- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: to The Atlantic
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The NSA has not admitted that it can break DES, but there is plenty >of evidence that 0.01% of its budget would be enough to build a >machine to break it. That sounds to me like a big "Yes" for supposition, then. -- Lefty [gYon-Pa] (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: Black Eye for NSA, NIST, and Denning
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry writes: > > However, it can be done in advance, and you can conceivably reuse > > forged LEAFs. > > I will point out something that I didn't quite understand myself but > have since discussed with Matt Blaze in some detail -- LEAF checksums > are tied to session keys. You CAN do this in advance but only if your > key exchange will permit you to generate your session keys in advance, too > Obviously, reusing forged LEAFs requires reusing session keys. More precisely, as Steve's summary pointed out, it's tied to the IV, which is tied to the session key. (It makes sense - assuming the descriptions of the LEAF contents are true, the only session key component in the LEAF itself is encrypted with the chip-unique backdoor key, and tying it to the IV accomplishes key-dependence, though they could also use the session key externally from the LEAF.) Unfortunately, most Clipperphones will probably use Diffie-Hellman key exchange, since it reduces or eliminates the need for prearranged public-key management (depending on whether they're using radio or a medium that can be actively wiretapped), so precomputation will generally not be usable. I suppose some crude Diffie-Hellman implementations might always use the same half-key for every conversation, rather than generating a random one each time, and you could precompute session keys for talking to them. For email applications, however, most standards will probably use sender-generated session keys, so it would be simple enough to make secure Tessera mailers if you don't worry about subliminal channels in the hash. Bill

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Re: Mandatory sig workaround
by Andrew Lowenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Roy Silvernail writes: > Tim, just for fun, what tools would need to appear to make it > possible for you to sign your traffic? Maybe a description will > inspire some of the Macheads out there to get hacking. (the astute > reader will note that I'm not suggesting new tools to the erstwhile > Mr. May, as has been done so often in the past) Perhaps I'm wrong, but doesn't MacPGP allow you to sign things on the clipboard? Are there any MacPGP users out there? If this is true (and I think it is), then I don't see what's holding Tim back... Compose message, select all, cut, sign, paste, deliver... andrew

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Mosaic / CEB / CypherEssay Archive and List
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think that Mosaic pages are the way to go these days. These are not hard to write and they are very nice to use. For some interesting examples of what can be done, check out some of the existing cypherpunk mosaic pages: ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/Home.html ftp://ftp.u.washington.edu/public/phantom/cpunk/README.html http://www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/Crypt.html http://digicash.support.nl ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks I think it would be good to have a "cypherpunks-essay" mailing list that was not moderated but people only sent essays that they thought were good enough to be archived. For starters, people can just CC: mail to "vac+cypheressay" and it will get dropped into a separate file in: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/cypheressay My "vac+cypheressay" was done with one line in my .maildelivery and a short shell script I call "save-numbered". Both are below (note the A.I. methods used to moderate mail). Having a "cypherpunks-essay" mailing list on the same machine as "cypherpunks" could be nice for folks who want a lower volume group. Could have mail to it also go to cypherpunks, and Reply-To: also go to cypherpunks. -- Vince Addr vac+cypheressay pipe R /usr/vac/bin/save-numbered /usr/anon/security/cypheressay #!/bin/csh -f # # This is not totally safe as it is not atomic. If two messages # came at the same time there is a chance one would get lost. # For a low volume list this will not be a problem. cd $1 umask 022 set current = `cat num` @ next = $current + 1 echo $next > num cat >> $next # Moderator says no reply messages grep "Re:" $next if ($status == 0) then /bin/rm $next endif

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The Illogic of Clipper
by Ed Carp [SysAdmin] 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sorry, but I just don't understand the government's position on Clipper. After all, the best way for people to ensure that the government's not going to listen in on their communications is to not use Clipper. Now, unless it was a crime to use anything other than Clipper, the government couldn't do a thing about it. No criminal is going to use a system that would allow the feds to eavesdrop - that's worse than sending messages "en clair". The only way I see Clipper working is if it was mandatory to use it, with stiff penalties against using anything else. That way, if the feds decided to listen in on someone's conversation, and they couldn't decrypt it, all they'd have to do would be to charge them with the crime of using a non-approved method of encryption. This raises another question - wouldn't