- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Clipper and Traffic Analysis
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Also, it probably goes via a different physical path. And at least some > SS7 trunks are encrypted with DES. Care to say anything about which ones are encrypted and why? Or to ask it another way, who decides? I phrased it that way because I'm not certain of the extent, and I'm not certain how much of what I know is AT&T-proprietary. But the obvious risks that encryption avoids are traffic analysis by enemies (pick your own definition of enemy), information on what channels to wiretap (remember the furor a few years ago about the location of the then-Soviet embassy on a hilltop in Washington, D.C.?), and the threat of phone-phreaking by introducing bogus call setup messages. On the latter point, recall that out-of-band signaling was introduced in part in response to ``blue boxes'' and other device that exploited in-band signaling technologies.

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New Crypto product & other ramblings
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the only way to prevent Clipper is pre-emptively. The advantages of Clipper are twofold: Gov't volumes may drive the price down The Algorithm is fast, and the silicon required to implement it is small. Modular arithmetic is (belief here, not fact) bigger, slower, and more expensive. There is enough knowledge, experience, and money on this mailing list to design an encryption chip to compete against Clipper. It would be better if we could just buy them- maybe that will happen. SGS-Thompson has just announced a smart-card chip with Modular Arithmetic Processor (ST16CF54) developed by an Israeli company, Fortress U&T Ltd. It's optimized for 256 and 512bit exponentiations, but can handle 1024 bit. It sounds like this is just for public key signature verification- it can't encrypt or decrypt at high speeds. Anyone know more about this product? (ref. EEtimes 2/14/94 pg 20) ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave, MS 305-3B * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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Big Brother PostScripts
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to some help, I have the Big Brother PostScript but have reduced its size so that it is about 1" x 1" or so (no ruler, just a guest). This is a perfect size for printing on stickers, letterheads, etc. If anyone wants a copy, please drop me a line and I'll be happy to mail it to you. If someone at cpsr.org wants to put it up for FTP, please also contact me and let me know where to upload it to (or if you want me to email it to you.) [As a side note, I'm thinking of breaking into the lab some night and putting these stickers on all of the workstations. Just thinking about it, not actually going to do it :-)] ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> In the United States, they \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> first came for us in Colorado... -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was recently helping a new start-up phone company get in operation]We As part of the initial acquisition process of a DCO/CS (Stromberg Carlson) based switch facility which the start-up was acquiring from a previous failed company we went on a swwitchroom tour... There tucked in a back corner and hooked to the "hacker" and fraud intercept trunks of the CS was a intercept operation... the previous consultant (who was giving the tour) bragged of having listened to Hot Ladies etc (usual sort of Drivel) Talking to the former owners I find the former switchroom tech(not this guy) was fired for this type of offense... this company and its sucessor used to carry my long distance traffic... NO MORE!!!... with clipper... this will become a pernicious typr of action ... impossible to stop... BTW the company and its sucessor is SF Bay Area Based... :)

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No Subject
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Extremely high activation potentials caused Xenon to ionize: ## "I am afraid of knowing the truth, for when you offer it to ## people, they call you mad." But if they call you mad, it says nothing about your possession of truth. Goddamn converse-is-not-the-contrapositive-ignorant, I-couldn't-possibly- be-wrong-claiming, solipsism-tending, basic-logic-error-making, self- deceiving, to-his-own-authority-pointing, self-esteem-up-propping ranters!

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stickers
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re: big brother stickers, Robert Hayden wrote: > Uh, how do you do dat? Well, I was able to use Word for Windows just now and drop a bunch of them on a page at once (they're postscript; import them as an .eps), resize them at will, and print the page out. If you wanted to make your own laser-stickers or whatnot, I could see this working for you. Of course, a nicer program (one more suited for the task) would be preferred, but .. :) Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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No Subject
by remailer＠merde.dis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

subject: xenon == ld? think about it... infiltrate and subvert, of course that would be subverting the perverts, but anyway... raven red

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Re:
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:48 2/16/94 -0800, Robert M. Solovay wrote: ... >Query: > What's ATM? ... ATM = Asynchronous Transfer Mode. This is a switched service running at at least 155 Mb/sec using optical fiber. 600Mb are expected to follow not much later. A single strand to customer premises provides that bandwidth full duplex. The strand provides for many multiplexed virtual circuits a bit like X.25 except that it will probably be priced according to a bandwidth selected at call setup and you will be prevented from exceeding that rate during the call. This service should be sufficient for video. Simillar technologies are being built for local LANs where each computer has a full duplex 155 Mb potential instead of the aggregate 10Mb provided by Ethernet.

