- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Hello directly from Jimbo at Wikipedia
by Paul Syverson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Some points of clarification that I hope will help: (1) On anonymity and authentication/pseudonymity/etc. All versions of Onion Routing, including Tor, were designed to separate identification from routing. The slogan way that I have put this for the last five or six years is: Onion Routing is about anonymizing the communication pipe, not what goes through it. The devil's always in the details, but as one-line summaries go, I think that sums it up pretty well.{1} (2) On various pseudonym authentication or anonym authentication{2}, etc. approaches to solving the problem at hand. Some of this is ultimately necessary for various applications, especially once the Internet looks as Geoff described it. (In fact I think it's one precondition to realizing anything like that vision.) But I'm dubious about any of those proposed to date here providing enough friction to identifier acquisition to deter abusers but not honest users in this context. They may be worth trying. Roger's suggestion about the temporary IP blocks and Steven's about the separate puzzle servers come to mind, probably some others I'm forgetting just now. But as Roger says, somebody's gotta code them up---and probably much more work---deploy them, maintain them, and evaluate their effectiveness, all on the Tor-Wikipedia frontier. I suspect that the abuser who goes postal as Jimmy described is willing to waste lots of time acquiring IDs, but perhaps stereotypes about attention span are close enough to true for some of the proposals to be effective. I had my own proposal that doesn't rely on any of this, and that could be implemented and deployed in a few days (OK after spending at least a few months or so thinking about the design, the engineering, and the implications.) In the spirit of mutt: All these ideas suck; I just think that one sucks a little less. ------------------------------------------------------------- {1} Some further specifics for (1) Anonymity and identification/authentication can be entirely compatible. By this I mean that one can be anonymous (to everyone) as far as one identifier goes but authenticated (to a specific protocol principal) wrt another as part of the same communication. This has been an intentional part of the design of every Onion Routing system including Tor. It contrasts with systems like Crowds, which was directed at distinct but related security properties, thus they made anonymity of the circuit inherently depend on the anonymity of the data passing over it. As a specific example of using Tor for authenticated communication over anonymous circuits, when travelling I often need to log back into NRL to check mail and do other things. I do this via ssh over Tor. That way the local hotel staff, ISP staff, any other network observers don't see me logging in to NRL. But I can assure you that I want to make sure I am going to NRL and no place else and that I want to make sure only I, and no one else, succeeds in accessing my account. (And Jimbo, in my experience, it has been realtime enough to be editing in vi or emacs with no noticeable trouble over this line. I can't say that someone who expects permanent T1 rate downloading is going to be happy with Tor, but you should check it out and see the performance for yourself over a few days, rather than relying on the reports you've heard.) I also discussed this in my testimony to the National Academy of Engineering panel that did a study of authentication and privacy several years ago. (Cf. _Who Goes There? Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy_ from the National Academies Press.) As many have noted, Tor has enough of a job trying to do one thing well. Trying to do more things will just mean it does that thing less well or later. But that does not preclude designing to be compatible with other things, e.g., privoxy to somewhat sanitize, i.e., anonymize web traffic over Tor, or connect to enable authenticated communication via ssh over Tor. (There's a program named `connect' in case you had trouble parsing that.) The discussion now is how to make Tor and Wikipedia compatible, the interface as Nick put it. {2} Yes you can authenticate someone who is anonymous from you. Besides various group signature approaches, cf., e.g., my papers on UST (Unlinkable Serial Transactions), or look at the proposal for common terminology (new version recently out) at http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/Anon_Terminology.shtml What we called an `anonym' in the UST work and elsewhere they call a `transaction pseudonym'. ------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

