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CFP: CARDIS 1996
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Found this in sci.crypt.research. Notice the name at the top of the program committee... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ___________________________________________ First Call For Papers CARDIS 1996 SECOND SMART CARD RESEARCH AND ADVANCED APPLICATION CONFERENCE September 18-20, 1996, Amsterdam, The Netherlands AIMS AND GOALS Smart cards or IC cards offer a huge potential for information processing purposes. The portability and processing power of IC cards allow for highly secure conditional access and reliable distributed information systems. IC cards are already available that can perform highly sophisticated cryptographic computations. The applicability of IC cards is currently limited mainly by our imagination; the information processing power that can be gained by using IC cards remains as yet mostly untapped and is not well understood. Here lies a vast uncovered research area which we are only beginning to assess, and which will have great impact on the eventual success of the technology. The research challenges range from electrical engineering on the hardware side to tailor-made cryptographic applications on the software side, and their synergies. Many currently existing events are mainly devoted to commercial and application aspects of IC cards. In contrast, the CARDIS conferences aim to bring together researchers who are active in all aspects of design of IC cards and related devices and environment, such as to stimulate synergy between different research communities and to offer a platform for presenting the latest research advances. CARDIS 1994, sponsored by the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) and held in November 1994 in Lille, France, has successfully brought together representatives from leading IC research centers from all over the world. CARDIS 1996 will be the second occasion for the IC card community in this permanent activity. CARDIS 1996 will be organised jointly by the Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science at Amsterdam (CWI) and the Department of Computer Systems of the University of Amsterdam (UvA). SUBMISSIONS Submissions will be judged on relevance, originality, significance, correctness, and clarity. Each paper should explain its contribution in both general and technical terms, identifying what has been accomplished, saying why it is significant, and comparing it with previous work. Authors should make every effort to make the technical content of their papers understandable to a broad audience. Papers should be written in English. Authors should submit: * 16 copies * of a full paper * typeset using the Springer LNCS format (see instructions below) * not exceeding 20 pages in length * printed double-sided if possible * addressed to Pieter H. Hartel Univ. of Amsterdam Dept. of Computer Systems Kruislaan 403 1098 SJ Amsterdam The Netherlands In addition, each submission should be accompanied by information submitted via WWW, (http://www.cwi.nl/~brands/cardis/submit.html) or submitted via email to cardis(a)fwi.uva.nl that consists of: * a single postal address and electronic mail address for communication * complete title, author and affiliation information * the abstract of the paper * a small selection of the keywords that appear on this call for papers, which best describe the contribution of the paper Proceedings will be available at the conference. It is intended to publish the proceedings in the Springer LNCS series. Authors of accepted papers may be expected to sign a copyright release form. IMPORTANT DATES Submission deadline March 1, 1996 Acceptance notification May 15, 1996 Camera ready paper due July 1, 1996 Conference September 18--20 1996 THEMES Technology/hardware 1 IC architecture and techniques 2 Memories and processor design 3 Read/Write unit engineering 4 Specific co-processors for cryptography 5 Biometry 6 Communication technologies 7 Interfaces with the user, the service suppliers 8 Reliability and fault tolerance 9 Special devices 10 Standards Software 11 The operating system 12 Models of data management 13 Communication protocols IC Card design 14 Tools for internal or external software production 15 Validation and verification 16 Methodology for application design Electronic payment systems 17 Road pricing 18 Internet payment systems 19 Untraceability Algorithms 20 Formal specification and validation 21 Identification 22 Authentication 23 Cryptographic protocols for IC cards 24 Complexity Security 25 Models and schemes of security 26 Security interfaces 27 Hardware and software implementation 28 Security of information systems including cards 29 Formal verification of transaction sets 30 Protocol verification IC Cards, individuals and the society 31 IC cards and privacy 32 Owner access of data 33 IC cards: political and economical aspects 34 Is the IC card going to change legislation? 35 Patents, copyrights Future of ic cards 36 Innovative technologies 37 Moving towards the pocket intelligence 38 Convergence with portable PCs, lap tops etc ... 