- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Photuris Primality verification needed
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"William Allen Simpson" writes: > Folks, I was somewhat disappointed in the response to our previous > requests for verification of the strength of the prime moduli. > > Recently, someone asked for a smaller prime of only 512-bits for speed. > This is more than enough for the strength of keys needed for DES, 3DES, > MD5 and SHA. Perhaps this would be easier to have more complete and > robust verification as well. I think that this is a very large mistake. Allow me to explain why. La Macchia (sp?) and Odlyzko (sp?) have a very nice result which shows that once you've done enough precalculation on a particular modulus, you can break any subsequent Diffie-Hellman operation performed on that modulus with (for our purposes) no effort. 512 bits is, from what I can tell, not far out of the realm of possibility for what someone could try to crack with current machines given enough effort. [Sorry about the spelling. I'm tired, and don't have time to look up your names. I know that Brian at least reads this list and I'm sorry about likely misspelling your name.] Perry

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Re: National Security Committee amendments to SAFE
by Steven Bellovin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Carl Ellison says: >>Decisions made by the Secretary of Commerce with the concurrence of the >>Secretary of Defense with respect to exports of encryption products under >>this section shall not be subject to judicial review. > >I take it this last sentence is intended to kill Bernstein, Karn and Junger >and any other cases we might try to bring. Correct? How could that possibly be binding? Anything the court system thinks is subject to judicial review is subject to judicial review. I'm sure one of the real lawyers will add a lot more detail. However... The way something can be beyond judicial review is if it's purely an executive branch function. You can sue, of course, but in order to overcome that argument you'd have to show that either the function wasn't executive branch-specific, *or* some other constitutional right is being violated. To see how a judge can rule on such an issue, have a look at the trial court's opinion in the Karn case. You can find that opinion at http://venable.com/oracle/oracle7.htm, according to Karn's page (I was unable to confirm that link just now).

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SSZ is back...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, SSZ has been down the last few hours because of a non-functioning ISDN line. Seems to be back up now. On with the show... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Crypto++ 1.1
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am still talking to RSADSI's lawyers, but it's taking a lot longer than I expected. So in the mean time I've decided to rerelease the Crypto++ library with RC4, RC5, RSA removed, and some calls to RSAREF disabled. RSADSI said it will not object to this rerelease. Version 1.1 also has some minor bug fixes. You can find it at ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_?????/libraries/crypto11.zip where ????? is in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README For the next version I hope to work out a deal with RSADSI to put some of those files back in. I'm also planning to add SAFER and perhaps some elliptic curve stuff. Other suggestions are welcome. I encourage people to use this library in commercial as well as shareware/freeware products. You don't have to pay me a cent, but don't forget about the patents. Wei Dai P.S. Does anyone know if elliptic curve key agreement protocols are patented?

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Summary of FBI talk @ MIT, Sept 10
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: 17 Sep 97 17:35:20 -0400 From: Request Admin <request-admin(a)phx.com> Subject: Summary of FBI talk September 10, 1997 To: BBLISA Announce <bblisa-announce(a)bblisa.org> ############################################################### Summary of FBI talk held September 10, 1997 7-9p.m. Room 395 MIT E-51 ---- HES [Heidi Schmidt] hschmidt(a)phx.com ############################################################### Note: I did not write down Steves' address but you can get it from the site. :) Concepts discussed regarding cybercrime.... T.O.E (Tool, Object, Evidence) Tool-- You are used to get to the target Object-- You are the target Evidence -- Evidence of the crime C.I.A ( all pertaining to data and your rights to have the following...) Confidentiality of data Integrity of data Availability of data The url for Subsection 1030. Fraud and related activity in connection with computers http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030_new.html This subsection protects three types of computers within institutions: 1) Financial based institutions using computers 2) Governmental based institutions using computers 3) Foreign commerce or Interstate commerce transaction based institutions using computers The url for Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section CCIPS http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/index.html Contact information for CSI http://www.gosci.com telephone: 415 905 2370 Since spam and other security issues cropped up as sub topics I am mentioning other urls that may prove helpful in the long run. Additional sites of interest regarding security and spam: Spam http://spam.abuse.net http://www.cauce.org Web security http://www.nmrc.org/faqs/www/ Sage resources (including security) http://www.usenix.org/sage/sysadmins/sysadmin_resource.html These are only but a drop on the planet, but they are a start. ############################################################### The next announcement will be regarding the development of the BBLISA web site currently beign hosted at http://jthome.jthome.com/~bblisa ############################################################### Heidi Schmidt hschmidt(a)phx.com UNIX Systems Administrator-Webmistress The Boston Phoenix Media Communications Group -- Send mail for the `bblisa' mailing list to `bblisa(a)bblisa.org'. Mail administrative requests to `majordomo(a)bblisa.org'.

