- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: NIST to propose cryptographic APIs
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:26 PM 06/09/94 -0700, Brad Shantz wrote: >that is a slam at RSA. (as such...Bidzo's seems to think that everyone hates >RSA. Everyone's out to get them.) I believe that tends to happen when one thinks about crypto a lot... -j

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Cypherpunks mail database does exist
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several times people have made comments about there not being an archive of old mail, or that it was not practical to index it. For the record, again, there is a database, it is indexed, and it is fast. Eric Johnson has put one together as: http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src Please don't think that you used to be safe doing something illegal on this list and that you no longer are. That would be foolish. -- Vince

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Re: NIST to propose cryptographic APIs
by bshantz＠spry.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excellent point. From: jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) Subject: Re: NIST to propose cryptographic APIs >>that is a slam at RSA. (as such...Bidzo's seems to think that everyone hates >>RSA. Everyone's out to get them.) >I believe that tends to happen when one thinks about crypto a lot... :::::::::::::::::<<< NETWORKING THE DESKTOP >>>::::::::::::::::: Brad Shantz Internet : bshantz(a)spry.com SPRY Inc Ph# (206) 447-0300 316 Occidental Avenue S. 2nd Floor FAX (206) 447-9008 Seattle, WA 98104 ---------------------------------------------------------------- "In gopherspace no one can hear you scream." ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

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Re: Cop On The Net - Watch Your ***
by jamesh＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Thu Jun 9 23:51:13 1994 > Date: Thu, 9 Jun 1994 20:38:05 -1000 (HST) > From: NetSurfer <jdwilson(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> > Subject: Cop On The Net - Watch Your *** > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9406092005.b20232-b100000(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > > Just when you thought it was safe to surf in the sunlight... > > > -NetSurfer > > #include standard.disclaimer > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> > \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: Fri, 10 Jun 1994 00:13:43 -0400 > From: E-d-u-p-a-g-e <info(a)ivory.educom.edu> > Subject: E-d-u-p-a-g-e 06/09/94 > > CYBERCOP > A former New Jersey police officer now spends his time cruising for > suspects in cyberspace and has been involved in dozens of criminal > investigations, including a sting operation that nabbed a pedophile who > lured young rape victims via a bulletin board service. (Tampa Tribune > 6/8/94 BayLife 5) > > E-MAIL PRIVACY > A survey of 301 companies by Macworld Magazine showed that 78.4% of > the firms do not spy on employee e-mail or search their electronic files. > Sen. Paul Simon (D-Ill.) has drafted legislation requiring that companies > tell their workers that their e-mail might be monitored. (Tampa Tribune > 6/8/94 BayLife 5) > > PAT ROBERTSON EYES VIETNAMESE CABLE TV > Religious broadcaster Pat Robertson wants to build a cable-TV > system in Vietnam and is confident a deal can be struck after meeting with > government and TV officials in Hanoi. The proposed system will use > microwave technology to beam dozens of channels to homes. (Investor's > Business Daily 6/8/94 A9) > > > > > -- JJH -- My loathings are simple: stupidity, oppression, crime, cruelty, soft music. -Vladimir Nabokov

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URGENT: Please Tell Congress to Allow Encryption Export
by gnu＠eff.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

