- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone, whose reputation is bigger than God, in the hope of sparing me public humiliation from the error of my ways (the very paradigm of a lost cause :-)), wrote to me offline on this topic. I'm posting it here, because frequently people reply to me with stuff which is extremely relevant to the argument at hand, and which should be heard in public. The main consideration I use is that none of the information in the reply can be used to identify the person who sent it, or mess up whatever plans they're laying, something you can clearly see in the following... At 4:48 pm -0400 on 5/3/97, somebody wrote: you write: > > I further claim that the most efficient digital bearer certificate is an > > anonymous one. > > Hal's point is this. There are two types of "anonymity": one where > the bank says "I swear I won't keep any records based on the name > you gave me" (the benign bank), and the other where we use Chaumian > blinding so the bank never even sees the identity information (the > untrusted bank). Right. Let's call the first one the Microsoft model, because I feel especially vicious this evening, and the second one the "Real" Chaum model. > Now, it seems to me that the "benign bank" sort of anonymity can't > cost any more (and in fact will even cost less) than the "untrusted > bank" Chaumian anonymity. Not true. With Chaumian anonymity, all the underwriter does is keep a database of spent digital bearer certificates, which they keep down by expiring certificate issues and the keys which generate them periodically. When someone double-spends a certificate, the underwriter has enough information to reveal their public key, but only when someone double spends and not before. With the Microsoft model, the underwriter knows who's buying your certificates, *and* the shared secret which makes the cash valid, *and* what time the certificate was issued, *and* what your shoe sizes, and the name of your sister's first date, and, and, and,... Anyway, I claim that the very Chaumian inability to *ever* know who bought the certificates you underwrite keeps you from ever *trying* to keep track of any other data, which, of course, is inherently cheaper. > Yet your arguments for anonymity apply > equally to both situations. No they don't. There's a qualitative difference between a system where you can't ever know who some one is, but you can still trust them, and a system where you always know who someone is and they have to trust *you*. :-). I say that one of the additional virtues of the former system is significantly reduced transaction costs, and finally, that that happy side effect will eventually result in a shift away from the latter kind of system, if it ever is useful to begin with. By the way, an additional cost of the system, which is obviously more in line with the privacy concerns of cypherpunks, and possibly less germaine to the transaction cost issue we're discussing, is the cost of the risk of breaking the confidentiality of systems like the Microsoft idea. I have a hunch that all it takes is one big information leak, and such systems will be dropped as a form of digital cash underwriting, but I'm going pretty far out on a limb to make that particular assertion. Should we call this the "Clipper effect", just to rattle peoples' chains? > Therefore, I say your arguments, taken > to their logical conclusion, imply that we'll end up with "benign > bank" anonymity, rather than Chaumian "untrusted bank" anonymity. Again, I don't think so. However, what we really need is some actual estimates and analysis to prove it, barring the existence of any actual transaction cost data, of course. :-). Something I'm not qualified to do, though I bet there are people here who can get those answers. > But "benign bank" anonymity is a very very weak form of anonymity > indeed -- it's not what most cypherpunks (or cryptographers) mean > when they talk about anonymous digital cash. Amen. Only people mired in the book-entry way of looking at things think otherwise. I believe the economics of the marketplace will soon teach them the serious errors of their ways... > "Benign bank" anonymity > is the sort of thing that Cybercash or other traditional systems > provide; "untrusted bank" security is what Digicash provides. And, again, I assert that the paradox of all this is that the cheapest form of commerce is a form where you don't trust anyone, or, better, trust, but verify, everyone. That's the beauty of the blind signature algorithm, it allows you to do all that, and not keep books, which cost money. > So, if I understand your argument correctly, you're saying that > we'll inevitably end up with some weak form of anonymity, but it > will be far weaker than what most cypherpunks want. I hope you can see by now, after I've taken another shot at explaining it better, what I was getting at. > That sounds more like a cause for a call to arms than a reason to > sit around reassuring ourselves that everything will turn out fine > without us! Nah. I don't do calls to arms. It's much better to change the world by making money. An especially important focus to have when you're building transaction systems. :-). I strongly beleive that you can easily knock three, maybe four, decimal places off the cost of any transaction you can care to mention just by using strong financial cryptography and anonymous digital bearer certificates on a ubiquitous geodesic network. That remains to be seen, however. I will say that I'm working as hard as someone with my limited skillset can to prove that hypothesis. :-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Ready for PrimeTime: FUD! The Newsletter of Fear Uncertainty and Doubt
by geeman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See this new exciting venture. Cards and Letters Welcome; use "FUD" in the subject header. www.best.com/~geeman

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YOU ARE APPROVED!
by YES!＠netcom.es 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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No Subject
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quoting: http://www.msnbc.com/onair/nbc/mtp/default.asp Tune in to Meet the Press with Tim Russert on Sunday... check local listings for details. Sunday: Meet the Press will look at crime, terrorism, national security, and foreign campaign contributions. Moderator Tim Russert will speak with FBI Director Louis Freeh. This week's panelist will be NBC's Pete Williams, and the roundtable guest will be Elizabeth Drew, author of Whatever it Takes. Meet the Press transcripts are usually available three hours after the show airs.

