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Re: Articles on RC5 and GOST in January 95 Dr Dobbs Journal
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:17 PM 12/11/94, Timothy C. May wrote: >In my view, the whole export issue is a joke anyway. Anyone with >access to Bruce's code could quite easily remail it, with or without >first hiding the exact form by compressing, encrypting, or stegging >it. > >That this hasn't happened--so far as we (or I) know--says more about >other things than about the laws supposedly barring such export. Well, it might actually say quite a bit about such laws, namely that they scare people into _not_ remailing Bruce's code. As is the point of such laws, obviously. So they appear to be working, right? People don't want to do something that is illegal, even if it would be easy to do so. But I had actually kind of assumed that this sort of thing _had_ happened. If anyone in some other country wanted to get a hold of Bruce's code, it would not be dificult to do so. And I figure someone probably has wanted to do such a thing, and probably has done it. If anyone out in non-U.S. land wants Bruce's code, and has been unable to get a hold of it, I bet a posting to alt.privacy.anon-server, or to the cypherpunks list, would result in people volunteering (via anon remailers, of course) to break the export laws. The non-U.S. citizens asking for the code wouldn't be breaking any laws, so they don't even need to use an encrypted address block, they can just ask publically. A U.S. citizen using PGP and going through a chain of 8 or 10 remailers (including non-U.S. ones) is not likely to be caught. Of course I'd never do such a thing, especially after talking about it publically on cypherpunks.

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Re: Storm Brewing Over Forged Bob Rae Posting?
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 11 Dec 1994, Mark Terka wrote: > Here's an idea. Someone mentioned trying to set up an anon remailer on the > North American Freenets, but it seemed there were software compatibility > problems. > > Would this be practical? Sounds like it would be worth a shot. But again, I > guess it comes down to the software compatibility problem. Yep, if you get info on Freeport (the most common Freenet software) they tell you up front that you will need a Unix programmer and network type to install and maintain it. And it isn't freeware, regardless of the name. It is a time-period license which you have to renew every few years... - -NetSurfer #include <standard.disclaimer> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.7: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " o " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " / \ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ G \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuupQyoZzwIn1bdtAQFD2gGAlu98f5K0uCamNSj9MGxNYZ3hjp8c4kLf 7a4B4ZhyI77vYtwdZ0PMtB9SjS3QDmPk =JA0O -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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re: real time surveillances
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Mark Hittinger had several thoughts about real-time surveillance. He wrote: ... The technology to fabricate video evidence is there is it not? Big problem with self-surveillance; not a problem with a properly set up system of police surveillance. The critical element is a trusted third-party agency to archive the tapes. There was a relatively recent sad case of two officers that had a video camera installed in their patrol car.... the occupants of the car murdered the policemen and the *entire* scene was obtained on video tape.... It is possible that they might have been saved had this been real-time video rather than taped. Yes, and real-time video monitoring would be a good upgrade when the technology allows it (real-time location monitoring is possible now). In the meantime, *obvious* video recording would also help protect officers in that some perps would think twice before killing someone *on camera*. ... Another great idea would be anonymous real-time monitoring of vital signs along with position data. Auto-911 if you will. We know somebody at this corner had a heart attack 5 minutes ago where is he? The developers of the localizer technology I mentioned in my article have anticipated you. Their equipment can do real-time vital sign monitoring. There are some obvious benefits for wired cops plus some subtle drawbacks for bad cops. (I leave discovery of said drawbacks as an exercise for the student.) S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Articles on RC5 and GOST in January 95 Dr Dobbs Journal
