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Netscape + Verifone
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My pager delivers me selected miniaturized Reuters news stories. I just got one that reads: REDWOOD CITY, CA - Netscape Communications Corp. and Verifone Inc. will devise a system to make electronic payments on the internet more secure. Anyone know anything about this? I'm away from my normal sources of such things (like Bloomberg terminals)... .pm

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InfoWarCon Europe 1996 Updated Schedule
by winn＠Infowar.Com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Revised Short Draft DOI: 18 Jan 96 ---------- P L E A S E D I S T R I B U T E W I D E L Y InfoWarCon (Europe) '96 Defining the European Perspective Brussels, Belgium May 23-24 1996 Sponsored by: National Computer Security Association Winn Schwartau, President and CEO, Interpact, Inc. Robert David Steele, Chairman & CEO, Open Source Solutions Group May 22, 1996 17:00 - 20:00 Pre-Registration 18:00 - 21:00 Hosted Cocktail Party with Music Most conference speakers will be in attendance. Meet Mr. Schwartau and Mr. Steele. May 23, 1995 07:00 - 08:30 Registration 07:00 - 08:30 Sponsored Continental Breakfast PLENARY SESSIONS 08:30 - 09:00 Keynote Speech Major General William Robbins Director General of Information and Communications Services Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom (Invited) 09:00 - 10:00 "Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway" Winn Schwartau, President and CEO, Interpact, Inc., USA 10:00 - 11:15 East Versus West: Military Views of Information Warfare Moderator: Robert Steele East: General Nikolai Ivanovich Turko, Information Warfare Expert Russia (invited) West: Captain Patrick Tyrell Assistant Director, Information Warfare Policy, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 11:15 - 11:45 Sponsored Break 11:45 - 13:00 Law Enforcement in Cyberspace: Cooperation is the Key Moderator: Winn Schwartau Miguel Chyamorro, (invited) Executive Assistant Director, Interpol Sweden Netherlands--Rotterdam Police (invited) 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch 13:30 - 14:00 Special Luncheon Presentation BREAKOUT SESSIONS 14:30 - 16:00 Breakout I: Threats to European Civil Prosperity Moderator: Winn Schwartau:) Private Businesses Germany, France, UK Breakout II: Information Warfare: Support for Conventional War Fighting Moderator: SHAPE - NATO (invited) Panel: US - Gen. Jim McCarthy USAF (Ret) Russia: Admiral Vladimir Semenovich Pirumov (Ret) Chairman of Scientific Counsel of the Russian Security Counsel (invited) Sweden - (Invited) 16:00-16:30 Sponsored Break PLENARY SESSION 16:30 - 18:00 "Hackers: National Resources or Merely Cyber-Criminals?" Co-Moderators: Mich Kabay, Ph.D., Director of Education, NCSA and Robert Steele, President, OSS, Inc. Panel: Rop Gonggrijp - Hactic and The Digital City Amsterdam, Netherlands Chris Goggans, co-founder Leagion of Doom, US CHAOS Computer Club, Germany (invited) "Frantic" Convicted French Hacker (invited) 18:00 - 21:00 Hosted Reception 21:00 - 23:00 "Dutch Dinners" for Birds of a Feather Rallying points will be provided. May 24, 1996 07:00 - 8:30 Sponsored Continental Breakfast 08:30 - 9:00 Keynote Speech "Efforts to Maximize Information As New Age Weapon" General Pichot-Duclos, France PLENARY SESSIONS 9:00 - 10:00 "Creating Smart Nations Through National Information Strategies: Intelligence And Security Issues" Robert David Steele, President, OSS, Inc. US 10:00 - 11:15 "The Convergence of Military and Commercial Vulnerabilities" Moderator: Winn Schwartau Panel: Bob Ayers, DISA, Department of Defense, US Dr. Leroy Pearce, Sr. Tech. Advisor, representing MajGen Leech, Asst. Dep. Minister, Defence Information Services, Canada Holland / Belgium Captain. Pat Tyrell, Ministry of Defence, UK 11:15 - 11:45 Sponsored Break 11:45 - 13:00 Societal Impact of Information Warfare Moderator: Winn Schwartau, Panel: The Croatian View: Pedrag Pale, Chairman InfoTech Coordinating Committee, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Informatics. General James McCarthy (ret) US 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch 13:30-14:00 Special Luncheon Presentation BREAKOUT SESSIONS 14:30 - 16:00 Breakout I: Legislation & Personal Privacy: A Global Electronic Bill of Rights? Moderator: Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA Simon Davies, Electronic Privacy International, UK Breakout II: "Industrial Espionage: An Update" Moderator: Winn Schwartau Phillipe Parant, Diecteur, DST, France (invited) Miguel Chamorro, Exec. Director, Interpol (invited) Kroll Associates US 16:00 - 16:30 Sponsored Break PLENARY 16:30 - 18:00 Defining War in the Information Age "The New National Security" Brief comments by Winn Schwartau and Robert Steele - and then a lively interactive audience debate. 18:00 - 18:10 Closing Comments 18:00 - 20:00 No-Host Reception To obtain the latest edition of this program, send EMail to: euroinfowar(a)ncsa.com For more information about NCSA: WWW: http://www.ncsa.com CompuServe: GO NCSA EMail: info(a)ncsa.com Sponsorships for various InfoWarCon (Europe) 96 events are still available. To find out how to sponsor portions: Contact Paul Gates at the NCSA: pgates(a)ncsa.com To reach: Winn Schwartau: Winn(a)Infowar.Com Robert Steele: ceo(a)oss.net V 1.3/1.18.96-Short Peace Winn Winn Schwartau - Interpact, Inc. Information Warfare and InfoSec V: 813.393.6600 / F: 813.393.6361 Winn(a)InfoWar.Com

