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Re: U.S. State Dept criticizes Chinese net-censorship
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - From State dept about China: > Government control > of news media generally continues to depend on self-censorship to > regulate political and social content, but the authorities also > consistently penalize those who exceed the permissable. It is this kind of double talk, "self-censorship", that makes possible the US govt. to do the exact same as China's one does. There is no such thing as "self-censorship". Either you stick to your values, and then it is *not* censorship, or then you do not, and then, it is neither. The *only* ultimate tool of censorship is a gun. JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUBUDMiycyXFit0NAQExqQf+JxkWi4BhPwQSXtzscf+AGGA++5dZjTmP 3mkhsPzT1JKT1Pl4LXVLbCEJctv+yeLOq1sRYV3rcdIZOIwh1cvfPoWI8LFqfCH4 63nkX6eTG+6VR1uCOMCuTfJFx/f86v5Y34ehfQDzGzcN2SrxCSXpDFwHuTMpB6/g 6Zjhspfqz8PT7U9vHbyHkytXBI9BdR9b6+WUkJMHMpflrDDbSTrsR+C3XObIO4gu 85l4/HjUqSf+EyAw9/Bv3J5uUFF45o+ff6BvWt5eVUMTgWEBcJkjHbm/JYgj7lrK Bjm3oXboh940zHIRIkjb56SRFEb2ITNSfoKilXLgq3CV9r/+Wx5q4g== =UnIn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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U.S. State Dept criticizes Chinese net-censorship
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > The U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report for 1995 talks about > restrictions on new media in China, pointing out that Internet access is > now limited. But will they have the balls to criticise singapore? SINGAPORE CRACKS DOWN ON INTERNET The Singapore government has informed Internet content and access providers that it will hold them responsible for voluntarily restricting pornographic and politically objectionable material in transmissions to the country's 100,000 Internet accounts. The Singapore Broadcasting Authority is charged with enforcing the ban on materials that could "undermine public morals, political stability or religious harmony." Most content providers will be deemed "licensed" unless they violate the restrictions, but political and religious groups must register their online intentions with the SBA. Punishments for transgressions have not yet been determined. (Wall Street Journal 6 Mar 96 B6) Gary - -- pub 1024/C001D00D 1996/01/22 Gary Howland <gary(a)kampai.euronet.nl> Key fingerprint = 0C FB 60 61 4D 3B 24 7D 1C 89 1D BE 1F EE 09 06 - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMUAQwioZzwIn1bdtAQHYrgF/ZsQe3y/aeQCoouoOJ7SnXSY4uVOkv3eP zPFB9+GjLuQ8xBDEzygjB5FnPkTcVnGI =nIgN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Net Day 96 and AOL
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Heard on the radio today that AOL will be donating service for a year to the first 2000 schools that ask for it, as part of their contribution to Net Day. (For those of you not from California, an industry-led group has been coordinating volunteers and materials to wire up schools to the net; tomorrow's effort will be installing inside wiring so that schools that have computers will be able to get hooked up.) Does anybody know if there's an AOL-friendly version of PGP that we can donate to the schools, to help teach kids about proper encryption? If nothing else, some of the cut&paste interfaces will do, I suppose. AOL is fairly friendly about pseudonyms, and remailer support is a no-brainer except for documentation readily understandable to kids. Bill #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281 # "At year's end, however, new government limits on Internet access threatened # to halt the growth of Internet use. [...] Government control of news media # generally continues to depend on self-censorship to regulate political and # social content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those who # exceed the permissable." - US government statement on China...

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Re: steganographic trick
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-03-07 23:02:48 EST, vznuri(a)netcom.com writes: >imagine an application where you freely admit that you have your >cryptographic tools, and that you are even willing to tell the >"feds" the key for your data. they run the crypto program, and >indeed the file decrypts. however, unknown to them, you have given >them a key that decrypts the file into something meaningful yet >benign, such as a cookie recipe, not >your plans for the overthrow of the state. in other words, >"interlaced" or "coincident" within the same file is your secret >data. given one key, it decrypts into one set of data, and given >another key, it decrypts into another set of data. The only computationally feasible way to accomplish this would be to use a variation of the one time pad (OTP) cipher, and use two keys: the genuine key, which is made by the random number generator of your choice, and a specially cooked key generated by XORing the encrypted message with an innocuous message. Decrypting with the random key will yield the real message, and decrypting with the cooked key will yield the innocuous message. The disadvantage to this system is that each key will be the same length as the message. The method you propose (using multiple RSA keys) is not workable. Finding 2 RSA keys that will decrypt a given ciphertext block to any 2 meaningful plaintexts is at least as difficult as breaking RSA, and expanding this concept to messages longer than 1 block moves it into the realm of impossibility. Jonathan Wienke

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Re: SurfWatch
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"jsw(a)netscape.com" "Jeff Weinstein" 9-MAR-1996 04:41:47.02 > I predict that 6 months after the first internet rating system is widely >deployed, the largest use of search engines such as altavista will be to >look for pages with the most "naughty" ratings. Perhaps such services will >allow text searches for free, but charge for searches based on the rating >tag... Unfortunately, AltaVista doesn't index based on comments field (in which category the SafeSurf ratings fall). Opentext, given that one supposedly can search for links to a page, may be able to do it on the other hand. Putting together a web spider that would search for such could be a profitable undertaking. I did some checking on AltaVista and found one service by the name of "Naughty Lynx" which automatically checks all of its links every hour or so - one problem with "adult-oriented" sites is that they disappear a lot. Some such feature would probably be necessary. Seems to be a good potential use of the DigiCash system, since one doesn't need merchant anonymnity that much until someone comes up with anonymous-location web pages; the Naughty Lynx system appears to support itself via advertising). Combining this with a web proxy would also be good. -Allen

