- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Orbiting Datahavens
by blane＠aa.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With all the recent talk about converted oil-rig DataHavens floating around the oceans, fending off pirates, and Low-Orbit satellite communications, I had a thought. How about an orbiting DataHaven. No jurisdiction to bother with, extremely difficult to get to (except by large governments...). You could put together a couple of Linux boxes with a RAID system, some backups and a large solar panel and have a very nice, secure DataHaven. Granted, you wouldn't have all the fun of floating around the south pacific fending off pirates and navies who are after your data, but it would work. Might even be cheaper than outfitting the oil-ring with the rate that they are tossing satellites into space. If the HAM radio community can get a satellite into space, why not the Cypherpunks/Linux communities? Brian ------- <blane(a)aa.net> -------------------- <http://www.aa.net/~blane> ------- "Extremism in the defense of Liberty is no vice" - B. Goldwater ============== 11 99 3D DB 63 4D 0B 22 15 DC 5A 12 71 DE EE 36 ============

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proxy servers in Singapore
by brendon＠home.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did anyone else catch the AP wire story (it ran here in the SF Chronicle on Thursday) about the Singapore government cracking down on "undesirable" (e.g., sex smut, anti-govt. postings etc.) content on web sites, usenet etc. Their basically forcing, by law, Singapore ISPs to use proxy servers that contain the information that the govt. deems fit. Scary if you ask me. But then they have a govt. that acts like it's the management of Disneyland. "Have a nice ride!" -B ===================================================== Brendon Macaraeg http://www.itp.tsoa.nyu.edu/~brendonm Finger macaragb(a)acf2.nyu.edu for my PGP Public Key

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Re: IE3.0 128-bit
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: merriman(a)amaonline.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, webmaster(a)microsoft.com Date: Sat Aug 17 09:15:34 1996 My results were have been the same using ie30b2, but Netscape would attampt to download or ask me what app to run the .pl file with. Lou Zirko > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Date: Sat Aug 17 08:59:05 1996 > Just got off of MS IE3 download page. To retrieve the 128-bit version, > they've got a perl script asking for a remote address and a host > address > via a pair of cookies. Unfortunately, it chokes *every single time* > it's > invoked on my system, and shows me a 1-800 number (terminally busy) to > call. > > Has anyone either managed to download it, or gotten through to the > 1-800 > number? I'd _really_ like a copy of the 128-bit version. I'm a U.S. > citizen, live here in Amarillo, TX. > > Anyone from MicroSloth reading this *might* want to let a Responsible > Person know about the perl script hiccups.... > > Dave Merriman, Densa's mole in Mensa > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > PGP Email welcome, encouraged, and PREFERRED. Visit my web > site at http://www.shellback.com/p/merriman > for my PGP key and fingerprint > "What is the sound of one hand clapping in a forest > with no one there to hear it?" > I use Pronto Secure (tm) PGP-fluent Email software for Windows Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMhXUEctPRTNbb5z9AQHbeQf/ZOFzjDVZzgWKBhKvsVFzbyA3ayNNyJqG NuSNQ+W1TAiETioARwuCvSaokah7RBmoMOtPetGtUJBDkaw0KsKiGnByP/95a+73 +J49pubnhx7sM0PqiUNcdnE25gyHKwzSC82M31yOmsGst1FfPoklryoCdCUc2AOT A0HJpjRaIY/CdMx1WtnO8u1Pnl47GyazfkCOqpXnD6fcONvQOawadNJFUL8ehvKF vrvTn8rwo7W/71ijoFqphBJYIxnZpM34eJRz2mX8KE6VXlXCBWzCeVzoJD4zk5Yo DYqYmhmhKRubl9I9jbzG2VR6yCAPeYdYrtjWPNWgs56Yd5swlUCKpA== =WlX/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Unix passwd-cracker online?