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ecash
by Juzzy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I'm new to this mailing list and i was wondering if someone could post me some information on ecash, what it is, and its implementation. Thank You Justin Walker

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request mailing list
by an253362＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

please include in mailing list --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Re: Lan Manager security
by daw＠beijing.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9601221620.AA11356(a)capybara.transarc.com>, <lws(a)transarc.com> wrote: [ ... the LanMan / Samba(?) password authentication protocol ... ] > The password is uppercased and truncated to 14 bytes (or padded to 14 > bytes with nulls). This is split (0..6,7..13) into two DES keys > which are each used to encrypt a static 8-byte value. The resulting > 16 byte key is stored at the server. [...] > To authenticate a connection, the server issues an 8 byte random challenge. [...] > The client then pads the 16-byte key to 21 bytes (with zeros, natch), > splits it in thirds, {0..6}, {7..13}, {14,15,NUL,NUL,NUL,NUL,NUL}, > uses each third to DES-encrypt the challenge, concatenates the > ciphertexts, and returns the response to the server. Oh yeah, this protocol again. I remember looking at it a while ago; many thanks to Andy Brown <a.brown(a)nexor.co.uk>, who showed it to me and kindly gave me lots of information. It's pretty crappy, IMHO. It's very weak against dictionary attacks (assuming I have a sniffer). For instance, if you use a password which is less than 12-14 characters long, it will be very easy to recover bytes 7..13 of your password. After that, it will often be simple enough to extend the password backwards if it is based on a dictionary word; even if the password is purely random, this reduces the strength of the password to an effective length of 7 bytes. Also, there is no salt used in the password hashing function, so precomputed dictionary attacks are easy (e.g. the "Exabyte attack", where you precompute the hash of each likely password and store each result on a huge tape.) Unfortunately, I don't have time right now to follow up with a sample exploit program or anything. Sorry 'bout that. Microsoft should have used a real crypto-quality hash function (e.g. MD5), instead of trying to synthesize one from multiple concatenations of DES. The technical details on the attacks follow. Call the bytes of the password P_0 .. P_13, the 16-byte key K_0 .. K_15, and the response R_0 .. R_23; and call the challenge C and the static 8-byte server key S; K is generated by DES encrypting S with P, and R by DES encrypting C with K. I know C,R and want to find P_7 .. P_13. First, try all possible values of K_14, K_15; the right value can be recognized when C_16 .. C_23 encrypts to R_16 .. R_23 under K_14, K_15, 0, 0, 0, .. Now that we know K_14, K_15, I can try the likely values of P_7 .. P_13; wrong values can be quickly discarded by trial encrypting S under P_7 .. P_13 and noting whether the last two bytes of the ciphertext equal K_14, K_15. Each remaining guess for P_7 .. P_13 gives me a candidate for K_8 .. K_13; I can check all K_7 possibilities to see if there's any for which C_8 .. C_15 encrypts to R_8 .. R_15 under the K_7 .. K_13 candidate. If there is such a K_7, the guess for P_7 .. P_13 is almost certainly correct; if not, try another candidate for P_7 .. P_13. If there are N likely values of P_7 .. P_13, this recovers the true value of P_7 .. P_13 with about N trial encryptions. Note that there is no salt used; in fact, if I'm willing to do N precomputed trial encryptions, recovering the true value of P_7 .. P_13 takes N / 2^16 work. Once I've found P_7 .. P_13, if I'm willing to do M precomputations [where M is the number of likely values of P_0 .. P_6], then recovering the true value of P_0 .. P_6 can be done with about M / 2^8 trial encryptions. (If I'm not willing to do precomputations, it'll take M trials.) Did that make any sense? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMQQYSioZzwIn1bdtAQFKkAGAqcC2ZoZsSHEUiqU8envvqHLI9vfi4xnf aexUGBX10peIeh3TSzq9RcMU2c8FxT45 =xQGr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CIA Stashes and Looted Gold?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