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Re: Signature 2
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Hi, > >> Assumption 1 : a privacy key can become uncrackable. >> Assumption 2 : an individual signature can become immune to fraud. >> Posit : fuse the two together so that pseudonyms/aliases/online names ensure >> complete privacy, but ensure that you talk to the same person >> everytime. >> Probably proposed already. > >Unforutnately both of your assumptions are wrong. A key cannot be >100% uncrackable, and a signature cannot be 100% immune to fraud. >With electronic security, there is always a chance that a key can be >cracked or a signature forged. The question is how hard is it to >crack the key or forge the signature? You need to balance the >security with the price. Derek is correct in that your use of the words "uncrackable" and "immune to fraud" were a bit over the top (in recent years everyone in the security and crypto community has become very nervous whenever anyone says things like this; they are usually trying to sell you something which is neither.) OTOH, he might want to temper his statement with a reference to fail-stop signatures... Just because someone with a lot of computational resources can produce a private key which matches your public key does not necessarily mean that they are the same ones that you generated, only that they found a set which work for the particular modulus which was chosen... In the "real world" there is nothing to prevent someone from forging your real signature on a check or document or from disguising themselves as you and taking your place at an important business meeting. The digital equivalents can be slightly more secure, but nothing is ever perfect. jim

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SLE_aze
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-8-96. FT: "Asean forum to fight Internet sleaze." The Association of South-East Asian Nations agreed yesterday to censor "negative elements" of the Internet. Information ministers are concerned about "information contamination" and agreed on the need for regulation and to learn from each other's experience, particularly from Singapore. 3-6-96. WSJ: "Singapore Unveils Sweeping Measures To Control Words, Images on Internet." Singapore said it will concentrate on individuals or organizations putting content on the Internet and the country's three access providers. Only public forums, or electronic spaces where people can converse or create displays visible to others who journey there, will fall under the regulations. 3-8-96. TWP: "FBI Advertises for Tips On Spies From Vietnam." FBI officials said the advertisements were prompted by an increase in activity by Vietnam's intelligence agents impersonating relatives of Vietnamese Americans to sneak into the country and steal high-technology secrets. SLE_aze (for 3)

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Re: TCP/IP Stego (was CU-SeeMe)
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-03-08 03:39:00 EST, you write: > -It can be applied by two routers which are in the middle > of the connection. The two endpoints of the TCP/IP > connection would not even notice. For example, if I control > a router "upstream" of a major connection point and the > site I wish to communicate with is in a similar position > then I can run the subliminal channel in a "spread spectrum" > mode across many connections and the packets can get reset > to their original settings by the other site. The user > whose stream we fiddled with does not even know that they > were used as carrier wave... You seem to be oblivious to the fact that this technique is only useful for ISP's, corporate networks, etc. that the average home computer user will never have access to. If I want to send a WAV file of my 2 year old son saying "Hi, gramma" (or a 24-bit color TIFF of him practicing nose-picking techniques) to my relatives, that is not overtly suspicious behavior, even if it has a slight amount of background noise (or graininess). As long as I don't stego too many bits in the file, and I strip out any overt "I'm crypto" headers, it will be impossible to prove that stego techniques were used on a file. Finding random bits where random bits normally live cannot be used to prove anything.

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Re: Jump Start ecash With IPhone
by eggplant＠inlink.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How about...only paying for the initial investment of the phone program and hardware. No more costs to pay, get rid of long distance charges all-togther. Except for the ISP charge of course. And how about the ISP's setting up a special account for people only needing the Iphone. That way all the revnue that generates (well most of it) can go to increasing the bandwith. Increased bandwith (fibre?) is the key factor here, both your scenario and mine. Also, what companies want to invest in a dedicated internet phone? How about a combination...all-in-one web browsing (that's what many people will wnt in the future for sure), internet phone and CD-ROM playing system. That way people who don't want a full-scale computer can get something cheaper than a computer that will do all they need it to do. Of course the system should allow for email (including PGP, etc) and some text editing. Just a thought.... -- "... In Germany they first came for the Communists and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for Catholics, and I didn't speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me-and by that time no one was left to speak up..." Pastor Martin Niemoller ++++++++++++ ************************************** * Matthew Murphy ------------ eggplant(a)inlink.com * ---------- * http://www.inlink.com/~eggplant * The Web page is under construciton at this time though.. * Please don't mind the mess.... * ************************************** ++++++++++++ finger eggplant(a)inlink.com for my PGP key.

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Boycott TCSM
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted to alt.security: Crypto relevance - TSCM are a counter-intelligence site with an attitude. I need some advise of Latent prints. Just got a assignment from a client concerning a large qty of empty "Ziploc" and Glazine <sp?> packets found around the plant. Most of the packets test positive (Nik-Kit) for Meth (Biker Crank), the problem is that I am having a tough time pulling decent prints off the little envelopes. Any suggestions?? I am going to try Nile Red (530nm) in ethanol instead of Rhodamine 6G, any thoughts or experiences?? And yes the plant has a full ten finger set on all employees, all we have to do is provide photos of any (9 point) prints <groan> -jma =============================================================== James M. Atkinson "...Shaken, not Stirred..." TSCM.COM 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 URL: http://www.tscm.com/ E-Mail: jmatk(a)tscm.com =============================================================== The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and the Most Complete TSCM Counterintelligence Site on the Internet ===============================================================

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