- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: free speach and the government
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:52 PM 2/3/96 +0000, Stephan Mohr wrote: > But do > you fighter[s] for free speech, in principle, think that nothing, really > nothing, [should] be prevented [from] being published? Yes: > [...] > >I know, of course, that by accepting that there is something that >shouldn't be available on the net, we would need something to decide what >and how to ban. So I wonder what would be a more 'net'-like way of handling >this type of thing and how to prevent that some 'strong-armed' governments >take the net over. There is no "net-like" way of preventing people from communicating when one wishes to speak and another wishes to listen. To attempt to achieve such a goal violates the principles that made the internet possible, such as the "no settlements" rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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mailing list
by rwm132＠psu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

can you put me and Catch 22 on your mailing list? got any good philes philes?

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Precipice remailer open for business
by David C. Lambert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Precipice Remailer is now open for business! Below, I have included the remailer-help file. You can get this file by sending a message to: mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com with a subject of "remailer-help". - David C. Lambert dcl(a)panix.com dcl(a)mix.precipice.com ================================================================================ This remailer supports both type II (Mixmaster) and type I (Ghio) cypherpunks messages. Help files for both are below. Both mailers have a 5 message reordering pool, with zero default latency. Posting to Usenet is not supported. I consider the following to be inappropriate use of this anonymous remailer, and will take steps to prevent anyone from doing any of the following: - Sending messages intended primarily to be harassing or annoying (this includes spam/velveeta); - Use of the remailer for any illegal purpose (death threats, kiddie porn, etc). Don't ruin this remailer for everyone by doing something stupid and/or illegal, and I won't be forced to assist the authorities in crushing you like an insect. If you don't want to receive anonymous mail, send me a message, and I will add your email address to the block list. You can get a list of statistics on remailer usage by sending mail to mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com with Subject: remailer-stats Have a nice day. - David C. Lambert dcl(a)mix.precipice.com The type I PGP key is: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzAypWYAAAEEAMUFk7ue4Isn2u1FMtYhJBLbSmxSgUaBgs8EJNZZYExcfTCr V+m8o2N3pYxzbjPRAZ/pv0N1Tg93Kh17/RSzEjR/y91aaBjePv36VYKwCS8KeeX+ 4LDyboic5EVkiDt1eu2cI6LIrl9w7Fo1/3YzNvsMVJ1ki/v5Ie5wAysW17oJAAUR tBttaXhtYXN0ZXJAbWl4LnByZWNpcGljZS5jb20= =hVLK -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- The Mixmaster key is: precipice mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com 05fef5887ac55dfe7379d0ef4a2a0c4b 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- 05fef5887ac55dfe7379d0ef4a2a0c4b 258 AATIdI/+dQ3rsvREcdYsnJkd+zQKCkPerZsyDXmX NaYjUTwMhiHHjl/e7Zqx/mUAUQnifQfg4KpHvBGL a6rQUTQjRhhz8sOvynyJci4NTm8DFDjYdTpvnbjp YPu7xNhSfg7fmqXuqCan1M/AmpU1r6sF6M6gA0W4 EpOqFaJo7g32xQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- ============================== TYPE II INFO (Mixmaster 2.0.1) ============================== This is a Mixmaster remailer. It provides an extremely high level of security. To use it, you must have a client program to produce the messages. This software is available from ftp://nately.ucsd.edu/pub/remail Read the README file for instructions. This file is export restricted, so it can not be retrieved directly. Some information can be sent to you by the remailer by including the following commands (one per message) in the subject line of mail to the remailer. remailer-help This file. remailer-stats Usage statistics for the last 24 hours. remailer-key The mixmaster key file for this remailer. A list of remailers is available from ftp://nately.ucsd.edu/pub/remail, http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/, and will be posted periodically to alt.privacy.anon-server and other privacy related groups. ====================== TYPE 1 INFO (Ghio 2.0) ====================== I have an automated mail handling program installed here which will take any message with the proper headers and automatically re-send it anonymously. You can use this by sending a message to mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com, with the header Anon-To: containing the address that you want to send anonymously to. (Only one recipient address is permitted.) If you can't add headers to your mail, you can place two colons on the first line of your