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Re: Telephone switch capacity -Reply
by Noah Brodbeck 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> John D. Ervin <jervin(a)netpath.net> 11/03/95 05:32pm >You would be suprised as to how much is being tapped >now. >You need to do a little more research before spouting off.. >>If the FBI wishes to set up a system that is capable >>of monitoring 1% of the total number of lines, that equates >>to a ability to tap 5%, not 1% of all calls in progress. I am very confused. I was not 'spouting off' in any sense of the word. Your comment refers to my apparent lack of knowledge of the widespread practice of wiretapping. A practice, at least according to the sworn testimony of agents of the FBI, is not very widespread at all. That is, however, beside the point. I was making a very truthful comment about the engineered capacity of the telephone network in the U.S. I made no comment whatsoever about the current ability or desire of the FBI to tap into individuals telephone conversations. -=- Noah

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Cypherpunks Santa Cruz Meeting/Party, 95-11-11
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have sent out a detailed announcement of a "Cypherpunks Santa Cruz" meeting/party at my house in Corralitos, California, on Saturday, 11 November. This was sent to the mailing list of interested folks I maintain. If you are on this list, you already got the detailed message. If you are interested in getting on the list, drop me a line. I can also send the detailed announcement to anyone who is interested. As background, the Cypherpunks Santa Cruz is for folks in the Santa Cruz, Monterey, Carmel, Boulder Creek, Watsonville, Salinas, Big Sur, etc. area, or for anyone else on the Central Coast. Or anyone else, for that matter. At the last (and first) party we had Greg Broiles down from Eugene, Oregon, and Jeff Simmons up from San Luis Obispo, plus a bunch of folks from "over the hill" in the Silicon Valley/Bay Area. All told, 25 people. I'm not sure if there is a Bay Area meeting that day. If so, attend one or the other, or both, as my party starts late afternoon (of course, it may be a long drive, depending on where the Bay Aryans are meeting). --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Photuris Primality verification needed
by William Allen Simpson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, I was somewhat disappointed in the response to our previous requests for verification of the strength of the prime moduli. Recently, someone asked for a smaller prime of only 512-bits for speed. This is more than enough for the strength of keys needed for DES, 3DES, MD5 and SHA. Perhaps this would be easier to have more complete and robust verification as well. Here are two "important" primes for Photuris use. If you have some spare cycles, it would be beneficial for in-depth verification of these strong primes. Implementation Optional. A 512-bit strong prime (p), expressed in hex: da58 3c16 d985 2289 d0e4 af75 6f4c ca92 dd4b e533 b804 fb0f ed94 ef9c 8a44 03ed 5746 50d3 6999 db29 d776 276b a2d3 d412 e218 f4dd 1e08 4cf6 d800 3e7c 4774 e833 The recommended generator (g) for this prime is 2. Implementation Required. A 1024-bit strong prime (p), expressed in hex: 97f6 4261 cab5 05dd 2828 e13f 1d68 b6d3 dbd0 f313 047f 40e8 56da 58cb 13b8 a1bf 2b78 3a4c 6d59 d5f9 2afc 6cff 3d69 3f78 b23d 4f31 60a9 502e 3efa f7ab 5e1a d5a6 5e55 4313 828d a83b 9ff2 d941 dee9 5689 fada ea09 36ad df19 71fe 635b 20af 4703 6460 3c2d e059 f54b 650a d8fa 0cf7 0121 c747 99d7 5871 32be 9b99 9bb9 b787 e8ab The recommended generator (g) for this prime is 2. > From: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> > I've used the mpz_probab_prime() function in the Gnu Math Package (GMP) version > 1.3.2 to test this number. This function uses the Miller-Rabin primality test. > However, to increase my confidence that this number really is a strong prime, > I'd like to ask others to confirm it with other tests. > Bill.Simpson(a)um.cc.umich.edu Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2

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Re: Telephone switch capacity -Reply
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:43 PM 11/3/95 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: > Of course the FBI doesn't have the staff to listen to all these lines, and > they need an individual court order to authorize each individual > interception, so this numbers game is a bit of a joke. This is false: The FBI is legally authorized to intercept phone lines by court order "or other lawful authority". >From the money it would seem that "other lawful authority" intercepts vastly exceed court ordered intercepts. You will recall the vast outcry in the liberal lapdog press when this vast new power was given to them -- You don't recall it?! Neither do I. This is one of the many vast extensions of government power that we see come down at a steadily increasing rate, to the accompaniment of total silence from a compliant and submissive mass media. > There is no controversy about the number of wiretaps that have been > authorized, except as manufactured by the Spotlight folks and other > conspiracy loons. If the only taps are court ordered wiretaps, it would seem we are paying about half a million to a million dollars per wire tap, which is a shade expensive even for government work. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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The Crypto Applications we would rather not talk about
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous remailer and PGP Unusual applications I dont know if anyone else caught it last year but High Times discovered anonymous remailers and PGP for an article last year for anonymous remote control of grow rooms. PGP Wins again? and lately the thule people(bigoted and racist Nazis) have been learning to protect themselves also according to news reports from germany. Crypto and Privacy tools protect everyone from the hero to the anti-hero... the technology itself is neutral I wonder how long it will be before we hear news reports of some of the governments people being caught using internet casinos from the white house network. On other notes CCCF(the chaos computer club France) was shown to have had a high level plant from the french intel services, The founder of the CCCF himself. this story seems to repeat itself over and over when you are doing something of which the authorities DONT approve they WILL attempt to infiltrate and subvert from the inside. The answers are there and have been published in most books on tradecraft, 3 person cells organized as pyramids. Anonymous remail tech and crypto make this system possible with out Face to face contact. When does this lesson finally get learned? anon

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