the mandatory use of Clipper violate the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination? The courts have held that for the government to mandate someone filling out a form (for example) that would incriminate them is not legal. It seems to me that to require someone to use an "approved" method of encryption is, in essence, violating one's fifth amendment rights. Before someone points out that it's the case now with the government's ability to read stuff "en clair" anyway, I would point out that the courts may find that there is a higher expectation of privacy when someone uses encryption that if they did not. There is a fundamental expectation of privacy, even if one is engaged in criminal activity, that the courts have tended to maintain. Ed Carp, N7EKG/VE3 ecarp(a)netcom.com, Ed.Carp(a)linux.org "What's the sense of trying hard to find your dreams without someone to share it with, tell me, what does it mean?" -- Whitney Houston, "Run To You"

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Privacy Rights Alert
by JWRCLUM＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts jwrclum(a)aol.com Re: Privacy Rights Alert Date: November 20, 1995 c 1995 ACLUMA We at the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts want to alert you to the fact that the right to medical privacy of all Americans is imperiled by a bill just introduced in the U.S. Congress. This bill, which is claimed to be a "Medical Records Confidentiality Act," in reality may turn out to be profoundly destructive of your right to privacy. Although Part I does contain certain aspects which could help privacy, Part II undercuts the very fabric of patient- doctor confidentiality. First, it preempts many state law and common law protections which currently exist. Second, it pushes the further computerization of medical records, and will bring about the creation of "Health Information Services" --- corporate entities which would receive, process, and serve as libraries for actual on-line medical records forwarded from hospitals, clinics, and individual doctors. It appears that this will take place without any requirement for individual patients' authorization or consent. As we all know, computerized data bases are not immune from being accessed by both unauthorized "outsiders" and unauthorized "insiders." Centralization of data storage, especially in electronic form, simplifies its being accessed. But aside from that, the bill would actually authorize access to the medical records in these data bases by a host of government and non-government entities. Each of our medical records would thus become part of a computerized "lending library" --- an internet of medical records. For example, the bill would permit release of your medical records from "Health Information Services" (the on-line data base holders) and "Health Information 'Trustees'" (providers, hospitals, health plans, employers, insurers, and health oversight agencies) to the following (among others): - Release to researchers (along with your medical history, it is possible that identifying information including your name, address, and phone number would be sent). - Nearly-automatic release, to the opposing party in a lawsuit, of your entire medical history, if your health, physical or mental, has been raised by you as an issue in that lawsuit. - Release to law-enforcement authorities under certain circumstances. - Release to Public Health Agencies under certain circumstances. - Release based on Judicial Warrant --- you would be notified by mail within 30 days after execution of the warrant (90 days or more with the government's ex parte option). - Release based on Judicial Subpoena, Grand Jury Subpoena, or Administrative Agency (e.g. Social Security) Subpoena --- you would be notified on or before the date of its execution (or within 90 days thereafter [or longer] with the government's ex parte option). -A special variant of this, where the identity of the patient is "unknown," would allow the search of records (plural) in order to identify the person being sought. [In essence, this would allow "fishing" expeditions, using a computerized net, into the private lives of Americans.] In some of these situations, you, the patient, will only be informed after the records have been released. You may, in some circumstances, have the legal right to "attempt to quash" the subpoena (etc.) by seeking a court's intervention. However, the standard by which the court is to reach a decision on this will be mandated by this bill to be a consideration of whether the government's interest in obtaining the information outweighs the privacy interest of the individual. We would encourage you to pull up a copy of the actual bill and view it yourself. This can be done through the Library of Congress internet site at http:\\thomas.loc.gov (104th Congress, Senate bill number S 1360 ). Alternatively, a hard copy by mail can be requested from the U.S. Senate Documents Room, by faxing to 202-228-2815 a note containing the bill number and your mailing address. All our voices need to be heard in order to help make certain that this bill is not passed by Congress. Possible actions include: (1) Letters to your Senators and congresspersons, and to the House and Senate leadership. (2) Letters to local newspapers and other media. (3) Forwarding the contents of this message to places where you feel it will be of interest and have impact. This document may be re-distributed freely, provided it remains in its entirety. If you value your right to privacy, the time to act is now....

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"Dear Newt" Letter...
