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"Persistent Institutions" (Re: Timed-Release Crypto)
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the last of these articles I plan to forward. This one mentions the "persistent institutions" idea (based on timed-release crypto mediated by mutually suspicious agents) I have mentioned at times. (I need to do a major piece on this, as my comments are mainly scattered in various places.) Dave Deltorto was asking about hardware failure of the host machines as a practical concern and this is what I was initially responding to. --Tim >Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 12:16:30 -0800 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) >Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto > >Dave Deltorto writes (about my idea for timed-release crypto): > >>Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other >>storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the >>disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to >>for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places > >Loss of hardware over the years due to unreliability is unlikely to be the >main issue, for several reasons: > >1. Modern MTBFs for large disk drives are approaching 100,000 hours, or >well over 10 years. The drives are likelier to be voluntarily retired >first. And newer drives, including archival optical drives, are even more >reliable (the drives may crash, but optical media survive). For the drives >that _do_ fail, backup strategies exist, as with all storage of critical >files. To wit, if your point is correct, then the failures of some disk >drives at banks, insurance companies, etc., should be producing some >fraction of "unrecoverable losses" each year. That they are not, because of >robust backup and redundant storage methods, is evidence that crypto time >vaults will also be reasonably secure. (Granted, you wouldn't want to trust >your $100,000 deposit for 20 years on Joe Random's aging Amiga 1000.) > >2. A relatively large file by today's standards, e.g., 10 megabytes, will >be a very small file by the standards of 10 years from now. The upshot is >that new and more reliable storage methods (and transmission methods) will >make storage of such small files quite trivial. (And remember that since >the pieces are encrypted, physical duplication for backups, redundant >storage, etc., is not a compromise of security.) > >3. The most reputatable crypto time vaults will of course be careful not to >lose client files, especially not for such mundane reasons as disk drive >failures. > >4. M-out-of-n voting strategies are likely in any case, to deal with >collusion of some of the nodes. That is, a file will be split into pieces >such that any 8 out of 12 pieces, for example, are sufficient to recover >the original file. (Encryption is a separate issue, though obviously >related.) > >5. The files are likely to be moved around a lot, anyway, making hardware >failures manageable on an instantaneous basis (that is, bad nodes, etc., >can be compensated for when the time comes to reroute the files). Thus, a >critical file does not just get "parked" at one site for 30 years. > >>where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where >>they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each >>such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to >>guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to >>sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years >>might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion. > >"Persistent institutions" is what I call these systems or trusts that last >for many decades. If such systems can be built, using some of the ideas >discussed here in this group, then interesting new financial and political >structures are possible. Imagine an anonymous, distributed trust that has >$10 billion in crypto-assets and a "goal" of funding nanotech or cryonics >research. (Lots of complicated stuff yet to be considered in enough detail >on how such "goals" might be stored, acted on, etc. For the sake of >simplicity, think of it as a kind of Howard Hughes Medical Foundation, >which once owned the Hughes Corporation, but which is not located in any >one single country....) > >>Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit. > >Thanks. Lots more work is needed. > >-Tim May > > >-- >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. >Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available. > > .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 3 of 3
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Edward, didn't you get the message......stop haggling over righteousness & get back to WORK! :>) Blanc

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Hello
by Peter Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Request Remailing-To: dacey(a)crl.com Hi.....drop me a line when you get this. c-ya

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Re: Hello
by r6788＠hopi.dtcc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! Did you want me to call you or just send you e-mail??? >Hi.....drop me a line when you get this. c-ya ;>

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Do you gamble, or want to know how?!
by DizzyG1616＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: DizzyG1616(a)aol.com Subject: Do you gamble, or want to know how?! From: DizzyG1616(a)aol.com Date: Sat, 17 Oct 1998 00:44:01 EDT <a href="http://members.theglobe.com/mulahnow/lotto.html">Do you gamble, or want to know how?! CLICK HERE! </a>

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NAFTA and crypto
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An amusing possibility has cropped up. While looking at a motion to dismiss the AA BBS (porn) case, it dawned on me that the same aggument might apply to exporting crypto. Namely NAFTA seems to have negated laws which interfear with free trade (with some minor exceptions). I will post the full text of the motion to the list later today or tomarrow. Keith

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NSA influence over cellular phone crypto
by Random H0Z3R 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Karn: >No, RC4 is not the European cellular phone encryption algorithm, but >that 32-bit figure *has* come up in discussions of what NSA will allow >the carriers to put into next-generation digital cellular telephones. This is an interesting comment. How, specifically, is the NSA influencing these decisions? Does it have any official say in the matter?