message, followed by the Anon-To line. Follow that with a blank line, and then begin your message. For Example: > From: joe(a)site.com > To: mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com > Subject: Anonymous Mail > > :: > Anon-To: beth(a)univ.edu > > This is some anonymous mail. The above would be delivered to beth(a)univ.edu anonymously. All headers in the original message are removed, with the exception of the Subject (and Content-Type, if present). She would not know that it came from Joe, nor would she be able to reply to the message. However, if Beth suspected that Joe had sent the message, she could compare the time that the message was received with the times that Joe was logged in. However, this problem can be avoided by instructing the remailer to delay the message, by using the Latent-Time header: > From: joe(a)site.com > To: mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com > Subject: Anonymous Mail > > :: > Anon-To: beth(a)univ.edu > Latent-Time: +1:00 > > This is some anonymous mail. The above message would be delayed one hour from when it is sent. It is also possible to create a random delay by adding an r to the time (ie +1:00r), which would have the message be delivered at a random time, but not more than an hour. Another problem is that some mailers automatically insert a signature file. Of course, this usually contains the senders email address, and so would reveal their identity. The remailer software can be instructed to remove a signature file with the header "Cutmarks". Any line beginning with the same text at in the cutmarks header, and any lines following it will be removed. > From: sender(a)origin.com > To: mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com > Subject: Anonymous Mail > > :: > Anon-To: recipient(a)destination.com > Cutmarks: -- > > This line of text will be in the anonymous message. > -- > This line of text will not be in the anonymous message. You can add additional headers to the output message by preceeding them with ## > From: chris(a)nifty.org > To: mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com > Subject: Nifty Anon Msg > > :: > Anon-To: andrew(a)hell.edu > > ## > Reply-To: acs-314159(a)chop.ucsd.edu > > A Message with a reply address. By separating messages with cutmarks, you can send more than one message at once: > From: me@mysite > To: mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com > Subject: message 1 > > :: > Anon-To: recipient1(a)site1.org > Cutmarks: -- > > Message one. > -- > :: > Anon-To: recipient2(a)site2.org > > ## > Subject: message 2 > > Message two. The two messages will be delivered separately. For added security, you can encrypt your messages to the remailer with PGP. The remailer software will decrypt the message and send it on. Here is the remailer's public key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzAypWYAAAEEAMUFk7ue4Isn2u1FMtYhJBLbSmxSgUaBgs8EJNZZYExcfTCr V+m8o2N3pYxzbjPRAZ/pv0N1Tg93Kh17/RSzEjR/y91aaBjePv36VYKwCS8KeeX+ 4LDyboic5EVkiDt1eu2cI6LIrl9w7Fo1/3YzNvsMVJ1ki/v5Ie5wAysW17oJAAUR tBttaXhtYXN0ZXJAbWl4LnByZWNpcGljZS5jb20= =hVLK -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- To utilize this feature, create a message with two colons on the first line, then the Anon-To line, then any other headers, such as cutmarks or latency, then a blank line, and then the message. Encrypt this with the remailer's public key. Then send it to the remailer, adding the header "Encrypted: PGP". If you forget this, the remailer won't know that it needs to be decrypted. Also be sure to use the -t option with PGP, or the linefeeds might not be handled properly. > To: mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com > From: me(a)mysite.org > > :: > Encrypted: PGP > > -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > hIkCuMeAjnwmCTUBA+dfWcFk/fLRpm4ZM7A23iONxkOGDL6D0FyRi/r0P8+pH2gf > HAi4+1BHUhXDCW2LfLfay5JwHBNMtcdbgXiQVXIm0cHM0zgf9hBroIM9W+B2Z07i > 6UN3BDhiTSJBCTZUGQ7DrkltbgoyRhNTgrzQRR8FSQQXSo/cf4po0vCezKYAAABP > smG6rgPhdtWlynKSZR6Gd2W3S/5pa+Qd+OD2nN1TWepINgjXVHrCt0kLOY6nVFNQ > U7lPLDihXw/+PPJclxwvUeCSygmP+peB1lPrhSiAVA== > =da+F > -----END PGP MESSAGE----- Any unencrypted text after the PGP message is also remailed. This is to allow sending to someone who is anonymous. If you create a PGP-encrypted message to yourself via my remailer, and then you give it to someone, they can send you a message by sending the encrypted message to the remailer. The remailer will then decrypt it and send it to you. The message gets anonymized in the process, so the sender will need to include a return address if he wants a reply. Messages sent this way can be encrypted using the Encrypt-Key: feature. Any text following a line beginning with ** will be encrypted with this key. For example, if you put in your PGP message: > :: > Anon-To: you(a)yourhost.org > Encrypt-Key: your_password > > ** The appended message after the ** will be encrypted with the key "your_password", using PGP's conventional encryption option.