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My, *this* looks interesting... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: 20 Nov 1995 11:21:01 -0800 Subject: please fwd to cpunks if you To: "Bob Hettinga" <RAH(a)shipwright.com> The Ad Hoc Taxpayer Coalition for Computer Privacy November 8, 1995 The Honorable Newt Gingrich Speaker of the House of Representatives H-232 The Capitol Washington, DC 20515-6502 Dear Mr. Speaker: We are writing to express serious concerns about the Administration's efforts to continue to restrict the ability of computer users at home and abroad to protect their personal and private information over electronic networks through the use of encryption technology. The Administration seems determined to ensure government surveillance of all electronic information and communications. It began with President Clinton's "Clipper Chip," but has not stopped. Consumers aren't happy with these proposals, and neither is the business community nor civil libertarians. In fact, it's hard to find anyone supportive outside the Administration except for the few that would benefit from the Administration's "proposed relaxation" of the nation's export policy. The Administration refuses to let American computer hardware and software companies sell products with good encryption worldwide unless the U.S. Government is guaranteed access to a key that unlocks that information. The Administration is trying to leverage these companies' need to export -- they derive more than half their earnings from sales abroad -- and desire to develop a single product worldwide, to force them to include a feature in products they sell in the U.S. and abroad that will allow government access. Administration officials also have said that if American companies do not "voluntarily" include such a feature, then they will seek legislation making such a feature mandatory. The Administration's approach is the wrong policy for today's marketplace. It's anti-consumer. Computer users will not entrust their sensitive information to computer networks unless its security and privacy are assured. Without good privacy protection, there simply will not be a Global Information Infrastructure -- and America won't be in the lead. It's anti-marketplace. There is no consumer demand for encryption products that give the government easy access. The Administration has come forward with a typical big-government approach -- a government designed solution for a government problem. This completely overlooks the realities of a free-market. It is anti-American business. The Administration's current policies are seriously harming the continued competitiveness of one of our fastest growing and most successful industries -- the computer hardware and software industry. Computer users are demanding good encryption but American companies are not allowed to supply it. Yet there are hundreds of foreign encryption products manufactured and encryption programs are widely available on the Internet. Finally, it is anti-progress. Wishing that there was no encryption available will not make it so. The technology is widely understood and available -- you can't put this genie basic in the bottle. Government policies should not encumber the American computing industry as it leads the world technology revolution. We strongly urge you to oppose attempts to limit the ability of Americans to use whatever encryption they wish and to support the immediate relaxation of harmful export controls on American products and programs with encryption features. The Ad Hoc Taxpayer Coalition for Computer Privacy Americans for Tax Reform Association of Concerned Taxpayers Competitive Enterprise Institute Citizens for a Sound Economy The Business Leadership Council The Small Business Survival Committee Citizens Against a National Sales Tax/VAT Virginia Postrel, Editor, Reason magazine Sheldon Richman, Senior Editor, The Cato Institute Tanya Metaksa, Executive Director, Institute for Legislative Action, National Rifle Association Kellyanne Fitzpatrick, The Polling Company Donna Matias, Institute for Justice =+=+=+=+ This information is provided as a service of the National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, Fairfax, VA. This and other information on the Second Amendment and the NRA is available at any of the following URL's: http://WWW.NRA.Org, gopher://GOPHER.NRA.Org, wais://WAIS.NRA.Org, ftp://FTP.NRA.Org, mailto:LISTPROC@NRA.Org (Send the word help as the body of a message) Information may also be obtained by connecting directly to the NRA-ILA GUN-TALK Bulletin Board System at (703) 934-2121. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://www.webstuff.apple.com/~vinnie/Rah >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pcw(a)access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) writes: > "Fewer" enemies? I am of the opinion that most of the Post SU countries will amount to no serious threat. Remember, most of our problem was with Moscow. Most of the SU didn't especially care about us -- they were more concerned with eating dinner that night. As a result, yes, there are a few emerging hot spots, but they aren't _our_ enemies. The Bosnia deal is a local political problem. It is _not_ a threat to US security, much as Clinton would like us to think it is... ;-) > Croatia etc... We didn't need to monitor the different governments in the > different regions. True, but, most of that died. Yugoslavia, for example, is hardly a threat to us. Our problems in the past were mostly with Moscow. Most of the rest of the SU was not an issue. So yes, we have more governments to watch, but fewer enemies. > The ex-SU is now split into too many pieces for me to count. Some of them > have nuclear weapons that they don't want to turn over. Others have military > ships. Yes, they have Nukes. If I did, in their shoes, you're damn right I wouldn't want to give them up! Yes, they bear watching. Hell, even Israel, our military ally, bears watching. That doesn't mean they require the same level of surveillance. > North Korea, the Mid East and Cuba are the only places that still need the > same amount of attention that they needed during the Cold War. This is > because they're already maxed out. NK is a hot spot at the moment. Even if the C/W was still in effect and the SU still in force, NK would probably still be a problem now. The Middle Eastern area still requires a mind-boggling amount of watching. That situation is just too volatile not to watch it. However, I find it hard to buy into the fact that we're going to give 100% to Middle East, and the same 100% to Russia, who not only still can't feed it's people, but has SERIOUS financial problems. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+ -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: Anonymity and Intellectual Capital