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've given this some thought before, and there are some optimizations required... First of all, assuming you have one plaintext password for every crypt()'d combo and salt (I think there are actually a bunch of possible plaintexts for each encryption, but I'll assume that we'll save the one that looks most like an english somethingorother as any of them should work.) If you just sort them, you only need to store the 8 char plaintext, which helps with the storage, and halves it approximatly (a little more, actually.) Now...Still too much sotrage for one system, but if we had a network of machines around the Internet, with multi-gig tape changers (i've seen 40GB changer things a discount places for $1000) I figure DNS could server as a way of reaching the system that has the range you want..say we have maxhines named xJG*a.crackcrypt.com, with a leading letter on each hostname, followed by enough characters to represent how much of a range that system holds. I don't have a back of the envelop handy, and it's too early in the morning...so I'll do the calc later. But, for a small fee, anything can be arranged :) Ryan The real problem becomes regeneration when someone's tape goes corrupt.... ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: al177820 cc: cypherpunks From: wmono @ Direct.CA (William Ono) @ smtp Date: 08/17/96 01:27:53 AM Subject: Re: Unix passwd-cracker online? On Fri, 16 Aug 1996, Carlos L. Mariscal may have written: > person has obtained a specific password by entering the desired > adresses'passord on a submnit form in a Web page. [deletia] > never have it if there really is such, but this came to my mind when i read > the posts on the plate-numbers-in-Oregon polemica. I would appreciate Somehow I have a hard time believing this to be true. I run crack, a password searching program that uses a dictionary as its base, on my /etc/passwd regularly to locate any users with easily guessed entries. With ultra fast crypt (UFC), the fastest crypt() replacement I can find, I can run through about 9700 passwords per second on this P6-150. Now, this is a back-of-the-envelope calculation: Assuming that the password can be one to eight characters of the following: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ1234567890!@#$%^&*() we find that we have a set of 72 characters. That gives us 72^8 + 72^7 + 72^6 + 72^5 + 72^4 + 72^3 + 72^2 + 72^1 or 732376025552520 possible combinations. At 9700 encryptions per second, it would take my system 2401 years to brute force -one- password to completion. That means that, most likely, if this 'locate password on demand' system existed, it would not work in real time, or in any time during any person's life. Moore's Law might shorten this timeframe considerably, but still not to any reasonable time frame. Continuing with my back-of-the-envelope estimate, we have the length of a crypt()'d password as being 13 characters. The password in plaintext has to follow, with a length of 8 characters. At a size of 732376025552520 * 21 characters, we would have a database of 15379896536602920 bytes, or 22565249 650mb CD-ROMs. That's for the passwords of one salt, without any formatting. Even if we could achieve a 95% compression rate on this data (it is text, after all) we would end up with 237528 CD-ROMs. Most likely my set of characters will be found to be incorrect, but anything that includes even a-z, A-Z, and 0-9 in one to eight character combinations most likely will not be a favourable crack target. Sorry, I don't think this is feasable, or possible. (Please do correct my calculations if errors are detected, especially if the corrected numbers make this possible.. it's getting late at night, and my mind is fogging up, so these calculations/estimates/wild guesses may be off more than usual. It does sound like an interesting project to undertake, if it were possible, but not on my equipment!) -- ** NOTE NEW KEY ** As of 08/28/95! Old key 0x2902B621 COMPROMISED! William Ono <wmono(a)direct.ca> PGP Key: F3F716BD fingerprint = A8 0D B9 0F 40 A7 D6 64 B3 00 04 74 FD A7 12 C9 = fingerprint PGP-encrypted mail welcome! "640k ought to be enough for everybody."