39 PCMCIA Innovative applications 40 Design methodology of applications 41 IC cards and the information system 42 Examples of new applications 43 Requirements for innovative cards Standards 44 Emerging standards 45 Compliance and approval ORGANISATION Steering committee chairman: Vincent Cordonnier (Rd2p, Lille) Local organisation: Pieter Hartel (Southampton, UK and UvA, The Netherlands) Stefan Brands (CWI, The Netherlands) Eduard de Jong (QC consultancy, The Netherlands) General Chairman: Pieter Hartel (Southampton, UK and UvA, The Netherlands) Program Chairmen: Pierre Paradinas (Rd2p, Lille) Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) Program committee Stefan Brands (CWI, Amsterdam) Andr\'e Gamache (Qu\'ebec, Canada) Louis Guillou (CCETT, France) Josep Domingo Ferrer (Tarragon, Spain) Pieter Hartel (Southampton, UK and UvA, The Netherlands) Hans-Joachim Knobloch (Karlsruhe, Germany) Pierre Paradinas (Rd2p, France) Reinhard Posch (Graz, Austria) Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) Matt Robshaw (RSA, inc, USA) Bruno Struif (GMD, Germany) Doug Tygar (Carnegie-Mellon, USA) LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE Advice to Authors for the Preparation of Camera-Ready Contributions to LNCS/LNAI Proceedings The preparation of manuscripts which are to be reproduced by photo-offset requires special care. Manuscripts which are submitted in technically unsuitable form will be returned for retyping or cancelled if the volume otherwise cannot be finished on time. In order to make the volume look as uniform as possible the following instructions should be followed closely. ************ * PRINTING AREA: Using 10-point font size for the main text the printing area should be 12.2 x 19.3 cm. Manuscripts prepared in this preferred format are reproduced in the same size in the book. With these settings, the interline distance should be arranged in such a way that some 42 to 45 lines occur on a full-text page. * TYPEFACE and SIZE: We recommend the use of Times or one of the similar typefaces widely used in phototypesetting. (In Times and similar typefaces the letters have serifs, i.e., short endstrokes at the head and the foot of letters.) Please do not use a sans-serif typeface for running text, except for computer programs. The text should always be justified to occupy the full line width, so that the right margin is not ragged. For normal text please use 10-point type size and one-line spacing. Small print (abstract and affiliation) should be set in 9-point type size. Please use italic print to emphasize words in running text; bold type in running text and underlining should be avoided. Headings should be capitalized (i.e., nouns, verbs and all other words with at least five letters should have a capital initial) and should, with the exception of the title, be aligned to the left. The font sizes are as follows: ************ Heading level Example Font size and style Title (centered) Type Theory 14 point, bold 1st-level heading 1 Introduction 12 point, bold 2nd-level heading 2.1 Simple Connections 10 point, bold 3rd-level heading Typing Rules. 10 point, bold 4th-level heading Remarks: (text follows) 10 point,italic ************ * FIGURES: If possible, originals should be pasted into the manuscript and centered between the margins; if no originals of the required size are available, figures may be reduced in scale and pasted into the text. For halftone figures (photos), please forward high-contrast glossy prints and mark the space in the text as well as the back of the photographs clearly, so that there can be no doubt about where or which way up they should be placed. The lettering of figures should be in 10-point font size. Figures should be numbered. The legends also should be centered between the margins and be written in 9-point font size as follows: (bold) Fig. 3. (text follows) * PAGE NUMBERING: Your paper should show no printed page numbers; they are decided by the volume editor and finally inserted by the printer. Please indicate the ordering of your pages by numbering the sheets (using a light blue/green pencil) at the bottom of the reverse side. There also should be no running heads. * PRINTING QUALITY: For reproduction we need sheets which are printed on one side only. Please use a high-resolution printer, preferably a laser printer with at least 300 dpi or higher resolution if possible. It is desirable that on all pages the text appears in the middle of the sheets. * REMARK 1: If your typesetting system does not offer the variety of font sizes needed for the preparation of your manuscript according to these instructions, you may choose a different (larger) font size and a correspondingly scaled printing area (12-point font size for the running text, for example, corresponds to a printing area of 15.3 x 24.2 cm and to a final reduction rate of 80%). * REMARK 2: You are encouraged to use LaTeX or TeX for the preparation of you camera-ready manuscript together with the corresponding Springer style files "llncs" (for LaTeX) or "plncs" (for TeX) to be obtained by e-mail or by ftp/gopher as follows: Mailserver: Send an e-mail message to svserv(a)vax.ntp.springer.de containing the line get /tex/latex/llncs.zip for the LaTeX syle files or get /tex/plain/plncs.zip for the TeX style files. Sending "help" to the server prompts advice on how to interact with the mail server. The style files have to be unzipped and uu-decoded for use. In case of problems in getting or uu-decoding the style files please contact "springer vax.ntp.springer.de". Ftp: The internet address is "trick.ntp.springer.de", the user id "ftp" or "anonymous". Please enter your e-mail address as password. The (above mentioned) files reside in "/pub/tex/latex/llncs". Gopher: Point your client to "trick.ntp.springer.de". ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: coding and nnet's