House Intelligence Committee holds key to Crypto Export ask(a)eff.org June 9, 1994 *DISTRIBUTE WIDELY* Today, the U.S. State Department controls the export of most encryption, working closely with the National Security Agency (NSA) to limit products that provide real privacy, from cell-phones to PC software. A bill introduced by Rep. Maria Cantwell would instead give authority over non-military crypto exports to the Commerce Department. Commerce has much more reasonable regulations, with "First Amendment"-style unlimited publishing of publicly available software, including PGP, Kerberos, RIPEM, RSAREF, and mass-market commercial software. The bill also prevents the Commerce Dept. from tightening the regulations even if NSA somehow gets its tentacles into Commerce. A few months ago, you-all sent over 5600 messages to Rep. Cantwell in support of her bill, H.R. 3627. As a result, on May 18, the bill passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by being incorporated into the Export Administration Act of 1994, H.R. 3937. Now the battle has become more intense. This portion of H.R. 3937 has been referred to the House Intelligence Committee with the intent to kill or severely maim it. We need your help again, to urge the Intelligence Committee to keep crypto export liberalization intact. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the only watchdogs for the NSA, tend to follow the agency's wishes when they wave the magic "national security" wand. They need plenty of input from the public that tells them that the nation will be *more* secure with good encryption, even though the NSA will be less happy. Not just computer users, but all users of telephones, cable TV, health care, and credit information systems would benefit from this change. The security of these applications is built on the foundation laid by the operating systems and network protocols on which they run. If this bill is passed, you will see high quality encryption built into Microsoft Windows, into the MacOS, into major Unix workstations, into the Internet, into cellular phones, into interactive television. The software already exists for confidentiality, privacy, and security of local and networked information, but it's not built-in to these systems because of the export ban. Today, each company could build two operating systems, one gutted for international use, but this would be costly and confusing for them and their customers, and would not allow international networks such as the Internet or telephones to be made secure and private. With this bill, these limits disappear. Furthermore, the Clinton Administration plans to permit high volume exports of Clipper products, while continuing to require tedious paperwork for truly secure encryption products. The bill would give Clipper and other crypto software more even-handed treatment. The bill also eliminates a senseless situation on the Internet. Today, crypto software can only be freely distributed from non-U.S. archive sites. It would eliminate that problem as well as the threat of prosecution against U.S. freeware authors of crypto software. This is the dream we've all been working toward. Here's how you can help to make this dream a reality. The Intelligence Committee must make its decision on the bill before June 17, so time is critical: 1) Fax a short letter TODAY to the chair of the Intelligence Committee, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS). Ask him in your own words to leave the encryption provisions of H.R. 3937 intact. Use a positive tone ("Please support...") rather than a flame or a rant. One paragraph is fine. State your title and organization if you will look more important or better informed than the average citizen. Rep. Glickman's committee fax number is +1 202 225 1991. This is the best option, since individual letters are given the most weight by members of Congress, particularly when sent on letterhead paper. 2) If you are unable to fax a letter, send an e-mail message to Rep. Glickman at glickman(a)eff.org. Software or staff at the Electronic Frontier Foundation will either fax it in, or print it out and hand-deliver it for you. 3) Send a copy of this message to everyone you know in Kansas, and personally urge them to write to Rep. Glickman today. Letters from constituents get a lot more weight, since they are from people who could actually vote for or against him in the next election. 4) If your own Representative is on the Intelligence Committee, send him or her a copy of what you sent Rep. Glickman. There's a list of all such Reps. below. Even if we lose this battle, you will have started educating your own Rep. about crypto policy. 5) Become a member of EFF. Our strength comes from our members' strength. Send a note to membership(a)eff.org asking how to join. Thanks again for your help! You can check at any time on the current status of the campaign at the location below. Send any comments on this campaign to campaign(a)eff.org. John Gilmore Chairman, EFF Crypto Committee EFF Board of Directors Member of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Member of International Association for Cryptologic Research House Intelligence Committee Members ------------------------------------ Subcommittee phone: +1 202 225 4121 Subcommittee fax: +1 202 225 1991 <== send your fax HERE <== p st name phone fax ___________________________________________________________________________ D KS Glickman, Daniel +1 202 225 6216 private Chair D WA Dicks, Norman D. +1 202 225 5916 +1 202 226 1176 D CA Dixon, Julian C. +1 202 225 7084 +1 202 225 4091 D NJ Torricelli, Robert +1 202 224 5061 +1 202 225 0843 D TX Coleman, Ronald D. +1 202 225 4831 +1 202 225 4831 D CO Skaggs, David E. +1 202 225 2161 +1 202 225 9127 D NV Bilbray, James H. +1 202 225 5965 +1 202 225 8808 D CA Pelosi, Nancy +1 202 225 4965 +1 202 225 8259 D TX Laughlin, Gregory H. +1 202 225 2831 +1 202 225 1108 D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud) +1 202 225 4801 private D RI Reed, John F. +1 202 225 2735 +1 202 225 9580 D MO Gephardt, Richard A. +1 202 225 2671 +1 202 225 7452 R TX Combest, Larry +1 202 225 4005 +1 202 225 9615 R NE Bereuter, Douglas +1 202 225 4806 +1 202 226 1148 R CA Dornan, Robert K. +1 202 225 2965 +1 202 225 3694 R FL Young, C. W. (Bill) +1 202 225 5961 +1 202 225 9764 R PA Gekas, George W. +1 202 225 4315 +1 202 225 8440 R UT Hansen, James V. +1 202 225 0453 +1 202 225 5857 R CA Lewis, Jerry +1 202 225 5861 +1 202 225 6498 R IL Michel, Robert H. +1 202 225 6201 +1 202 225 9461 The full text of this alert is stored at: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export.alert gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export.alert http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export.alert BBS (+1 202 638 6120, 8N1): "Alerts" file area, export.alt The actual text of this part of H.R. 3937 is at: ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export, hr3937_crypto.excerpt http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt BBS: "Privacy--Crypto" file area, hr3937.crp For current status on the bill: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export_alert.update gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export_alert.update http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export_alert.update BBS: "Alerts" file area, export.upd A general Web page on crypto export policy is at: http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html