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Re: Firewalls
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester possesses a rudimentary dick less than one inch long, half the size of his mother's clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries. \|||/ (o o) -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo

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Re: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bob Hettinga wrote: >I strongly beleive that you can easily knock three, maybe four, decimal >places off the cost of any transaction you can care to mention just by >using strong financial cryptography and anonymous digital bearer >certificates on a ubiquitous geodesic network. Although I stongly share your overall beliefs in the superiority of digital bearer certificates (DBC), I am much less certain about the intrinsic financial cost differentials. Let's first consider credit cards (CCs). Consumers using CCs, if they choose their bank/agent carefully and settle their monthly statements in full and promptly, pay nothing (directly) for the priviledge of using the cards. One can argue that merchants build the cost of their CC transaction clearance costs into their price structure and therefore every patron, whether using cash or CC, pay for the costs of CC usage (few merchants offer cash discounts). Most walk-in retail merchants, in good standing, pay about 2% in discount (fees). On-line and mail order merchants pay about 3% as do those with a higher rate of chargebacks and/or in grey businesses (e.g., on-line gaming and adult entertainment). These fees represent the costs of operating the CC clearing system (MC, VISA, AMEX, etc.) the bank's overhead and profit. Now let's look at Automatic Clearing House (ACH). ACH is a Federal Reserve service offered by 18,000 financial institutions to 40,000 corporations and generating 2.5 billion transaction per year. It is used by business to pay employees (automatic payroll deposit), automatic debt of consumer checking accounts (periodic payments) and business-to-business transactions (a primitive EDI). Costs of the service are born entirely by the business and rates vary considerably, depending upon volume and depth of business relationship with the bank or service company (e.g., ADP) and how much of the ACH pre-process work is automated or performed by the business. Charges are generally below $0.25 per transaction. The amount of back office processing required for ACH is not inherently different than for CCs. However, there is a significant difference in amount of marketing and distribution costs. It is not unusual for a bank to pay $50-60 to acquire a new CC customer. Compared to the massive CC consumer branding campaigns, there's not much marketing overhead in ACH. Whereas ACH is highly automated and all report generation is already included in the checking account fees (both business and consumer), CCs are often an additional and costly overhead. This is one reason the larger banks have been moving to integrate their consumer relationships into a single monthly statement (e.g., Citibank's "CitiOne"). When clients are convinced that electronic statements over the Net are acceptable this overhead will shrink considerably for both services, but will not be anywhere near zero. Will DBC systems will have lower marketing costs than CC or ACH serving similar customer bases and applications? I think not. Indeed, the case could be made that in order for DBC to gain widespread acceptance over ACH or CC marketing expeditures might need to be consideable. It is not clear that the back office costs of running a mint are any cheaper than a book-entry system (e.g., control and auditing requirements to meet Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and establish/maintain trust) and you still need the book-entry system to occassionally transfer value; to the extent that digital bearer certificates become accepted as legal tender costs should decline, but the regulatory issues increase. However, the ACH and CC system's prices reflect the substantial Fed and CC backbone cost and profit to run their private networks, and it is here that costs for on-line digital bearer certificate systems will have and edge for some time. When one combines the transactional economic advantages of DBC: no customer accounts, statement generation, little or no need for dispute resolution and the economies of using the Net for settlement, with the still considerable marketing costs, the likely differential between DBC and CC/ACH is closer to one order of magnitude at best. This is still considerable, however, and if properly branded and marketed could significantly displace current competition, for lower value transactions. The overhead of CC discounts is keenly watched by merchants. If a trusted DBC issuer/agent offered 1.0% fees (especially to on-line merchants) it would get noticed quickly. --Steve PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."