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Re: Brand e-cash implementation?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brands has a web page at <URL:http://www.cwi.nl/~brands>. I don't know of any implementations of his technology. The last time I heard from him was early this year and at that time he apparently was still looking for backers. BTW he has a new paper out as of July 95, available above, which discusses some problems and attacks on some earlier papers. He had proposed a notion called "secret key certificates" in which some problems have been found. Basically a secret key certificate is just like a public key certificate (a signature by someone on a public key as in PGP) except that realistic-looking but ultimately worthless secret key certificates can be faked up (simulated) by anyone. No one can distinguish a fake secret key certificate from a real one. However, they are worthless because the faking process requires you to choose a random public key, and you can't figure out what the secret key is. Brands has (re)expressed his digital cash technology in terms of these secret key certificates. But Berry Schoenmakers of CWI has shown a way in which a faked-up secret key certificate can be used to spend a coin which was never withdrawn. However, to do so, you have to go through the withdrawal protocol in a particular incorrect way. You force the bank to act as an "oracle" for a certain discrete log problem when you do the withdrawal. The data you get from the incorrect withdrawal protocol allows you to spend the fake coin. So this is not actually a dangerous attack, because you in effect have to withdraw a coin in order to spend the fake one. You can't make any money from it. Still it was not anticipated and that is a bit worrisome. I'm not sure why Brands' various proofs of correctness (which are one of the big selling points of his technology) did not anticipate this attack. (In effect this is a different form of a blind signature than what Brands planned for, since you withdraw one thing and get another. I was thinking Brands should write this up under the title "Unanticipated Blinding for Signatures", a pun on Chaum's "Blinding for Unanticipated Signatures", one of his credential papers.) Brands has a workaround to prevent this attack, but it hurts the provability of his scheme. "A rigorous prove [sic] of the effectiveness of the measure may be hard to provide, though, since one must hereto prove that the CA cannot be used as an oracle to perform the cryptographic action in the showing protocol with respect to simulated public keys." So this may be a setback in Brands' attempts to get his thesis finished and accepted. As for the question of whether any digital cash scheme offers "true" anonymity, I think you have to be more specific. Virtually all cash advocates will claim that they can offer this. In the debate I had earlier with Lucky Green I argued that Chaum's ecash does offer a certain kind of anonymity. The extent to which it does not is largely not technical but a product of not allowing anonymous bank accounts. With anonymous accounts Chaum's technology offers as much anonymity as any system that I have studied. There is one technical problem with Chaum's ecash which Lucky mentioned, but I believe it applies to all systems. That is that the spender of the cash can "mark" it or at least recognize it when it is later deposited. If the spender wanted to attack the receiver of the money and it is deposited non-anonymously then this will be a problem. However, as we discussed here several months ago, Chaum's paper "Transferred Cash Grows in Size" from a recent Crypto proceedings shows that by colluding with the bank a payor of cash can recognize it at any later stage of the payment chain. So this kind of anonymity is very hard to achieve. Chaum's paper applied to off-line cash, though, so perhaps an online system could do it. But you'd have to blind the coins twice, once when they pass from bank to payor and once when they go from payor to payee, and I don't see how to do this. Hal Finney