Re: [Freedombox-discuss] Tahoe-LAFS is like a Bittorrent with which you can upload as well as download
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 7:29 AM, Nick Daly <nick.m.daly(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > What's Tahoe's required overhead? Is it static (5KB, regardless of > partition size), or does it grow with the reserved space (2% from 0 - > 5 GB, 3% for > 5GB)? Hm, I'm not exactly sure. In general, people tend to allocate large amounts of disk space to one Tahoe-LAFS storage server, like at least 0.5 TB, and then not worry about the few KB or MB of overhead that Tahoe-LAFS adds. The storage server process is the one that stores ciphertext on disk and sends and receives ciphertext over TCP on behalf of a storage client. It stores each piece of ciphertext in a separate file in its local filesystem, and it organizes those files into 2-level hierarchy of directories. That's a source of overhead, since it takes a little more than X bytes of disk space to store an X byte file in your file system. That overhead is proportional to the number of files stored and the exact amount is determined by the filesystem, but I would estimate 2 KiB per file. Another source of overhead is that the storage server maintains a couple of small files of metadata about which files it has processed. That is a small fixed amount that doesn't grow with the number or size of files. It's probably around 10 KB. Another source of overhead is per-file metadata -- leases (markings showing that someone said "I'm interested in this file -- please don't garbage-collect it for at least 30 more days!"), and integrity-checking hashes. The integrity checks are proportional to the size of each file, but small. It's about 64 bytes of hashes for each 40 KB of file. > My biggest concern with this is space, as the 2GB microSD card the DreamPlug comes with is tough to manage. If we can use the SD card slot when it's available, this'll be less of a problem, but I haven't really thought about that problem yet. My instinct would be not to try to make use of such scarce storage resources, but instead say "Want to contribute to the great FreedomBox Cloud Storage grid? Then plug in a 1 TB hard drive to the USB port!". That would actually make the resulting storage much more reliable, because only people who felt a certain level of willingness to contribute would run a Tahoe-LAFS storage server at all. By excluding all the people who turned it on at some point and then got bored a few hours later and turned it off again, we would greatly reduce the churn and unreliability. Regards, Zooko _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

[tor-talk] TorBirdy 0.0.12 released - testing and feedback requested!
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi! TorBirdy 0.0.12 is now out. It's still quite experimental - of course. Use at your own risk and especially if you're using it with Enigmail and GnuPG without a local[0] HTTP proxy. We've continued with updating the web page to show some TorBirdy screen shots: https://github.com/ioerror/torbirdy/wiki/Screen-shots Call for help: We're looking for assistance with Translations - if you'd like to translate TorBirdy, we'd gladly accept a patch that prepares TorBirdy for translation work. We now have German, English and Punjabi! Even if you can't help translate, we'd love to know what languages matter to you or your friends - please let us know? Release Highlights: 0.0.12, 27 Sept 2012 TorBirdy now has localization support Current languages: English, German (translated by Karsten N.), Punjabi TorBirdy code cleanup: fix global namespace pollution Do not select the last selected account to prevent automatic login (TorBirdy selects 'Local Folders' on startup to prevent this) Restore proxy settings at TorBirdy uninstall (settings prior to installation of TorBirdy) TorBirdy now allows HTTP/SSL connections Users may opt-out from `--throw-keyids' Enhanced TorBirdy JonDo support (thanks to Karsten N.) Fix a bug in 0.0.11 that prevented account preferences from being set Add Screenshots directory TorBirdy no longer requires a configured HTTP proxy for full use with Tor TorBirdy now enforces the safest HTTP proxy usage possible with GnuPG TorBirdy attempts to disable all name resolution in GnuPG due to a serious SOCKS5 problem with GnuPG proxy options in how we invoke GnuPG; GnuPG only supports SOCKS5 when it is linked against libcurl (>7.21.7) and hostnames are not used. This is outlined the following bug: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2846 General content anonymity caution note: TorBirdy has known leaks in the Message-ID and in the Date header, we're working on merging an upstream patch that will allow these leaks to be closed. There are no known proxy leaks unless you use additional extensions that do not respect the proxy settings of Thunderbird. If you use GnuPG and Enigmail, we encourage you to use it with a local HTTP proxy due to the issues mentioned[0] regarding GnuPG. Here's the wiki page for TorBirdy: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy Here's the latest XPI for TorBirdy: https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbirdy/torbirdy-0.0.12.xpi https://github.com/downloads/ioerror/torbirdy/torbirdy-0.0.12.xpi Here is a proper GPG signature for the latest XPI: https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbirdy/torbirdy-0.0.12.xpi.asc https://github.com/downloads/ioerror/torbirdy/torbirdy-0.0.12.xpi.asc Here is the sha1sum of torbirdy-0.0.12.xpi: 4d956d0458580dd689f2e02a6cf369384e4aa5af The GnuPG signature that signed this email is also the same key that signs the TorBirdy releases. To learn more about signature verification of Tor Project related software such as TorBirdy please visit this page: https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html The plugin on AMO has been preliminarily reviewed and we are still in the review process. It is again possible (Hooray!) to install TorBirdy directly from Thunderbird or by downloading the extension in a web browser from Mozilla's website: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/thunderbird/addon/torbirdy/ We believe that users who installed previous versions from Mozilla's addons site should receive this update automatically. We now upload a full XPI and GnuPG signature for every new release to the Tor Project's web servers: https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbirdy/ All the best, Jacob [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2846 _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Re: [liberationtech] Silent Circle Dangerous to Cryptography Software Development
by Moxie Marlinspike 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 10/11/2012 11:24 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: >> Zimmerman stated that servers are located in Canada to avoid US >> subpoenas (not a lawyer, not sure what's that worth in the end). > > His entire IP block is connected to servers in the United States. I > am very skeptical of that claim. Furthermore, this is nonsense; the > issue isn't being protected against *one* country's subpoena, it's > being protected against *any* subpoena. This is also not going to be technically possible in a mature product. If all servers were located in Canada, that would mean two people having an encrypted conversation in Europe would have an additional 300ms latency added to their call. Getting low-latency audio working on many mobile platforms is extremely difficult, even when you don't have the network working against you. - moxie -- http://www.thoughtcrime.org -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