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Software manpower exports and the power of governments
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 13:23 16/08/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >At 10:49 PM 8/14/96 +0600, Arun Mehta wrote: >> I was trying to explain how incomes and prices happened to be >> lower in India, > >That was not an explanation, that was mystic word salad. > >It would be an explanation if wealth mysteriously rained >from the sky, rather than was produced by men. Huh? And why are we so grumpy today? >In fact what gets sent to the Indian campus is largely legacy >work, which is in large part precisely the work that requires >the closest contact with the customer, contact with actual >working conditions, and the like. Not necessarily: as an example of legacy work, consider the conversion of Cobol to 4GL. When you have a working program to emulate, you can do that without too much customer contact. It's in new software (where maybe the customer is herself not clear what she actually needs) that close contact is essential. Take another example: you have some old software, and you need to add a bell or whistle. Sure, you may need to run the modified software on site for testing, but often that too can be done from a remote terminal. And even if you do have to travel for the purpose, it still works out cheaper, since manpower costs are low in the 3rd world. >This seems to be a general practice, not just an Informix practice, for >in an article on "India's silicon valley" I read that the work done in >India was largely done on existing legacy apps, often in obsolete >languages and operating systems. Um, maybe you misread: why would an American company pay to have software written, that only runs on obsolete machines? Now, converting that software to run on a modern machine, that's altogether different -- you have to be able to read Cobol or Autocoder or whatever, but what you actually write would be based on modern tools. >This is of course the work that places the least amount of the >companies intellectual assets in India, and thus the work that >gives the Indian government the least power over Informix and its >activities. Informix could abandon the Indian campus and all >the intellectual assets on which it was working, and all the >physical assets located there, at any moment and not suffer any >serious loss or inconvenience. A sensible business decision: long-distance security is hard to achieve. But I doubt that it has anything to do with the power that the Indian government has (or hasn't) over Informix? >It is overwhelmingly clear that the question is simply who has the >power? Those who wish to hire peoples services in order to produce >wealth, or those who can command peoples services because they have >guns? Are you suggesting that Indian programmers come to work with like a chain gang, with armed government guard? You really must talk to some programmers from India, ask them if the government commands them this way, but do have some oxygen handy, or they might die laughing... >That is what makes most people in some places poor and most people >in some places affluent. Look, governments in the 3rd world are often stupid and corrupt -- no doubt that contributes to poverty, but that isn't the only reason. I'm sure one of the reasons is cultural: modern industrial societies require a high degree of training, discipline, whatever. Western societies needed centuries of misery to learn these, we're trying to do it faster, and hopefully be a bit more humane in the process. >> Could you please be more precise? In what way does the "power of >> the Indian government" intrude? >Presumably the same kind of reasons as caused foreign companies >to flee India the first time around. Other that Coke and IBM, which we already discussed, can you name one other? In the last years, lots of companies have opened shop here, including Coke and IBM. And even these two didn't flee: a new law was passed, they didn't want to comply, so they left or were asked to leave. In the case of Coke, I can understand the government not wanting to spend precious foreign exchange on sugared water in a country where there is a serious shortage of drinking water. Tim made the perfectly valid point that such decisions cost the country in reputation, but the Indian government doesn't mind loss of reputation in matters it firmly believes in, as in the current CTBT discussion. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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Re: "world communications being monitored"
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:44 PM 8/16/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > >------- Forwarded Message >From: "Mat Guthrie" <matguthrie(a)enterprise.net> >To: mmlist-l(a)newciv.org >Date: Wed, 14 Aug 1996 20:14:39 +0000 >Subject: All Int' Communications Are Monitored > > >- - -> SearchNet's snetnews Mailing List > >Hi there all, > >I heard an amazing news report on the radio today, that confirmed >what I've heard and suspected for a long time - all international >communications *are* continually being monitored!! No, what this guy heard was a book report. I don't know how well a writer Mr. Hager is but if he doesn't have proper documentation then he confirms nothing. > >The report was on "The World at One" news report on BBC Radio 4 - >about as respected, reliable and informative a source as any >mainstream media is ever likely to be. The feature spoke about a >book that's come out in New Zealand called "Secret Power" by Nicky >Hager, that has been endorsed by the former (?) Prime Minister of New >Zealand himself. It supposedly goes into great detail about an >international agreement called "Echelon" of which the US, UK, >France, New Zealand, Australia and several other nations are all >participants. According to Nicky Hager - who was interviewed on the >program - a system of