- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Patches to make PGP2.3a compatible with 2.6
by Alan Barrett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's a set of patches relative to PGP 2.3a to make it do the following: * Display and accept hexadecimal key IDs with 8 digits. * Accept input "packets" with version 2 or 3. * Produce output "packets" with either version 2 or 3, under control of the new "version_byte" variable in the config file or on the command line. * Produce ASCII armour (or "armor" for USAans) with an desired version string, under control of the new "armor_version" variable in the config file or on the command line. This stuff needs testing and documentation. No warranty, etc. Please send comments to me. If it works the way I hope, then pgp +armor_version=2.6 +version+byte=2 should be compatible with MIT PGP 2.6 before September, and pgp +armor_version=2.6 +version+byte=2 should be compatible with MIT PGP 2.6 after September. Enjoy, - --apb (Alan Barrett) diff -u3 -r pgp/src/armor.c pgp-apb/src/armor.c - --- pgp/src/armor.c Sat Jul 3 00:32:38 1993 +++ pgp-apb/src/armor.c Wed May 25 17:38:32 1994 @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #include "crypto.h" #include "armor.h" +char armor_version[20] = ""; /* version text in armor output */ + static int dpem_file(char *infile, char *outfile); static crcword crchware(byte ch, crcword poly, crcword accum); static int pem_file(char *infilename, char *outfilename, char *clearfilename); @@ -508,7 +510,8 @@ else fprintf (outFile, "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE, PART %02d/%02d-----\n", 1, noSections); - - fprintf (outFile, "Version: %s\n",rel_version); + fprintf (outFile, "Version: %s\n", (armor_version[0] != '\0' ? + armor_version : rel_version)); fprintf (outFile, "\n"); init_crc(); diff -u3 -r pgp/src/config.c pgp-apb/src/config.c - --- pgp/src/config.c Mon Jun 14 02:44:57 1993 +++ pgp-apb/src/config.c Wed May 25 18:00:33 1994 @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ MYNAME, TEXTMODE, TMP, TZFIX, VERBOSE, BAKRING, ARMORLINES, COMPLETES_NEEDED, MARGINALS_NEEDED, PAGER, CERT_DEPTH, CHARSET, CLEAR, SELF_ENCRYPT, - - INTERACTIVE, PKCS_COMPAT, + INTERACTIVE, PKCS_COMPAT, ARMOR_VERSION, VERSION_BYTE, /* options below this line can only be used as command line * "long" options */ #define CONFIG_INTRINSICS BATCHMODE @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ "MYNAME", "TEXTMODE", "TMP", "TZFIX", "VERBOSE", "BAKRING", "ARMORLINES", "COMPLETES_NEEDED", "MARGINALS_NEEDED", "PAGER", "CERT_DEPTH", "CHARSET", "CLEARSIG", "ENCRYPTTOSELF", - - "INTERACTIVE", "PKCS_COMPAT", + "INTERACTIVE", "PKCS_COMPAT", "ARMOR_VERSION", "VERSION_BYTE", /* command line only */ "BATCHMODE", "FORCE", }; @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ STRING, BOOL, STRING, NUMERIC, NUMERIC, STRING, NUMERIC, NUMERIC, NUMERIC, STRING, NUMERIC, STRING, BOOL, BOOL, - - BOOL, NUMERIC, + BOOL, NUMERIC, STRING, NUMERIC, /* command line only */ BOOL, BOOL, }; @@ -392,6 +392,20 @@ case INTERACTIVE: interactive_add = flag; + break; + + case ARMOR_VERSION: + strncpy(armor_version, str, + sizeof(armor_version)); + armor_version[sizeof(armor_version)-1] = '\0'; + break; + + case VERSION_BYTE: + version_byte = value; + if (version_byte < VERSION_BYTE_MIN) + version_byte = VERSION_BYTE_MIN; + if (version_byte > VERSION_BYTE_MAX) + version_byte = VERSION_BYTE_MAX; break; case BATCHMODE: batchmode = flag; break; diff -u3 -r pgp/src/crypto.c pgp-apb/src/crypto.c - --- pgp/src/crypto.c Fri Jul 2 23:55:07 1993 +++ pgp-apb/src/crypto.c Wed May 25 17:53:53 1994 @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ #define USE_LITERAL2 +int version_byte = VERSION_BYTE_DEFAULT; /* PGP packet format version */ /* This variable stores the md5 hash of the current file, if it is available. It is used in open_strong_pseudorandom. */ @@ -313,7 +314,15 @@ */ int version_error(int val, int checkval) - -{ if (val != checkval) +{ return version_range_error(val, checkval, checkval); +} + +/* Return nonzero if val isn't in range from minval to maxval, after + * printing a warning. + */ +int +version_range_error(int val, int minval, int maxval) +{ if (val < minval || val > maxval) { fprintf (pgpout, PSTR( "\n\007Unsupported packet format - you need a newer version of PGP for this file.\n")); return(1); @@ -786,7 +795,7 @@ put_word16((word16) ske_length, certificate+certificate_length); certificate_length+=2; /* advance past word */ - - certificate[certificate_length++] = VERSION_BYTE; + certificate[certificate_length++] = version_byte; /* Begin fields that are included in MD calculation... */ @@ -1367,7 +1376,7 @@ goto badcert; /* complain and return bad status */ version = *certificate++; - - if (version_error(version, VERSION_BYTE)) + if (version_range_error(version, VERSION_BYTE_MIN, VERSION_BYTE_MAX)) goto err1; mdlensave = mdlen = *certificate++; /* length of material to be added to MD */ @@ -1807,7 +1816,7 @@ goto badcert2; /* complain and return bad status */ version = *certificate++; - - if (version_error(version, VERSION_BYTE)) + if (version_range_error(version, VERSION_BYTE_MIN, VERSION_BYTE_MAX)) goto err2; mdlensave = mdlen = *certificate++; /* length of material to be added to MD */ @@ -2361,7 +2370,7 @@ FALSE); /* Write version byte */ - - ver = VERSION_BYTE; + ver = version_byte; fwrite (&ver, 1, 1, g); writekeyID( n, g ); @@ -2745,7 +2754,8 @@ /* Read and check version */ fread (&ver, 1, 1, f); - - if (version_error(ver, VERSION_BYTE)) + if (version_range_error(ver, VERSION_BYTE_MIN, + VERSION_BYTE_MAX)) { fclose (f); return (-1); } diff -u3 -r pgp/src/crypto.h pgp-apb/src/crypto.h - --- pgp/src/crypto.h Mon May 10 01:38:27 1993 +++ pgp-apb/src/crypto.h Wed May 25 17:11:46 1994 @@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ /* Print an error message and return nonzero if val != checkval */ int version_error (int val, int checkval); +/* Print an error message and return nonzero if val not in [minval..maxval] */ +int version_range_error (int val, int minval, int maxval); + int check_key_sig(FILE *fkey, long fpkey, int keypktlen, char *keyuserid, FILE *fsig, long fpsig, char *keyfile, char *siguserid, byte *xtimestamp, byte *sigclass); diff -u3 -r pgp/src/keymgmt.c pgp-apb/src/keymgmt.c - --- pgp/src/keymgmt.c Wed Jun 23 22:53:53 1993 +++ pgp-apb/src/keymgmt.c Wed May 25 