- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Sue D. Nym, and Netcom records
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >I'm not disturbed by this, actually. The only way to stop it would be >for Netcom to demand to see people's national ID papers before giving >them an account. Do any of us want that sort of world? Oh, sure, give us an easy choice... Detweiler or National ID card..... Dave M Wherever you go in Life - there you are!

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RE: uh... excuse me
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sue D. Nym "....maybe I should leave. You guys seem a little too paranoid for my tastes." ......................................................... It's not paranoia, it's just that LD is always trying to induce the list members into self-incrimination: he intends to evoke crowd-gathering behavior wherein they will all betray their true nature, true motives, true attitudes. He doesn't believe that they deserve as much credit as they seem to give themselves and wants to reveal to them, by their actual responses, what they would deny in public. He doesn't think that they have all that much respect for privacy, but are only opportunists bent on only their own advantage, rather than supporting the principle of privacy per se (even for their enemies, who could as well use the available methods against them). Everyone always knows what his true aims are, though, and no one ever gives him any slack. Blanc

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Re: Sue D. Nym, and Netcom records
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Oh, sure, give us an easy choice... > > Detweiler or National ID card..... That's real easy - I'd take Detweiler in a minute. Sure, it takes work to filter out each incarnation of Sue D. Spoof, and there are N-1 more like him out there, but it's a lot less work than explaining to people why you don't have any intention of using the Nationalist ID Card Number in your databases, or carrying it on your person, or presenting it when you open bank accounts, or getting it printed on your armonce they make tattoo removal the monopoly of the National Health Care System or whatever the paranoids will thinnk of next. (And *please* don't say too much of this around politicians; they tend to miss the smileys and think this sort of thing is a good idea....) Bill

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Re: Key length security (calculations!)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> solman(a)mit.edu writes (quoting someone else initially): > >What about Shamir's triple pass key exchange protocol (explained briefly > >below). Its the perfect key exchange algorithm. > >It obsoletes Public key systems entirely as long as you only need to > >exchange keys and not authenticate. [ A: Ea(K) B: Eb(Ea(K)) A: Da(Eb(Ea(K))) == Da(Ea(Eb(K))) == Eb(K) ] Some problems - commutative symmetric encryption algorithms aren't very common; the most obvious one ( M xor K ) doesn't work here, since you have known plaintext, making it trivial to find Ka and Kb, while the usable M**K mod p looks suspiciously close to Diffie-Hellman from a patent perspective, though Diffie-Hellman makes useful simplifications, as Hal points out. Also, an active eavesdropper can break it (maybe at the cost of reencrypting the entire conversation), which is the main weakness of Diffie-Hellman; authentication is still necessary in environments where this matters. Hal writes: > Also, this does not obsolete PK since it requires several exchanges > before communication can occur, making it inappropriate for high-latency > communications, such as for most email. Lots of email these days flows over SMTP connections, where a couple of extra messages at handshake time isn't a major problem, though it's really more applicable for link encryption than end-to-end, given the amount of mail that really goes through MX records or other mail gateways. It wouldn't be that hard, now that RSAREF includes Diffie-Hellman, to do a DH-SMTP and DH-POP, though the <censored> export regulations make it a bit annoying to use internationally, and you could just as well use Shamir's 3-way handshake if there's no patent problem. Bill Stewart

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HR 3937 comes to the floor this wednesday with a "good" amendment!