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Re: Delayed self-encrypting messages
by dfloyd＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Begin Included Message -----

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Time Locks-- Re: Delayed self-encrypting messages
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>----- Begin Included Message ----- > >>From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Fri Jun 10 15:13 CDT 1994 >Date: Fri, 10 Jun 1994 13:04:07 -0700 >From: Paul Schauble <pls(a)crl.com> >To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Delayed self-encrypting messages >Precedence: bulk > >I have a need to distribute some information fairly widely, but it's >critical that it not be openly revealed before a certain date. Consider the >model of an embargoed press release. > >Can I do this with crypto technology? Can I send someone a message, and >possible a program, such that the message can only be decrypted after a >predetermined date? > > > > ++PLS > > > >----- End Included Message ----- > >You could do the simple way, distribute the message, then a key at the >later date. To make sure the encrypted message is genuine, sign the message >encrypt it, then sign it again, to ensure that people know that the >encrypted text is okay. This is a good method, but let's say that you die in between? What happens? I wrote a paper on Crypto Time Locks that is a fair to okay solution. It was a loose extension on a scheme from Crypto 92 for reducing Junk Mail. Here's a summary: What you want is an encryption function f and its inverse f' such that computing f' takes some factor of n times longer than f. So if you want to lock things up for 128 days and you're willing to put in 1 day of computation time, then you look for a pair of f and f' such that n=128. One example of such a pair is DES with 48 bits of the key fixed. The locker chooses the extra 8 bits at random. The unlocker tries all 256 combinations until the correct answer is found. Actually, you want to don't want to use DES, you want to use a variant that I'll call k-DES for lack of a better name at this time. k-DES is DES with more than 16 rounds. It is DES with enough rounds to make it run for k units of time on the fastest, commonly available RISC chip. Note that this is an inherently serial computation. A better approach would probably be to use some sort of triple DES variation with more fixed bits to prevent birthday attacks. This simple version is succeptable to attacks by parallel machines. There are better versions that I don't have time to describe at this moment. You can also construct pairs of f and f' using public key functions. When you need to choose one of the two keys, set one to be 3 or 5 or some small number. That means that exponentiation for locking (encryption) will only take log(3) steps. But decryption could take log(X) steps where X is the other key. Note that the "strength" of RSA is not being used in this case. Everyone knows both keys. But decrypting with one is still a factor of n times longer. Copies of the extended paper are available to anyone curious. -Peter Wayner

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Delayed self-encrypting messages
by Paul Schauble 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a need to distribute some information fairly widely, but it's critical that it not be openly revealed before a certain date. Consider the model of an embargoed press release. Can I do this with crypto technology? Can I send someone a message, and possible a program, such that the message can only be decrypted after a predetermined date? ++PLS

