- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

I will be in Detroit/Cleveland/Akron area this weekend
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

...and cities between. I could also stop in Ann Arbor. Any cypherpunks in these towns who want to sign keys, etc, email asap; I might not be able to retrieve it after I depart. Be seeing you, Scott Collins | "That's not fair!" -- Sarah | "You say that so often. I wonder what your basis 408.862.0540 | for comparison is." -- Goblin King ................|.................................................... BUSINESS. fax:974.6094 R254(IL5-2N) collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2D Cupertino, CA 95014 ..................................................................... PERSONAL. 408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Remailer Chaining Security?
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What level of security is achieved by the practice of "chaining" messages through various "anonymous remailers"? Do these servers not keeps logs by which a post could be traced back through the chain to the source? If there is a REAL level of security afforded, then the question arises "how much is enough"? =======

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CYBERSPACE IS BY NAT
by bmorris＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com ZZ> Something which is as legalistically demented as ITAR not allowing ZZ> PGP EXE to be exported but which does allow the source and detailed ZZ> format changes to be exported! ZZ> Ah, but it doesn't. Not in any online and useful format. Submitting Hmmm, I thought the MIT FTP site had the source and file formats available for anyone to download, regardless of geographical location. * RM 1.4 B0037 *

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Re: Remailer Chaining Security?
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)shell.portal.com wrote >>> | What level of security is achieved by the practice of "chaining" | | messages through various "anonymous remailers"? Do these servers | | not keeps logs by which a post could be traced back through the | | chain to the source? If there is a REAL level of security | | afforded, then the question arises "how much is enough"? | Yes. If you use only one remailer, and that remailer keeps logs, then it makes it trivial for the remailer operator to find out who sent the message. If you chain remailers, then it makes it more difficult to trace it back, but the first remailer can see the source and destination, which means someone could find out if they looked. However, if you chain and use PGP, it requires the cooperation of all remailer operators involved. If someone really tried to get a lot of remailer operators to cooperate in tracing a message, someone's going to make a stink about it. Now there is the traffic analysis problem, and the time-correlation problem. This can be solved by using the slower (UUCP) remailers. "How much is enough" is something you must decide for yourself. BTW: Which remailers keep logs? Mine does... I think Chael Hall and Hal Finney do. And catalyst doesn't (or didn't awhile ago). What about the rest?

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Loompanics is online
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Looking at some old cypherpunks mail from Tim May: >Enjoy finding and reading these. But your first priority should be to >get the Loompanics catalog...other books may spark your interest more. >I think the catalog is still $5 (well worth it), unless you order >another book first, as described below. I thought it might be worth pointing out that most of their catalog is now online as: gopher://gopher.well.sf.ca.us/00/Business/catalog.asc And you can send mail to them at: loompanx(a)pt.olympus.net -- Vince

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Re: NIST to propose cryptographic APIs
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:26 PM 06/09/94 -0700, Brad Shantz wrote: >that is a slam at RSA. (as such...Bidzo's seems to think that everyone hates >RSA. Everyone's out to get them.) I believe that tends to happen when one thinks about crypto a lot... -j

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Cypherpunks mail database does exist
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several times people have made comments about there not being an archive of old mail, or that it was not practical to index it. For the record, again, there is a database, it is indexed, and it is fast. Eric Johnson has put one together as: http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src Please don't think that you used to be safe doing something illegal on this list and that you no longer are. That would be foolish. -- Vince

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Re: NIST to propose cryptographic APIs
by bshantz＠spry.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excellent point. From: jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) Subject: Re: NIST to propose cryptographic APIs >>that is a slam at RSA. (as such...Bidzo's seems to think that everyone hates >>RSA. Everyone's out to get them.) >I believe that tends to happen when one thinks about crypto a lot... :::::::::::::::::<<< NETWORKING THE DESKTOP >>>::::::::::::::::: Brad Shantz Internet : bshantz(a)spry.com SPRY Inc Ph# (206) 447-0300 316 Occidental Avenue S. 2nd Floor FAX (206) 447-9008 Seattle, WA 98104 ---------------------------------------------------------------- "In gopherspace no one can hear you scream." ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