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:52 PM 11/10/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >Schneier's 2nd edition says "Neural nets aren't terribly useful for >cryptography, >primarily because of the shape of the solution space. Neural nets work >best for >problems that have a continuity of solutions, some better than others. >This allows a neural net to learn, proposing better and better solutions as >it does. >Breaking an algorithm provides for very little in the way of learning >opportunities: >You either recover the key or you don't. (At least this is true if the >algorithm is >any good.) Neural nets work well in structured environments when there is >something >to learn, but not in the high-entropy, seemingly random world of cryptography." >And he doesn't give any references. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This paragraph sounds a _lot_ like what I wrote in sci.crypt a while back on the usefullness of AI and neural nets for crypto. Sounds almost like exactly the paragraph I wrote, in fact. And I recollect that Bruce dropped me a note saying I made the point succinctly and that he wanted to use what I said in his next edition. (My recollection at least, but I don't have any easy way anymore of searching my several hundred megs of accumulated mail, articles, etc.) I have no problem with Bruce using my points. I hope he didn't use my _exact_ words, though. But not a cosmic issue. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update: Nov. 8, 1995
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:15 PM 11/8/95 -0500, ACLUNATL(a)aol.com wrote: > According to the government's own statistics, 1,800 innocent conversations > are intercepted each and every time a wiretap or other form of electronic > surveillance is placed. This seems curiously inefficient, even for government work. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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SEMPER
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

And now for something completely different, a Euro-centric plan for Net digital commerce. Haven't had a chance to look at the URL yet, but obviously crypto-relevant... Joel ---------- Development of Electronic Marketplace: EUROPEAN COMMISSION FUNDS FIRST OPEN SOLUTION FOR SECURE COMMERCE OVER THE INTERNET PRESS RELEASE Zürich, November 2nd, 1995: Backed by the European Commission, a consortium of 20 partners from European industry and academia has embarked on a research project to develop the fundamentals for secure electronic commerce. The goal of the 9-million ECU (approx. 14 million CHF) project, SEMPER (Secure Electronic Marketplace for Europe), is to provide the first open and comprehensive solutions for secure commerce over the Internet and other public information networks. A wide range of businesses are rapidly moving to explore the huge potential of networked information systems, especially with the Internet-based WWW (World-wide Web). The Internet, which already connects more than 3 million computers and a substantially larger number of users, is growing at a breathtaking pace with thousands of newcomers every day. Although the Internet has its roots in academia and is still dominated by free-of-charge information, dramatic changes are expected in the near future. For instance, the WWW will be used for a wide variety of electronic commerce such as on- line trade or delivery of advanced multimedia information services. The evolution of broadband networks and "information highways" will intensify this trend. The need for secure transactions in this new business environment, which involves networks available to the general public, has triggered a number of related efforts. These initial developments are based almost exclusively in the US and most of them are limited to proprietary, or otherwise closed solutions, involving only electronic payment issues. In contrast, SEMPER is directed towards a comprehensive solution for secure electronic commerce, considering legal, commercial, social, and technical requirements as well as different options for an electronic marketplace. Consistent with its broader goals, the SEMPER project will be managed by an interdisciplinary team of experts from the academic, industrial and general business environment in Europe. The team includes representatives of the social sciences, finance, retail, publishing, as well as in information and telecommunication technology. The first of the three one-year phases will address a coherent security model and a generic, open security architecture for the electronic marketplace. This architecture will be independent of specific hardware, software, or network architectures. The most fundamental electronic commerce services, such as secure offering, order, payment and information delivery, will also be integrated in the first phase. Subsequent phases will concentrate on more advanced services. These will include fair exchange of documents, credentials, advanced document processing, notary services and multimedia-specific security services, such as protection of intellectual property rights. Multi-party security and protection of user's privacy will receive prime attention. SEMPER will use and integrate existing architectures, tools, and services where appropriate. Early trials will be provided for WWW, and subsequent tests performed on ATM-based broadband networks to demonstrate the broad applicability of SEMPER's architecture and services. The SEMPER project is part