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The analogy between corporations protecting physical capital and anonymity protecting intellectual capital is interesting, and I will write a bit about it here. I don't think it quite works in all ways but it does suggest some ideas. Capital, as I use the word, means stuff which helps you be productive. Money can be physical capital, as can machines, computers, and so on, but generally not consumer goods. Traditionally, intellectual capital by the same definition refers to training, knowledge, experience, education - those mental skills and characteristics which help you produce. We have sometimes extended this notion here to reputation capital, which we often use just to mean your reputation itself, your good name. But if we are going to call it "capital" it should really be those aspects of your reputation which lead to productivity. To the extent that your good reputation helps you accomplish your productive goals, it can be considered capital. Particularly if you are a manager or performer in some other position where people's opinions of you make a big difference in how much you get done, you have a lot of reputation capital. Business reputations have many of the characteristics of capital, too. For some uses of anonymity it does make sense to think of them as protecting reputation capital. If you are going to send a message which carries a risk of harming your reputation, perhaps because it is terribly stupid or harsh, then anonymity can protect you in that way. I think some people do communicate anonymously for this reason. However there is another motivation, too, and that is fear of physical consequences. Some anonymous messages might lead to lawsuits or retribution in other forms, such as firing or blackballing. There is more involved in these cases than just loss of reputation capital. Physical capital is involved as well. So this is one way in which I think the analogy does not work. Another difference relates to the number of people involved. As I understand it, the motivation for the corporate veil of immunity from liability is so that people can safely band together in business. If there were no veil, and one harmful act by a member of the corporation could result in any stockholder being held liable, then few people would be willing to commit their assets to such an activity. The risk would be too great. The point is that this protection is oriented towards protecting large numbers of people. It does not make much sense for a single person to incorporate in order to try to protect himself from his own harmful acts, and in fact I understand that the veil can often be easily pierced in such situations. On the other hand, with anonymity we are generally dealing with single individuals. There is no apparent need for people to pool reputation capital in an endeavor, and have it be protected by the use of anonymity. The closest I can think of would be for a bunch of highly regarded individuals to announce that they were going to join together and create commentaries which would demonstrate all the insight, wit, and other traits which gave these people such a high reputation in the first place, but that the resulting missives would be released anonymously, so that if one of them ended up reflecting badly on the writers, there would be no way to know who had actually created it (it could be a fake created by an imitator). While I can't rule this out, it doesn't seem like a likely scenario, and it doesn't seem to offer the opportunities that corporations do for increasing productivity. Another issue is the different forms of anonymity, which don't have clear analogies with physical capital. Using a pseudonym you can build up reputation capital (or at least reputation) in the nym, but then you no longer have immunity from harm if it commits some gaffe. (Actually I suppose this is not too different from the corporation whose assets can be attacked but not those of the shareholders.) Then there are the limited pseudonyms discussed by David Chaum, where there are limits in how many pseudonyms of a particular type a person can create. You could have one "committed" pseudonym, unlinkable to your True Name, which you post under; but you'd only get that one. (You could post under other pseudonyms but they wouldn't be able to get that "committed" stamp.) You'd have to be pretty careful what you say via that nym, much as you are today with your True Name (which BTW a lot of people don't realize yet). Then people could filter so they only received messages from committed nyms, figuring that senders would be more likely to put meaningful content into these kinds of messages. Chaum's system of credentials also could allow you to transfer endorsements from one pseudonym to another. We have discussed the idea that such endorsements could be considered an embodiment of reputation capital. You could post a wide range of messages under different pseudonyms, collect the positive endorsements (and discard the negative ones), and attach them to your True Name or committed nym. This might encourage people to abandon their natural caution in making postings which will come back to haunt them years hence (again, this will be more an issue once people realize that this will happen). Hal

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WANTED: roommate for defcon
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wanted: a roommate for the weekend at defcon. Just let me sleep on the floor and I'll pay part of the bill. Also, I am not an axe-murderer! (what a deal!) -nate -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons <nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu> <nate(a)yuma.ANCS.ColoState.Edu> | | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | | Data Visualization/Interrogation, Modeling, Animation, Rendering | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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