- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Sternlight on C'punks
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:42 7/16/96, Peter D. Junger wrote: >How does one set up a kill-file for a mailing list? I run a Linux box >with sendmail and use the MH mail system. > >My best guess is that I will have to install procmail, but would like >your advice before going to a lot of labor. Procmail is the way to go. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: Message pools _are_ in use today!
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>receive message pools by satellite dish-- hurray for true broadcasting! tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: >Yeah, and I should have mentioned the "PageSat" Usenet distribution model, >too. (It was a really hot topic 3-4 years ago, but I've heard little of it >in the past couple of years...the rise of the Web has made passive >downloads of Usenet a lot less interesting.) Volume has been a real problem. Usenet is probably close to 10MB/hour these days, which is 30 kbps if you don't compress it, or 10-15 kbps compressed (since the binary newsgroups are a good chunk of the volume and are already mostly compressed.) That's pushing what you can do with really-low-end satellites, and as Tim says, the Web has affected the size of the market for that kind of service. I don't know how easy it is to get one of these pseudonymously, and they do cost a bit, but an amusing transmission medium for message pools is alphanumeric pagers; you can get pager cards for PCs, or just limit your messages to 250-byte blocks.... Bay Area alphanumeric service probably costs $25/month, though nationwide is $60-100. >2. The authorities already have identified a suspect, call him "Bob," and >wish to know if he reading (and perhaps decrypting) messages to "Alice." > >As several of us have noted, #1 is tough--real tough. The authorities would >have to contact 10,000 or more ISPs who have local newsfeeds and subpoena >their logs of who read which newsgroups...assuming such logs are even kept Getting everybody is tough. Getting a lot of the potential suspects, however, isn't as tough as it looks - the vast majority of home Internet users are on AOL, Compuserve, Prodigy, UUNet, Netcom, or (RSN) AT&T. Anonymous Message Pool users are a bit more likely to use niche-market ISPs, especially under pseudonyms, but if the number of users increases significantly there'll still be a reasonable proportion on the big carriers, which are probably more cooperative and probably keep more complete logs. On the other hand, several of the big players are good places to get disposable accounts charged to that secured Visa debit card you opened under a pseudonym.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Confuse Authority!