GPS my door?
by Somebody 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Suppose you are a domestic terrorist because you have made noises, written newspapers, put Ron Paul stickers on your bumper, you are an Oath Keeper," a member of JPFO, ad-nauseum: http://wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=96916 Now suppose your house has been located by one of the 170,000 people working for the census and coordinates given to your front door: http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=97208 Now suppose some problems break out in your area between angry citizens and our Mother Culture.imagine that somewhere out there a pilot is typing your name into his plane or choppers computer, the one that controls Precision-guided munitions (PGMs, smart munitions, smart bombs, guided bomb units or GBUs) you know, the ones being perfected over in the Mid-Eastyour name and coordinates are set: Better yet, maybe the pilot just flies, and someone in Homeland Security at some darkened monitor somewhere types your name.heres what happens: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWSfHCsi8ss Id suggest activists might want to leave their homes for a while should disagreements break out between the Mother Culture and her charges. Lets listen to Ben Franklin a moment, should you wonder if our government is capable of this stuff: Never trust a government that doesn't trust its own citizens with guns. Then ask yourself: Does your government trust you, or does it seem just a little paranoid? This is rather bizarre....target on your back? Nope....heh....target on your front door... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ <snip...>

1 0

Location tracking -- a bill of rights?
by Brian Smithson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[OK for IP if it's OK with you] Dave, I think Dennis' post about dodgeball gives a real life example of what I think should be the basic "Bill of Rights" for tracking devices. This is kind of rough, as I am making it up as I write. And pardon my wishful thinking :-). I. I should be informed of the existence of any tracking mechanism. This would include those which are integral to a product like in a cellphone, those which are deliberate add-ons like if "dodgeball" is an app I'm installing on my phone, and those which are embedded for some purpose unrelated to my own purpose like an RFID inventory- tracking tag in a sweater that I'm buying. Many people don't know that their phone can be used to track their location. Many more won't know that their *sweater* could be used to track their location. II. I should be able to turn the tracking function on and off. Of course, this may render the item useless, like a cellphone which can't communicate with its network. RFID companies won't like this one because RFIDs usually have no external controls and cost is a major factor in RFID adoption, so maybe it will be sufficient in some cases to simply be able to turn the function off (permanently). After I've bought the sweater, inventory tracking is no longer needed. III. I should be able to give explicit permission for trackers to track me for specific purposes. This would be like GLBA privacy laws, only let's try to make them actually work :-). So the cellphone carrier could track me, but only for the purpose of making the phone work unless I give them permission to do something else with that information. IV. I should be able to give permission through intermediaries. For example, I might want to give my cellphone carrier permission to give my tracking information to a third party for a particular purpose. This could have multiple levels, such as if (through a third party service, let's say dodgeball) I gave permission to Bob and Carol but denied it to Ted and Alice. V. I should own my tracking information. Those who facilitate tracking would have a "license" to the tracking data. I should be able to control how long it is retained by revoking that license. VI. Tracking facilitators are common carriers. Let's say I have a Verizon phone. If I want Verizon to make my tracking data available to another party, such a request should not be unreasonably refused. In other words, if I want Verizon to make my tracking data available to dodgeball, for example, they should not be able to refuse and insist that I use their social networking service instead. VII. I should be able to access records of who has been tracking me, when, and how. This may not be easy all the way to a personal level, but we should try. I can think of cases when I would want to know that on March 19th, Joe Blow at the phone company looked at my location records for the month of February. Or I might just want to know who location-enabled-spammed me when I had not given anyone permission to do that. VIII, IX, and X. I know there should be 10 rights, but I couldn't think of them. -- - Brian Smithson brian(a)grot.com ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

[IP] Location tracking -- a bill of rights?
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