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Mon, 12 Dec 1994, Ian Farquhar wrote: > Even so, I really wonder if the export of cryptography ON PAPER but in a > machine-readable form would be in violation of ITAR? If anyone has one of > these old scanner, it might very well be worth trying. And what about using MICR ink? Paper-floppy (sort of)? - -NetSurfer #include <standard.disclaimer> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.7: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " o " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " / \ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ G \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuuprCoZzwIn1bdtAQE1fQF+KJn5Hfh3guv4/ElbppMv6RkkZCGjBKSn PvzVDBCbvdueYJwp5AAbZBI2ycCFQizh =ZxaK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Broadcasts and the Rendezvous Problem
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <v01510103ab114c09dd73(a)[192.0.2.1]>, Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> wrote: >Which brings us back to the news -> mail gateway. There has to be a better >way. I don't see a problem. Broadly put, news is broadcast e-mail. There are many sites which in fact do not distinguish between the two, the most notable of which is CMU's Andrew Message System: the admins of such systems believe the "experiment" to be an all-around success. If you want message A to get from site B to site C without a clear trail, you've got to broadcast. It's that simple. It isn't a very big problem that site B put something into the flow, so mail to news isn't a weak point: an article can be injected at the remailer's site without compromising the channel to traffic analysis. - -- Todd Masco | It's difficult to be loud about keeping your enumerated cactus(a)hks.net | rights when you're busy exercising your unenumerated ones. cactus(a)bb.com | http://www.hks.net/~cactus/cactus.html - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuu/KyoZzwIn1bdtAQHDbwGAgkIM2IZ3W1NtzzgNbpCkjpfJwPMVCMG2 ed0TnOHKU7ws4oUrHpddC6pAjzmk22uO =2zh3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Real-time surveillance of the police
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Michael Crawford wrote about my article in the December '94 issue of Wired, ("Watching the Detectives", p. 141): ... The advantage for society is that the cop's behaviour, such as billy-club swinging velocity, can be monitored. It could detect gunfire, too, ... This would work to the extent that the equipment is actually mounted on the cop it claims to belong to, so some manner of authentication would be needed. Fleming told me that the localizers would also take biometric readings to monitor the cop's physical status. It turns out that individual biometric readings vary significantly from person to person. It would be very hard for one cop (or a dog, suspect, whatever) to pose as someone else by wearing his localizer. ... Yes, that's right - keep surveillance cameras going on _yourself_. If you're not doing anything illegal, you've got nothing to fear from taping everything you do. I don't like this idea one bit. I agree with Tim that it is the first step on a very slippery slope. ... I expect that it will be difficult to convince our Nation's Finest to adopt this new technology - though I'm sure they'd be happy to apply it to parolees and those serving on probation.... It would be difficult for the cops to reject it. After all, it definitely benefits vast majority of good cops. It only hurts that teensy-tiny minority who violate people's rights. Right? Michael also argued that it might be more easily sold to private security firms for legal liability reasons. This argument is even more persuasive for police officers. Cities routinely pay astronomical settlements, or fight expensive law suits, arising out of alleged incidents of police misconduct. Frivolous lawsuits would be quickly thrown out of court. Rogue cops would be identified and thrown off the force. Works for me. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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RE: Real-time surveillance of the police
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:11 PM 12/11/94, Sandy Sandfort wrote: > ... Yes, that's right - keep surveillance cameras going > on _yourself_. If you're not doing anything illegal, > you've got nothing to fear from taping everything you > do. > >I don't like this idea one bit. I agree with Tim that it is the >first step on a very slippery slope. > > ... I expect that it will be difficult to convince our > Nation's Finest to adopt this new technology - though > I'm sure they'd be happy to apply it to parolees and > those serving on probation.... > >It would be difficult for the cops to reject it. After all, it >definitely benefits vast majority of good cops. It only hurts >that teensy-tiny minority who violate people's rights. Right? I'm not sure if you are being sarcastic here, although I don't think you are. That seems like a slippery slope all it's own, there. I don't like it when someone tells me "what do you have to worry about if you aren't breaking any laws," and I don't like it when someone says that about the cops too. That argument is awfully scary. Yeah, if the cops didn't want to accept such a thing, it might be worth calling them on their hypocrisy for applying that argument to citizens and not to police. But I don't think it would be wise to use the "what do you have to worry about if you aren't breaking any laws," argument too often.