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Re: Opiated file systems
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:06 PM 7/17/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote: >1. Confiscate computer (along with physical drive) with duress-capable >encrypted file system; 2. back up the encrypted sectors; 3. reverse-engineer file >system driver to figure out how the duress-key works, if there are >multiple keys, where data is stored; 4. make sure you've rubber-hosed >or subpeoned all passphrases or keys; 4a. if the system destroys data, >you've got backups ("Very funny kiddo; now give us the real key...") >4b. even if there are two filesystems, the attacker will want access >to both, just to make sure... It has long occurred to me, considering the size and low power of the typical 3.5" hard drive compared with the size of the typical house or apartment, that it might be an interesting project to remotely connect such a (hidden) drive to your computer using a reasonably surreptious link that is difficult to trace. Say, an IR optical link, a single bare (unjacketed) optical fiber, a LAN with hidden nodes, or a similar system. Maybe an inductive pickup. In any raid, they'll have to decide what to take, and chances are very good that they won't find every hidden item. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Sternlight on C'punks
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:11 7/15/96, David Sternlight wrote: [...] >Nothing like a good personal defamation before even reading my posts, eh? >As those who have paid attention know, I post my policy views, not >flame-bait. The idea that I am deliberately trying to start flame wars is >pure paranoia. LOL. ROTF. While the poster of the message to which you are responding may not have read your posts, I have. Hundreds of them. Your USENET posts routinely lead to some of the longest flame wars I have ever seen. While starting flame wars may not be your intention, it most certainly is often the result of your posts. Consequently, you are one of only two people in my global USENET kill file. Not because I hate you, but because I don't enjoy reading the endless flame fests that seem to be the inevitable result of your posts. Deliberate or incidental, you *are* starting flame wars. No offense, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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"address verification databases"? (was: Netscape download...)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:45 PM 7/17/96, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > Because we have not yet been able to obtain the address verification >databases that we need for Canada. There is someone working on >tracking this down right now. When we get the proper database we >will add access to canada. > > --Jeff Jeff, can you tell us anything more about what these "address verification databases" are? For example, are they derived from government sources? Census data? (Naw, can't be, for at least two obvious reasons). Voting records? (Naw.) Credit card purchases? (??) While I can imagine various commercial firms have indicators that a "T. Christopher May" once lived in Rio Del Mar (the name of a town I lived in, though not an official "Postal Service" address), I really find it odd that, for example, there would be any database that could "parse" the informal information people provide (absent a well-defined set of addresses and precise spellings). In case I'm not making myself clear, there are no "official" addresses of persons in the U.S! Not even the tax system requires registration of all persons and specific addresses. This has come up in several "voter's rights" cases, where persons with no fixed address were nevertheless able to vote. If I, T.C. May, say my address is Moonbeam Trailer Park, who's to say it's not? Maybe it's where I'm staying with a girlfriend, maybe it's where I get my mail, maybe it's my spiritual home. And yet just which "address verification database" could possibly confirm that I live in (or get my mail at the Moonbeam Trailer Park at this exact moment? Absent any laws clearly defining what one's official name is, official phone number is, official zip code is, official address is, etc., just about anything we choose to put down on the Web form is kosher. At least the MIT system was based on ISP domain names, crude as this is, and not on putative names and residential or business addresses. Anyway, I don't know if Netscape is rejecting the information I'm providing them, as I've been unable to get through in roughly 30 connect attempts. But I'm still curious about what these "address verification databases." Sounds ominous to me. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Opiated file systems
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:30 PM 7/16/96 -0700, Jim Gillogly wrote: >"Deranged Mutant" <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> writes: >>A problem with a c'punk-style encrypted fs with source code and wide >>distribution is, of course, that attackers will KNOW that there is a >>duress key. > >Good point. This suggests a design desideratum for any such system should >be that the user may choose not to have a duress key, maintaining >semi-plausible deniability for those who choose to have one. Perhaps a user settable number of duress keys with different behavior for each of them? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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ANNOUNCEMENT: nym.alias.net enters beta testing
by lcs Remailer Administrator 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm pleased to announce that the nym.alias.net pseudonym server has now entered the beta-testing phase, and seems quite stable. Nym.alias.net offers several interesting features: * Public-Key encryption of all received mail. Once mail has gone through nym.alias.net, no one can read it except you--even if you have been sending your mail to a newsgroup and your reply-block and remailers become compromised. * Support for multiple, probabilistically-weighted, reply blocks. These can be used for redundancy or to foil traffic analysis with decoys. * Replay detection. This foils replay attacks, but can also be used for higher reliability if you send redundant copies of a message through different remailer chains. * An option to receive only fixed-length messages (by splitting up large messages and padding small ones with garbage). * An option to sign mail you send with the remailer's public key, so as to give some assurance of authenticity without having to publish your own PGP public key. * Support for finger [pending DNS approval]. You can choose to make your nym's PGP public key available to all who finger its E-mail address. Right now you can test this by fingering at 18.26.0.252. In addition, experimental nym.alias.net support for Premail is now available (in the form of a patch to premail 0.44). With this patch, premail will store your nym's PGP key on encrypted keyrings. This allows you to publish a PGP key for your pseudonym without the danger of your identity being revealed to someone with access to your main PGP keyrings (or a backup copy of them). To obtain more information about nym.alias.net, finger <nymhelp(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> or send mail to <help(a)nym.alias.net>. To get information about using premail with nym.alias.net, finger <premail-info(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> or send mail to <premail-info(a)nym.alias.net>. These documents are also available on the new nym.alias.net web page: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html Please report all bugs to <admin(a)nym.alias.net>. I'll also be glad to consider feature requests, particularly from anyone interested in developing any more client software. Enjoy! mix-admin(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMf6dcUTBtHVi58fRAQE4NgP/SoKSqHxobEHuyWl6lXVAHgk9yqNS/WAD jUfKYGodThr93kJZkmreyIHrWgbromJJlXo6MPq9KpZzIh85uHRzBPRSh293hfUo ta8/sdZsW1+uoEkAs8JUWlwAEGo+bfmgRnFswf80pAPClpbGo52DAKyLKfdCaFps kQ+4hoouUvo= =qEWa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Freeh Testimony 7/25/96
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wish someone had asked Freeh directly whether he granted, in saying: >First and foremost, the law enforcement community fully supports a >balanced encryption policy that satisfies both the commercial needs of >industry and law abiding individuals for robust encryption products [...] that law abiding industry and individuals have a legitimate need to keep information private from the US government -- and especially the FBI. +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2| | "Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song." | +-------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+

