- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

DigiCash can use whatever currencies are valued
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As Perry and Eric and others have noted, schemes for digital cash are primarily a transaction mechanism, and not a new currency unto themselves. Transfers, accounts, payments, all the usual stuff. However, the strong crypto used allows more flexibility in bypassing normal currency rules and can allow users to mutually agree on whatever currency they wish. (This is in large part already possible, for some folks, in the international markets, the Eurodollar markets, etc. It's one of the things that keeps countries in line. Duncan Frissell and others have elaborated on this market mechanism.) Just as in Havana, the U.S. dollar is the de facto hard currency unit, so too could future digicash transactions be based on the Latvian luble, the Qatarese marq, or the Cyberian cyphertaler. Or on a market basket of such currencies. Or on uranium futures. Whatever the parties to a transaction agree on. (Obviously the usual Cypherpunkish issues of market forces, trust, reputation, escrow, etc., enter in here. How the dollar comes to have a "value" that is worth, say, 5 pounds of bananas to some merchant, while the officially supported Cuban peso is worth, say, half a banana peel, is a complicated and "emergent" thing. It's complicated, but was understandable to Saddam's ancestors in the markets of Babylon thousands of years ago. Enough said.) The prospects for breaking open these financial markets even further is breathtaking. Of course, it won't be easy. More than some casual programming will be needed. I don't expect folks on this list to pull this off all by themselves. Some may. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Well users loose for now
by William Rodham Wisner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On May 4, 8:37am, Hugh Daniel wrote: > The Well has two IP feeds into the internet, due to > political/biz_profit/sysadmin problems the two feeds do NOT back each > other up, and the one that can be seen from toad.com has been down for > a few days, thus blocking your email. This is not quite accurate. The WELL has one IP feed into the Internet, through BARRNET. The WELL also has a private T1 line to a TLG customer, and traffic between the WELL and TLG is routed through this link. No packets to the rest of the Internet are sent through TLG. At least, that was the case. I just updated our routing tables to send TLG traffic through BARRNET like everything else, since that TLG link is down right now.

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DOJ Clipper documents scheduled for summer release under FOIA
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As you know, there has been much debate about the Clipper Chip initiative, but relatively little hard information. John Gilmore, member of the board of directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, filed FOIA requests to numerous government agencies last April after the Clipper plan was announced. In June 1993, he filed a FOIA lawsuit against the Justice Department ("DOJ") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Gilmore v. FBI, et al, C-93-2117, U.S. District Judge Charles Legge, Northern District of California. As a result of this lawsuit, the Justice Department has agreed to a staggered release of some documents about Clipper and Digital Telephony. The Justice Department and Gilmore signed a joint stipulation and agreement on Friday, April 29, 1994, in which the Justice Department and several other federal agencies agreed to release documents over the next several months: a) DOJ's Office of Information and Privacy ("OIP") will transmit all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents that it has identified as requiring referrals or consultations to the appropriate agencies or DOJ components by May 31, 1994. OIP will complete processing of all documents that it has identified as not requiring referrals or consultations to other agencies or DOJ components by June 20, 1994. b) DOJ's Justice Management Division ("JMD") will complete processing of all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents, excluding documents which have been referred for processing to other agencies, by July 30, 1994. c) The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which OMB had received as of April 20, 1994 by May 20, 1994. d) The National Security Agency ("NSA") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which it had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 18, 1994. NSA will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by July 18, 1994. e) The National Security Council ("NSC") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which NBC had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 29, 1994. f) The Department of Commerce and National Institute of Standards and Technology (collectively "Commerce") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which Commerce had received as of April 20, 1994 by August 7, 1994. Commerce will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by August 7, 1994. The documents being processed by the NSC include the Presidential Review Directive and Presidential Decision Directive which started the Clipper initiative. We have been informed that NSC is processing the two final versions as well as 68 draft versions. We have also been informed that documents produced in the course of the OMB legislative clearance process for the Digital Telephony Bill are being processed. This should provide insight into how the government decided to proceed with this bill. We have also been informed that there are approximately 25 documents produced in the course of the government's solicitation of industry views on Clipper. Obviously, we do not know how much useful information will be released. It is probable that the documents will be heavily redacted. Given the recent directives from the President and the Attorney General that all possible discretionary disclosures of information should be made, we hope, optimistically, that these disclosures will prove illuminating. Unfortunately, the FBI is not a party to this agreement. We are in the process of attempting to obtain the release of about 3000 pages of FBI records. FBI has told the Court that it will be approximately 2 years and 8 months before it will even begin processing Gilmore's request, and that actual processing will take about