- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

DEATH TO THE SYSMONGERS!!!
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: subject: DEATH TO THE CRACKERS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE CENSORS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE CRACKPOTS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE LUDDITES!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE NEWBIES!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE WANNABES!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: APRIL FOOLS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com -- ......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

DEATH TO THE SYSMONGERS!!!
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: subject: DEATH TO THE CRACKERS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE CENSORS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE CRACKPOTS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE LUDDITES!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE NEWBIES!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: DEATH TO THE WANNABES!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com :: subject: APRIL FOOLS!!! request-remailing-to: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu,nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu,hal@alumni.caltech.edu,hfinney@shell.portal.com,rants@wired.com,nightly@nbc.com,alt.politics.datahighway.usenet@decwrl.dec.com,news.admin.policy@news.demon.co.uk,cypherpunks@toad.com -- ......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

CryptoAnarchy
by tmp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hello. could someone tell me what is meant by the term `cryptoanarchy'? --tmp

2 1

Re: Cryptography banned in the Netherlands....
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> So, among "liberals" we can include Reagan, J. Edgar Hoover, Joe > McCarthy, and Nixon, all of whom took some pretty extreme steps to > silence critics of "government and other large institutions," up > to and including political assassinations. Get real. With very few exceptions, the entire American political spectrum is made up of liberals. That most certianly includes Reagan, MaCarthy, definitly Nixon, and mabey Hoover. brad ``When *I* use a word,'' Humpty Dumpy said, in rather a scornful tone, ``it means just what I choose it to mean---neither more nor less.'' Reagan, McCarthy, Nixon and Hoover wouldn't call themselves liberals. We liberals certainly don't number them in our ranks. To call them ``liberals'' is to deny all meaning to the word. (Not that it's definition is clear -- but they sure aren't included.)

1 0

tmp@netcom.com
by beker＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Organization: Oasis Pictures In addition to Tim's equating tmp@netcom with LD, here's some header info from an LD post on sci.crypt: From: ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.society.privacy,alt.privacy,sci.answers,comp.answers,alt.answers,news.answers Subject: Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet FAQ (1 of 3) Date: 12 Mar 1994 14:02:13 GMT Organization: TMP Enterprises

1 0

Politics do not belong here
by Jeremiah A Blatz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I may very well be completly wrong here, but IMO there is no place for politics on this list. Cryptography, by its very nature, is an anti-political thing. All politicians who try in increase the power of government are against the cypherpunk agenda of increasing the use of encryption, it doesn't matter what party they belong to. This discussion is simply a bunch of messages that bait people with different political alignments than the sender's, please take it elsewhere. Jer darklord(a)cmu.edu | "it's not a matter of rights / it's just a matter of war finger me for my | don't have a reason to fight / they never had one before" Geek Code and | -Ministry, "Hero" PGP public key | http://www.cs.cmu.edu:8001/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr25/jbde/

2 1

Re: tmp@netcom.com
by cfrye＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not sure what the time-delay features for the "nowhere" anonymous remailer ler are, but the messages that arrived last night all came through within a few minutes. Interestingly, the messages were sent at around 3:00 am, corsimilar to LD's posting patterns from before. I deleted the most recent postings, but if someone could send them to me, I'd like to run them through a grammar checker and compare the results to the message base I developed before. Curt

1 0

REMAIL: standardized remailer syntax
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall) > Sameer writes: > > > Here's my suggestion.. > > > > Header pasting: > > The '::' header pasting syntax should be available-- i.e. when > >a message comes into a remailer with a body starting with '::' the > >lines following until a blank line are pasted into the header. > > > > The '##' header pasting syntax-- when a remailer is sending > >out a message, if the body begins with a '##' line then the lines > >following that are pasted into the header of the outgoing message. I like Sameer's goal of standardized syntax, but I have to admit that I find the :: and ## bit confusing, and hard to explain. The way Eric Hughes' original remailer worked was that the "remailer commands" were in the message header, up with Subject and In-Reply-To and such. However, many mailers won't let people put custom material there, so the "::" pasting token was invented to take the following lines and put them into the header before the remailer processed them. The effect was that you could put remailer commands after "::" and they would work. But there were also some situations in which the user might want to control message headers as they *leave* the remailer. For example, they might want to put a Reply-To to some anon pool so that they could receive reply messages. So Eric created the "##" pasting token for those. The remailers based on his scripts first look for "::" and add in any headers following it; then they process the message, looking for command lines in the header; then as they remail it they look for "##" and stick any following lines in the outgoing message header. This all makes sense but it makes for a complicated system. I think people would find it easier to understand an approach in which they put remailer commands at the top of their message, marked in some way to separate them from the rest of the message. "::" on a line by itself could indicate the beginning of a block of remailer commands, terminated by a blank line. Or, as an alternate syntax, each remailer command line could start with "::" followed by the text of the command. Both approaches have been used by different software on the net and they could be considered two different ways of expressing the same thing. This would get away from the add-to-header/process-header/add-to-header approach of the current Perl remailer scripts and use a simple one-step "process remailer commands" approach which I think would be simpler. You could still have all the functionality of the current approach (perhaps a paste-outgoing-header command could be used for the "##" functionality) in a package which is conceptually simpler (to me, at least). Another advantage of this approach is that you could make use of the order of the commands in the remailer block so that you could have finer control over what you are asking the remailer to do. > > Header commands: > > "Anon-To","Request-Remailing-To": strips headers and sends the > >message to the specified recipient. I would suggest abandoning one of "Anon-To" or "Request-Remailing-To", as they are redundant. I know above I suggested two redundant ways of specifying remailer commands; maybe that should be reduced to one, as well. > 1. The bsu remailers no longer paste ANYTHING from a "::" header > into the header of the outbound message. Many of the remailers pass Subject lines. I don't think they should. Chael's approach makes sense to me. The best thing is to have a way to set the subject as the message leaves the last remailer in the chain. (My "chain" program does this automatically.) > 3. They also support multiple recipients. You can place as many > "Request-Remailing-To:" lines in the headers as you wish and > it will individually address and send each one. I sent mail a few minutes ago (before seeing Chael's message) suggesting the danger of this in making it easy to create huge numbers of messages. > 4. Full debug logging has been turned on until I can verify that > both remailers are acting as they should. This form of logging > includes a mirror of the message as it is received and a > one-line message listing each recipient. We have had a lot of talk about logging. My feeling is that one should get security in using the remailer network by going through a number of machines in widely different regions. It should not, as was suggested here some time ago, be a matter of trusting any given remailer operator. Privacy is not a gift being provided by remailer operators to their users. It is still some- thing that the users must provide for themselves. The remailers are just a tool to help achieve that. Thanks to Chael for re-kindling this discussion. Hal