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Re: "An who shall guard the guardians?"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:46 AM 8/1/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > >The Latin maxim "And who shall guard the guardians?" has some relevance to >the headlong rush into converting the U.S. into even more of a security >state than it is now. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

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Reuter on P8 Anti-Terrorism
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

G7, Russia adopt anti-terror pact, avoid sanctions Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 10:00:07 PDT PARIS (Reuter) - The world's major powers closed ranks to combat terrorism Tuesday, urging other nations to join forces with them but sidestepping a dispute over U.S. demands for sanctions against what Washington calls "terrorist states." Foreign and security ministers from the Group of Seven industrial nations and Russia approved a list of 25 measures to defeat terrorists around the globe. "We will not stop in this united effort until those responsible are brought to justice," U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno told a news conference after the five-hour meeting of the so-called P8 nations -- P being for political. The package included pledges to reinforce police cooperation and training, share intelligence, ease extradition and legal assistance, dry up sources of funding and weapons and strengthen national anti-terrorism legislation. The ministers also vowed to prevent extremists from using the Internet computer network to plan attacks and spread bomb-making instructions. Participants heard Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy recount how his 11-year-old son had shown him where to find such content on the Internet. French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette said the meeting had achieved its two objectives, "to adopt concrete measures and to send a very clear signal to the international community and to public opinion that the leaders of the P8 are strongly determined to act shoulder-to-shoulder, hand-in-hand." Under-Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff said the U.S. delegation had not raised President Clinton's contentious call for "strong sanctions" against four states he says support terrorism -- Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan. France, Japan, Britain and Germany all made clear they would not accept U.S. legislation to punish foreign firms that dealt with such countries. "We did not discuss country-specific cases ... We recognize the fact that some of legislation passed in the United States recently has encountered opposition among our trading partners," Tarnoff said. French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debre, who co-chaired the meeting, said before it began: "The American analysis is a bit simplistic and a bit outdated. If we look at the phenomenon of terrorism today, we can see that it's more complex." He cited the bomb attack that killed two people and wounded 110 at the Atlanta Olympic Games last Saturday as evidence of what he called "home-grown terrorism" without outside help. State-sponsored and extreme-left terrorism were largely a thing of the past, and the international community now faced two virulent new forms -- regionalist extremism and religious militancy -- which did not have state support, Debre said. The United States offered extra proposals to tighten airport security and mark explosives chemically so bombers can be more easily traced, which the other countries accepted. Axworthy voiced widely shared alarm at the use of poison gas in recent attacks in Japan, including on the Tokyo subway. "We are beginning to see terrifying signs of what the future could hold if we don't take strong action. Terrorists are now getting access to weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, even nuclear weapons," he said. "It's (a threat) that really has a doomsday quality unless we act now," he said. The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia agreed that solving regional conflicts and stabilizing crisis areas was the best way to tackle the roots of terrorism. "There must be no safe havens," German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said. The ministers agreed their experts would hold follow-up meetings to draft a new international convention to prevent the abuse of political asylum to plan, fund or commit terrorist acts and to coordinate security in public transport. Japan said it would hold an Asia-Pacific counter-terrorism seminar by next June including Asian and Latin American experts. [End]

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