a year, if not more. We believe that this delay is unlawful and cannot be countenanced. The FBI offered to complete its processing a year from when we sign an agreement; we believe they should process these documents in a maximum of six months (which would be a year and a half from our original FOIA request). Note that this processing time only includes their initial response to us; they will undoubtedly withhold many documents and parts of documents which we will contest the withholding of. This will take additional time, probably years. Because we and the FBI have been unable to agree, we have presented this controversy to the Court, and Judge Legge will decide what deadlines to impose on the FBI. The agreement mentioned above does not include NSA except to the extent that NSA is reviewing documents submitted to it by the Department of Justice. We also filed a FOIA request with NSA for all of its documents on Clipper, and have received no response after a year. We have an existing lawsuit against NSA's pattern and practice of delay in responding to FOIA requests. Depending on how that suit develops, we will take some kind of legal action to force them to respond. Lee Tien (Attorney for John Gilmore) and John Gilmore tien(a)well.sf.ca.us gnu(a)toad.com PLEASE REDISTRIBUTE IF YOU LIKE.

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DOJ Clipper documents scheduled for summer release under FOIA
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Date: Wed, 4 May 1994 08:00:28 -0700 From: Lee Tien <tien(a)well.sf.ca.us> Subject: DOJ Clipper documents scheduled for summer release under FOIA As you know, there has been much debate about the Clipper Chip initiative, but relatively little hard information. John Gilmore, member of the board of directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, filed FOIA requests to numerous government agencies last April after the Clipper plan was announced. In June 1993, he filed a FOIA lawsuit against the Justice Department ("DOJ") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Gilmore v. FBI, et al, C-93-2117, U.S. District Judge Charles Legge, Northern District of California. As a result of this lawsuit, the Justice Department has agreed to a staggered release of some documents about Clipper and Digital Telephony. The Justice Department and Gilmore signed a joint stipulation and agreement on Friday, April 29, 1994, in which the Justice Department and several other federal agencies agreed to release documents over the next several months: a) DOJ's Office of Information and Privacy ("OIP") will transmit all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents that it has identified as requiring referrals or consultations to the appropriate agencies or DOJ components by May 31, 1994. OIP will complete processing of all documents that it has identified as not requiring referrals or consultations to other agencies or DOJ components by June 20, 1994. b) DOJ's Justice Management Division ("JMD") will complete processing of all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents, excluding documents which have been referred for processing to other agencies, by July 30, 1994. 0) The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which OMB had received as of April 20, 1994 by May 20, 1994. d) The National Security Agency ("NSA") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which it had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 18, 1994. NSA will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by July 18, 1994. e) The National Security Council ("NSC") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which NBC had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 29, 1994. f) The Department of Commerce and National Institute of Standards and Technology (collectively "Commerce") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which Commerce had received as of April 20, 1994 by August 7, 1994. Commerce will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by August 7, 1994. The documents being processed by the NSC include the Presidential Review Directive and Presidential Decision Directive which started the Clipper initiative. We have been informed that NSC is processing the two final versions as well as 68 draft versions. We have also been informed that documents produced in the course of the OMB legislative clearance process for the Digital Telephony Bill are being processed. This should provide insight into how the government decided to proceed with this bill. We have also been informed that there are approximately 25 documents produced in the course of the government's solicitation of industry views on Clipper. Obviously, we do not know how much useful information will be released. It is probable that the documents will be heavily redacted. Given the recent directives from the President and the Attorney General that all possible discretionary disclosures of information should be made, we hope, optimistically, that these disclosures will prove illuminating. Unfortunately, the FBI is not a party to this agreement. We are in the process of attempting to obtain the release of about 3000 pages of FBI records. FBI has told the Court that it will be approximately 2 years and 8 months before it will even begin processing Gilmore's request, and that actual processing will take about a year, if not more. We believe that this delay is unlawful and cannot be countenanced. Lee Tien Attorney for John Gilmore tien(a)well.sf.ca.us PLEASE REDISTRIBUTE IF YOU THINK IT'S WORTH IT. (feel free to edit any obvious typos, too) -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994 -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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Anonymous Mail via Port 25
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Awhile ago, someone mentioned that at some colleges & universities, the dialup lines don't require you to log in immediately. Rather, they let you specify which system to telnet to, and then you log in there. Telnets are usually limited to machines in the University's domain, but they often don't restrict what ports you can telnet to. So you can telnet to port 25 and send an anonymous mail which would be very difficult to trace. Does anyone know of any such systems? Anywhere in the U.S. or Canada? I'm thinking of using such mail ports for a new anonymous remailer I'm working on, and I want to make tracing the mail as difficult as possible. Please post modem numbers...