1 0

[EMED-L] New York City Starts To Monitor Diabetics
by Steve Schecter 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<EMED-L(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU> This is a little too much government for my liking thank you very much. By Rob Stein Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, January 11, 2006; Page A03 New York City is starting to monitor the blood sugar levels of its diabetic residents, marking the first time any government in the United States has begun tracking people with a chronic disease. Under the program, the city is requiring laboratories to report the results of blood sugar tests directly to the health department, which will use the data to study the disease and to prod doctors and patients when levels run too high. The unprecedented step is being hailed by many health experts as a bold attempt to improve care for diabetes, one of the nation's biggest medical problems, which is burgeoning into a crisis because of the aging population and the obesity epidemic. Some public health experts, ethicists and privacy advocates, however, say that the initiative raises serious concerns about confidentiality and is an alarming government intrusion into people's medical care. Both sides agree that the decision is probably a harbinger of a trend in which the government will apply tactics traditionally reserved primarily for infectious diseases to chronic conditions such as diabetes, heart disease, asthma and cancer, which have supplanted communicable illnesses as the most pressing public health concerns. "Because of the enormous number of people affected and the costs, chronic diseases have become the most prominent issue in public health," said Lawrence O. Gostin, who directs the Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins universities. "There are lots of good reasons to do this kind of thing, but the questions it raises all have to do with the nanny state: Should the government be collecting this kind of information? Should it be intervening like this?" Gostin said. "You can imagine it getting to the point where you have a public health worker showing up at your door and asking, 'Did you remember to exercise, eat right and take your medication today?' " The government has a long history of tracking infectious diseases -- including cholera, gonorrhea, malaria, plague and, more recently, AIDS -- to protect the public. In addition to requiring that such diseases be reported, public health officials have sometimes taken more aggressive steps, quarantining sick travelers, confining tuberculosis patients who are not taking their drugs and notifying the sexual partners of people with syphilis. Governments also track cancer cases to spot clusters. Some managed health care plans have begun gathering information about chronic diseases and notifying doctors and patients when care could be improved. But the New York effort marks the first time any government has required routine reporting of laboratory test results for a major chronic, noninfectious disease so that government officials can scrutinize how well doctors and patients are treating it. "It's really a natural consequence of calling everyday health conditions epidemics and public health threats," said Wendy K. Mariner of Boston University's schools of public health and law. "We've begun to talk about chronic diseases in the same way we talk about contagious diseases, and so it follows that we would start to take the same kind of public health measures." Under the plan, beginning on Sunday all 120 New York medical testing laboratories with the ability to transmit data electronically will be required to report the results of a blood test known as A1c within 24 hours. Diabetics undergo the test at least once a year to provide a long-term measurement of how well they are controlling their condition, in addition to the blood testing they do several times a day. Health officials first plan to use the data to monitor the quality of care and to determine which parts of the city are being hit hardest by diabetes. But health officials also plan to use the data to directly intervene in individual patients' care. In a program that will be tested first in the South Bronx, city officials will alert doctors about patients whose blood sugar levels are not being well controlled and will offer advice. Patients will be contacted. High blood sugar can