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[updated July 18, 1994 shabbir] [HR 3937 COMES TO THE FLOOR WEDNESDAY JULY 20TH; YOUR ACTION NEEDED] [PLEASE CHECK THE "WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW" SECTION!] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Introduction & Alert Status of the bill What you can do right now List of legislators supporting HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) List of legislators wavering on HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) List of legislators opposing HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) What is the Cantwell bill? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please contact vtw(a)panix.com so they can be added to this list. General questions: vtw(a)panix.com Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)panix.com Press Contact: stc(a)panix.com Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/1/1/vtw WWW URL: Be patient; we're working on it. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILL (updated 7/18/94) The Cantwell bill HR3627, that allows for fewer restrictions on exports of cryptography, was rolled into the General Export Administration Act HR 3937. The House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the full strength version out of committee after open, public hearings. The House Intelligence Committee took the bill and gutted it after a day of closed, secret hearings. The gutted version will come to the House floor on Wednesday July 20th. A amendment that reinstates Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography export provisions WILL be offered. It is crucial that you ensure that your representative knows that you support ONLY the amended version of this bill. This may be the last thing you can do for the cryptographic export legislation. Take the time to make a call! Schedule/Chronology of the bill Jul 20, 94 HR3937 comes to House floor; a "good" amendement will be offered [YOUR ACTION IS NEEDED TO PASS THIS] Jul 11, 94 House Rules Committee marks HR3937 "open"; allowing amendments Jun 30, 94 [*** vote postponed, perhaps till the week of 7/11/94] House Rules Comm. decides whether to allow amendments on the bill when it reaches the House floor Jun 14, 94 Gutted by the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 20, 94 Referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 18, 94 Passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18 attached to HR 3937, the General Export Administration Act Dec 6, 93 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Nov 22, 93 Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW Estimated time to do this good deed: Six minutes Your legislator needs to know that you want them to support HR3937 but only with an amendment including Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography export provisions. If you wish to fax a letter instead of calling, that's fine too. If you don't know who your representative is, call: -The League of Women Voters in your area, or -Any representative from your state. They will tell you which is yours. You can obtain a complete copy of all representatives by: -checking the VTW gopher site: URL:gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/1/1/vtw (check under Congress) -or by dropping a note to vtw(a)panix.com [Our directory is a bit out of date. Please check all fax numbers before sending. People volunteering to obtain a new directory for us are welcome to help out.] Feel free to use the following sample communique: The Honorable ____________ address Washington DC, 20515 Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, On Wed. July 20th, HR 3937 (General Export Administration Act) comes to the floor. Please support HR3937 but only with an amendment including Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography export provisions. These provisions are crucial to the development of privacy-enhancing technology as the competitiveness of the American cryptographic industry. Sincerely, _________________________________ A shorter telephone sample communique might be: Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, Please support HR3937 but only with an amendment including Rep. Maria Cantwell's cryptography export provisions. Thank you. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION The following legislators have formally registered support for cryptography export legislation. Call them with your cheers. All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 1 WA Cantwell, Maria (D) 1-202-225-6311 1-202-225-2286 1520 LHOB HR 3627's sponsor; thank her for her work! 16 IL Manzullo, Donald (R) 1-202-225-5676 1-202-225-5284 506 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 11/22/93 3 UT Orton, William H. (D) 1-202-225-7751 1-202-226-1223 1122 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 3 OR Wyden, Ronald (D) 1-202-225-4811 1-202-225-8941 1111 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 16 CA Edwards, Donald (D) 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 2307 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 19 OH Fingerhut, Eric D. (D) 1-202-225-5731 1-202-225-9114 431 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 4 MA Frank, Barney (D) 1-202-225-5931 1-202-225-0182 2404 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 2 UT Shepherd, Karen (D) 1-202-225-3011 1-202-226-0354 414 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 3 WA Unsoeld, Jolene (D) 1-202-225-3536 1-202-225-9095 1527 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 19 FL Johnston II, Harry (D) 1-202-225-3001 1-202-225-8791 204 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 9 WA Kreidler, Mike (D) 1-202-225-8901 