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FCC proposes V-Chip for computers, from Time/Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE V CHIP, COMING TO A COMPUTER NEAR YOU Time Magazine November 3, 1997 Page 36 If you hated the idea of a V chip in your television, wait until you hear that the government wants to install one in your computer. TIME has learned that the FCC has proposed that new PCs be outfitted with a V chip to filter out video violence and sex. Still unclear is what Net broadcasts could be affected. The idea alarms free-speech advocates, who wonder why Americans need a Net-nanny. "What you get is a devolution of the First Amendment," argues lawyer Bob Corn-Revere. FCC chairman REED HUNDT says the high-tech industry can "be part of the process" as the agency sets rules. There's a low-tech alternative: the off switch. --By Declan McCullagh/Washington ********** For details check out the Netly News (netlynews.com) at: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1528,00.html -Declan

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RE: Orthogonality and Disaster Recovery
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: >I'm quite certain that the Security and MIS directors at various companies >asked PGP, Inc. to include message recovery features. Not so much to handle >the very rare (almost nonexistent) cases where a piece of mail sent at some >time in the past has to be recovered because Alice was hit by a truck, or >similiar unlikely events (*), but because Security and MIS folks would like >the option of "monitoring" e-mail traffic. As someone who has witnessed recovering email (the icky task fell to someone else), I can tell you it's not a pretty sight. Employees leave, sometimes under a cloud (sometimes under several tornadoes worth of bad weather), sometimes people are assigned overseas, etc. -- sometimes file recoveries need to be done, which implies that there may have been encryption used on those files. CDR (IMHO) would allow for these kind of recoveries without compromising the security of the data en-route. Personally, I would prefer a CDR system that did _not_ encrypt the stored plaintext, just because that simplifies matters while also preventing use of CDR for GAK, as there are _no_ general organization keys for the government to desire. Nothing prevents the employee from encrypting the "recovery file" anyway, which should be done if the information is "sensitive but unclassified" (like company financial data that should only be viewable by the employees responsible for that data). (This should be done in most companies because any computer kept at the desktop is inherently insecure.) (Handling disk/file encryption keys in a corporate setting is a separate matter.) The ability to recover important documents is what _I_ want as an IS member -- and CMR isn't the best way to do it. (Personally, if IS has time to monitor everyone's email, I think they are *way* overstaffed...) ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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Re: Tim's worst nightmare
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Woman in Standoff Shoots at Police > Filed at 10:12 a.m. EST > By The Associated Press > ROBY, Ill. (AP) -- Gunfire rang out again at the home of a > woman involved in a month-long standoff with authorities who > have a court order to bring her in for psychological testing. Just imagine a few hundred (or thousand) people getting together in Roby, Ill., defying the police-ordered half mile ban around her house and sitting down peacefully between her and the police...

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Re: FCPUNX:puff pieces vs tough crypto issues (Re: Singapore TOILET
by Eli Brandt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote: > >From my perch in Washington, I see PGP 5.5/CMR as an existence proof that > key recovery can be done. So far the crypto-advocates have been able to > wave around the Blaze et al white paper that says we don't know how to do > it. Even Dorothy Denning agreed. But now when a mandatory GAK bill goes to > the House floor, all Rep. Solomon etc. have to do is wave around a > shrinkwrapped copy of PGP and say: "I bought this for $19 at the Egghead > shop at 21st and L." Details will be lost in the fearmongering. Key detail lost: what the white paper says is that we don't know how to do it *right*. -- Eli Brandt | eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu | http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~eli/

