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Digital Watermark
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Times, 22 Feb 96 Digital watermark protects copyright Scientists at the NEC Research Institute in Princeton believe they have developed "a fundamental enabling technology" for protecting the copyright of images and music on the Internet. They have developed a secure method of producing a digital watermark, an invisible code that identifies the owner, which is permanently embedded in the multimedia data. Attempts to remove the watermark would be virtually impossible without degrading the image quality. Moreover, counterfeiting would be almost impossible, says NEC. the Japanese electronics company. The digital watermark is designed to be used in conjunction with cryptography, which limits access to encrypted data to legitimate users. NEC Research Institute: US, tel 609-520-1555 fax 609-951-2481.

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test message
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is sent to cypherpunks-outgoing-ksiuw. Will it make it to the cypherpunks list?

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Look, a chain letter :-)
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received a curious mimetic e-mail. The cypherpunks relevance is: will we or will we not bring down the White House server? :-) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- To whoever may read this, This is not a typical chain letter, in that by passing it on to as many people as you can, you are taking part in what may yet become the world's biggest practical joke. The U.S. Government has recently passed an act which enforces censorship on the internet. A group of internet users has now come together to kick back at this oppression, and have a bit of fun at the same time. The aim of this exercise is to re-establish the United States as "The Land of the Free", not a fascist state where freedom of speech and thought are curtailed. Communist Russia fell as a result of such limits being placed upon the minds of the general populus. On receiving this letter, please pass it on to as many friends or E-mail lists as you can. We predict that if everybody copies the letter to 5 other addresses, by February 29th 1996, this letter should have reached in excess of 2 million people. That's when the fun begins........ On February 29th, please send the message: Dear Mr. President, Do you remember this: And afterwards enclose the pre-typed copy of the Bill of Rights. By sending the letter on the date above, you will contribute to either one huge petition for freedom, or else lead to a crash of the White House server. Send all letters to: President(a)Whitehouse.gov Remember that solidarity is the key to success THE BILL OF RIGHTS Amendment I Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Amendment II A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. Amendment III No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. Amendment IV The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Amendment V No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Amendment VI In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Amendment VII In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. Amendment VIII Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Amendment IX The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Amendment X The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: [No subject]
by Yee, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Earlier, I mentioned that two and a half protocols survived the >> day. The remaining one is MSP. It's actually not a bad protocol. It >> has two features that none of the others have: the ability to label >> classified messages, and a cryptographically strong signed receipt. >> Both of these functions are highly important for government users. It >> looks like government suppliers are going to go ahead and implement >> it, and the government is going to use it. >Although these benefits are present in the current MSP, I >don't see anything inherent in MSP that makes it necessarily superior in these >areas. If you were doing normal MIME-type receipts (whatever that means, since >I think there are three different drafts under way currently), and you simply >added the ability to cryptographically sign a timestamp in the "proper" MIME >receipt type, then MSP would lose this advantage. FIF. I guess this could be said about any of the protocols. With enough changes they all have the same feature set. :-) MSP just has it now and it works. >I think labeling could potentially be done by follow-on >versions of other packages as well, since I think we all agree that generic >labeling which can be used both for standard gov't-style classification levels >and compartments, as well as for business-style sensitivity labeling. In fact, >I'd almost be inclined to say that it would likely be as easy (or easier) to >create a new general-purpose labeling system for use with any of the >competitors than it would be to modify MSP to support business-style labels in >addition to the gov't-style labels I'm sure it has today (maybe it already has >labels, but I don't think that this is that tough of a problem to solve in any >event). Well, read MSP first before assuming. And of course, see above comment. -Peter