18:06:31 1994 @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ char *bufptr; /* ptr to Key ID string */ static char keyIDbuf[2*KEYFRAGSIZE+1]; - - /* only show bottom 3 bytes of keyID */ + /* only show bottom 4 bytes of keyID */ bufptr = keyIDbuf; @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ ** MSB-first keyID format */ - - for (i = KEYFRAGSIZE-3; i < KEYFRAGSIZE; i++) + for (i = KEYFRAGSIZE-4; i < KEYFRAGSIZE; i++) { sprintf( bufptr, "%02X", keyID[i] ); bufptr += 2; @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ fwrite(&ctb,1,1,f); /* write key certificate header byte */ convert(cert_length); /* convert to external byteorder */ fwrite(&cert_length,1,sizeof(cert_length),f); - - version = VERSION_BYTE; + version = version_byte; fwrite(&version,1,1,f); /* set version number */ convert_byteorder(timestamp,4); /* convert to external form */ fwrite(timestamp,1,4,f); /* write certificate timestamp */ @@ -467,7 +467,8 @@ else if (is_ctb_type (ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE)) { if (sigkeyID) { fread(&version,1,1,f); /* Read version of sig packet */ - - if (version_error(version, VERSION_BYTE)) + if (version_range_error(version, VERSION_BYTE_MIN, + VERSION_BYTE_MAX)) SKIP_RETURN(-6); /* Need a later version */ /* Skip timestamp, validity period, and type byte */ fread(&mdlen, 1, 1, f); @@ -493,7 +494,7 @@ if (n != NULL) set_precision(MAX_UNIT_PRECISION); /* safest opening assumption */ fread(&version,1,1,f); /* read and check version */ - - if (version_error(version, VERSION_BYTE)) + if (version_range_error(version, VERSION_BYTE_MIN, VERSION_BYTE_MAX)) SKIP_RETURN(-6); /* Need a later version */ if (timestamp) { fread(timestamp,1,SIZEOF_TIMESTAMP,f); /* read certificate timestamp */ @@ -1214,10 +1215,10 @@ } /* Here's a good format for display of key or signature certificates: - -Type bits/keyID Date User ID - -pub 1024/xxxxxx yyyy-mm-dd aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa - -sec 512/xxxxxx yyyy-mm-dd aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa - -sig 384/xxxxxx yyyy-mm-dd aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa +Type bits/keyID Date User ID +pub 1024/xxxxxxxx yyyy-mm-dd aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa +sec 512/xxxxxxxx yyyy-mm-dd aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa +sig 384/xxxxxxxx yyyy-mm-dd aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa */ if (moreflag) @@ -1406,7 +1407,7 @@ if (mcguffin && strlen(mcguffin) > 0) fprintf(pgpout,PSTR(", looking for user ID \"%s\"."),LOCAL_CHARSET(mcguffin)); } - - fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nType bits/keyID Date User ID\n")); + fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nType bits/keyID Date User ID\n")); } for ( ; ; ) { long fpos = ftell(f); diff -u3 -r pgp/src/pgp.h pgp-apb/src/pgp.h - --- pgp/src/pgp.h Fri Jun 11 09:44:11 1993 +++ pgp-apb/src/pgp.h Wed May 25 17:33:27 1994 @@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ #define CK_ENCRYPTED_BYTE 2 /* Conventional key is encrypted */ /* Version byte for data structures created by this version of PGP */ - -#define VERSION_BYTE 2 /* PGP2 */ +#define VERSION_BYTE_MIN 2 /* PGP2 to 2.5 */ +#define VERSION_BYTE_MAX 3 /* PGP2.6 */ +#define VERSION_BYTE_DEFAULT 2 /* PGP2 */ /* Values for trust bits in keycntrl packet after key packet */ #define KC_OWNERTRUST_MASK 0x07 /* Trust bits for key owner */ @@ -230,6 +232,8 @@ extern int compl_min; /* number of fully trusted signatures needed */ extern int max_cert_depth; extern char pager[]; /* file lister command */ +extern char armor_version[20]; /* version text in armor output */ +extern int version_byte; /* PGP packet format version */ /* These lists store hashed passwords for future use. */ /* passwds are passwords of as-yet-unknown purpose; keypasswds diff -u3 -r pgp/src/zipup.c pgp-apb/src/zipup.c - --- pgp/src/zipup.c Mon May 10 01:39:19 1993 +++ pgp-apb/src/zipup.c Wed May 25 17:49:09 1994 @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ # define fhow (O_RDONLY|O_BINARY) # else /* !MSDOS */ #ifndef AMIGA - - long lseek(); + off_t lseek(); #endif /* AMIGA */ # define fhow 0 # endif /* ?MSDOS */ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.whatever iQCVAgUBLeN86t7alOJsS1cfAQFS1gQArASHvKV51lLRIuaSiyAqF6h9XXQpalZo jdeZpoCC7P8oEe4inKNbtmFqPcQl8uTVlpTdUxJeErDLxSoDXlw04csW6gNssaFL 07+DpXqoogrOV9+kaPflNl+U3O1EWEDMGG064uDSSgJXLldYs8gGONOWpMV3EqZr tdQzYgc0rBM= =wsTt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: PGP 2.6 is dangerous in the long term ?
by bshantz＠spry.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>What if (the cypherpunk community) comes out with a secure program that >doesn't rely on RSAREF? Can it be done? >NOTE: I very likely don't know what I'm talking about. >____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu >\ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- > \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is > \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" >-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- >(GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ > n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*) Robert, The c-punk community could come up with a secure data encryption program that did not rely on RSAREF, but it would take time. When you look at the code for RSAREF, the algorithm really isn't all that bad. (In fact, IMHO, it's quite good.) Several questions that need to be brought up are, "How much time would it take?" "How solid is the algorithm", "Can it be accessible to the public?" Also, "Will whatever the c-punk community comes up with eventually turn into a PGP-like international version control nightmare as is happening now (Patents, international embargo's, NSA complaints, lack of backwards compatibility)?" It is my opinion, that since we do not live in a perfect world, eventually we'd run into the same problem we have now. Is it worth it? (Oooh, I smell a discussion about to start.) Brad :::::::::::::::::<<< NETWORKING THE DESKTOP >>>::::::::::::::::: Brad Shantz Internet : bshantz(a)spry.com SPRY Inc Ph# (206) 447-0300 316 Occidental Avenue S. 2nd Floor FAX (206) 447-9008 Seattle, WA 98104 ---------------------------------------------------------------- "In gopherspace no one can hear you scream." ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