U.S. Hid Weapons In Austria Vienna, Austria, Jan 21 (AP) -- Fearful of a Soviet takeover after World War II, the United States hid at least 79 weapons caches in Austria for anti-communist partisans. According to the newspaper Kurier, a U.S. congressional committee monitoring CIA activities found documents on the weapons caches that had not been known to the Clinton administration. A report Saturday in the Boston Globe prompted Hunt to inform the Austrian government, Kurier said. The Boston Globe report said CIA agents stashed the weapons while the U.S. military conducted loud military maneuvers. However, Fritz Molden, a former Austrian journalist, said Sunday that the secret weapons depots were established at the initiative of the Austrian government led by Chancellor Leopold Figl, and planning for them began in 1948. He claimed that some depots were also placed in the Soviet occupation zone in eastern Austria. Molden told the APA he had acted as a liaison between the Americans and the postwar Austrian government. However, it was not clear why the information was not handed down to subsequent governments. -- Austria demands details on secret US arms depots Vienna, Austria, Jan. 21 (Reuter) -- Austria's leadership Sunday demanded the United States supply details of 79 secret U.S. arsenals scattered across Austria. "The Americans should give us a plan indicating where the weapons depots are, how serious they have to be taken and what dangers they pose," Chancellor Franz Vranitzky said. Speaking on television Sunday, Vranitzky cautiously indicated the possibility of secret stockpiles from the other occupation forces -- France, Britain and the Soviet Union. "Approaching the other three occupation powers and asking them whether they too still have secret depots on Austrian soil will be dealt with in a very pragmatic and sensible way," Vranitzky said. The chancellery said the U.S. government was working on an exact list detailing the locations of the depots, and U.S. Ambassador Hunt promised to furnish details as quickly as possible. The television said experts assume each of the arsenals contained sufficient weapons and explosives for 150 anti-communist guerrillas and could also contain significant amounts of gold. Austrian television said that while the U.S. foreign ministry had assured Austria it would act as soon as possible, the CIA, which alone knows the exact locations of the arsenals, has remained silent on the issue. -- Postwar leaders acted with U.S. on arms caches Vienna, Austria, Jan. 22 (Reuter) - Austria's postwar leaders cooperated with the United States to stockpile arms around the country in a top-secret operation to safeguard against a Soviet attack, an ex-resistance fighter said Monday. Fritz Molden, who acted as a liaison officer between the resistance and the allied powers, said that if the Kremlin had discovered the plan to organize an anti-communist underground, Soviet troops would have immediately annexed eastern Austria. "It was all top secret. There were no archives, no papers made, no protocols written," Molden told Reuters. Molden said he was surprised that Austria's current political leaders were unaware of the arsenals. Details had appeared in two books, one of which he wrote 16 years ago. Austrian media speculated that the arsenals were part of a wider anti-communist strategy by the United States, which feared Soviet expansionism following the end of World War II. Newspapers cited the Gladio operation in Italy, set up as a secret Cold War resistance group in the 1950s to fight any Warsaw Pact invasion. Austrian experts estimated the depots held enough weapons and explosives for 150 anti-communist guerrillas and might also contain gold. They said likely sites included graveyards where digging would have gone unnoticed. Molden said arms were transported on U.S. trucks and trains into Vienna, which was surrounded by the Soviet eastern zone, and then secretly passed on to Austrians who risked their lives stashing the weapons away. He suspected most arsenals in western Austria were handed over to the Austrian army and gendarmerie after 1955 and that the arms sites in eastern Austria might now also be empty. --

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NOISE.SYS Stupid Bugs w/Int13h
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's an unpleasant bug in NOISE.SYS, BTW. It doesn't properly return the flags from the Int 13h handler, so disable that for now unless you'd like to do funky things to your disks. Sorry 'bout that. Rob.