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Re: "E-Money" is trademarked
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:54 AM 2/24/96, Jim Miller wrote: >FYI, I learned tonight that Electronic Funds Clearinghouse, Inc., holds >the trademark "E-Money" which is licensed to E-Money, Inc. a Delaware > >Corporation. See the Web page http://www.efunds.com > >I guess I will have to rename my E-Money mini-FAQ. I guess we're left with "D-marks" (D for digital...). I can only hope that someone soon trademarks the stupid "e$" and thus enjoins the rest of us from using it. (On a serious note, yet another example that the American copyrighting and patenting engine is overrevving.) --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Alternative to e$
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why not use the name Electronic Cash Unit, abreviated ECU? :-) JFA **** OLD KEY: DO NOT USE ANYMORE UNLESS FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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[Fwd: LFB Book News: EAT THE RICH]
by S�ren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may be preaching to the choir, but for anyone who doesn't know about http://www.laissezfaire.org ... To: booknews(a)laissezfaire.org Subject: LFB Book News: EAT THE RICH From: Russell Hanneken <russell(a)laissezfaire.org> Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1998 17:31:38 -0700 ================================================================= Laissez Faire Books - Book News - September 10, 1998 Please forward this message to anyone who might be interested. ================================================================= First 350 with autographed bookplates! A grand slam from P. J. O'Rourke, the best political humorist since H. L. Mencken EAT THE RICH by P. J. O'Rourke (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1998) HU7872 (hardcover) 246p. Publisher's price: $24.00 Our price normally $16.95 SPECIAL SALE PRICE, LIMITED TIME ONLY: $14.41 (reviewed by Jim Powell) Everything P. J. O'Rourke writes makes you smile, but I'd rate EAT THE RICH as his best book, better even than his super-seller PARLIAMENT OF WHORES. The political content is very high, and the book is loaded with great lines. Open to a page, any page, and you'll soon find something wonderful--not just wit, but passion as well. O'Rourke offers uproarious commentary about fashionable politicians, intellectuals and dogmas in Albania, Sweden, Cuba, Russia, Tanzania and Shanghai as well as the United States. A sampler: "I had one fundamental question about economics: Why are some places prosperous and thriving while others just suck? It's not a matter of brains. No part of the earth (with the possible exception of Brentwood) is dumber than Beverly Hills, and the residents are wading in gravy. Meanwhile in Russia, where chess is a spectator sport, they're boiling stones for soup." "Microeconomics concerns things that economists are specifically wrong about, while macroeconomics concerns things economists are wrong about generally. Or, to be more technical, microeconomics is about money you don't have, and macroeconomics is about money the government is out of." "Government does not cause affluence. Citizens of totalitarian countries have plenty of government and nothing of anything else." "And technology provides no guarantee of creature comforts. The most wretched locales in the world are well-supplied with complex and up-to-date technology--in the form of weapons." "Nationalization does to goods and services what divorce does to male parents--suddenly they're absent most of the time and useless the rest." "Altruism towards strangers is mostly a sentimental and fleeting thing, a small check dashed off to Save the Children. Twenty billion dollars worth of it is rare. In the Cold War days, of course, we were giving money to Tanzania on the theory of: 'Pay them to be socialist so they won't be communist and figure out what the difference is later.' But now, I'm afraid, the ugly truth is that we care about Tanzanians because they have cool animals." "The Russian stuff is no good. Even the smallest, simplest items stink. The way you use a Russian match is: After you strike it, you put it back in the matchbox. It's as likely to work as any of the other matches in there. In the old days the soda pop tasted like soap, the soap lathered like toilet paper, the toilet paper could be used to sand furniture, the furniture was as comfortable as a pile of canned goods, the canned goods had the flavor of a Solzhenitsyn novel, and a Solzhenitsyn novel got you arrested if you owned one." "How a peaceful, uncrowded place with ample wherewithal stays poor is hard to explain. How a conflict-ridden, grossly over-populated place with no resources whatsoever gets rich is simple. The British colonial government turned Hong Kong into an economic miracle by doing nothing." "So if wealth is not a world-wide round-robin of purse snatching, and if the thing that makes you rich doesn't make me poor, why should we care about fairness at all? We shouldn't." "If we want the whole world to be rich, we need to start loving wealth. In the difference between poverty and plenty, the problem is the poverty and not the difference. Wealth is good." As these delightful selections suggest, nobody today has a more gifted pen than P. J. O'Rourke. You'll love this book. ================================================================= EAT THE RICH HU7872 (hardcover) 246p. Publisher's price: $24.00 Our price normally $16.95 SPECIAL SALE PRICE, LIMITED TIME ONLY: $14.41 ================================================================= How to order from Laissez Faire Books: SALES TAX: If we are shipping your order to California, you must pay sales tax. To learn the applicable tax rate, contact us, or point your web browser to <http://laissezfaire.org/2order.html#tax>. SHIPPING & HANDLING: For destinations in the US: STANDARD SHIPPING (1-3 weeks): Merchandise total Standard shipping price $ 0.00 - $24.99 $3.50 $25.00 - $49.99 $4.50 $50.00 - $74.99 $5.50 $75.00 - $99.99 $6.50 $100 and over FREE! 3-DAY SHIPPING (3 business days, no PO boxes): $9 for the first item ($19 if destination is Alaska or Hawaii) plus $2.50 for each additional item. For destinations outside the US: SURFACE MAIL (2-8 weeks): $4.50 for the rist item plus $1.50 for each additional item. Contact us for other shipping options. PAYMENT: All orders must be prepaid. Checks or money orders should be drawn on a US bank and made payable to Laissez Faire Books. If paying by credit card, please include both the card number and the expiration date. We accept Visa, Mastercard, and Discover. If you have placed a credit card order before, we can process your order using the information we have on file (provided it is up to date). Please include your name and zip code (or postal code) so we can find your record. Members of the Laissez Faire Book Club can pay with funds drawn from their account. For more information about the Book Club, contact us, or point your web browser to <http://laissezfaire.org/2order.html#bookclub>. SUBMITTING YOUR ORDER: BY EMAIL: Address email orders to <orders(a)laissezfaire.org>. PGP-encrypted mail is accepted. For our public key, email <russell(a)laissezfaire.org>, or point your web browser to <http://laissezfaire.org/pubkey.html>. BY MAIL: Write to Laissez Faire Books, Dept L50, 938 Howard St., Ste. 202, San Francisco, CA 94103-4114, USA. BY PHONE: Call toll free 1-800-326-0996 (US and Canada) or dial (415) 541-9780. Customer service representatives are available between 9am and 6pm PACIFIC TIME. BY FAX: Fax us at (415) 541-0597. If you'd like to receive our free monthly booklist, please email your postal address to <custsvc(a)laissezfaire.org>. If you'd like to receive weekly Book News announcements via email, or if you have any other questions or comments, please contact Russell at <russell(a)laissezfaire.org>. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Russell Hanneken Laissez Faire Books russell(a)laissezfaire.org http://laissezfaire.org/

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Replay
by Soren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why isn't remailer(a)replay.com posting to cypherpunks? I've sent several and none have shown up -- rants up in smoke.