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Re: IBM's NetSP
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> CDMF alleviates the worry of having your data flow across > the network in clear text. The degree of security is > equivalent to encryption using DES but with keys limited > to 40 bits. IBM has obtained approval from the US > Government to export CDMF in products without the > license required to export products containing DES. > Exportable and limited to 40 bits? Sounds like they're using RSA's RC2 algorithm. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: PGP 2.6 is dangerous in the long term ?
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>What if (the cypherpunk community) comes out with a secure program that >doesn't rely on RSAREF? Can it be done? Bizdos and gang will _still_ hold the patent on RSA-style public key encryption. What you're suggesting is, in essence, exactly what Phil Zimmerman did with PGP 1.0. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: Graph isomorphism based PK cryptosystems?
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I talked to a lawyer very recently about this. She does not specialize in patent law but does deal with it. The situation is confusing and fluid. Here is what I think I heard, ommiting occasional caveats: If the patent office knows of prior art (as indicated in some publicat ion)it will not issue a patent. If it does not know then it may issue the patent. Etc. Note that the patent office itself has a publication for stuff that you don't want to patent. I know of no better way to get something into their files.

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Re: MacPGP interface project
by sidney＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On May 13, Richard.Johnson(a)Colorado.EDU wrote: > From the keyboard of: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)access.digex.net> > >> I would design around MacPGP2.3 v.1.0.5 (or whatever) >> The V1.1 source code doesn't look like it will be around real soon. > >Can someone fill the rest of us in on the true story behind this? Why >is the (copylefted) source code to 2.3a V1.1 not available? I saw the question, but no reply. I did have some problems that caused me to miss cypherpunks mail for a few days after that. Was there a reply on the list? In any case, I too would like to know what is the story with source code for MacPGP. In fact, the latest version executable I've seen is 2.3v1.0.5. From Black Unicorn's quote, it seems that there are sources available for that version and executables for 2.3a v1.1. If that's true, where can I find them? Is anyone applying the patches for 2.6 compatibility? -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)apple.com>