of the Advanced Communication Technologies and Services (ACTS) research program established by the European Commission Directorate General XIII for 1994-1998. ACTS is the follow-on program for Research on Advanced Communications in Europe (RACE) 1987- 1994. The project will establish a Special Interest Group for Secure Electronic Commerce (SIGSEC) which will make results available to all interested parties, including standardisation bodies, and will co-ordinate related projects, in particular those funded by the European Commission. IBM's Zurich Research Laboratory will provide the technical leadership for the SEMPER project, and IBM France will act as co-ordinator. The other members of the consortium are Cryptomathic (DK), DigiCash (NL), EUROCOM EXPERTISE (GR), Europay International (B), FOGRA Forschungsgesellschaft Druck (D), GMD - German National Research Center for Information Technology (D), IBM European Networking Center (D), INTRACOM (GR), KPN Research (NL), Otto-Versand (D), r3 security engineering (CH), SEPT (F), Stichting Mathematisch Centrum / CWI (NL), University of Freiburg (D), University of Hildesheim (D). Banksys (B), Banque Generale du Luxembourg (L) and Telekurs (CH) are associated with SEMPER. For more information please contact Matthias Schunter Philippe Delaoutre Universitaet Hildesheim IBM France Mail: schunter(a)rz.uni-hildesheim.de Mail: FRIBMSPK(a)IBM.COM Tel. + 49 5121 883 788 Tel. + 33 1 49 05 61 12 Fax + 49 5121 883 732 Fax + 33 1 47 68 40 33 or see <http://semper.darmstadt.gmd.de/~semper> or <http://www.zurich.ibm.com/Technology/Security/extern/semper/>.

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(no subject)
by Jaana Segerberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Prev][Next][Index] Pornography Server ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- * To: Cypherpunks Mailing List <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> * Subject: Pornography Server * From: "Robert A. Hayden" <hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu> * Date: Sun, 13 Feb 1994 12:23:28 -0600 (CST) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- In response to the posting about setting up a pornography server (Sorry, I'm afraid I deleted the specific message so I cannot remember who you was :-). That is certainly a way for people to get and use PGP and to get used the remailers. It would get a lot of heavy use as well. Now, if there was a way to batch mailings (so that if, say, six people ordered one item, it would be sent as one letter to all six instead of six different letters, with precedence set to bulk), that would help even more. Now, there are also some practical considerations as well. What materials do you archive? If you put up pictures (gif or jpeg), you will be talking about tremendous amounts of traffic. Once they are uuencoded, even with compression, they can be huge. If you limit yourself to things such as stories and the like, you will have less traffic, but also less use. There is also the legal side of distributing pornography. Interstate transfer is naughty and with Al Gore's Information-Superhighway Patrol, it will raise some very political issues (but, by using a decent blind system, for all the patrol knows, the distributor might be in the recipient's state). Also, and this is really just an interface issue, scripts should be developed that will automate the retrieval process (ie, build and submit the mail message). These would be similiar to the hop.mail or anon.mail scripts, but would be custom to the pornography server. For example: It begins with an input for the file to be retrieved. It will continue prompting for that until the person enters a null (or 'q' or something) It will then list (at least) one dozen remailers, and they can select one (or take a default, and randomize it. Or perhaps randomize it through >1 remailer, although that decreases response time.). They will then have to PGP sign their mail message (so that the ordering software can verify the person placing the order. This is to cut down mail-spoofing to mail-bomb an enemy with porn.) Encrypt it for the appropriate parties Send it on its way. The server can either reply immediately with the appropriate files, or it can batch everything up for processing during low-traffic times (I personally like the first, but dont' really care that much). The mail is then PGP encrypted back to the recipient (by getting the key from a key server, or by having the orderee register their key before hand, with the latter probably being easier, although it does leave a paper trail that can be examined) and sent out with precedence set to 'bulk' so that other stuff is more important on the mail links. It should all be fairly accomplishable with a series of perl and sh scripts on either end. The real question is what to offer. I'll talk more about this from an organizational stand-point if anyone is interested. I'm afriad that I'm really not that good a programmer (even of simple shells) as my field of expertise is in management and other administrative stuff (but obviously not spelling :-) ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> In the United States, they \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> first came for us in Colorado... -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- * Prev: Re: A possible solution * Next: Pornography Server * Index: Cypherpunks

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FC: Letter from high-tech CEOs to Feinstein: back off!
