- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Droped messages...
by jim＠Tadpole.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the looks of it, the DAT copy protection stuff has just been worked around.

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Re: Clipper Death Threat
by LYLE, DAVID R. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-->> > -->> > -->3. Why we have a right to strong encryption. -->> > -->> > Actually, our constitution does not say we have the right to private -->> > communication. It would be nice, but it's not a right. --> -->The Supreme Court disagrees with David in cases ranging from -->NAACP v. Alabama to Griswold v. Connecticut. --> Perhaps so, but the Supreme Court saying something does not a "right" make. Free speech is a right which does NOT allow anyone to say anything they wish, and it does not guarantee privacy from government interferance so long as there is probable cause for law enforcement to interfere. Remember as well, you must ASK the government for permission to sue it, which is how something gets to the Supreme Court, after possibly years of expenses. Not to mention that many agencies don't NEED ANY approval to take actions. Notice the FBI/CIA recent mole... they have not been found guilty, yet every belonging has been forfeited. Of course, everyone's "pretty sure" they're guilty, but ... *************************************************************** Lyled(a)pentagon-emh9.army.mil - My opinions are mine alone- ***************************************************************

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lists of U.S. cypherpunks and Tentacles.
by Tentacle＠Medusa.Conspiracy.Org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fellow Tentacles, Does there exist lists of Tentacles and CypherPunks who are U.S. citizens with U.S. email addresses? Such a list would be useful to code creating cypherpunks who wish to distribute code widely in the U.S., but who do not wish to become involved in the Crypto Exportation hassles. If such a list does not exist, why not create one? Yours in Conspriacy Tentacle(a)Medusa.Conspiracy.org

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No Subject
by cowen＠glia.biostr.washington.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course we could always send all our mail in code. work up a number or letter code for everything, then code that again. and ony the ones witht he code key get mail seems like that should put a damper on anything that the "big brothers" of the world could do to you. at least for normal traffic. even if they have a clipper chip on the lines. you the user, will have a code that they must brake first then all you have to do is change the code every day or so. that should get them (( unnamed foes )) back for reading your mail. just a few thoughts, from a puzzle freak. charles the monster maker

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Droped messages...
by hugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last week toad.com had some problems with the cypherpunks mail list, in cleaning up from all that (megs and megs worth of gunk) I found two messages that I do not think got out to the list. Here they are (I could find no headders for them). Majordomo seems to be doing a great job, the load on toad.com is down and messages are geting though much faster. Ah, the power of software! ||ugh Daniel Your Sometimes Postmaster hugh(a)toad.com -------- Mystery Message #1: Phil Karn says... > > >I have a program called direct to disk from OMI that lets me load > >audio data from an Apple CD-SC300 or the Toshiba mech, outputting > >AIFF, Sound Designer II and several other file formats. The AIFF and > >SDII formats are stereo 16-bit 44.1kHz; usually the QuickTime formats > >are 8 bit. So the AIFF and SDII formats have the full bit stream. > > Not necessarily. It's possible that the data you see has been > converted to analog and then back to digital. Many multimedia > CD-ROM/sound card systems have this capability, but are not able to > read the raw bits from a music CD. No, the Sony and Toshiba drives have firmware that supports reading digital audio data (via SCSI). OMI's program Disk to Disk (excuse my type before hand) digitally reads the audio frames from the CD-ROM and converts it into one of the various sound formats popular on the Mac. The AIFF and SDII formats are not compressed, they are full 16-bit formats. They are also well documented, so it is easy to dissect and process these files, for whatever purpose you have in mind. So, I am actually geting a true digital copy. Even more accurate than if I was taking the S/P-DIF digital out on a CD player and sucking it into a computer, because the S/P-DIF digital out comes after the error correction and interpolation circuitry. (Digital out on a CD player is not raw data off the disc.) There is also no way that what I am doing could go through an analog stage because there is no audio connection between my Mac and the CD-ROM. > > You wouldn't be able to tell by listening, but it would certainly throw > a wrench in the works if you tried to do steganography that way. Actually, I use this setup to compare different pressing of one-off CDs, we were trying to track down some glitches in the JVC CD-R mechanism when recording red-book audio disks. I'm interested in persuing this further, it would be real intersting to produce some audio disks with embedded information. Let me know if you are interested. --- Rusty H. Hodge, Cyberneticist <rustman(a)netcom.com> -------- Mystery Message #2: > A set of remailers isolated from a restriction cooperative is a fully > operative set of remailers. Adding them to the killfile doesn't > prevent these remailers from directly posting and directly mailing. But it restricts the political heat from wide-open remailing to those remailers who accept it. This isn't ideologically pure, but it might let more people run remailers in the face of people like Detweiler (who has already attacked one and likely two remailers). Eli ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu