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Re: removed from list....
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: joshua geller <joshua(a)cae.retix.com> there was a mass unsubscribing, probably from nalbandian. so it is very likely that you did nothing whatever and that no one is pissed off at you. eric wouldn't unsubscribe you without telling you why it was happening and asking you to stop whatever it was that was causing to be frustrated. Actually I was speaking to lile recently and she said that she was removed from the list *after* resubscribing successfully after the mass removal. Something funny is going on. Anyway, if she wasn't taken off by eric, maybe you could resub her? I think she's sloped off in a huff assuming she was thrown out deliberately :-( G

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Re: Graph isomorphism based PK cryptosystems?
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:42 5/25/94 -0400, smb(a)research.att.com wrote: > This is one of the main > reasons behind such publications as the IBM Technical Journal--the > publication of results not worth patenting themselves, but definitely > worth preventing others from patenting. > >Actually, no. IBM has a separate publication for just that purpose. >The Technicnal Journal (and others like it) are intended as PR vehicles >and as gold stars for researchers -- that's an important part of our >salary, as it were. I think that you are refering to IBM's "Technical Disclosures" publication. Its entries are in the form of patents, presumably in less finished form. They carry thru the process of writing up the patent, at least in rough form, and then decide whether to go to the greater expense of patenting it. If they decide not to patent it they publish it in Technical Disclosures.

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Re: SUE - the legal morass (fwd)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Was the dinosaur encrypted? Yes, but the key diddn't have enough bits to protect it for more than 50 million years under attack by the Feds :-)

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(fwd) FBI Digital Telephony Wiretapping a Done Deal??
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From alt.politics.crypto, several forwards deleted: >US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 30, l994 >THE FREEH LOBBY. Thanks to intense personal lobbying by FBI >Director Louis Freeh, there are now sufficient votes on Capitol Hill to >assure passage of legislation that would make it far easier for law >enforcement officials to wiretap the nation's telephone system. The >snoop-friendly measure, which may be introduced this week, would >require manufacturers of telephone, computer and cable >communications equipment to design and build their machines so >that they could be readily accessed by wiretap and other types of >eaves-dropping devices used my US law enforcement agencies. The >legislation would cover communications equipment now in use as well >as items not yet on the drawing board.

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