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from Declan's list >From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> >Subject: FC: Letter from high-tech CEOs to Feinstein: back off! >X-URL: Politech is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ > >=== > > January 15, 1998 >> >> >> The Honorable Dianne Feinstein >> United States Senate >> Washington, DC 21510 >> >> >> Dear Senator Feinstein, >> >> As Chief Executive Officers of leading California companies, we were >> disappointed by your >> November 5 comments at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing implying >> that >> California companies >> are ambivalent regarding your position on encryption policy. We are >> anything but >> ambivalent about an >> issue that will have a profound impact on our companies, our >> customers, the >> citizens of our country, >> and our nation itself. >> >> We are in the midst of a transformation of our society into an era >> where >> information technology is >> affecting and improving all of our lives and all of our businesses. >> Without >> effective security we put >> at risk the confidentiality of our intellectual property, the public's >> privacy >> and the nation's critical >> infrastructure. And none of us will be able to take full advantage of >> the >> opportunities being presented >> to us by the promise of global electronic commerce. >> >> And consider the burgeoning threat of personal identity theft. As >> emphasized in >> the September 1997 >> issue of Consumer Reports, "the crime is one of the fastest-growing in >> the >> nation, according to the >> California District Attorneys Association. Identity thieves make off >> with >> billions of dollars a year...." >> Strong encryption with no systemic vulnerability is the best >> protection against >> such damaging fraud. >> Indeed, the credit-card industry, as you heard in testimony before the >> Judiciary >> Subcommittee on >> Terrorism and Technology on September 3, soon will be offering >> publicly a very >> sophisticated system >> for secure credit-card transactions over the Internet. While the >> system will be >> able to reconstruct >> transactions soon after the fact in response to legitimate >> law-enforcement >> requests, it does not employ >> keys and would not comply with the kind of mandate contemplated by the >> FBI. >> >> Mandatory key recovery policies, domestically and for export, will >> make the >> United States a second >> class nation in the Information Age. >> >> We are very sympathetic to the concerns of law enforcement, and we >> greatly >> respect your continuing >> support for them. In fact, if we believed that the policy of >> mandatory key >> recovery could successfully >> prevent criminals from having access to unbreakable encryption, we >> might support >> that position. >> However, this policy cannot succeed, and in the process of failing it >> will >> sacrifice the leading role that >> the State of California is playing in the international economy. Even >> more >> important, perhaps, the >> policy will create new law enforcement and national security >> challenges because >> U.S. corporations and >> government officials will be forced to rely on unproven foreign >> encryption >> technology. Maintaining >> United States leadership in the development of state-of-the-art >> cryptography is >> in the best interests of >> U.S. national security and law enforcement. California companies and >> industries >> nationwide are >> united in opposition to domestic and export controls that jeopardize >> this >> leadership. >> >> California companies need your support to be able to meet this new day >> with a >> strong and competitive >> encryption industry. We urge you to meet regularly with >> representatives from >> our companies, in >> Washington D.C. and in California, to discuss this issue further. >> >> Sincerely, >> >> >> Christopher Allen >> President and CEO >> Consensus Development Corporation >> >> Bill Archey >> CEO >> American Electronics Association >> >> Jim Barksdale >> CEO >> Netscape Communications, Inc. >> >> Carol Bartz >> CEO >> Autodesk, Inc. >> >> George Bell >> CEO >> Excite, Inc. >> >> Eric Benhamou >> Chairman and CEO >> 3Com Corporation >> >> Jim Bidzos >> CEO >> RSA Data Security, Inc. >> >> Philip Bowles >> President >> Bowles Farming Co., Inc. >> >> Steve Case >> Chairman and CEO >> America Online, Inc. >> >> Wilfred J. Corrigan >> Chairman and CEO >> LSI Logic >> >> Thomas B. Crowley >> President & CEO >> Crowley Maritime Corporation >> >> Philip Dunkelberger >> CEO >> PGP >> >> Judy Estrin >> President & CEO >> Precept Software, Inc. >> >> David W. Garrison >> CEO >> Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc. >> >> Karl Geng >> President and CEO >> Siemens Business Communication Systems, Inc. >> Santa Clara, Calif. >> >> Charles M. Geschke >> President >> Adobe Systems, Inc. >> >> Brian L. Halla >> President, Chairman & CEO >> National Semiconductor, Inc. >> >> Gordon Mayer >> CEO and Chairman >> Geoworks Corporation >> >> Scott McNealy >> Chairman and CEO >> Sun Microsystems, Inc. >> >> >> >> Ed Mueller >> Predident and CEO >> Pacific Bell >> >> Kenneth J. Orton >> President and CEO >> Preview Travel, Inc. >> >> Willem P. Roelandts >> CEO >> Xilinx, Inc. >> >> Eric Schmidt >> CEO >> Novell, Inc. >> >> Tom Steding >> CEO >> Red Creek >> >> Deb Triant >> CEO >> Checkpoint >> >> David E. Weiss >> Chairman, President and CEO >> Storage Technology Corporation >> >> >> >> >> > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology >To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: >subscribe politech >More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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My apology