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NY Times Clipper Editorial 6/12/94
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

6/12:EDITORIAL: A CLOSER LOOK ON WIRETAPPING c.1994 N.Y. Times News Service The New York Times said in an editorial on Sunday, June 12: The government's ability to tap private phone calls is under siege. Newly developed encryption systems allow callers to mathematically scramble their messages so that no one, including the government, can eavesdrop. And digital technology - from cellular phones to call-forwarding - makes wiretapping increasingly difficult. The Clinton administration is running scared and proposes two fixes, neither satisfactory. Government needs to wiretap under legally restricted circumstances. Though used sparingly during the 1980s (1,000 a year), taps helped convict more than 20,000 felons. But before tampering with existing arrangements, the administration must show that its proposals are workable and will not trample on existing rights to conduct private phone conversations. So far it has cleared neither hurdle. To overcome private encryption, the administration will encourage people who plan to encode calls to buy phones with a government-designed encryption system, known as Clipper, built into the hardware; the government, with judicial approval, would be able to unscramble the messages. But the policy is unlikely to work because Clipper phones are unlikely to dominate the market - leaving Washington the choice of admitting defeat or turning Big Brotherish and outlawing non-Clipper encryption systems. To overcome technological barriers, the Federal Bureau of Investigation proposes a second fix: legislation that would require phone companies to adopt only those technologies that preserve the government's ability to wiretap. The problem with this plan is that its sweeping prohibitions threaten to stop telecommunication innovations before anyone calculates the consequences. The administration would like to begin by encouraging the IRS and other agencies to buy Clipper phones; it might then require private parties that wish to send the government encoded messages to do so only with Clipper phones. The government hopes that in time Clipper phones would become standard equipment everywhere. Callers using other encryption systems would have to plan ahead and acquire compatible software, a big task for run-of-the-mill criminals. But many experts predict that Clipper phones will not become standard. There are easy-to-use encryption systems that require no special phones, no shared secret passwords. And, unlike Clipper, they cannot be intercepted by the government. Because un-tappable systems will prove attractive the private market is likely to make them as readily available as Clipper. Clipper uses a secret mathematical formula for scrambling calls. But there are flaws in the formula, as The New York Times recently revealed. The danger with secret formulas is that someone in or outside government could discover a new flaw and exploit it to tap encoded calls without a court order. Another bad feature concerns the passwords (actually, numbers) the government needs to unscramble calls from Clipper phones. The passwords would be held in escrow by two federal agencies (and released to the FBI upon presentation of a court order). A better way to protect against government abuse would be to entrust passwords to the courts or designated non-government organizations. The FBI's fix - requiring phone companies to build easily tappable systems - raises the unsettling image of forcing a phone company to design its "home" so that the police can easily enter. And the fix is unnecessarily blunt. The government could compel phone companies to solve specific problems, like making call-forwarding tappable. The administration is right to worry about its ability to tap phones for legitimate law enforcement. So far, its suggestions for safeguarding that ability seem unworkable and potentially intrusive.

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crypto in the NY Times
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times Magazine Sunday 12 June 1994 Whitfield Diffie on the cover. Cover text: "Whitfield Diffie's Amazing breakthrough could guarrantee computer privacy. But the Government, fearing crime and terror, wants to co-opt his magic key and listen in. Now it's crypto-war on the electronic frontier. THE CYPHERPUNKS VS. UNCLE SAM by Steven Levy Inside title: Battle of the Clipper Chip Photos: Phil Zimmermann vs Jim Kallstrom D. James Bidzos vs F. Lynn McNulty John Gilmore, Eric Hughes vs Dorothy E. Denning Vice Adm. John M. McConnell vs Whitfield Diffie Good read. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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crypto in the NY Times
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Once and for all we have to squaush the stupid question that leads the last paragraph of the NYT Magazine article: "What if the [VoicePGP] static shielded the murderous plans of a terrorist or kidnapper? Phil Zimmermann would feel terrible." Presumably because he is "of the Left". Phil goes on to talk about tradeoffs. The real answer is: That's a real stupid question. Right now in my head I could be a psycho killer planning all sorts of terrible stuff, does that mean that you should use the techniques of the Inquisition to fight crime by peeling back the layers of my mind? Computers and communications are just extensions of the minds of individuals. If I can keep my mind private, I can keep my computer private. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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