- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Suitcase for sale - $1,000,000
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Weight of suitcase: 80 lbs. For details contact: toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

1 0

FVG ??
by Asgaard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.fvg.com In Santa Fe (?). What kind of joke is that? Is this what Java is for?? Asgaard

1 0

GAK Hits
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Blasts of the GAK plot, maybe genuine, more likely appeals for be-quiet-honey NDA-money: http://jya.com/gak-news.txt

1 0

Re: Online Casino - REAL MONEY!!
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How kosher is this: ]Date: Thu, 4 Sep 1997 21:51:06 -0400 (EDT) ]From: mxzr2(a)savetrees.com ]Subject: Online Casino - REAL MONEY!! ]Reply-To: mxzr2(a)savetrees.com ] ]It's not 'like' the real thing, it IS the real thing!! Goto: http://www.max2001.com/golden/ ] ]The time has come to enjoy casino games online from the comfort of your own home. ] ]17 games are now available. All the traditional games are available: ] ]Blackjack, Poker, Slot Machines, Roulette, Baccarat, Keno and much much more . . . . ] ]Play for fun, or if it is legal in your jurisdiction, PLAY FOR REAL MONEY!! ] ]Open up a real money account and we will give you $25 FREE!! ] ]It is that simple . . . . Goto: http://www.max2001.com/golden/ ] ] GET IN ON THE ACTION . . . CLICK BELOW NOW ] ] http://www.max2001.com/golden/ ] ] and we will show you the money ] ] ] ]Again, to check out our ONLINE CASINO, please goto: ] ]http://www.max2001.com/golden/ ] ] ] ]

1 0

Re: Infoworld and Denning's study
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Infoworld NZ has just published an awful article (written by US reporter Sari >Kalin and titled "Criminals Eyeing Encryption"), which emphasises repeatedly >that encryption is a major problem just waiting to happen, using Dorothy >Dennings report as a basis. This represents a rather ugly way to interpret >the report (and, presumably, an attempt by the USG to recover something from >a report which was supposed to come down firmly in favour of crypto >restrictions but didn't). Due to the late hour I got that wrong, it's Computerworld NZ, not Infoworld (slight difference in naming). Even later last night I wrote a letter to the editor which, I gather, will appear in the next issue. I've included it below in case anyone finds it useful, it's written for a general audience who probably aren't aware of the deeper issues apart from the fact that the USG has a peculiar attitude towards crypto, due to length constraints I couldn't go into too much detail. If you feel the need to circulate this, please don't do so until after next Monday when it's officially published. Peter. -- Snip -- The article "Crims eyeing encryption" in the September 9 Computerworld presents an extremely peculiar view of the study "Encryption and Evolving Technologies in Organised Crime and Terrorism". The final conclusion of the study was that there is no real "encryption problem" which justifies placing limitations on the use of encryption, and yet the article, by more or less ignoring the conclusion and concentrating instead on a number of scaremongering quotes, manages to create exactly the opposite impression. To understand what's involved here, it might be useful to know a bit about the background of the study. For a number of years the US government has held that it needs to strongly restrict peoples access to encryption. They can't actually provide you with any supporting facts for this because they're all classified, but if they were allowed to tell you, they're certain you'd agree with them. Now over the years they came to the realisation that people weren't really buying this argument, and so they decided to create a study which would provide proof, once and for all, that they were right. The two people who worked on this study were Dorothy Denning, virtually the only supporter of the US governments policy apart from the US government itself, and a vice-president of SAIC, a large defence contractor. They toiled away for quite some time, and finally announced their results a month or two back. Unfortunately the findings put them in a rather awkward position: Although the study was supposed to provide proof that there was some sort of "encryption problem" which needed to be countered, it instead showed that there wasn't really a problem at all. Sure, it showed that criminals occasionally use encryption, just like criminals also drive cars, eat pizza, drink Coke, and (quite probably) read Computerworld. The important point - which was almost completely ignored in the article in favour of running scaremongering quotes from a variety of US government officials - was that the "encryption problem", the whole reason for the governments' claimed need to restrict encryption, by and large didn't exist. It got even worse for the government though. So convincing was the evidence in the study that Denning - for years a very outspoken supporter of their policies - did an about-face and declared that she was no longer prepared to back government plans for restricting encryption until someone proved to her that there was a very good reason for it (this was reported in a number of US papers and publications which cover computer issues, so it was reasonably well known, eg "Denning unable to confirm FBI Assertions; alters her position" in the Mercury News, the largest silicon valley paper). Although the governments star technical witness was unable to find any evidence that their position was valid, the Computerworld article, by resorting to selective quoting and innuendo, paints a very different, and quite inaccurate, picture. (As a side-note, I find it amusing to read that the government policy relies on people handing over their encryption keys to them. Quite apart from the question of why anyone would trust the US government with their keys, there's also the small problem that no criminal will ever do this - that's why they're criminals after all. The only ones who'll ever get caught by this cunning plan are you and I). -- Snip -- (I'm assuming most readers will get the Baldrick/Blackadder reference in the last sentence :-).