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Anonymous access to certificate revocation lists?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Hmmm - a crypto-related technical discussion that looks like it's coderpunks material?] The article on Digital Signature Legislation by Brad Biddle <biddle(a)acusd.edu> Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Ctr for Public Interest Law http://pwa.acusd.edu/~prc had good coverage of the legal issues related to the Utah digital signature law, but it touched on one interesting technical point - signature verification systems that use Certificate Revocation Lists are vulnerable to traffic analysis because you need to check the CRL at a CA every time you want to verify a signature from a user certified by that CA. (There's also denial-of-service risk.) For example, Alice wants to check the signature on Document D, which is signed by Bob, whose key is certified by Carol's CA. Alice may have Bob's public key, or may need to fetch it from somewhere (this is only a minor traffic analysis risk; she can get it from Bob or from some public server, or even download all keys from the server.) If the signature on Document D is good, Alice needs to verify Bob's key. Alice can check Carol's signature on the key (perhaps fetching Carol's), but she also needs to know if Bob's key is still good or if it's been revoked. In a PGP environment, Bob is the only one who can revoke a key, and he's responsible for shipping out revocations. In a X.509 environment, Carol the certifier can revoke her certification of Bob, so Alice has to check with Carol to be sure she hasn't. This creates a transaction record. Biddle's article is concerned about the privacy implications of Carol knowing about everybody who wants to verify Bob's key, because the law doesn't address who she can sell the data to. For cypherpunks, there are more concerns - it's tough to have a private conversation if you've got to exchange messages with your friendly Government Post Office Certification Authority. Is there a need to build anonymous CRL-checking proxies so people can check X.509 signatures (e.g. the ones used by Netscape) anonymously? How much caching can you do? How would you decide how much to trust it? The failure modes look different from anonymous remailers, where a dishonest remailer can save your address, but you can protect yourself by chaining remailers in serial. With anonymous CRL proxies, a dishonest proxy can tell you that "Bob"'s key isn't on Carol's CRL when it is; to avoid this problem, you need to ask a bunch of proxies in parallel, which means that any dishonest proxy can reveal your queries. There's also the denial of service problem - depending on your policies, and their implementation in software (especially packaged software), what happens if you don't get a reply saying either yes or no on revocation - what if Carol or a Man In The Middle decides not to respond to Alice's requests, or to requests for certifications on Bob's key? Are you hosed? #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com / billstewart(a)attmail.com +1-415-442-2215 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs Pager +1-408-787-1281

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Re: TIS--Building in Big Brother for a Better Tommorrow
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 12:19 AM 2/23/96, P.J. Ponder wrote: >>The first paragraph here bothered me. If a user (or an organization) >>needs to have access to data that was encrypted by an associate ( or one >>of its employees) wouldn't sound practice require that the key not be >>entrusted to just one person? I don't see the need for any fancy >>"key-recovery" protocol with any outside entities. We can handle this >>internally in my shop. Some keys I give a copy to Alice, and down the >>hall Bob has some, too. If I get hit by the bus, they can get my company >>related data back. We don't need any "service" or "licensee" or "trusted >>third party" or any of that, thank you very much. And we don't need any >>one developing OTPs for us either, and we don't need government agencies >>keeping copies of any of our keys. Hear, hear! A decade or so ago, when I was a tool of the Military-Industrial Complex, we had key escrow and trusted third-party products, but they were appropriate technology - Big Ugly Safes that were rated for classified storage. If you had data or (physical) keys or safe combinations you wanted to protect, you could put them in the safes in the computer room or security office. The main thing we used the latter for was the combination of the computer-room safe, which we kept in a sealed envelope for emergencies. The same technique can work just fine for crypto keys today. If you'd rather use electronic storage than sticking floppies in a safe, encrypt the password with Corporate Security's public key, and email it to them with a Subject: line explaining what it is. Retrieval is easy, and it's _not_ automatic; a human needs to be involved, which is a Good Thing - this is _supposed_ to be an emergency backup. If you don't trust it, split the key and email to two different Corporate Security Management folks. If you don't trust the users not to send bogus keys, you shouldn't be trusting them with the information the keys protect. (System V being what it was in those days, we protected the root password to our computer by giving it to all the technically competent users so they could reboot the VAX or exceed system limits to get their work done. :-) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com / billstewart(a)attmail.com +1-415-442-2215 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs Pager +1-408-787-1281

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