lead to a host of devastating health problems, including heart attacks, kidney failure, amputations from nerve damage and blindness, but the effects can be limited by the careful use of diet, exercise, drugs and insulin. "It really ravages and wreaks havoc on the body," said Diana K. Berger, who heads the Diabetes Prevention and Control Program in the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. "People can live long, beautiful lives with diabetes, but if they don't take it seriously, it can be devastating." The plan has alarmed privacy advocates, particularly because the information is being collected without first getting patients' consent. "It's an incredible invasion to privacy to have your sensitive medical information grabbed by the city of New York," said Robin Kaigh, a New York lawyer who opposes the effort. "It shocks the conscience that they are not even required to tell you this is happening." Doctors may not even know data on their patients are being collected. "It's a little creepy that it's being done so undercover -- in the laboratories -- where it's completely out of sight of the doctor-patient interaction," said Twila J. Brase of the Citizens' Council on Health Care, a nonprofit group in Minnesota. Beyond the city having the information, other privacy advocates are concerned about whether the data could be passed on. "This is really a recipe for invasion of privacy," said Sue A. Blevins, president of the Institute for Health Freedom, a Washington-based advocacy group. "Under the law, personal health information can be shared without consent for many purposes. All it takes is a click of a mouse." That fear is shared by some diabetics. "I don't want the city knowing any more about my private life. I fear this information could be taken out of the data bank and disseminated to people or places I don't necessarily want it to be disseminated," said Steven Lazarus, 44, a diabetic who lives in Manhattan. Lazarus is also uncomfortable with the government getting involved in his medical care. "I don't want the city telling me what to do nor do I want the city telling my physician what to do," Lazarus said. Although diabetes does not carry the stigma that AIDS once did, information about a person having the disease could make it harder for someone to get health insurance or, perhaps, to get a job. "Government concern often shifts to government coercion," Mariner said. "Today we're telling people what you should do voluntarily. Tomorrow it may be we're telling you what to do or you'll be penalized." Because New York is often a leader in public health measures, the decision is likely to prompt other jurisdictions to follow, for diabetes and perhaps other conditions, Mariner and others said. City officials say the data will be kept strictly confidential. "The department of health has a 100-year history of collecting and protecting highly sensitive data," Berger said. "The privacy issues being raised pale in comparison to the public health benefit. How could we not do something about this ravaging epidemic?" Officials at the American Diabetes Association said the plan has merit as long confidentiality is protected. "We greatly support the idea of helping people with diabetes better manage their disease," said Richard Kahn, the association's chief scientific and medical officer. "We also are concerned with information about a person's individual medical condition becoming publicly known." Other experts praised the plan. "There are hundreds of thousands of Americans who are going to have heart attacks, strokes, amputations and dialysis because we are not paying good enough attention to their diabetes," said Benjamin Littenberg of the University of Vermont, who has been studying the approach. "This has got tremendous potential to prevent an enormous amount of misery, pain and premature death." primum non nocere Steve Schecter, NREMT-B This message is intended only for the use of the Addressee and may contain information that is PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, dissemination of this communication is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please erase all copies of the message and its attachments and notify the sender immediately. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com To unsubscribe, send the command "SIGNOFF EMED-L" to LISTSERV(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