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Solution to McKain's worries
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The alternative solution might go something like this (also known as the Mother of Clipper): 1. Outlaw use of any crypto not authorized and provided by an Official Source, which is to be provided in the form of hardware on the CPU/Motherboard (or equivalent, depending on the computing/communications device) 2. When you wish to send an encrypted communication or store encrypted data, the Official Crypto Device from the Official Source first must obtain a Secrecy Credential from a Central Repository, to which you have applied for some strength crypto. The Credential gives you certain secrecy privileges ... as long as you're being a good citizen. The Credential enables the crypto on your official device: the device will not function without communicating with the Central Repository and obtaining today's Credential. 3. When LEA wants to tap you, it sends a control message to the Central Repository which modifies your Secrecy Credential, dumbing you down to, say, 40bits. They could even provide the entire session key (or other secret as required by protocols.) As long as this state is in effect, your "encrypted" communications and storage are readable by the LEA. Now: consider the profits to be made by the Central Repository, which is responsible for maintaining your Credential. Each Credential use could be charged a transaction fee, as well as the annual licensing. The crypto device provider has a locked-in market for its silicon, as it must go on all the motherboards and into the CPU's. The big-system manufacturers responsible for the servers and communications required to manage the communications between the crypto and repository make out real well too. It sounds like a perfect fit for Microsoft, Intel, together with HP-s ICF!!

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"The Failure to Do Your Job" amendment (was Re: White House ...)
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please forgive me for following up to my own posting, but I just realized how close I was to a solution: A Constitutional amendment that would call for the impeachment of the President for failing to veto any three bills that are overturned by the Supreme Court on Constitutional grounds. Call it "The Failure to Do Your Job" amendment, or the "For Violating Your Oath" amendment. Maybe include a clause that stipulates the ex-President must also return any salary earned during his or her tenure. John -- J. Deters "Don't think of Windows programs as spaghetti code. Think of them as 'Long sticky pasta objects in OLE sauce'." +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: mailto:jad@dsddhc.com (work) mailto:jad@pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | For my public key, send mail with the exact subject line of: | | Subject: get pgp key | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: The Recent Trend in "Collective Contracts"
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reputation Monger wrote: > An anonymous message dated: Sat, 12 Jul 1997 08:46:32 +0200 (MET DST), > and signed with the initials KC, wrote: > >In any case... > Damn. Kent's figured out anonymous remailers. I read this message > because it came from anonymous--Kent's in my killfile. > > Know what this means? > Anonymous remailers have more reputation capital than Kent. Excerpt From: Welcome to the Cypherpunks Mailing List (TcM) ------------------------ Your initial post to the list has been digitally classified by the Cypherpunks Automated Response system in order to determine the initial level of reputation capital you will be awarded as a new member of the Cypherpunks Mailing List (TcM). ... At Reputation Capital levels below -1, you may be subjected to shame, humiliation and filtering to the point where the only hope for your posts being read is for you to post to the list anonymously, as a "Monger" of one sort or another. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- *** "Cypherpunks Mailing List" is a (Trade{cocksucker}Mark) of the Electronic Forgery Foundation, and any abuse of this (TcM) will be considered normal behavior on this list. *** Kent has obviously read "The Tao of Remailers," which explains the concept of turning the CypherPunks tools against them as weapons. One has to wonder if Louis Freeh has read the book as well and is sitting at home sending threatening letters to the President via a variety of remailers. I wonder if it is feasible to design a remailer which sends out anonymous email which is rated (Anonymous +7 / Anonymous -4) on the basis of reputation capital? Slightly Anonymous