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RC4 for HP48
by cpunk＠remail.ecafe.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here is the RC4 cipher for the HP-48 calculator. It complements the DES implementation by William E. Sommerfeld. RC4 has a higher throughput than DES, but its key setup is slower. The key may be up to 256 characters (2048 bits) -- the maximum supported by the RC4 algorithm. Here are sample timings for a HP-48GX. The SX will be correspondingly slower. Key Setup (200 bits) 25.18 sec RC4 throughput 5.06 cps String to Array 61.83 cps Array to String 56.12 cps The HP-48 comes with a 2400 baud IR link and a 1200/2400/9600 baud RS232 port. The 48S, 48SX and 48G have 32Kb of RAM, almost none of which is used by the operating system. The 48GX has 128Kb of RAM. With an entry price of ~100$ US, I feel that the HP-48 series would be a good choice for a smart token. Possible uses are as digital cash wallets and authentication tokens, not the mention simple encrypted dumb terminals. Installation: If you have a serial cable, download the code below to your HP and call it 'RC4'. This will create a directory called 'RC4' with four programs in it. If you don't have a cable you can type the whole thing in; it's not too large. Store it as 'RC4' and again it will create a directory. Remember not to type the "%%HP: T(3)A(D)F(.);" -- it's only needed for a serial download. Instructions: These instructions assume that you are familiar with stream-ciphers in general. If you are not, you might want to get _Applied Cryptography_ by Bruce Schneier from your library or book store. Bit streams are represented as one dimensional arrays of real numbers between 0 and 255. Yes, that's right, this cipher uses floating-point! In User-RPL it's the fastest way. To convert between strings and arrays use the commands S2A and A2S. S2A "String" -> [Array] A2S [Array] -> "String" To setup a key, use the SK command. It takes a bitstream representing the keytext and returns the key context. They keytext can be up to 256 bytes long. Additional bytes will not be used. The key context is another bitstream with 256 values in it. Because of time/memory tradeoffs, a key context takes 2082 bytes of RAM to store. If memory is tight, use A2S to compress the key context to a string. SK [Key text] -> [Key context] To encrypt something use the RC4 command. The first argument is the key context, the second is the plaintext or ciphertext, both in bitstream form. It returns the updated key context and the ciphertext or plaintext. RC4 [Key context], [Plaintext] -> [New key context], [Ciphertext] or RC4 [Key context], [Ciphertext] -> [New key context], [Plaintext] Enjoy The Cunning Artificers - -- CUT HERE -- %%HP: T(3)A(D)F(.); DIR SK \<< DTAG OBJ\-> OBJ\-> DROP 0 255 FOR N N NEXT 259 258 PICK + 0 259 4 FOR N OVER PICK N PICK + + 256 MOD DUP 255 - NEG N 4 - DUP2 IF \=/ THEN DUP2 IF > THEN SWAP END DUP2 6 + ROLL SWAP 6 + ROLL SWAP 4 ROLL 5 + ROLLD SWAP 3 + ROLLD ELSE DROP2 END SWAP 1 - DUP IF 260 < THEN DROP 258 PICK 259 + END SWAP -1 STEP DROP2 0 0 258 \->ARRY OVER 2 + ROLLD DROPN "Key" \->TAG \>> RC4 \<< DTAG DUP SIZE OBJ\-> DROP 3 PICK 258 GET 4 PICK 257 GET 1 + 1 4 ROLL FOR N 256 MOD 1 + DUP 5 PICK SWAP GET 3 ROLL + 256 MOD 1 + DUP 5 ROLL SWAP 4 PICK CSWP DUP DUP 5 PICK GET OVER 5 PICK GET + 256 MOD 1 + GET 5 ROLL DUP N GET R\->B 3 ROLL R\->B XOR B\->R N SWAP PUT 4 ROLL 4 ROLL 1 - SWAP NEXT 4 ROLL 257 3 ROLL 1 - PUT 258 3 ROLL PUT "Updated key" \->TAG SWAP "Result" \->TAG \>> S2A \<< DUP SIZE \<< \-> LEN \<< 1 LEN START DUP NUM SWAP TAIL NEXT DROP LEN \>> \>> EVAL 1 \->LIST \->ARRY \>> A2S \<< DTAG OBJ\-> OBJ\-> DROP "" SWAP 1 SWAP START SWAP CHR SWAP + NEXT \>> END - -- CUT HERE -- - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzEAEf4AAAEEAMONoLHj5CwKvaM6ch9GOcUjgoVS5sjXa4TzD2ohhtHFYR9l QzNj0vNASBQKE/Mk9Flqg+dtitS7S7B0qZQ+mQmMT73yniun596jt1NCJ5sLBKrM jDvYK3wGbycVX43RBiR3iwJZGq5blfWqNRE7kFdTxgu+bCdtLOFNVew9oBf9AAUR tBZUaGUgQ3VubmluZyBBcnRpZmljZXJz =pf3Y - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQRCWuFNVew9oBf9AQEPJgP/QzwxGIWU0sf+a8Vzj2tXtMqRhRQjG4Qp Pcrwr76WhM/2KnHGNAdC3lKwyEK17cu32zbmPePhOvtdUNyV3L1KZlBioURK5Kxu ZspnOLCmlKo8lbOa5mJl2bmV55W49B96ua+yxst1XaOzhfYDN/KjZsztGRnEbQx9 VovMpLXooLo= =4pzv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The usual issue: That if a foreign-originated product even appears to be a > standard (so far, none have been), and includes strong crypto, then the NSA > and other agencies will simply change the rules. Thus, if extremely strong > crypto from "Netscape-Zurich" starts to have a significant market presense > in the U.S., then some law will be passed to restrict it. But