1-202-226-2361 1535 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 4 WA Inslee, Jay (D) 1-202-225-5816 1-202-226-1137 1431 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 7 WA McDermott, James A. (D) 1-202-225-3106 1-202-225-9212 1707 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 8 IN McCloskey, Frank (D) 1-202-225-4636 1-202-225-4688 306 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 14 CA Eshoo, Anna G. (D) 1-202-225-8104 1-202-225-8890 1505 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 10 NC Ballenger, Thomas C. (R) 1-202-225-2576 1-202-225-0316 2238 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 2 WA Swift, Al (D) 1-202-225-2605 1-202-225-2608 1502 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS WAVERING ON CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION [Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling or writing a legislator.] 26 NY Hinchey, Maurice D. (D) 1-202-225-6335 1-202-226-0774 1313 LHOB Recently told a constituent that he is taking the Cantwell bill under consideration, but has "national security concerns" about allowing encryption to be exported outside the United States. 1 IA Leach, James (R) 1-202-225-6576 1-202-226-1278 2186 RHOB Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. 13 NY Molinari, Susan (D) 1-202-225-3371 1-202-226-1272 123 Cannon Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. (has taken inordinately long) 8 NY Nadler, Jerrold (D) 1-202-225-5635 1-202-225-6923 424 Cannon Met with lobbying constituent in April '94; no position taken yet 25 CA McKeon, Howard P. (R) 1-202-225-1956 1-202-226-0683 307 Cannon Responded to a constituent with a "non-position", May '94 Had a favorable meeting with a constituent and a VTW volunteer in May '94. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS OPPOSING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION [Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling or writing a legislator.] Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 5 AL Cramer Jr, Robert E. (D) 1-202-225-4801 1-202-225-4392 1318 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 8 CA Pelosi, Nancy (D) 1-202-225-4965 1-202-225-8259 240 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 32 CA Dixon, Julian C. (D) 1-202-225-7084 1-202-225-4091 2400 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 40 CA Lewis, Jerry (R) 1-202-225-5861 1-202-225-6498 2312 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 46 CA Dornan, Robert K. (R) 1-202-225-2965 no reliable fax 2402 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 2 CO Skaggs, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2161 1-202-225-9127 1124 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 10 FL Young, C. W. (R) 1-202-225-5961 1-202-225-9764 2407 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 4 KS Glickman, Daniel (D) 1-202-225-6216 1-202-225-5398 2371 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 NE Bereuter, Douglas (R) 1-202-225-4806 1-202-226-1148 2348 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 9 NJ Torricelli, Robert (D) 1-202-224-5061 1-202-225-0843 2159 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 3 NM Richardson, William (D) 1-202-225-6190 no reliable fax 2349 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 NV Bilbray, James H. (D) 1-202-225-5965 1-202-225-8808 2431 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 17 PA Gekas, George W. (R) 1-202-225-4315 1-202-225-8440 2410 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 2 RI Reed, John F. (D) 1-202-225-2735 1-202-225-9580 1510 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 14 TX Laughlin, Gregory H. (D) 1-202-225-2831 1-202-225-1108 236 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 16 TX Coleman, Ronald D. (D) 1-202-225-4831 None 440 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 19 TX Combest, Larry (R) 1-202-225-4005 1-202-225-9615 1511 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 UT Hansen, James V. (R) 1-202-225-0453 1-202-225-5857 2466 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 6 WA Dicks, Norman D. (D) 1-202-225-5916 1-202-226-1176 2467 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- What is the Cantwell bill? The Cantwell bill would permit companies to export products with encryption technology in them. US companies are currently not permitted to export products (hardware or software) with this technology in them. What is encryption technology? Encryption technology, or cryptography, is the art of scrambling a conversation so that only the people communicating can decode it. Other people (such as eavesdroppers) cannot learn about the conversation. Where is cryptography being used? Cryptography is used to encrypt electronic mail to protect its confidentiality in transit. It's used by bank automatic teller machines to protect sensitive data (such as your account number, your Personal Identification Number, and your bank balance). It can be implemented into software (such as electronic mail programs and word processors) as well as hardware (such as telephones and "walkie-talkies") to ensure your privacy. Why is there a restriction on exporting products with technology in them? For many years the United States poured vast sums of money into cryptography. The US government thought that if they did not let this technology be exported, foreign individuals would not be able to obtain it and use it against us (by keeping US intelligence agencies from eavesdropping on their communications) Today, many companies selling cryptographic technology are producing their products for the global market. A recent Software Publishers' Association Report (available from the VTW gopher) identified