1 0

Re: FUCK! how do i unregister from toad.com or the 2 other server ?%
by Allan Thompson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

are you tired ? >I am tired, i am registered to 3 cypherpunks server and tired or receiving >40-50 new message each day! > >Please someone reply! > >Martin >mgmicro(a)usa.net > > > ************************************************** "The World is full of shipping clerks who read the Harvard Classics." --Bukowski ***************************************************

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) The remailer list here has been out of date for some time, but should be up to date now. I'm still working on updating the web page. Last update: Mon 8 Sep 97 6:48:45 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net ####**+#-## 7:03 99.95% hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ----_.---.. 14:56:18 99.95% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *+*****++**+ 11:30 99.93% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ----------- 3:17:57 99.83% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com -__.-*+*-.- 7:50:19 99.81% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -----_..---* 10:10:24 99.81% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org ..--------- 3:33:37 99.31% arrid arrid(a)juno.com -- -------- 7:27:32 99.15% neva remailer(a)neva.org -+*#+*--* # 25:21 98.45% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + ++++++ 39:06 97.23% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +++ +++ 28:43 97.10% replay remailer(a)replay.com +**-++ +** 9:49 96.75% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org -*+* ++# 10:58 96.60% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ++..+ * -- 2:32:31 84.34% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com **+*++*+ 1:14:29 58.44% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: EMP & Cars (fwd)
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> > Forwarded message: > > > Date: Fri, 5 Sep 1997 11:48:08 -0400 (EDT) > > From: Ray Arachelian <sunder(a)brainlink.com> > > Subject: EMP & Cars (fwd) > > > There has been quite an interest in EMP. > > > pulses to a near miss lightning strike. As far as vehicle disabling, There > > are claims that auto manufactures have built in a shut down frequency into > > the computers in certain vehicles. We wound a large coil on a carpet paper > > tube and put an oscillator on it and it would flood a vehicles electrical > > system to shut it down, but it was huge. > > Mind being a little more specific?... [...] > > The easiest way to learn about > > EMP is to find the International TESLA society web site and interpret the > > information there. > > Some of the best sources are ECM & EECM texts/sites. > > While it is a good source of technical info it does take a bull-shit > detector set to full to sift through all the other detritis the ITS wallows > in. Space aliens, hollow earth, over-unity power, etc. Ham radio operators have been dealing with this issue for years. There's a lot of (mostly anectodotal) stories of mobile operators keying up their rigs and having either their own or neighbouring cars misfiring or dieing. Shielded ignition cables seem to fix things (though they are actually bought to prevent ignition noise from getting into the radio, not the other way around). Ham operators can use *much* more powerful transmitters than CB or cell phones - my own transceiver puts out 50 watts, but some go a lot higher. It's fairly common for hams to 'test' a prospective car purchase by waving an HT over the engine while transmitting, to see if it has a problem. I suspect that it would be quite possible to build an EMP gun to kill most running cars, but it would also kill anyone with a pacemaker. I'm more worried about the current trend towards placing remotely controlled electronics in cars. Already, one US manufacturer offers as an option a satellite reciever which (among other things) can unlock the car remotely if you lock it in the car accidentally. I have no idea how much authentication is required for such a request, but I'm sure car theives are looking into it. To defend against this, I expect next years model will also allow the car to be turned off by remote control, or turn on a tracking device. The popular 'Lojak' car tracking system has similar civil liberties issues. I understand that the car owner has no control over it's activation, can't disable it, and there is no indication that it is in operation.Apparently all the "authorities" need to turn it on is the VIN. Peter Trei N1MNV

2 1

Re: Prayer to A.M. Turing
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back wrote: >Monty Cantain writes: >> Oh Lord Turing, God of Messages and Pathways, please reduce the >> latency time of the remailer network! Please accept this humble >> offering: 10110AlanMathisonTuring8ef2b1912670b51 > >Your email to Lord Turing may bounce, your hashcash postage doesn't >collide: > >% ashcash AlanMathisonTuring 10110AlanMathisonTuring8ef2b1912670b51 >collision: 0 bits >% Add an "f". AMT

2 1

No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jesus had 3 nipples. (this has been proven to be true)

1 0