by Roger J Jones 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim, I stand corrected, This must be Chem-Punks Roger J. Jones

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Re: DejaNews all over again
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Jeff, I think it's in your best interest to not waste your time >responding to this moron (who bears many features in common with >Detweiler) Except for his esteemed "credentials", of course... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://www.webstuff.apple.com/~vinnie/Rah >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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"conspiracypunks"
by nobody＠valhalla.phoenix.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

May have been silenced, but the Slick criminality story continues apace, and it's fitting that the most Nixonian president since Tricky himself should have a "Deep Throat," no matter how some of you feel about Orlin, who is, BTW, doing thejob the media claims to be responsible for. [Don't Flame C2]

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More on ISDN Features
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is from UK Crypto, where the ISDN-snoop part of the EuroParl report on technologies for political control was cited and asked if true. Perhaps Jim Choate, Steve Schear and others might clarify. Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 00:09:40 +0000 To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk From: John Brooks <jbrooks(a)peeras.demon.co.uk> Subject: Re: [vin(a)shore.net: EuroParl Report - NSA, Crypto, Liberty & Trade] >A draft ("consultation version") of a report by the European >Parliament's Office for Scientific and Technological Option Assessment >(STOA) entitled "AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL >CONTROL" has been submitted to the EuroParl's Civil Liberties and >Interior Committee. But this is all (or 99 percent) complete bollocks. >"[...] Some systems even lend themselves to a dual role as a national >interceptions network. ??? > For example the message switching system used on digital >exchanges like System X in the UK supports an Integrated >Services Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol. This allows digital >devices, e.g. fax to share the system with existing lines. The ISDN >subset is defined in their documents as "Signalling CCITT1-series >interface for ISDN access". I think this means I series - which are all public docs... >What is not widely known is that built in to the international CCITT >protocol is the ability to take phones 'off hook' Yes - ok. If you have a delinquent ISDN switch AND the totalitarian state wants to bug you AND YOU choose to use a handset which DOES NOT break the analogue path between the microphone and the ISDN NTU / TA (all standard analogue phones break the circuit, AFAIK. It's only the speakerphone gadgets that could be subverted.) Then I suppose this is possible. But who gives a s**t about the .1% of vulnerable phones. And it would be dead easy to mod them to defeat any such attempt. There are loads of easier ways to mount covert surveillance than screwing up the phone system! >and listen into conversations occurring near the phone, >without the user being aware that it is happening." ISDN is NOT a 'message switching protocol', and there is none as such on Sys X and Y, which use SS7 for inter-switch signalling anyway. The ISDN interfaces and service are only defined for the ends of various types of subscriber line, as far as I remember. What happens inside the provider network is up to the provider and is not ISDN. I'm much more concerned about the Echelon system which was (finally) reported in the Sunday Telegraph just before Xmas. This system, it is alleged, can intercept and look for keywords in ALL international comms traffic. I believe this also gets a mention in the Europarliament report. Vote early and often for freely available strong encryption!! (whatever JR mutters about 'doing him out of his livelihood' :=) ) Key escrow is another example of complete bollocks, IMHO. Cheers -jb -- John Brooks - Consultant in Data Communications, Networking and Energy Systems South Croydon, 7,CR2 7HN, UK Tel: (44) 181 681 1595 Fax: (44) 181 649 7536 The opinions expressed here are mine but are not offered as professional advice. ---------- BTW, provocative commentary on the EuroParl report by Vin McLellan, which is the source of the UK Crypto thread, is available at: http://jya.com/nsa-etc-nf.htm

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