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Re: Cop On The Net - Watch Your ***
by jamesh＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Thu Jun 9 23:51:13 1994 > Date: Thu, 9 Jun 1994 20:38:05 -1000 (HST) > From: NetSurfer <jdwilson(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> > Subject: Cop On The Net - Watch Your *** > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9406092005.b20232-b100000(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > > Just when you thought it was safe to surf in the sunlight... > > > -NetSurfer > > #include standard.disclaimer > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> > \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: Fri, 10 Jun 1994 00:13:43 -0400 > From: E-d-u-p-a-g-e <info(a)ivory.educom.edu> > Subject: E-d-u-p-a-g-e 06/09/94 > > CYBERCOP > A former New Jersey police officer now spends his time cruising for > suspects in cyberspace and has been involved in dozens of criminal > investigations, including a sting operation that nabbed a pedophile who > lured young rape victims via a bulletin board service. (Tampa Tribune > 6/8/94 BayLife 5) > > E-MAIL PRIVACY > A survey of 301 companies by Macworld Magazine showed that 78.4% of > the firms do not spy on employee e-mail or search their electronic files. > Sen. Paul Simon (D-Ill.) has drafted legislation requiring that companies > tell their workers that their e-mail might be monitored. (Tampa Tribune > 6/8/94 BayLife 5) > > PAT ROBERTSON EYES VIETNAMESE CABLE TV > Religious broadcaster Pat Robertson wants to build a cable-TV > system in Vietnam and is confident a deal can be struck after meeting with > government and TV officials in Hanoi. The proposed system will use > microwave technology to beam dozens of channels to homes. (Investor's > Business Daily 6/8/94 A9) > > > > > -- JJH -- My loathings are simple: stupidity, oppression, crime, cruelty, soft music. -Vladimir Nabokov

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URGENT: Please Tell Congress to Allow Encryption Export
by gnu＠eff.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