4 3

Positive uses for PGP
by Philip Zimmermann 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To all PGP users: We've all heard arguments raised by the law enforcement and intelligence communities that PGP and other encryption technology can be used by criminals to hide their activities. This line of reasoning is being used to justify Government key escrow systems like Clipper, and to clamp down on encryption technology like PGP. It would be helpful to come up with real-world examples of how PGP has been used for good constructive purposes. Journalists sometimes ask me for examples of positive uses for PGP. But most of my fan mail from PGP users do not tell me what they are using it for. If you have any stories about how PGP is used for good purposes, I'd like to see them. Not just disaffected paranoid libertarians embracing it for the theoretical benefits for a free society. We need to be able to cite examples of real people using PGP for good ends. Human rights activists using it are a great example. But it doesn't have to be in the Nobel-Prize winning catagory of human endeavor (although that would be nice). It could just be any positive upbeat application that normal people can relate to in a positive way, so I can tell reporters about it. I'd like to hear (actually, see some email) from real people who are actually using PGP for good things. It could be for helping others, like protecting HIV patient records, or keeping psychological counseling records. Or conducting good wholesome business that must remain confidential. Or lawyers using it to maintain confidential records and communications with their clients. Or, it could be for your own personal life, but for wholesome upbeat uses, like sending love letters (you don't have to supply any actual love letters), or keeping your diary. For those that don't know what PGP is: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a free software program that encrypts email using public key cryptography, allowing you to communicate securely with people you've never met, without the prior exchange of keys over secure channels. PGP has become the worldwide de facto standard for email encryption. It's available on many Internet FTP sites and BBS systems. Please send me some email (to prz(a)acm.org) with the subject line "Positive uses for PGP", so that I can quickly sort it out from the rest of my email. If it's a really good story, I may want to use it, so let me know if I can and if I can give reporters the information. You might not get a reply-- it depends on how much mail I get or how busy I am when you send it. There is no prize for the best story, but for what it's worth, I'll sign the public key of the person who submits the best story by Monday, April 11th. But keep sending stories after that date if you've got them. This notice can be copied and reposted on any newsgroup or mailing list that is likely to be familiar with PGP. Philip Zimmermann prz(a)acm.org

5 5

Re: Web of Trust?
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:17 3/30/94 -0800, Hal wrote: ... >In other words, if I want to communicate with joe(a)abc.com, I can only do so >if one of the signators of his key is a person I know. If not, I have no way >of judging the validity of his key. > >This belies simple interpretations of the "web of trust". I may have signed >A's key, A has signed B's, B has signed C's, C has signed D's, and D has signed >Joe's, but this is of no value unless I know D. Only then can I trust Joe's >key. Ideally, perhaps in cyberspace, one's public key is spread along with X's reputation, i.e. thru the same channels. When a reputation for X reaches you so does X's public key. You say that you want Henry Kissinger's public key. I respond that by whatever means you know that there exists such a person, you will (in cyberspace) already know his public key. The logical limit of this idea is that the public key becomes the name and the key authentication issue dissolves into the mist. We trust reputations because they reach us thru diverse paths. Public keys arriving thru diverse paths should likewise carry extra weight. As crypto becomes more common reputations will eventually belong more to public keys than to names. The question will then be not "What is Henry's public key?" but "What is the name of the person who knows the secret key that corresponds to this public key?". I suppose that Detwiler feared being unable to answer that question in specific cases. I don't. In the meantime, redundant webs that parallel the normal information webs thru which reputations propagate should provide public keys at least as reliable as the reputations themselves. One particular case is of interest. If you contract with me to process some of your secrets, I will agree not to divulge those secrets except under the protection of a one of a set of public keys that you give me. In such a case the web of trust model can be usefully employed and is not intrinsically limited in the number of levels.

1 0