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Re: DES w/ variable S-boxes
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:32 PM 6/15/94 -0400, Rick Busdiecker wrote: > Date: Wed, 15 Jun 1994 17:32:24 -0700 > From: Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu > > Are there any implementations of DES-variants that use variable S-boxes? > >Well, if you don't use the DES S-boxes then it isn't DES :-) Well...yeah.... >Variable boxes tend to weaken DES. The DES S-boxes were chosen to >make differential cryptanalysis difficult. Random S-boxes don't tend >to have this desirable property. Perhaps I should clarify: not DES with randomly-chosen fixed S-boxes; I'm well aware that those that DES uses are the best for differential cryptanalysis. However, as Bruce Schneier points out (p. 242), *variable* S-boxes make differential cryptanalysis impossilbe, as such an adaptive plaintext attack relies on knowledge of the composition of the S-boxes. If the boxes and their contents change with both keys used and plaintext--probably with the help of a strong RNG--then the only way such an attack could work would be by first figuring out what causes the changes in the S-boxes; in that case, the attack is probably already finished, by other means. Perhaps, even, the S-boxes could change with so many chunks of text--again, variable, of course. Most, if not all, of the actual S-box designs used would be much weaker than the original design of DES for differential cryptanalysis. However, each different plaintext (and key) would use different s-boxes, so that particular attack isn't possible. So, I guess part of my question should be, does this open up other attacks? Or, for that matter, am I completely wrong? And, like I said before, has this been done? >Use IDEA. Certainly, until there's something better. I'm just hoping this might be, or that I can learn more along the way. > Rick And thanks to Bill and Lyman, who also responded similarly. b& PS Hopefully, I'll learn to check the Cc: line more carefully in the future. Apologies again for the noise. b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

