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Re: Digest Version???????
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Typically the way to get a digested version of a cow is to kill and eat it... Oh, wait, you probably mean the list..... www.hks.net and nntp.hks.net let you read the Cypherpunks and Coderpunks mailing lists with the Web and Newsreader programs (except when they're down for repairs.) The Web version is typically half a month behind because it gets summarized and hypertextified monthly, though I suspect the articles are there and it's just the index that's old. If you're looking for a reduced-volume list filtered using human intelligence, Eric Blossom <eb(a)comsec.com> does cypherpunks-light for $20/year, and Ray Arachelian (sp?) does fcpunx for free, somewhere you can probably look up with AltaVista. At 05:30 PM 4/3/96 -0600, you wrote: >Anyone know if I can get a digest version of this??? > > (__) > (oo) > /--------\/ > / | || <-- Moo.(We live in Wisconsin, the dairy state, get it?) > / || || > * ||-----|| > ~~ ~~

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time/date hash
by Jerry Whiting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Interesting note in current issue of PC Magazine about how DOS 4 and later generates volume ID numbers. Neil Rubenking describes a time/date hash of the form: month plus seconds day plus hundredths of seconds high byte of the year plus hours low byte of the year plus minutes I've actually been thinking about such a time/date hash during idle brain cycles. Any thoughts on how secure such a hash is, as in how collision proof if the input date is from today forward 50 years? thanks, Jerry Whiting 72627.746(a)compuserve.com <- til our server is back up...

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Re: [mis]FWD: On digital cash and geodesic economies
by Alexander 'Sasha' Chislenko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry - sent previous post to cp instead of bionomics.

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No Subject
by agil.home＠mail.telepac.pt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscrive * agil.home(a)mail.telepac.pt unsubscrive * agil.home(a)mail.telepac.pt unsubscrive * agil.home(a)mail.telepac.pt

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Re: Bad news from Judge Richey
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:35 PM 4/4/96 EST, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: >"E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU> writes: >> Umm... one would guess that a federal judge would be against the >> whole Assasination Politics idea, whether or not he himself became a target. > >It's worth noting that one of the new newsgroups that Rich Graves mentioned is: >talk.politics.assassination Assassination Politics >My congratulations to Jim Bell on getting his own newsgroup! Hey, it's news to me! I'll have to check it out... BTW, are you sure it's not an old one? After all, there have been enough assassination conspiracy theory discussions (Lincoln, Huey Long, JFK, RFK, King, etc) over the decades that I'm sure they'd merit a discussion area. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been doing some thinking about the whole key escrow retrieval matter. There are a couple of situations in which I can see real reasons for doing voluntary key escrow of sensitive material: A. You're afraid of losing the key. B. Your organization is afraid that you'll lose the key or be unavailable. The second can be handled internally via key sharing; if all the people you share the key with have as much to lose by the information getting out as you do, then they should be trustworthy and as hard to subpoena as you are. Encrypting the shared section with another, appropriate key should take care of the cop-stealing problem (i.e., they break into the machine). The first is more of a problem. If where you've entrusted your keys is known, then the cops can come in and strong-arm/subpoena your keys away. Thus, the basic protection mechanism should be denying them that knowledge. (Another protection mechanism is key sharing between key escrow organizations.) In other words, anonymous remailers with stable nyms for the key escrow organizations, together with fully anonymous digital cash. One problem in this is how the organization's reputation originally is established so people will deal with them so they can get a reputation.... etcetera. The basic method of doing so appears to be to post a digital cash bond. (I don't know the mathematics well enough to tell whether one could post verifiable digital cash with it still not being usable without a decryption step. If one can't, that's a real problem... but I suspect that one can.) The encryption on such a bond should be put into the hands of a group of above-ground "judges" via secret sharing, who would be a group of people chosen by the key escrow organization in hopes of their being trusted to resolve any disputes. Of course, digital receipts would be a big help here... -Allen

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HANDS UP!
by etoy＠hijack.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Video retraces as a source of entropy...
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 4 Apr 96 at 5:58, Laszlo Vecsey wrote: [..] > > In pseudo-C: > > > > int retrace(void) { // test for video retrace > > #ifdef __MSDOS__ > > return (port[0x3da] & 8); // Some VGA, maybe EGA cards > > #else > > // your OS here > > #endif > > } > > [..] > > x = 0; > > while (!retrace()) x++; > As far as I know, while(retrace()) will loop until vertical retrace > begins, and then you call while(!retrace()) and that will loop until > vertical retrace is over. (Or it may be the other way around). Sloppy pseudo-C code. The code I've been experimenting with waits until it's no longer in a vertical retrace (if one is still active since the last sample) and then collects the sample when the next vertical retrace occurs. [..] > What if the screen is filled with different colors, or shapes. On some > monitors you can actually see the size of the screen changing, warping out > a little.. maybe the time for retrace will be different when painting > screens with different data. I haven't done a lot of tests yet.... and even then, it's probably very system specific. Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

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rc4 weak keys fix?
by Jack Mott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got a paper from the cryptography technical report server "http://www.itribe.net/CTRS/" about a weak class of RC4 keys. The report said that with some keys, it was possible to predict what some parts of the State-Box would be. I was thinking of a way to fix this, and had this idea: do some sort of hashing function with the key that derives a number between 55 and 500 or something like that, then scrabmle the S-box that many times. In this way, the chances that the State-Box will have any correlation becomes extremely small. I think it is 1/125 to begin with anyway, so this would make it around 1/(125*NumPasses). And since the exact number of passes is a function of the key, the cracker won't know how many times it went through. I tried this out and having 1000s of passes doesn't effect the randomness of the state-box in any negative way, possibly it makes it more random? If anyone has any thoughts I'd love to hear them. -- thecrow(a)iconn.net "It can't rain all the time"

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:57 AM 4/5/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >If the secrets or assets _cannot_ be retrieved--a scenario which is >possible, if the protocol is so written (clauses for court action)--then >contempt charges are meaningless and would not stand, IMNALO. The Black Unicorn indicates that if the reason the secrets _cannot_ be retrieved is because they are in a jurisdiction which refuses to reveal them when the owner is under compulsion, the owner can still be punished for contempt (A contractual situation). I don't know what would happen if they _cannot_ be retrieved for technical reasons. If a communication key was aggreeded to be DH exchange and then discarded, I would think this would be analogous to asking for a document that was destroyed (before the subpoena) as part of a policy of destroying obsolete documents. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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