monitoring stations have been set up in various >countries in the world that continually monitor ALL fax, email, >telephone and satellite communications etc, "sniffing" for keywords >using super computers. When these key words are identified the >information is automatically logged and according to Hager, sent >directly to the US intelligence services. > >Now whilst many of us have undoubtedly come across this sort of >information before and undoubtedly many of us have probably scoffed >at such ascertions as merely impossible and blatantly paranoid, >something very significant sets this report apart. Before the book >was published, Hager went with his manuscript to the New Zealand >Prime Minister who had been responsible for signing NZ up to the >agreement (I got the impression that he is no longer in power). If anyone cares to look up the political history of the western Pacific rim, it would seem very suspicious that N.Z and Australia would have any intelligence commitment with France at all. >Anyway, the PM was so shocked by the revelations that the book >contained, that he has written the forward to the book. Supposedly he >says that he had no idea of the true nature of the agreement and the >powers which it bestowed on the intelligence services and is >obviously trying to distance himself from the storm that's beginning >to brew up about it. Maybe he's just covering his arse or maybe he >was just another puppet head of government who wasn't properly >informed about what was really taking place in his own country, but >either way, the fact that he has got involved with the book adds >considerable credibility to it's claims. If the PM has no credibility (his saying he knew nothing) how does his input add credibility to the book? Those of you who have often >said that such wide-scale monitoring is "obviously impossible" might >be wise to re-evaluate your positions! > Those of us in-the-know won't be reevaluating anything. Save your money and wait for the book to get into the local library. Better to spend your money on David's book on Enigma. Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy May wrote: >Others have shown how meaningless your repeated calls for a proof are, as >so many assumptions must be carefully spelled out. >To give an example of how hard the situation is to analyze, consider the >computer and chip industries. (If you argue that your "theorem" is for >nations in the aggregate, and not any particular companies or even >industries, then I will maintain that my example holds pretty much true for >automobiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and so on._ >The computer and chip industries move certain investments abroad, to >Malaysia, the Phillipines, Indonesia, Mexico, and so forth. But by moving >these investments abroad, they believe their net market size, >profitability, shareholder value, etc., will be enhanced. Else they >wouldn't do it. >Multiply this by all the industries.... >Now, would "the economy" be "better off" if Intel, say, had not moved >assembly operations to Malaysia in the 1970s? Perhaps Intel would now be >bankrupt and gone, as so many of its rivals of the time are now gone and >barely remembered. >You see the problem? Who can say what "better off" is, given that we can't >run history down alternate paths as an experiment. >Your one-track mind is truly astounding. We've had kooks and oddballs on >the list before, but never one who has written a dozen or more posts asking >the same ill-phrased question over and over again. So you say that my question can't be answered because the situation is too difficult to analyze, "given that we can't run history down alternate paths as an experiment." The situation is indeed hopelessly difficult if you think that economics is an empirical (experimental) science. But, as an Austrian, you should know that economics isn't an empirical science; it's a science that deals with the logic of human action. It starts from the axiom of human action, and all the other axioms of economics follow from this axiom by deductive reasoning. This is called the praxeological method. The answer to economic problems can only be given by reasoning, not by running experiments in the real world. Read Mises (Human action), Rothbard (Man, economy and state) etc. for further information. To prevent you from claiming this isn't true, I will quote Rothbard (in 'The foundations of modern Austrian economics', p. 19, ed. E. Dolan): "Praxeology rests on the fundamental axiom that individual human beings act(...) The praxeological method spins out by verbal deduction the logical implications of that primordial fact." etc. So, it really doesn't matter at all that we can't run history down alternate paths as an experiment, because the kind of empirical 'data' that such experiments would generate are not very helpful in the first place. Fortunately, situations that are at first sight hopelessly difficult can sometimes be analyzed and simplified by performing a thought experiment. That's what I did when I offered my 'reductio ad absurdum' proof. I didn't use empirical data, I used logic and reasoning; that's the way it should be done in economics. So far, you didn't rebut the proof I offered. You only argue that my proof must be wrong because the situation is too difficult to analyze because of all the empirical data that are lacking. That argument is, as I explained above, not to the point. And the fact that you take refuge in name-calling makes me suspect that subconsciously you don't find it very to the point yourself either. I understand it's not pleasant to be rebutted every time you answer my posts, but I fear it's something you will have to get used to. Of course, you could also consider making better arguments (after reading the books I suggested), or else stop posting on the subject. Bart Croughs

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CS8191 data sheet and ordering info...