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EFF Summary of May 3 1994 Clipper and Digital Telephony Hearings
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EFF SUMMARIES ============= May 4, 1994 __________________________ Contents: * Senate Subcommittee on Technology and the Law holds Clipper Hearing * House Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation holds hearing on Clipper and Digital Telephony proposals; EFF's Executive Director Jerry Berman and Board Member David Farber testify __________________________ SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HOLDS CLIPPER HEARING ----------------------------------------- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law held a hearing on Tuesday (5/3) to examine the Administration's "Clipper Chip" Key Escrow Encryption proposal. Witnesses included Asst. Atty. Gen. Jo Ann Harris (Criminal Justice Division), NIST Deputy Director Raymond Kammer, Whitfield Diffie (of Sun Microsystems), Stephen Walker (President, Trusted Information Systems), and NSA director Vice Adm. J. M. McConnell. The discussion touched on a number of key issues, including the necessity of the Clipper proposal for law enforcement; the privacy interests of network users; the costs associated with implementing the Clipper scheme; export controls; and whether those intending to use communications networks to break the law would actually use Clipper as opposed to other encryption schemes. Although a variety of views were offered, few new developments emerged in this controversial debate. Assistant Attorney General Harris and NIST's Ray Kammer both stated that the Clipper Scheme and Key Escrow system would not provide law enforcement with any new surveillance abilities. Rather, Harris argued, Clipper is analogous to a translator. Harris stated, "All Clipper does is, after a court has authorized interceptions of communications, is that we get the ability to understand the content of legitimately intercepted communications". The Administration continues to maintain that the market would accept the Clipper standard based on the assumption that it is the strongest encryption scheme, regardless of who holds the keys. When pressed by Sen. Leahy on this issue, as well as on the question of whether criminals or terrorist organizations would be willing to use the Clipper standards, neither witness offered any assurances, and admitted that this is still an open question. Senator Leahy expressed skepticism: "I have serious questions about whether any sophisticated criminal or terrorist organization is going to use the one code endorsed by the U.S. Government and for which U.S. Government agents hold the decoding keys. There are a multitude of alternative encryption methods commercially available. If Clipper Chip does become the standard encryption method used by Americans, criminals may be forced to use Clipper to communicate with legitimate outsiders. But this is a big 'IF' ". In what may prove to be a significant development, NIST's Kammer conceded that additional fiscal authorization may be needed to fund the implementation of the Clipper proposal. If this is the case, Congress would be required to consider legislation to authorize funding, and at this point passage of such legislation is at best uncertain. EFF will continue to closely monitor this development, and will pass along information as it develops. Sun Microsystems Diffie urged a slow and careful approach to the Clipper issue, cautioning that a rush to implement Clipper may create a bureaucracy that would be difficult to dislodge at a later time. Diffie stressed the need for international for information security, and cautioned against attempts to use the power of technology to increase the power of government. Diffie added, "Integrity of political speech is the root of legitimate laws in a democratic society. We are in a position where if we do not make it a national priority to make privacy available", this integrity may be compromised. Steve Walker, of Trusted Information Systems, stressed the need for the removal of export control restrictions. He also countered the Administration's contention that very few foreign encryption alternatives exist; noting that his company had found over 340. Walker displayed several of these applications, and noted that because of export controls U.S. manufactures of encryption technology face a significant disadvantage on the world market. Although the Senate Hearing did not produce many new developments, it is significant to note that no members of the Subcommittee expressed outright support for the Clipper Chip proposal. Chairman Leahy, the most vocal panel member at Tuesday's hearing, was also the most skeptical, and as such the fate Clipper proposal is still very much in doubt. *** ------------------------------ HOUSE PANEL CONSIDERS CLIPPER AND DIGITAL TELEPHONY PROPOSALS ------------------------------------------------------------- Tuesday proved to be a busy day for Clipper on the Hill, as the House Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation also considered the Clipper and Digital Telephony proposals. Witnesses on the panel included James Kallstrom of the FBI, NSA's Clinton Brooks, NIST Deputy Director Ray Kammer, Dr. Dorothy Denning, Dr. David Faber, EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman (on behalf of DPSWG), and Chmn. Willis Ware of the Congress/NIST System Security and Privacy Advisory Board. The discussion centered mainly on the Clipper issue. Unlike the Senate panel, there seemed to be some support for the Clipper proposal on the House Subcommittee. Rep. Dan Glickman (D-KS), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, declared his "cautious support", for the proposal, and stressed law enforcement's need for strong surveillance abilities. Subcommittee Chairman Valentine (D-NC), as well as Reps. Morella (R-MD) and Rohrabacher (R-CA) all expressed reservations. James Kallstrom urged full support of both the Clipper and Digital Telephony proposals on behalf of all law enforcement, citing the need to counter the increasing sophistication of digital communications technologies. Kallstrom painted a picture of a network populated by criminals, terrorists, and drug dealers which would pose a great danger to public safety, unless law enforcement is given the ability to intercept illegal communications. EFF's Jerry Berman countered this assertion by arguing that Clipper would only solve law enforcement's problems if criminals use it. The only way to do this, Berman added, would be to mandate the Clipper standard, something which the Administration does not claim to want to do. The only solution is for Congress to deny appropriation for Clipper and send the Administration back to the drawing board, Berman argued. Dr. Farber, appearing as an expert witness, stated that solutions to the Clipper issue will not come easily and will not come in one big step. Rather, a carefully considered and open approach is required. While stressing the need for encryption standards on communications networks, Dr. Farber cautioned against "smoke-filled-room standards" of encryption which are, in his view, likely to bead mistrust. Dr. Farber also argued for the removal of export controls on encryption technology. NSA's Clinton Brooks expressed support for Congressional Consideration of the Clipper issue. He argued that Clipper is a sound technological solution to a legitimate law enforcement and National Security dilemma, and that a public debate on its merits would eventually remove the misinformation and mistrust of government, and would prove Clipper to be in the public interest. Dr. Farber offered a strong caution to this, expressing the concern that a future administration may find it necessary to mandate the Clipper standard. Dr. Farber suggested that at the very least Congress weld into law a guarantee that Clipper remain voluntary, that the Judiciary be an escrow holder. He cautioned, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety" ************** Written testimony & documents from the hearings are available as: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/[filename] gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper, [filename] gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper, [filename] http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/[filename] where [filename] is: berman_eff_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Jerry Berman (EFF) brooks_nsa_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Clint Brooks (NSA) denning_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Dorothy Denning farber_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of David Farber kallstrom_fbi_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of James Kallstrom (FBI) kammer_nist_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Ray Kammer (NIST) ware_csspab_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Willis Ware (CSSPAB) clip-dt_hearings.docs - charter, witness list, diagrams. * Senate testimony and spoken testimony from both hearings will be made available from in the same directory when obtained. This material will also be available from the EFF BBS within a day or so, at +1 202 638 6120. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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Keyserver service outage