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NetCenter Member Services - VeriSign Digital ID Request
by id-center＠verisign.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear NetCenter Member: Thank you for requesting information about VeriSign Digital IDs from Netscape's Netcenter. A VeriSign Digital ID provides a means of proving your identity in electronic transactions, much like a driver license or a passport does in face-to-face interactions. By using your Verisign Digital ID you can: *Sign your e-mail. Recipients are assured that the information they receive is from you, and hasn't been altered in any way by outside tampering. *Encrypt and decrypt e-mail. This assures no one except the intended recipient can view its contents. In addition: VeriSign's new public directory is your "white pages" for Digital IDs. Look up anyone's Digital ID. Then send and receive signed and encrypted e-mail -- all from within Netscape Messenger. (If you use another email package you can still easily access the directory from VeriSign's web site.) Your browser will automatically store your Digital ID and present it for you at participating sites. This means no longer remembering multiple passwords to gain access to these sites. You automatically receive the peace-of-mind of US $1,000 NetSure(sm) protection against economic loss caused by corruption, loss or misuse of your Digital ID (not available with free trial ID). For more information about Digital IDs and how they are used, please visit http://www.verisign.com/products/individual/index.html. To enroll for a VeriSign Class 1 Digital ID, please complete the form below, read our Subscriber Agreement, then click the Accept button. If you are not using Netscape Mail, you may not be able to view the form below. Please visit our Digital ID Center at http://digitalid.verisign.com/class1Netscape.htm to enroll for your free Class 1 Digital ID. Title: VeriSign Class 1 Digital ID STEP 1: Contents of Your Digital ID. This information is included in the Digital ID which is available to the public. NOTE: Please complete with no punctuation. Please use only the English alphabet with no accented characters. First name: Last name: Email address: Include email address in your Digital ID? Yes No Answer Yes to use your ID for sending and receiving secure email. STEP 2: Easy Web Site Registration You have the option of including this one-step registration information in your Digital ID (which is also available to the public), in order to use it for "one-step registration" at participating websites and customized information services. Personalize your Digital ID? YesNo Country: Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada China Denmark Finland France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Mexico Netherlands Norway Philippines Singapore South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan United Kingdom United States Other Countries Zip or postal code: Date of birth:(MMDDYYYY) (Example: 12251966) Male Female STEP 3: Choose a Challenge Phrase A challenge phrase enables you to cancel and replace your Digital ID (i.e., if you change computers, software, etc). The challenge phrase is only known by you and should be kept in a safe place - you must have it to cancel your Digital ID if it is compromised or stolen. Challenge phrase: No punctuation, please. STEP 4: Choose Full Service Class 1 Digital ID or 60 day Free Trial A full service Digital ID comes with these features: Send and receive secure e-mail (via S/MIME) Replaces passwords and enables one-step registration at participating websites VeriSign Customer Care, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week Automatic Enrollment in $1,000 NetSureSM Protection Plan Free replacement and revocation of your Digital ID should it be lost or corrupted I'd like a full service Digital ID for only US$9.95. (Please complete Step 5.) I'd like to test drive a 60-day trial Digital ID for free. (does not include revocation, replacement, the NetSure Protection Plan or premium customer care) STEP 5: Finalize Enrollment Your Digital ID is valid for a one year period. Your credit card will be charged US$9.95 when you click the Accept button below. All enrollment and credit card information is transmitted securely using the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. This information is kept confidential and is not included in your Digital ID. Card type: Visa MasterCard Discover American Express Card number: Expiration date: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 97 98 99 00 01 02 Name on card: Street number: Street name: Apt. #: City: State/Province: Zip/Postal Code: Country: Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada China Denmark Finland France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Mexico Netherlands Norway South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States Other Countries PLEASE READ THIS SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT BEFORE APPLYING FOR, ACCEPTING, OR USING A DIGITAL ID/CERTIFICATE. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT, PLEASE DO NOT APPLY FOR, ACCEPT, OR USE THE DIGITAL ID (CERTIFICATE). THIS SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT will become effective on the date you submit the certificate application to the designated issuing authority (IA). By submitting this Subscriber Agreement (and certificate application) you are requesting that the IA issue a Digital ID (certificate) to you and are expressing your agreement to the terms of this Subscriber Agreement. VeriSign's Public Certification Services are governed by VeriSign's Certification Practice Statement (the "CPS") as amended from time to time, which is incorporated by reference into this Subscriber Agreement. The CPS is published on the Internet in VeriSign's repository at https://www.verisign.com/repository and ftp://ftp.verisign.com/repository/CPS and is available via E-mail from: CPS-requests(a)verisign.com. Amendments to the CPS are also posted in VeriSign's repository at https://www.verisign.com/repository/updates. YOU AGREE TO USE THE DIGITAL ID (CERTIFICATE) AND ANY RELATED IA SERVICES ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CPS. NETSURE(SM) NOTICE: THE NETSURE(SM) CERTIFICATES ISSUED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT AND OTHER AGREEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTIVE DATES UNDER THE NETSURE(SM) PROTECTION PLAN ("PLAN") ARE LISTED AT HTTPS://WWW.VERISIGN.COM/REPOSITORY/NSCERTS.HTML. EFFECTIVE MAY 30, 1997, IF YOU OBTAINED A NETSURE(SM) CERTIFICATE, THE PLAN PROVIDES YOU WITH CERTAIN LIMITED WARRANTIES, DISCLAIMS ALL OTHER WARANTIES, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND LIMITS LIABILITY. FOR INFORMATION ON THE PLAN, SEE HTTPS://WWW.VERISIGN.COM/REPOSITORY/NETSURE. OTHERWISE, THE IA PROVIDES LIMITED WARRANTIES, DISCLAIMS ALL OTHER WARANTIES, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, LIMITS LIABILITY, AND EXCLUDES ALL LIABILITY FOR INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS STATED IN THE CPS. SEE THE CPS FOR IMPORTANT DETAILS. YOU DEMONSTRATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THIS SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT BY EITHER (I) SUBMITTING AN APPLICATION FOR A DIGITAL ID (CERTIFICATE) TO VERISIGN, OR (II) USING THE DIGITAL ID (CERTIFICATE), WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST. Read CPS or Download CPS If you agree to the terms of the Subscriber Agreement, please click Accept to continue. Optional Enhancement If you use the standard version of Netscape Navigator or Communicator, choose 512 from the list below. If you use the US-only version, you can choose 768 or 1024 for greater security. Copyright © 1997, VeriSign, Inc.

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