by Eric Blossom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attached is the ascii version of the data sheet, followed by ordering information. Full protocol specifications will be available in about 2 weeks. Eric ---------------------------------------------------------------- Communication Security Corporation CS8191 Triple-DES Telephone Privacy Device With the growing number of tools available to assist in wiretapping, anyone using a telephone in the '90's is vulnerable to unwanted eavesdropping. With many of today's standard technologies, anyone can gain access to our most private of conversations. As a result, the telecommunications industry has an increasing need for private, secure voice communication devices. The Communication Security Corporation has dedicated its resources to addressing this need by designing the CS8191, our flagship product and the most secure telephone privacy protection available. Unsurpassed Security Truly open, encryption technology is at the heart of the CS8191 telephone security unit. With the press of a button, the CS8191 is activated. Within seconds your conversation is kept secure from the intrusion of any type of wiretapping. Open-Standard Encryption How are you assured that your tele-security unit is really working to protect your telecommunications? In truth, the "trust-us" proprietary solutions used by competing products are an indication of weak privacy protection. They "hide" from the user, the ability to verify proper functioning of the unit. Communication Security provides users with the best privacy protection by incorporating leading-edge encryption technology that utilizes the power of truly open standards. Our commitment to an open specification allows sophisticated users the ability to "check under the hood" and evaluate the security attributes of the system. Portable And Easy To Use The CS8191 has been designed to work with conventional analog telephone systems (POTS). The unit connects between your telephone and the wall, much like a telephone answering machine. Plug in the power, and that's it. In "clear mode" your telephone continues to work as it normally does. To begin an encrypted conversation, simply press the 'go secure' button and wait for the green light to come on. The system is easy to use and compact, making it the perfect telephone security solution for home, travel or office use. Superior Performance * As a standard component, Communication Security has incorporated a leading-edge speech coder for clarity unsurpassed in secure telephone devices, to date. * Voice clarity is virtually undisturbed whether the system is in secure or clear mode. * LED indicators on the unit let you know instantly that your call is being transmitted securely. Service And Support The Communication Security Corporation provides a one year warranty for all parts and labor. Upgrades are included in the price of the CS8191 and are available under the terms of the warranty. For More Information To get more information on securing your phone communications, send email to info(a)comsec.com or call (707) 577-0409, fax (707) 577-0413. Features Benefits * Open standard encryption Allows independent evaluation and verification of protocol and behavior * Excellent speech quality Superior clarity is assured with leading-edge speech coder as a standard component * Auto Secure Allows for secure, unattended operation for all-hours data protection * Small size and weight Makes the CS8191 the perfect solution for secure home, office or travel telephone communications Specifications: Modem * ITU V.32bis (14,400 bits/sec) Interfaces * Two buttons (Go Secure, Go Clear) * Two LEDs (Secure, Clear) * External power supply * Two modular phone jacks Power * Input voltage: 110 volts AC, 50-60 Hz. Approvals * FCC, part 15 and 68 Warranty * 12 months parts and labor Software Upgrades * One year of upgrades included in purchase price Voice Nodes * Clear voice * Secure voice Secure Mode Speech Compression * International standard GSM 06.10 full rate speech transcoding (13,000 bits/sec) Notes: * Specifications subject to change without notice. * Government regulations apply for export license. * Completing the circle of secure communication requires the receiving end of your call to also have a CS8191 unit connected to their phone. Cryptographic Details: * Unique session key generated for each conversation using Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange (2048 bit modulus) (U.S. Patent No. 4,200,770 licensed by Cylink Corporation) * Defense against "man in the middle" active attack using interleave protocol combined with voice verification of six digit key name derived from the public exponentials * Hardware Random number generator based on Johnson noise * Three Key Triple-DES (168 bit key), operating in modified counter mode. * No back door, "Key-Escrow" or GAK * Open standard. Full protocol specifications available. Communication Security Corporation 1275 Fourth St. Suite 194 Santa Rosa, CA 95404 Tel: 707-577-0409 Fax: 