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Digital Money, Sandy, Mark
by Scott Beaudreau 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark's wrote: > Sandy writes: > >I would like to start a new thread. I want to know what the > >people on this list intend to do with cryptography in the "real > >world." > >... > >My interest is more than academic. I am one of the Cypherpunks > >involved in creating a digital bank. > >Sandy - > > In the real world there are already secret banks. There are already >forms of untraceable cash and forms of completely fungible money. These >techniques are very ancient and time honored. They are well understood. >Many of them have stood the test of time and have not been compromised by >various incarnations of police states. > >Given the existence of efficient, accessible, secret, and widely accepted >monetary exchange I can't really see the need for a digital bank from the >privacy side. I can't really see anyone who uses the current techniques >being interested in a new experimental form unless they are techno-junkies. >Nevertheless, please continue. Some of us are techno-junkies. I read Mark's reply to Sandy's post. I believe it was well thought. I was interested in knowing more though. Please tell me more about the secret banks that exist today. I would like to hear about the time honored techniques for cash funelling. I am sure that we all have some familarity with the different power groups that exist, and the games they play. Are these groups secure? Are their methods efficient, accessible, secret, and widely accepted? How can I use this old system if I chose to today? That would be my real interest. I think that digital banks are very needed. I think they are feasible. I even think that some power groups might start using them as opposed to the old ways (whatever those ways are!) There are many different kinds of digital money systems possible. I would suggest to Sandy that any work in the area defintely continue. The Net today is only an infant. We all know what is coming. There seems to be a real need for a secure economic system for it. Mark has very valid points about what other technologies are needed in the privacy arena. I completely agree with him that many other problems must be solved as well. I think Mark views crypto technology with a good perspective. There is much more than technology involved. I am including the rest of Mark's post: > It is already well known to privacy fanatics that you should not use > credit cards, debit cards, checks, atm cards, or other forms of electronic > money. All transactions are logged and are easily analyzed. > > Astute people cash their pay check at the employer's bank and pay cash for > everything. Admittedly, this is somewhat paranoid, but on the other hand it > is fun to defeat the monolithic database builders who want to make money off > of selling information that belongs to you. > > Cypherpunks must concentrate on solving problems that are true problems > now. Do not spend time creating a variant of an existing/workable/fun > solution. Email privacy was a true problem. Clear text on your pc's hard > drive was a true problem. > > Right now there is the well known problem of ethernet sniffers and the > trivial security breaches that can occur. A telnet/lat traffic encrypter > is needed badly by the Sun/Dec/HP world. Novell needs something badly as > well. > > Cellular phones desperately need something. The masses just have NO > IDEA how badly cellular needs something! Fax machines need a variant of > PGP. Pagers probably need it too. > > I think the larger issue that cypherpunks need to blue sky about is wether > they will be content with a role as grey-area political criminals underneath > the boot of an ever growing police state. Can crypto be more than a defensive > weapon? What would people be defending against? > > Crypto can do some things but it won't be the total solution. In the end > we need to strengthen the rights of the little guy and devise ways to dilute > any new state powers that are created by technology. Crypto is just one > compartment on our batman utility belt. > > People always argue that criminals would use these tools. I'm certain > of it. Strengthening the state's hand to fight criminals always screws the > little guy. The criminals all go to work for the state when its powerful > enough! We've seen this over and over. > --------- > I'd like a 250 Mhz 128 bit hybrid processor with 64 meg of 8 way interleaved > memory, a 10 megabyte per second i/o channel, two 3 gig hard disks, two dat > drives with compression, and a large diet coke. /**************************************************************************** Name: Scott Beaudreau Occupation: Undergrad in Computer Engineering at Texas A&M. Graduate 05/94! Signature: No signature. I am working on it, Dammit! Opinions: !(In my opinion, everybody agrees with me and I'm always right!) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAi1ZjXYAAAEEAKr/Z+hhR4svDYqZq2FG1tyBXthOne5aCHY9Ff2cbIOQDhni gNlu7B86ARjyHf0c2XufqzYga5hb5AMdxV1n0WkKCE46EKtRPsWH9fQRp+fQjv7y meLjXK3cDgO9WMaFG8xIv9zfR3u6GI7/WjNz8CF/qkZ4xi61xg6eIvS4JXE9AAUR tCpTY290dCBKLiBCZWF1ZHJlYXUgPHNqYjgxOTVAemV1cy50YW11LmVkdT4= =obz5 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- *****************************************************************************/

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Re: Big Brother PostScripts
by qwerty-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Robert Hayden wrote, >[As a side note, I'm thinking of breaking into the lab some night and >putting these stickers on all of the workstations. Just thinking about >it, not actually going to do it :-)] How about payphones? No they aren't Clipper phones. But the point is to make people paranoid, and thus make them think about the issues. For soon it WILL be a Clipper phone. -=Xenon=- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWJGIASzG6zrQn1RAQEglwP/UvzVBo9VDGZX62u3yqM76Pe1GP804HMa dZppBecPtH1ioClP2cR7InCTE8ORSxhPbWBsRDxtF05/ABpSwZogVZcvUzu+s6Lv 2nZtvZWpX18bCI1zdHnJyI4M9EhLLmGe3uoMP7gK8RxK7vVu4YwA6KD/FWgl3uhl jnnfBfvDrtQ= =4w6z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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