you use 4 major terms, get two of them wrong, and can't use basic grammar. Even if I know the first thing about cracking (which I don't), I would never teach you that or anything else in a million years because you are obviously too stupid to be worth wasting my time on. Hell, you're even too stupid to troll well, if that's what this is...

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Kevin Mitnick RC5 Crack team - Join Us
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Have your CPU fight for justice in it's spare time! Some of the folks from the mitnick(a)2600.com mailing list have set up an RC5 team in hopes of generating awareness about Kevin Mitnick's ordeal and possibly some cash for his defense. Details are at our site: http://www.paranoid.org/mitnick/ The site has more info about Mitnick and the RC5 crack if you're not familiar, as well as a gallery of graphics & banners you can put on your own site to show your support. We hope to have a stats page up soon. We're registered at both www.distributed.net and www.cyberian.org ... give us a hand!

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Encryption: yet another reason
by amp＠pobox.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yet another reason why we need ubiquitous strong encryption... >From The Wall Street Journal Law: News Concern Denies Allegations It Spied On Pager Messages NEW YORK -- Breaking News Network of Fort Lee, N.J., denied prosecutors' allegations that it illegally intercepted sensitive pager messages intended for New York City officials. Carl Rowan Jr., an attorney for the company, said the concern will fight the charges, announced Wednesday by Mary Jo White, Manhattan's U.S. attorney. Mr. Rowan said the company believes two former volunteers fabricated information that led to the prosecutors' charges. Breaking News said it uses a network of volunteers to listen to police scanners and other public radio traffic. The company then distributes information, such as the locations of fire and police activity, to news organizations paying for the service. "The company is absolutely outraged at how it has been treated and believes that what is really involved here is an effort to intimidate and embarrass a news-gathering organization," Mr. Rowan said. According to a complaint unsealed this week, Breaking News and people affiliated with the company allegedly used tracking software and a "cloned" police pager to illegally tap into alphanumeric messages sent to high-ranking police, fire-department and city officials. ------------------------ Name: amp E-mail: amp(a)pobox.com Date: 08/29/97 Time: 11:12:34 Visit me at http://www.pobox.com/~amp == -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/) == 'Drug Trafficking Offense' is the root passphrase to the Constitution. Have you seen http://www.public-action.com/SkyWriter/WacoMuseum ------------------------

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Stealth Helicopters
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> "Like them new Stealth Helicopters, equipped with devices to drown out > the sound." Or very quiet private jets. I saw a small, unmarked jet plane tailing and tracking an urban police helicopter just the other night while out on a walk in a deserted commercial district. Its light signature resembled Vader's Imperial Shuttle, incidentally. -THE LIE

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RE: ASK ToolKit Clarifications
by Phillip Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For my comments on snakeoil see: http://crecy.ai.mit.edu/snakeoil/ Follow the navigation bars through 'key distribution" to "Monkey Wrench" Despite the hype KeyGen does not "throw a monkey wrench" into anything. It is unfortunately nothing particularly new. It is simply an example of the type of technique that is commonly used in conjunction with a public key system to keep keying material fresh while avoiding additional public key exchanges. >Unfortunately, I cannot talk about those things that are being patented, but >maybe in the near future. I hope you are not about to claim a patent on the use of one way hash functions to create keying material. I have prior art on that dating back to 1993 and I wasn't the first to discover it by a very long chalk. I suspect that the internals of Photuris probably contains most of the KeyGen proposal. >The keys are both random and unpredictable -- meaning that you will not be >able to deduce what the next key is even if you have any key that was used >in the past. The system does not depend on the secrecy of internal >algorithms for security. What about hard coded internal parameters? If you can avoid the need for an initial insecure exchange your magic box means you don't need the synchronisation technique at all. >We are not blindly implying that applications using the ASK ToolKit are >unbreakable. However, the toolkit provides the means for intrusion >detection and prevention. We know of no method this simple that does that. I know of many, the problem is that most of them arn't much good. The only exceptionaly simple schemes I know are Diffie Helleman and RSA. D-H is certainly simple. It is astonishingly simple in fact and much easier to explain to someone than MD5 or SHA. >The toolkit provides a number of bells and whistles to allow the developer >of an appliction using it to do many things like change keys as often as >wanted -- even every bit (not practical) or re-synchronize (which is >different from re-initializing). It also allows the last session >information to either be stored in encrypted form on the machine or removed >to a portable medium. OK how about the symmetric key exchange system from Shen? You already have exchanged a private key S beteeen the parties (e.g. used public key or you have a password established). You don't want to exchange the password over the wire en-clair of course. Nor do you wish to use the shared secret as the encryption key over long periods of time. One option is for party Alice to chose a random session mask M and send Bob M, The session key is then K = M XOR S. If the encryption system used is secure both parties can use the derrived session key without problems. A better solution however is for Alice to chose a random token R and send Hash (K, R), R to Bob. She can also use the XOR mask trick as well to decouple key exchange and session key choice. This is a massive advantage if the text you want to exchange has already been encrypted. i.e. we calculate M = K XOR S rather than chosing M at random. >The ToolKit does not provide the initial strong authentication needed to >start the process off. There are many very good methods for doing this, so >why should we bother. BECAUSE YOU GREAT PUDDING HEAD THAT IS THE ONLY HARD PART. Techniques to keep symmetric key material fresh indefinitely have been known for years. Kerberos is full of them. So incidentaly is Windows NT which happens to have a lot of similar ideas at least with respect to authentication. The GSSAPI probably has the same stuff burried inside it somewhere. >The claims we make are not so much for the ToolKit itself but for the >applications that we envision can be developed given the ingenuity of the >developer. We invite everyone who has a genuine interest in possibly >using the ToolKit, >and who is not just tossing flame about, to contact us with their questions. >If you are a responsible consultant or represent a responsible organization >and can sign an NDA, then we would be glad to fill in the details. This is the whole big problem. Most people I know who are interested in security worry about the competence of their security expert. So the obvious thing to do is to hire another security expert to audit their work. That is not possible if there are NDAs. Signing an NDA to not reveal source code is one thing, signing one to not use a mechanism is quite another. The capabilities you describe can be easily performed using conventional techniques. The only case in which NDAs normally come up in security work is when actual source code is being exchanged. Even then the norm is for the provider of the security toolkit to be providing their their trade secret source to the purchaser rather than this happening the other way round. As for licensing terms that relate to the utility of the functionality rather than the cost of doing the work these tend to be limited to cases where the selling party has an established product of known quality protected by credible patents. Jim Bizdos meets these criteria, you do not. Phill

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info
by EHaile＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please send more details...thanks

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Snuffle Availability
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dan Bernstein's 1990 version of Snuffle posted to sci.crypt remains available: ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/snuffle.shar

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