House Intelligence Committee holds key to Crypto Export ask(a)eff.org June 9, 1994 *DISTRIBUTE WIDELY* Today, the U.S. State Department controls the export of most encryption, working closely with the National Security Agency (NSA) to limit products that provide real privacy, from cell-phones to PC software. A bill introduced by Rep. Maria Cantwell would instead give authority over non-military crypto exports to the Commerce Department. Commerce has much more reasonable regulations, with "First Amendment"-style unlimited publishing of publicly available software, including PGP, Kerberos, RIPEM, RSAREF, and mass-market commercial software. The bill also prevents the Commerce Dept. from tightening the regulations even if NSA somehow gets its tentacles into Commerce. A few months ago, you-all sent over 5600 messages to Rep. Cantwell in support of her bill, H.R. 3627. As a result, on May 18, the bill passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by being incorporated into the Export Administration Act of 1994, H.R. 3937. Now the battle has become more intense. This portion of H.R. 3937 has been referred to the House Intelligence Committee with the intent to kill or severely maim it. We need your help again, to urge the Intelligence Committee to keep crypto export liberalization intact. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the only watchdogs for the NSA, tend to follow the agency's wishes when they wave the magic "national security" wand. They need plenty of input from the public that tells them that the nation will be *more* secure with good encryption, even though the NSA will be less happy. Not just computer users, but all users of telephones, cable TV, health care, and credit information systems would benefit from this change. The security of these applications is built on the foundation laid by the operating systems and network protocols on which they run. If this bill is passed, you will see high quality encryption built into Microsoft Windows, into the MacOS, into major Unix workstations, into the Internet, into cellular phones, into interactive television. The software already exists for confidentiality, privacy, and security of local and networked information, but it's not built-in to these systems because of the export ban. Today, each company could build two operating systems, one gutted for international use, but this would be costly and confusing for them and their customers, and would not allow international networks such as the Internet or telephones to be made secure and private. With this bill, these limits disappear. Furthermore, the Clinton Administration plans to permit high volume exports of Clipper products, while continuing to require tedious paperwork for truly secure encryption products. The bill would give Clipper and other crypto software more even-handed treatment. The bill also eliminates a senseless situation on the Internet. Today, crypto software can only be freely distributed from non-U.S. archive sites. It would eliminate that problem as well as the threat of prosecution against U.S. freeware authors of crypto software. This is the dream we've all been working toward. Here's how you can help to make this dream a reality. The Intelligence Committee must make its decision on the bill before June 17, so time is critical: 1) Fax a short letter TODAY to the chair of the Intelligence Committee, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS). Ask him in your own words to leave the encryption provisions of H.R. 3937 intact. Use a positive tone ("Please support...") rather than a flame or a rant. One paragraph is fine. State your title and organization if you will look more important or better informed than the average citizen. Rep. Glickman's committee fax number is +1 202 225 1991. This is the best option, since individual letters are given the most weight by members of Congress, particularly when sent on letterhead paper. 2) If you are unable to fax a letter, send an e-mail message to Rep. Glickman at glickman(a)eff.org. Software or staff at the Electronic Frontier Foundation will either fax it in, or print it out and hand-deliver it for you. 3) Send a copy of this message to everyone you know in Kansas, and personally urge them to write to Rep. Glickman today. Letters from constituents get a lot more weight, since they are from people who could actually vote for or against him in the next election. 4) If your own Representative is on the Intelligence Committee, send him or her a copy of what you sent Rep. Glickman. There's a list of all such Reps. below. Even if we lose this battle, you will have started educating your own Rep. about crypto policy. 5) Become a member of EFF. Our strength comes from our members' strength. Send a note to membership(a)eff.org asking how to join. Thanks again for your help! You can check at any time on the current status of the campaign at the location below. Send any comments on this campaign to campaign(a)eff.org. John Gilmore Chairman, EFF Crypto Committee EFF Board of Directors Member of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Member of International Association for Cryptologic Research House Intelligence Committee Members ------------------------------------ Subcommittee phone: +1 202 225 4121 Subcommittee fax: +1 202 225 1991 <== send your fax HERE <== p st name phone fax ___________________________________________________________________________ D KS Glickman, Daniel +1 202 225 6216 private Chair D WA Dicks, Norman D. +1 202 225 5916 +1 202 226 1176 D CA Dixon, Julian C. +1 202 225 7084 +1 202 225 4091 D NJ Torricelli, Robert +1 202 224 5061 +1 202 225 0843 D TX Coleman, Ronald D. +1 202 225 4831 +1 202 225 4831 D CO Skaggs, David E. +1 202 225 2161 +1 202 225 9127 D NV Bilbray, James H. +1 202 225 5965 +1 202 225 8808 D CA Pelosi, Nancy +1 202 225 4965 +1 202 225 8259 D TX Laughlin, Gregory H. +1 202 225 2831 +1 202 225 1108 D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud) +1 202 225 4801 private D RI Reed, John F. +1 202 225 2735 +1 202 225 9580 D MO Gephardt, Richard A. +1 202 225 2671 +1 202 225 7452 R TX Combest, Larry +1 202 225 4005 +1 202 225 9615 R NE Bereuter, Douglas +1 202 225 4806 +1 202 226 1148 R CA Dornan, Robert K. +1 202 225 2965 +1 202 225 3694 R FL Young, C. W. (Bill) +1 202 225 5961 +1 202 225 9764 R PA Gekas, George W. +1 202 225 4315 +1 202 225 8440 R UT Hansen, James V. +1 202 225 0453 +1 202 225 5857 R CA Lewis, Jerry +1 202 225 5861 +1 202 225 6498 R IL Michel, Robert H. +1 202 225 6201 +1 202 225 9461 The full text of this alert is stored at: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export.alert gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export.alert http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export.alert BBS (+1 202 638 6120, 8N1): "Alerts" file area, export.alt The actual text of this part of H.R. 3937 is at: ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export, hr3937_crypto.excerpt http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt BBS: "Privacy--Crypto" file area, hr3937.crp For current status on the bill: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export_alert.update gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export_alert.update http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export_alert.update BBS: "Alerts" file area, export.upd A general Web page on crypto export policy is at: http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html

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