707-577-0413 info(a)comsec.com ---------------------------------------------------------------- Yes, I want real telephone privacy protection! Send me ________ CS8191's at $995.00 each: $____________ Shipping and Handling: $_______10.00 California residents add sales tax: $____________ Total: $____________ I'm paying with Check or M/O ____ Visa / MC ____ Name on Card:______________________________ Card Number:_______________________________ Exp. Date:__________ Ship To: _________________________________________ _________________________________________ _________________________________________ __________________________________________ Allow 6-8 weeks for delivery. I am a US citizen or "Lawful Permanent Resident" Yes____ No____ Make checks payable to: Communication Security Corp. Mail or fax this order form to: Communication Security Corp. 1275 Fourth St., Suite 194 Santa Rosa, CA 95404 v: 707-577-0409 f: 707-577-0413

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signoff cypherpunks
by Greg Nygren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> >Received: from toad.com by tor-srs2.netcom.ca (8.7.5/SMI-4.1/Netcom) > id TAA12781; Fri, 16 Aug 1996 19:38:39 -0400 (EDT) >Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id KAA07516 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Fri, 16 Aug 1996 10:30:44 -0700 (PDT) >Received: from soleil.mnet.fr (root(a)soleil.mnet.fr [194.51.151.1]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id KAA07511 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Fri, 16 Aug 1996 10:30:35 -0700 (PDT) >Received: from linux (ppp03.mnet.fr [194.51.151.26]) by soleil.mnet.fr (8.6.11/8.6.9) with SMTP id TAA21252 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Fri, 16 Aug 1996 19:29:49 +0100 >Message-ID: <3214BCA6.6ED8124F(a)mnet.fr> >Date: Fri, 16 Aug 1996 13:23:34 -0500 >From: Arnauld Dravet <scraver(a)mnet.fr> >X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.0b6 (X11; I; Linux 2.0.0 i586) >MIME-Version: 1.0 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: signoff cypherpunks >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk > >signoff cypherpunks > >

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Re: Hackers invade DOJ web site
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:42 AM 8/18/96 -0500, you wrote: >>CNN online (http://www.cnn.com) is reporting a "breakin" by "hackers" >>to the DOJ web site. They don't elaborate exactly how thy did it. Well the DOJ site still is down, but here's some details I pulled out of a USENET newsgroup this morning (hopefully L.G. Shirley won't mind the forward). All in all, it sounds like a fairly childish stunt... From: "L. G. Shirley" <lgshirley(a)mail.worldnet.att.net> Newsgroups: rec.radio.scanner Subject: DOJ homepage hacked!!! Date: 17 Aug 1996 22:47:59 GMT Organization: AT&T WorldNet Services Lines: 49 Message-ID: <4v5i6v$hm8(a)mtinsc01-mgt.ops.worldnet.att.net> About 10PM last night I clicked on my bookmark for the Federal Gov't and then selected, by random, the Dept of Justice. http://justice2.usdoj.gov/ SURPRISE!!!!!!!!!! Someone had made a few changes, For one it is now called the Department of Injustice. You are immediately greeted by the Nazi swastika all over your screen's background. A flag w/the symbol is apparent. George Washington's picture is captioned with his words, "Move my grave to a free country! This rolling is making me an insomniac". Janet Reno's portrait has been replaced by Hitler's. And a flag now bears the Nazi symbol. She is now called Attorney General Furher. There is plenty of nudity and the many links will take you to places you may never have been before. I don't think we're in Kansas anymore Toto! I have no clues how it was done or when. My guess is someone changed all the links to the DOJ page to another one, the one you see when you click on the DOJ's homepage. I worked today and when I came home and tried to get back to the DOJ's page, no luck. Must be a major overload <grin> of people trying to get to the link of women clad in, well, next to nothing and tied with rope! I don't think the author will make any brownie points w/women. He hacked the homepage they have w/the DOJ on violence against women. I'm not condoning such action and violence is a very serious issue but whoever did the hack was also very serious. He changed a Clinton speech on affirmative action and insulted blacks with his choice of words. There is a lot of rambling about the internet and the Gov't taking away our rights on it. The author has a interesting slant on things. This should be enough of a warning if you're easily offended by racism, hate, foul language, porn on the net, and general crudeness. Don't go there. I would like to know just how this was done, any ideas? Is it that easy to hack someones homepage? I wonder how long it'll be before this homepage link is removed and can they find who did the evil deed? Two months on the Net and just when I think I'd seen it all, wow.

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