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"I have in my hand a working message recovery system"
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I've changed the thread name to "I have in my hand a working message recovery system." Some of you may know what this is a reference to.) At 12:47 PM -0700 10/27/97, Eli Brandt wrote: >Declan McCullagh wrote: >> >From my perch in Washington, I see PGP 5.5/CMR as an existence proof that >> key recovery can be done. So far the crypto-advocates have been able to >> wave around the Blaze et al white paper that says we don't know how to do >> it. Even Dorothy Denning agreed. But now when a mandatory GAK bill goes to >> the House floor, all Rep. Solomon etc. have to do is wave around a >> shrinkwrapped copy of PGP and say: "I bought this for $19 at the Egghead >> shop at 21st and L." Details will be lost in the fearmongering. > >Key detail lost: what the white paper says is that we don't know how >to do it *right*. Agreed, but this is just the kind of "detail" Congress is already so good at ignoring. Declan is right, that Congress will hold PGP 5.5 and its CMR and "Policy Manager" up and will say, "See, even industry is demanding message recovery. And here's a program that already does it." Granted, CMR will not meet FBI requirements for real-time access, and will not meet SIGIN/COMINT wishes for surveillance-friendly systems, but it's a start. I'll bet, as I said in a post a few hours ago, that if CMR is widely adopted, that various regulatory agencies like the FTC, SEC, OSHA, etc., will begin to impose rules about how and where CMR archives are stored.... Then the battle will be 80% over. --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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prova
by daniele baldi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anon-Post-To: danbaldi(a)tin.it daniele

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Infastructure Protection and Paranoia
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:41 PM 10/21/1997 +0100, Sandy J. Wong wrote on Cyberia-L >Buried in Tuesday's Wall Street Journal was a small three-paragraph article >mentioning that the U.S. may be vulnerable to a cyberspace version of the >Pearl Harbor attack. A futile suggestion--in my opinion--was made by the >President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection spend $1 >billion during the next seven years on cyber-security research. that >suggestion followed a 15-month study of the nation's critical >infrastructures. The story, in shorter or longer form, has been in most of the major papers. The InfoWar crowd has been lobbying and running conferences about this one for a couple of years, and it sounds like they're making political progress. The longer versions of the articles make the connection between infrastructure risk and the need for encryption to prevent attacks, with various FBI spokecritters talking about how we obviously need FBI access to all communications to ban InfoTerrorists. I've got mixed feelings about it; on one hand it seems like a bunch of Defense Department wonks trying to find a way to keep their jobs now that the world isn't threatened by Commies any more, but on another hand, some of them may have looked at the problem seriously and said "<Expletive deleted>! Disabling the country's critical infrastructure really does look pretty easy! Fixing it is probably our job." The new direction for the electric power industry in California replaces the current monopolies with an Internet-technology-based running auction with buyers and sellers trading electricity in half-hour chunks. I don't think it's out on the open Internet, unless one of the hundreds of players gets careless with computer security, but it's certainly a vulnerability issue. Denial of service attacks are much harder to block than privacy cracks - how secure are the protocols? The regulatory process will probably require revealing most of the information anyway; I doubt we'd end up with anonymous buyers and sellers of power :-) (Actually, anonymity is probably fairly easy; just use corporations instead of remailers to provide your pseudonyms. (This message is brought to you by Californians For A Secure Electrical Infrastructure.)) The recent San Francisco power failure appears to have been sabotage - somebody turned off a bunch of switches around 6am taking out 1/4 of the city's power for 2-3 hours; the papers don't say if it was just that one substation (in which case they should have been able to bring it up much faster) or whether it cascaded to a bunch of the other substations as well. Is it just another disgruntled employee? An organized Ecoterrorist Conspiracy? Or a government provocation to reinforce their report's impact? In either case I'm sure the government will take political advantage of it. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639 [I'm currently having hardware problems with my main email; send Cc: billstewart(a)att.com if you need to reach me in a hurry.]