what would they restrict? The use of strong crypto between two domestic points, or strong crypto where one end is within the US and the other without? We already have the former -- wouldn't it be hard for them to take it away? Especially if the software already has a large installed base, which is your premise? I'm not denying that there are people in the NSA who would want to react that way, but I don't think they'd be able to pull it off. It is true that the National Security establishment has a lot of power and influence here. But there are other groups with power as well, and the security types don't have the ability to do whatever they want without regard to the opinions and interests of those other groups. I think America's commercial interests will carry the day. The NSA isn't capable of achieving its objective, which is to preserve passive surveillance. It doesn't matter what the rules are or what Congress passes. It's over. There are a lot of smart people in the NSA, and some of them have to know that. Big companies like Netscape, Sun, Microsoft, and IBM/Lotus, on the other hand, will almost certainly achieve their objectives if they win the political fight. They'll make buckets of money selling crypto software abroad. And if they lose the fight, they're going to be handing big opportunities to foreign competitors. Who's going to fight harder? You add to that the fact that impartial observers will say, for the most part, that Netscape's right and the NSA is wrong, and the tremendous interest world wide in creating a trustworthy net based infrastructure for commerce, and the NSA starts to look a good poker player with a bad hand. They used to say that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country." A lot of people still feel that way about our biggest companies. When they get their acts together and stare down the NSA in a block, it will all be over. I feel a little strange about constantly playing the corporate shill here. I'm not a corporate person, and all of the companies I talk about here would probably find me unsuitable for employment. I'm certainly not going to participate in the crypto profits that they'll realize. My interest in this isn't the same as Netscape's. But it's going to be Netscape that pushes this thing over the top. Crypto is a big tent issue. Some people want the restrcitions eased so they can make money, some are afraid of the government, some want to protect civil liberties, some love the math and technology, and others just want to thumb their noses at Mr. Freeh. I want to see censorship become technically infeasible. There's very little popular support for that position among the general public; everyone wants censorship as long as they agree with the censor. Arguing for crypto from the vantage point of a civil libertarian is pointless. Even here on cypherpunks the bill of rights doesn't get much respect. The point is that the only guy in the big tent with any clout at all is the corporate manager. When the kids get together on the street and protest net censorship, does anyone care? Is a militia movement argument going to play in Peoria? (I think those are counter productive -- at times I've been scared enough by them to re-examine my own position.) I agree with Noam Chomsky when he says that corporate interests dominate our politics, but I also agree with Milton Friedman when he says its for the best. We should focus our efforts on energizing corporate America for the fight. The best way to do that is to demonstrating to customers that exportable security is nothing more than snake oil under the current rules. Another way it is to explain to people -- journalists and managers alike -- exactly why the current rules are bad for business. Lets develop and popularize arguments against the NSA position, not radical or esoteric arguments, but the kind of arguments that sensible people who go to work and read the paper every day can repeat to one another when they talk about politics. If we can get this stuff onto the editorial page of the WSJ -- which is where it belongs -- we'll be in spitting distance of a victory.

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POT_ktl
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-29-96 NYT reports on the Montana Freemen's competition with the USG: printing money and fostering free market brigandry; building arsenals for terrorizing the weak and suppressing dissent; amassing national security treasure for the protection of the people; and PC education to boot. The USG, looking in the mirror, says such actions are a criminal conspiracy, a "school for crime." POT_ktl

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