over 200 non-US companies producing cryptographic technology in the global marketplace. You can buy the same, high-quality cryptographic technology from many international firms despite the US export regulations. Although the marketplace has changed, the regulations have not. Why should the regulations be changed? US companies compete in a global marketplace. Because of the export regulations, they often compete alongside products with superior cryptographic capabilities built into them. The result is that US companies build their products with an inferior encryption technology. The result of this is that you, as an American consumer, have great difficulty obtaining products with strong encryption in them. Because US products cannot compete against products with better privacy features, and because the laws are outdated, the regulations should be changed. The Cantwell bill fixes these regulations to more accurately resemble the current situation of the world marketplace. How can I help encourage more privacy-enhanced products and pass the Cantwell bill? Call or write your representative and ask them to support or cosponsor Rep. Cantwell's export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937. You can base your letter on the sample communication below. SAMPLE LETTER OR PHONE CALL The Honorable ____________ address Washington DC, 20515 Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, As a citizen concerned for my privacy, as well as a supporter of American business, I urge you to cosponsor the Rep. Cantwell's cryptographic export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937. The bill would allow US companies to produce and export products with cryptographic privacy-enhancing technology in them. These products are already available from firms throughout the world. US companies lose nearly $100 million per year in exports to them. By encouraging this industry, ordinary citizens like you and me would be able to purchase products with better privacy features. Please support or co-sponsor HR 3937. Sincerely, ___________________________________ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Board games
by apoulter＠nyx.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy May writes:- >An obvious problem with crypto card games is this: what does it >provide that is worth the extra effort of doing encryption? Quite so. What other sorts of games are there that could benefit from crypto? There are a large number of multiplayer board games which combine high levels of complexity in move options with the necessity for inter-player diplomacy. Such board games are suitable for play-by-email (PBEM), as players need time to negotiate and work out moves. They generally work by requiring all players to submit orders for their move by a deadline. Problems with PBEM of such games revolve around having to persuade one person to sit out and adjudicate player moves (the luckless 'games master' or GM). There is a die roll server (send 'help' to dice(a)danpost4.uni-c.dk for details) which can provide die rolls for game functions but a person is still needed to request the appropriate die rolls to resolve player orders. The solution here is crypto. You can do away with the need for an extra person as GM by having one of the players act as GM (the 'player-GM') and resolve moves for each turn. Since all moves are due by one deadline there is the risk that the player-GM can move in response to other player's moves which have been sent to the player-GM for resolution. To prevent this the player-GM must make their move before all the other players. If done using plain text this puts the player-GM at a disadvantage so their orders are encrypted before emailing to all other players. These encrypted orders cannot then be changed in response to other player orders. During move resolution all player orders are published. This benefits all players in that they can check that the player-GM has resolved their orders correctly (when using a non-player GM order resolution is typically hidden). These published orders would include the decrypt pass phrase for the player-GM's orders, and the plain text of those orders. It would be incumbent on one or more of the players to be able to decrypt the player-GM's orders using the decrypt pass phrase, just to check that when decrypted they match the plain text version. Player-GM offers other advantages as well. For example, players can swap the onerous role of player-GM to allow for holidays etc. Using a non-player GM, if that person drops out then the game dies. Player-GM also allows short deadlines, each successive deadline being handled by a different player-GM, which speeds up the game and spreads the GMing load. Another use of a non-player GM is to hold secret agreements between players. Using player-GM this is no longer possible, but public/private key-based encryption can be used to allow players to sign secret treaties with each other. There is a specific forfeit in many game rules for breaching a signed treaty, so the need exists to make secret deals that can later be verified by players not in on the secret deal. Once public keys have been exchanged by players then secret treaties are no problem. Persuading gamers to use crypto to play multiplayer board games PBEM does not take much doing. If no one wants to be a non-player GM (and few do) then without crypto there is no game. I am currently playing in a 7-player PBEM board game called 'Empires of the Middle Ages' using the player-GM method. We use PGP as it supports the encryption facilities needed, runs on the various platforms different players use and is free. However, player-GM and crypto have yet to make an impact in the PBEM gamer community. This community