Re: [Fwd: High-traffic Colluding Tor Routers in Washington, D.C. Confirmed]
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Fri, Apr 13, 2007 at 12:50:00PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: > > A group of 9 Tor routers also functioning overtly or indirectly as Tor > > exit nodes have been observed colluding on the public Tor network. > > Yeah. This happened in mid 2006. I don't know why some random person > just picked it up now. "Nostra2004(a)Safe-mail.net" sent me some follow-up questions, which I'll answer here so we can keep the thread in one place. Maybe this will finally put the topic to rest. :) | How did Steven Murdoch and Richard Clayton tracked down the operator? I believe they made some phone calls to their friends who work in the network operations center at psinet. | How did they determine it was an innocent mistake? They know the person who was running them. It was somebody in the security field who was helping out but was embarrassed to realize that he was actually putting the network at risk by helping out quite so much. :) The fellow felt that private embarrassment was adequate, and asked not to be publically named. I trust them, and they trust him, so from my perspective it is now fine. | Even if the | operator is benevolent, that capability with so few nodes is disturbing. Yep. I agree. The Tor network may seem large, but it still needs to grow a lot larger to resist even medium sized attackers. | How were 9 nodes apparently able to touch 11% of all Tor traffic? If you launch a bunch of Tor servers that together push upwards of 200MBit/s each way sustained, ...that's a lot of bytes. Tor weights path selection by bandwidth -- otherwise Tor performance would be extremely miserable rather than just miserable. (http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WhySlow) There are even several research projects currently looking at how to trade off a bit more privacy for better performance, including one of our GSoC interns. See also item #4 on http://tor.eff.org/volunteer#Research | Have changes to the code since then reduced this vulnerability? Yes. See the previous post: This issue also prompted us to speed up the fix/feature in 0.1.2.1-alpha: "Automatically avoid picking more than one node from the same /16 network when constructing a circuit." http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Aug-2006/msg00300.html But the issue still exists with respect to people who control different /16 networks, and who can push lots of bytes (or trick us into thinking they can). | Do you think there needs to be activity (perhaps "collusion" between a | group of good guys), similar to what's on Bit Torrent, to identify and | blacklist nodes (discussions about the risks and legality of such | things can be left till later)? Well, the Tor directory authorities list servers, and can mark each server as invalid, badexit, etc. So in effect the authority operators can collude to blacklist nodes that we agree are behaving badly. A majority of authority operators need to claim something before clients will believe it. See http://tor.eff.org/svn/trunk/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt for a few more details. | Is there a transcript of the talk those slides were given with, or at | least a video? Yes, there is actually a video, courtesy the 23C3 folks: http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Streams look for talk 1513. For example, http://media.hojann.net/23C3/23C3-1513-en-detecting_temperature_through_clo… Hope that helps, --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

GPS my door?
by Somebody 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Suppose you are a domestic terrorist because you have made noises, written newspapers, put Ron Paul stickers on your bumper, you are an Oath Keeper," a member of JPFO, ad-nauseum: http://wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=96916 Now suppose your house has been located by one of the 170,000 people working for the census and coordinates given to your front door: http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=97208 Now suppose some problems break out in your area between angry citizens and our Mother Culture.imagine that somewhere out there a pilot is typing your name into his plane or choppers computer, the one that controls Precision-guided munitions (PGMs, smart munitions, smart bombs, guided bomb units or GBUs) you know, the ones being perfected over in the Mid-Eastyour name and coordinates are set: Better yet, maybe the pilot just flies, and someone in Homeland Security at some darkened monitor somewhere types your name.heres what happens: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWSfHCsi8ss Id suggest activists might want to leave their homes for a while should disagreements break out between the Mother Culture and her charges. Lets listen to Ben Franklin a moment, should you wonder if our government is capable of this stuff: Never trust a government that doesn't trust its own citizens with guns. Then ask yourself: Does your government trust you, or does it seem just a little paranoid? This is rather bizarre....target on your back? Nope....heh....target on your front door... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ <snip...>

1 0