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RE: Don't type your yes/fraud response into your computer
by A. Padgett Peterson, P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Nice try - but the virtual machine model used by intel supports interception >of I/O operations. (something educating prior generations how to apply a near vacuum to shelled embryos). Sure it does - why it is essential for protective activity to begin while the system is still in REAL mode following boot. Might also need to write a .VXD (horrors) >I still think the basic 'if the machine is not secure all bets are off' >premis stands. Oh I agree, just believe that software can make a machine secure (or at least detect when security cannot be assured which is almost as good). Might I suggest you take a look at the "safe PC" discussions on Virus-L c.a 1989-1990. We were talking about virus protection then but is the same thing. Believe it or not, we even had real and protected mode discussions back in those days while we were waiting for Noah (only guy who ever took out a cattle boat and wound up half-way up a mountain...). Warmly, Padgett

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Aegis PGP Shell
by paralax＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gordon Campbell wrote: GRC> After doing a total reinstall of my system (don't ask) I discovered that I GRC> don't have a copy of the Aegis PGP Shell distribution archive anywhere. I GRC> attempted to grab it from http://iquest.com/~aegisrc as listed in the docs, GRC> but the site doesn't exist. GRC> Doesn anybody know what gives and where I can get a new copy of the archive? GRC> I really like this shell and haven't figured out how to otherwise integrate GRC> PGP with EudoraPro. GRC> Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics >From alt.security.pgp another reader writes: > It seems that iquest.com has dropped off the net today so the > normal url: http://iquest.com/~aegisrc/beta2.htm is > unavailable. With the weather around here right now, I doubt > it will be up any time soon. > I've created a very quick mirror site at: > http://fly.hiwaay.net/~lyman/pgpwsbeta.htm > Please use it only if you cannot connect to the first url. A. Paralax View

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Subj: Kiwanis Club Update (7/97)
by autosavr＠albany.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

E-Mail News Service (E.N.S.) of Clifton Park, NY USA Top Story: Clubs Are Making Big Bucks With The Kiwanis Car Care Fund-Raising Program! --- Kiwanis clubs all over the country are signing up to participate in one of the most profitable fund-raising programs around! The Kiwanis Car Care Fund-Raiser is a fully licensed Kiwanis fund-raiser, and produces unbelievable profits for clubs of all sizes. The Kiwanis Car Care Fund-Raiser is able to reach over 231,000,000 car owners, all of which want to keep their cars looking new. Your club can get started right away by calling 1-800-724-8155, or by looking up http://www.albany.net/~autosavr/kiwanis on the World Wide Web. Related News: Kiwanis Car Care Manufacturer Has Over 9 Successful Years In The Automotive Appearance Business! --- The manufacturer of the Kiwanis Car Care Fund-Raiser is AutoSaver Systems, located in Clifton Park, NY. They have been in business for over 9 years, providing high quality automotive appearance products to car care professionals world wide. "We started our company a while back, and turned it into a success. We're confident that we can provide the same level of high quality products for Kiwanis, and help them become successful at fund-raising. Any Kiwanis club, in any area of the country can raise money for their community with the Kiwanis Car Care Fund-Raising Program..." - Warren Camp, President of AutoSaver Systems AutoSaver Systems provides factory direct convienence and pricing (no middlemen). The Kiwanis Car Care Fund-Raiser is competitively priced with similar store bought products, and literally has "Kiwanis" written all over it! For full details, check out their web site at http://www.albany.net/~autosavr/kiwanis or by calling 1-800-724-8155. If you have received this message in error, and are not affiliated with Kiwanis, send mail to autosavr(a)albany.net and type "REMOVE" in the subject heading. This will remove you from the E.N.S. news list. E.N.S. of Clifton Park, NY USA July Edition 1997 Kiwanis Members Only

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