is small and the ownership of particular games is limited. The game I am playing player-GM, 'Empires of the Middle Ages', although an excellent game, has been out of print nearly 15 years. I will be trying to start other board games using crypto and player-GM in the near future. Watch rec.games.board and rec.games.pbm for announcements. I should mention that player-GM is not the only solution to the GM problem. Another answer is to code a email-driven program which will adjudicate orders. Here the problem is the inherent complexity of many board games. The most successful adjudicator program to my knowledge is the Diplomacy judge (send 'help' to judge(a)morrolan.eff.org for details). Diplomacy is a relatively simple board game set loosely in Europe prior to the Great War. As the game name suggests, players can only win the game by good diplomacy, as military skills are not enough on their own. Many thousands of people play PBEM Diplomacy and its variants (games which change certain rules and/or map features from the standard game). Although the Diplomacy judge allows anonymous opponents and faked email in certain Diplomacy variants, it has no built-in facilities for use of public keys, which seems to me a strange omission. More information on the Diplomacy Judge can be found in the FAQ for rec.games.diplomacy. Alan Poulter (apoulter@nyx.cs.du.edu/a.poulter@lut.ac.uk)

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NSA searches for Tentacles
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone said: > Someone else posted in t.p.c that they'd sent in a letter and been > told that NSA would not license this technology to individuals. That > sort of echoes the argument that there are some munitions appropriate > for government but not for individuals. Spies generally like to help each other -- after all the CIA and KGB had much more in common with each other than with the common people of their respective nations. Probably the foremost use of NSA's technology would be by governments monitoring traffic and other data for incorrect thought patterns. I can see other uses, though -- if Cypherpunks had this thing, we wouldn't need Arsen Ray's Tentacle-sniffer -- NSALookUp (tm) Detweiler should do it ;-) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Detweiler Files on FTP
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Following the announcement last week that I'd be willing to hold the "detweiler files" (sounds like a FOX television show), they are now available on FTP: vorlon.mankato.msus.edu: /home/ftp/pub/cypherpunks/detweiler_files/detweil.zip Enjoy. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)vorlon.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or anyone else, dammit -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 2.0) GJ/CM d- h-- s-:++>s-:+ g+ p? au+ a- w++ v* C++(++++) UL++++$ P+>++ L++$ 3- N+++ K+++ W M+ V-- -po+(---)>$ Y++ t+ 5++ j r+++$ G- v+ b D+ b--- e+>++(*) u** H* f r-->+++ !n y++**

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Re: The Detweiler Files on FTP
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

a detweiler testicle says: >> L.Detweiler retypes most notes to prevent style analysis >> and inference detection that would lead to our identities. sheesh. You folks weren't kidding about the "net.loon" stuff... His self-reference in the third person says a lot more than he lets on, I bet... But he's right, though, he *is* a conspiracy. ;-)^h^h^h (oops, smiley detester present...). On the other hand, how old is this guy? 12? I mean what do we really know about him? Do these archives have anything on him besides his spam and the resultant fusilades? Has anyone actually met him? Not that I'd like to, I guess... I'm curious about this guy for no legitmate reason. He just seems bright, and he must have done some crypto once. He is listed as a contributor on my copy MacPGP, for instance, and before he started spamming it, his posts to imp-interest could make sense on occasion. If this discussion is not applicable to crypto (I can't imagine how it really could be) send me e-mail, please. cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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encryption and Ham Radio
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A while ago I thought about getting a Ham Radio license for doing TCP/IP over the airwaves. I never got around to learning the details, but I know that it is possible, and that many Hams in big cities have detailed digital nets running over the airwaves, using TCP/IP, or other protocols. There are even some gateways onto the internet. When I was investigating getting a license, it came to my attention that FCC rules prohibit encrypting any digital data you send over the airwaves in this way. I don't know exactly how far this prohibition reaches, but I know you can lose your ham license for sending encrypted data over the digital ham network. I haven't actually seen any mention of this by the EFF and other groups like that, where I'd expect it. Or on cypherpunks, for that matter. Maybe it's because no one knows about it. So I'm telling you. I think that this is a pretty terrible state of affairs, because ham radio TCP/IP provides a low cost (if really low bandwith) permanent connection to the internet, and currently anyone who accesses the internet this way is _prohibited_ from using encryption. Bad. [Oh, they are also prohibited form broadcasting "bad" words in digital form. Which causes endless problems for people with usenet gateways onto these digital ham nets. They need automated software robots searching out all posts for Carlins 7 bad words, and deleting them.]

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