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RE: Real-time surveillance of the police
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Jonathan Rochkind wrote: ... I don't like it when someone tells me "what do you have to worry about if you aren't breaking any laws," and I don't like it when someone says that about the cops too.... This misses the point I was trying to make. The first argument in favor of wiring the cops, is that it is to their benefit. It helps backup officers or medical personnel to find them. It protects them from unfounded accusations of brutality or other misconduct. It makes a permanent visual and sound recording of perps who get away. This helps in later identification. Even with all these arguments in favor of wiring, I have a sneaking suspicion the cops will not want it. Why? Though few police would admit it publicly, my conjecture is that they know they are currently getting away with murder (sometimes literally) and would feel being wired would force them to obey the law. So my "teensy-tiny-minority" argument was offered sarcastically. In addition, I think recording officers' shifts would show just how little work cops actually do for their pay. Wiring would really throw a money wrench in the doughnut-boys cushy deal. Cynical? You betcha. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: News->Mail & CMU's Andrew Message System
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Todd Masco writes: > I don't see a problem. Broadly put, news is broadcast e-mail. There are > many sites which in fact do not distinguish between the two, the most > notable of which is CMU's Andrew Message System: the admins of such > systems believe the "experiment" to be an all-around success. Is the AMS software (or some similar system) available as freeware or shareware somewhere ? I'm considering the possibilities for anonymized subscription to newsgroups through a mechanism like this. Come to think of it, many newsgroups are gatewayed to related mailing lists for readers on BBSes and such; I need to search a bit for the software used to do this. I'm curious how such systems deal with cancellation messages; presumably they would simply have to drop them. This would partially eliminate the threat of spam-of-cancels attacks I mentioned earlier. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "We've got computers, we're tapping phone lines; I know that that ain't allowed" --Talking Heads - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLuwcj2f7YYibNzjpAQEFgAQA0NujNGNOBBLyhPvCL09CmGn1atDbckX+ 98e5iSm+BMJNeD++m55uLl+8jk5HugNmu4M3/cYDq3fwff6d2lLczBQlHTPRxz3E JGKrB8Ho0scxHbvv70UL2SYHR22JQJk/GQWmx91wwdWb27maTW2QWVRtraQzLBaR EJJzpj29Iyo= =mIVa - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuwdyioZzwIn1bdtAQEThAGAuTkPjJ+9wOwl5PnTJUnZ8BK1XDEcoKyY NR9OCOYqzWz3NWk944ypq4ZX1z8w5Eyw =0Fo0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: BofA+Netscape
by marca＠neon.mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:08 PM 12/11/94, James A. Donald wrote: >Amanda complained that Netscape pisses all over the >standardization committees. > >Well guys, the victor has room to move. It must come as a big >shock to Apple, Microsoft, and IBM, but reality is that Netscape >can set WWW standards and they cannot. > >If they indulge the standardization committees by listening to >them first, and then deciding to ignore them, the committee >should be thoroughly greatful. For the record, we're not trying to set standards -- we're trying to build products with functionality that our customers want and need. We'll succeed or fail on the basis of whether we do that, not whether or because we set standards. We fully realize that being proprietary or isolated from existing or future standards only locks us out of our market, which does us no good at all. That doesn't mean that we're not going to innovate when we need to, but it means we're not going to be anything other than totally open and standards-compliant. To that end, we aggressively support all current standards (HTML, HTTP, URLs, NNTP, Gopher, SOCKS, FTP, you name it), are a charter member of W3O (with a concomitant $150K commitment), and from day 1 have made SSL available to the broader community and have given it to the W3O security working group (of which we are a full participant) exactly in parallel with SHTTP and the three or four other proposals that have been submitted for consideration by other companies and third parties. I fully expect we'll be supporting other security standards and approaches as they emerge, and we certainly welcome realistic suggestions on what we should do, when, and how. Cheers, Marc -- Marc Andreessen Netscape Communications Corporation Mountain View, CA marca(a)mcom.com

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