by Brian A. LaMacchia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The public keyserver running on martigny.ai.mit.edu will be unavailable starting Thursday, May 5, 1994 at approximately 9am EDT. During the coming week, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology will begin formally distributing PGP 2.5, a new version of PGP that is based on the RSAREF 2.0 cryptographic toolkit, under license from RSA Data Security, Inc., dated March 16, 1994. When that distribution becomes available, the keyserver will return running PGP 2.5. At that time, the keyserver will no longer accept keys that are identified as having been created by versions of PGP lower than 2.4. (PGP 2.4 is Viacrypt PGP.) --Brian LaMacchia public-key-server-request(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu

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Advertisement
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I realize that one-time pads are sort of outri these days, but what do you use when there are no computers around? I've written three programs in C which [1] construct a TeX-printable sheet of pads with pseudo-random numbers (use your own rand() function), [2] automatically encrypt a message using modular summing rather than XOR (easier to do if you don't have a computer handy), and [3] decrypt the message. They aren't the best examples of C coding, but they work. The first program is included below, conventionally encrypted with PGP. For a total of just 12 [TWELVE] Tacky Tokens I'll release the password. Please send your COIN.DAT contributions by encrypting with the PGP key below and posting to alt.test with the subject: IGNORE - NEON. Cast your bread upon the waters. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCVAi2/ZzEAAAEEOQGMwT6H90aJMTmkf3bLdMVyJ3hyBDoh8ruQfa2x/8tTEPhs 0dyOMroWwMMFQHY5Gdc7etULE6G3W8Q8CGotwFIEUMCXEc9UBeePv3WaU3ovZ/Dz bdvnTeH8KYpQhV68bi1jvX3ahM2tk5jRwK8zP9+YHv5ZpbQlubVI6pRIYxGNuGfP zntP48UABRG0CG5lb24gPEA+ =CTOG -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Since I don't know how to do a zero-knowledge (0-k) proof, I post part of the documentation below, as proof that it exists: PAD CONSTRUCTION ---------------- Cut each pad out seperately as shown, and staple together. A hot-melt glue gun can also be used for binding. The figure "EAF45" is a random value generated as a lable for each pad (see line #12 of OTP.C). 18 12 25 04 18 13 15 19 15 12 15 10 12 08 27 29 18 24 19 20 S 24 20 17 06 25 21 12 04 00 11 T 21 16 24 08 24 28 16 20 25 04 A 02 17 11 25 12 25 02 16 16 28 P 24 12 15 10 14 08 18 00 25 29 L 10 23 07 05 07 15 08 10 18 24 E 18 02 02 22 03 25 20 25 03 14 13 14 26 09 25 11 00 16 03 10 12 18 23 20 20 17 10 02 19 23 EAF45 Page 3 (etc.) -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3a pgAADYzOLESSLoz1Lddh5LT3bg8J5abD8CJL16I4c+9ws8KIMpnTgJjCRWysFpfn 70huIgY6tPzmRA2P7B9/foTcQ8oMNao/FAiOw8m5Hym1SKk1OdMNL+ryWRa4okTH dtBJgAg+JNFVnM5IuKy2XGnIaDwUxuF5wsgqMzXVWr0aOMFj307IYrISubo4JarG y48cRn6UOXLIFb72+Ua1aJIwTnskfEqxvPSFUOutZEPXrRUocyTWu0udD7Jdzhu1 Iq1doB1HeG1Mm0+yppwFEevCvHZKVzueWDfCZTo/b/ia2eyUZAkq6Q4BaLW4HW1j /V4R1+zxLK/MW8jeb8OMDMpzI3iEjHM/G0fm1JCfIRa3zlbOetWthxZSDlikfKaH fhUa8usOqmXlvAl/vP2thejeGfTZFQnqiLnhtj2jmJa1EKe0RAqL8ffak7/tXJHh 188oKIOuFRyKoe2lAk2oRzhvG7L99B9OZHD05L8dZD7JsVUkat6ryV2HNNlWcHuD 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Re:Visual Basic (yes, Basic!), and "VBX" tools
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes... >Buried deep in Bill Garland's message, I found the following: > >> 6. Learn Unix. Maybe I'll get a shell account on Sameer's machine. >> I've been a DEC RSTS/VMS Basic-Plus/VAX BASIC V2 programmer for >> too long, and I've not yet become unixificated. I don't even >> know if I could read a C++ program. I'm obsolete...again. > >Maybe not. The tide may be shifting a bit. "Visual Basic," from >Microsoft, is coming on like gangbusters for Windows programmers. I agree 100%! Just check out some of the ZIP files of Windows programs on the FTP sites. Many of them include VBRUNxxx.DLL and VBX files. These are the telltale signs that the product was written in VBASIC. Even WinPGP was written using it! G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP fingerprint = C9 95 0F C4 E9 DD 8E 73 DD 99 4E F5 EB 7A B6 1D | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Anonymous phone calls.
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I asked this a while ago, but my mail system has some problems and I don't know what the responses were, if any.... Is there any way to make a phone call anonymously? Caller ID can be blocked somewhat with one of those *## numbers dialed before the call is made. Is there a way to route a call through a series of phone-type remailer systems? This would allow one to make a call that would be as hard to trace as anonymous mail. Any ideas? G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP fingerprint = C9 95 0F C4 E9 DD 8E 73 DD 99 4E F5 EB 7A B6 1D | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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