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http:--www.cnn.com-TECH-9705-04-web.libel.ap-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Tech banner Puzzled about doing real business on the Web? rule CAUTION: ANYTHING YOU POST MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU Libel May 4, 1997 Web posted at: 9:51 p.m. EDT (0151 GMT) In this story: * When slander becomes libel * Privacy issues * E-mail can make it a federal issue * The wrath of large corporations (AP) -- When the Founding Fathers wrote the First Amendment protectingfreedom of the press, they never imagined millions of Americanswould someday have their own version of one sitting in their backrooms. But with the advent of the World Wide Web, that's exactly whathas happened. And from this revolution has emerged a new legalquandary: Just what standards are private individuals to be held towhen it comes to what they "publish" on the millions of Web pagesand other online forums that serve as the world's soapbox? To a great extent, the answer thus far is this: No one knows.With the Web revolution less than 3 years old, a body of case lawhasn't yet been built up. But lawyers who study online issues dohave some observations -- and advice. When slander becomes libel First off, they note, the line between slander, once the realmof individuals, and libel, the bane of publishers, has beenblurred. It used to be that spreading malicious gossip aboutsomeone down at the barbershop could lead to charges of slander.But slander, by definition spoken, was hard to prove and generallydidn't reach enough people to do any major harm. Post that same information where it can be read by millionsonline, however, and you've suddenly entered the realm of libel --governed by stricter laws originally written to cover printpublications. "Let's face it," says Mark Rasch, director of informationsecurity law and policy at the Center for Information Protection atScience Applications International Corp. in McLean, Virginia. "If I wereto print up a handbill saying bad things about my neighbor thatwere false, at most I could distribute a couple of hundred of them.With the Web, I can now damage his reputation worldwide." The law is clear: Libel consists of publishing a false anddefamatory statement about an identifiable person, causing injuryto the subject's reputation. Often tied to it is the legal notionof defamation, defined as that which exposes a person to hatred,ridicule or contempt, causing them to be shunned or injuring theirbusiness or calling. Truth is always a defense against libel, so if your Web pagesays someone has two heads and they do, you're fine. But saythey're a murderer and you can expect someone to come asking forsome proof -- and possibly a bill for damages if you don't have any. Privacy issues Then, there's invasion of privacy. It's one thing to pass alonga juicy bit of gossip to a friend. It's quite another to post it tothe Web. "Let's say, for instance, you disclose some private fact aboutsomebody -- say, their medical records. Or you snuck into theirhouse and took a nudie photo of them and put it up on the Net. Thatwould be a no-no under civil law and they could sue for damages,"says David Banisar, staff counsel for the Electronic PrivacyInformation Center in Washington, D.C. Although few of these cases have actually gone to court, lawyersoften are called in when things get ugly. "I know of a few cases where the ex-husband and ex-wife havegone after each other on the Net," Banisar says. "In oneinstance, the ex-wife put up a diatribe page on what a scumbag hewas and how he wasn't paying his child support -- and gave out hisphone number so suitably angry women could take it up with him." Remember, too, that the Internet's reach magnifies everything inthe eyes of the law. E-mail can make it a federal issue Shouting "You jerk, I'm gonna belt you one!" at a carelessdriver who runs over your mailbox won't get you into trouble. Butposting the threat on the Internet is dangerous. It's all aquestion of reach: Anything done over a telecommunications deviceis automatically an interstate communication. "This suddenly makes it a federal issue if you e-mail,"Banisar warns. State statutes vary, but when federal laws come into effect, anycommunication containing a threat to kidnap or injure a personcarries with it the possibility of imprisonment up to five years ora fine of up to $1,000. And an entirely different level of concern pops up when theobject of the threat is an elected official. Like the "no jokes"signs posted by airport metal detectors, the FBI has no sense ofhumor when it comes to threatening officeholders. "We can't forget all those idiots arrested for sending threatsto the president. So don't send threats to the president overe-mail. It's a federal crime," Banisar says. Fraud is another sticking point. It's illegal everywhere, ofcourse. But the Federal Trade Commission has taken an especiallyhard line against fraud on the Net. Send a snail-mail chain letterasking for money and you might get a call from postal authorities.Try it on the Web, however, and you'll be investigated by the FTCforces who track online scammers. The wrath of large corporations But in the end, the biggest vulnerability of any self-publisheron the Web is probably the wrath of large corporations. You can say their logos are ugly and their presidents are jerksand they don't flinch. But try using any variety of a heavilytrademarked name or image on your site and watch the injunctionsflow. Generally speaking, it's other businesses who get into trouble.But, once in a while, an individual will set out to make a point --and get a legally phrased e-mail in response. Several cases haveresulted in Web sites' being taken down, including individuals whoposted statements against Kmart and McDonald's. Overall, remember that putting words or pictures up on your Webpage is just like publishing them in the newspaper. Use Rasch's simple test: "What you should avoid putting on theWeb is the same stuff you'd avoid putting on leaflets and handingout on the street." Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. rule Related sites and stories: * The Communications Decency Act: Related sites and stories - June 12, 1996 External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. rule Watch these shows on CNN for more sci-tech stories: CNN Computer Connection | Future Watch | Science & Technology Week rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards Tell us what you think! You said it... [INLINE] Puzzled about doing real business on the Web? rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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Re: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tom Weinstein wrote on cryptography(a)c2.net: {With Perry dripping Sameer's sperm from his mouth as his C2Nut Jackboots soiled the message with the following:} [I felt I had to let this go through, but I would advise that those involved restrict themselves to calmer comments from here on... --perry] > sameer wrote: > > > > In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to > > include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this > > so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key > > length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the > > government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich > > Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer > > databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?" > > This is utter crap, and I'm sure you know it. All we're going to do is > provide an OPTIONAL (and I mean really optional, not the way the feds > use it) way for administrators to recover private keys. This is not > GAK. I will never work on a product that includes GAK. > > Oh, but I guess saying that Netscape is responding to customer > requirements by including support for corporate key recovery wouldn't > make such good press release spam. Crap seems to be such a violent, obscene word when used to describe C2Nut's bullshit. Good thing that the cryptography list has Perry to protect the list subscribers from StrangleHold's competition defending themselves from Sameer's self-serving denigration of their products. Too bad C2Nut doesn't have a StrangleHold on the cypherpunks list, as well. Then they could use censorship threats to make us all be good little boys and girls, too. I expect all PR statements to have a modicum of bullshit in them and I resent any lame-fuck-would-be-Hitler trying to put a lid on the response to that bullshit. The fact that StrangleHold seems to have so many things to hide and such a strong need to control discussion of its product indicates to me that perhaps their product cannot stand up to the light of public scrutiny and criticsm. C2Nut's bottle-fed cryptography list may be fine for those who are afraid to know too much about StrangleHold, but anyone who owns a wetsuit needs to subscribe to the cypherpunks list for the good, old-fashioned pissing contests that send the pretenders home with their tails between their legs. (Anyone hear from DataERetch lately?) PissMonger

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Re: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:50 5/02/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: >On Fri, May 02, 1997 at 12:34:19AM -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >The basic point, really, is that organizational complexity grows >with the size of the organization, at a greater than linear rate. >This is because organizational complexity is a function of >interactions between members of the organization, which is at least >n-squared. (However, when you consider that alliances form and can >interact, the true complexity grows at a much faster rate.) You seem to be taken with making all sorts of bare, unsupported claims, obviously with the intention of explaining (for example) away what was apparently an INTENTIONAL increase in the size of Federal government between (say) 1932 and today. To read your paragraph above, its increase in size was simply the unavoidable consequence of nature's laws or something akin to it. Maybe a product of number theory, or the Fibbonacci sequence, exponential increase, or something like that. Which would, if true, remove just about all the blame from those who were in control of the situation. BULLSHIT! Chances are good that at least 75% of the size of the US Federal government today is due to spending that wasn't considered the proper Constitutional function of the government before 1930, and certainly not before 1900 or so. (Large peacetime military, Socialist Insecurity, Welfare, Medicare, Medicaid, interest on national debt caused by deficit spending that occurred due to funding these previous atrocities, etc.) >> But NONE of this is truly needed. I have a solution to that problem. > >Jim, have you considered the interaction between religious beliefs and >AP? You apparently don't have direct knowledge of this, but after a >certain level of economic security has been reached economics becomes >a much less important as a motivator [Maslow]. Other people have blown this claim away, so I don't think I need bounce the rubble further. However, I wonder why you think that people will not resent the theft of their property simply because they've reached "a certain level of economic security."? Frankly, it sounds like yet another of your "let's justify the government through specious arguments" exercises. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 5 May 97 6:45:39 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net *+*#+#+++**# 3:30 99.99% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++++*-++***# 19:39 99.98% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *####*####*# 1:52 99.97% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +-++++++++- 1:54:28 99.94% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +-++-+++++- 1:57:01 99.90% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 35:18 99.90% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++.-.-.---.- 8:18:24 99.87% replay remailer(a)replay.com ***++- * -* 54:35 98.34% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******* *** 8:52 97.43% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -------..- 5:58:48 97.30% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net #+#**#+# + 5:34:09 95.94% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net -+.--+-.+ 1:19:01 90.79% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -..-- 3:59:41 78.48% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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