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Microsoft's CMR Keys
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Tim May, or someone like him, Wrote: > I am offering $25,000 for the CMR key for Microsoft. > (As a loyal American, > I plan to then send it to Janet Reno and Louis Freeh.) Here's the public key (that _was_ what you asked for, wasn't it? :-) If you'd like the private key, please enclose $25,000 in small unmarked Mark Twain digicash encrypted to the CMR key, mailed to billg(a)microsoft.com, with Subject: Testing Message Recovery, Please Ignore and I'll get back to you RSN. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Comment: Where do you want your email to go today? mQDiBDRUOOkRAgDtlZ1gI4119yWvNk3Z3bdCtGinrTYRM9aBSKGpLnQWMgQRTKag xoEvj+PSkzdOplbQNb17FkyS+eqNOD3FxDLvAKD/2YkyTt80jTpYE7JKxhN+J0I3 +wH9HI9pkAJIShLGZb7u6WgqRWlR3imV6mKuGG6t7vbWouZhypvfsoxpzGg6oyFk xeQA7N0ABVUGWBkWAwrhUjp8iAIAo1hA59RTDdeUBysdJpsli2Bg/Sfq7Zf5VQ2o nvrR0vlrCPxOJOAkr8SGHkUBEQNmtFNL5TB/qRq8LHCtGEkDCrQ6TWljcm9zb2Z0 IENvcnBvcmF0ZSBNZXNzYWdlIEFwcHJvdmFsIDxiaWxsZ0BtaWNyb3NvZnQuY29t PokAUQQQEQIAEQUCNFQ46QUJABZpgAQLAwECAAoJEB6kQiu8rV1FoIgAnRZkIP1i yANKty1MAoIjYXvCzyE+AKCBQkDQGDgxEuTByy3BYb1NA2DE4rkAjQQ0VDjtEAIA 6Oe+OrwLtt90xns7irMJz+VMd0HxixdLlieOLb9s0kkeUME2sKIq0KdgGM46n1Pn 4HDQVzdwx58PQ9unNwDnVQACAgH8D4vJKkYtf5hFfqdm1OSXTZ0pvv3roIxUupEL H8udhVTOWuD6Y9oglXXtzmPIomISBN0XMFstiHkkERBvIbICw4kATAQYEQIADAUC NFQ47QUJABZpgAAKCRAepEIrvK1dRcdZAKCb3QJ4REIo6OhDLeaJtnZuoaZu3ACg tNtmL3GB3O4cwXZQ7FgDP2zXBH4= =M5ch - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Janet -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNFQ97R6kQiu8rV1FEQItRACfY1uQmy77eu26qX2HHVxylRp1PPMAoOGZ pYLAVHGuHxzJeJkju0B0MZve =hz8F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639 [I'm currently having hardware problems with my main email; send Cc: billstewart(a)att.com if you need to reach me in a hurry.]

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WPI Cryptography Seminar
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: goya.WPI.EDU: christof owned process doing -bs Date: Mon, 27 Oct 1997 13:26:02 -0500 (EST) From: Christof Paar <christof(a)ece.WPI.EDU> To: ecegraduate(a)ece.WPI.EDU, ma-clipboard(a)wpi.WPI.EDU, DCSB <dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu>, ecefaculty(a)ece.WPI.EDU, faculty(a)owl.WPI.EDU, graduate(a)owl.WPI.EDU Subject: WPI Cryptography Seminar MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Christof Paar <christof(a)ece.WPI.EDU> Starting next week, we will again offer an open Cryptography Seminar at WPI. We will meet (mostly) Tuesdays at 4:30. Some of the talks until the end of this year are - Erik DeWin, K.U. Leuven, Belgium: The P1363 IEEE Public-Key Standard. - David Jablon: A new network identification system. - Jens-Peter Kaps, WPI: High-speed implementation of DES on FPGAs. - Christian Cachin, MIT: Unconditionally secure key agreement. - Tobias Lohrenz and Kai Wollenweber, U. Siegen, Germany: Implementation of a key-agile ATM security module. IF YOU WANT TO RECEIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS FOR THE CRYPTO SEMINAR, please send me a brief reply and I put you on the mailing list. Otherwise you won't here from us again :) Regards, Christof Paar PS: All students in my current or past cryptography courses are automatically on the list; please don't respond. ************************************************************************* Christof Paar http://ee.wpi.edu/People/faculty/cxp.html Assistant Professor email: christof(a)ece.wpi.edu Cryptography Group phone: (508) 831 5061 ECE Department, WPI fax: (508) 831 5491 100 Institute Road Worcester, MA 01609, USA ************************************************************************* For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re:Choices
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Q: "If 1984 was so terrible, why didn't Winston just move to another > year? > A: "Duuhhh..." Q: "How would history have changed if Horatio Alger was black?" A: ???

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