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Michael Clive Price? Please mail me
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- (Sorry about the wasted bandwidth) You mailed me but I inadvertently deleted it and lost your address-- could you mail me again? Thanks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLW6Xyni7eNFdXppdAQHauAP/eQRSsQvvDbbo8LcWc6wh9ogfy+jDnR/f bP8Kq45pz8xP9yf5H3Sc5AWG9FufbGGcntnjbZkZQw5+afhMH0OlB0arHK6X3hTm kyhof3a44vKX/ufqbOmDW+RJ0Nr1wKNORwO04DA+PIglb8n251Uq6eDZuTRStUEf wzB44obCgLI= =E/hJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Clipper Death Threat
by LYLE, DAVID R. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-->> Actually, voting is not a "right" as such. It can be revoked by the -->> government, and is revoked for all convicted felons. --> -->Does this mean your right to freedom of speech is not a "right," since -->the government can limit the free speech of convicted felons? The -->government is even more restrictive of the 4th Amendment rights -->of convicted felons, so are you saying that the 4th Amendment is not -->a "right as such"? --> Good question... what exactly is a "right"? To me, a right is something that cannot be removed from any citizen. I would like to see privacy as a right. However, at what point do you draw the line? When does privacy interfere with someone else's rights? Freedom of speech has never been a right. A lot of people think it is. But go out on a street corner and try to incite a riot. See what happens. Or threaten someone. Or commit treason. Speech is not a right. I don't pretend to have all the answers. But I see a lot of folks very mis-informed about the difference between a right and a benefit of citizenship. lyled(a)pentagon-emh9.army.mil

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RE: Clipper Death Threat
by LYLE, DAVID R. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--> -->On Fri, 25 Feb 1994, LYLE, DAVID R. COMPEX wrote: --> -->>. . . -->> -->> -->3. Why we have a right to strong encryption. -->> -->> Actually, our constitution does not say we have the right to private -->> communication. It would be nice, but it's not a right. -->> --> -->Try the 9th Amendment on for size: --> -->"The enumeration in the Costitution, of certain rights, shall not be -->construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." --> -->Privacy was a long recognized right in Anglo-American juris prudence. It -->goes all the way back to the very English idea that "a man's home is his -->castle." --> Sandy, please re-read what I said... "private communication". If this were a right, then wiretapping AT ALL would be illegal, and it is not. Don't get me wrong. I am all for private communications. I'm very much against restricting the public's access to encryption technology. What gets me is when everyone runs around saying "this is a right". lyled(a)pentagon-emh9.army.mil --> --> S a n d y --> --> --> -->

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If only Vxxxx Fxxxxx had used encryption....
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks: [Wait! This =is= crypto-related! I promise!] Heard on the news today that Bernard Nussbaum said he had done "nothing irregular" in going through Vince Foster's effects immediately after his demise, in order to secure "sensitive information". Presumably, Nussbaum's contention is that some of the information in Foster's possession was covered by attorney-client privelege, and therefore the Authorities had no right to take it into possession. (IANAL-Comments from those who are?) Anyway, this case got me to thinking: If Vince had kept all his "sensitive" things encrypted, and never written down the passphrase, then the data would effectively have died with him. In this case, lack of key escrow is not a bug, but a feature! Then I thought some more - that the whole Key Escrow thing needs to be rethought: Instead of escrowing the private key, we need to develop better key management techniques for multiple recipients. For example, if Alice is an attorney representing Carol Client, Bob and Ray are partners in Alice's firm, which uses escrow agent E; and A, B, C, R and E are the public keys (and A'... are the private keys) of our dramatis personae: Carol sends her message to Alice as usual, generating the session key S, and encrypting it S'=A(S). Whenever Alice recieves a message, after decrypting the session key [S= A'(S')] she adds to it an additional S"= E( B(S) ) and S"'= E( R(S) ) or some other construct which involving Shamir Sharing or whatever. The details of the protocol(s) can be worked out after the basic premise: There is no reason for anyone to give up the "master key" to all of their business, when the minimal overhead in storage space for adding an escrowed =session= key will suffice. PGP needs a mechanism to handle "detatched session keys", so that our escrow agent can, upon notification by Bob and Ray that Alice has [died | left the firm], process the whole package of S" and S"' back into B(S) and R(S), so that Bob and Ray can carry on their work. Just as with a detatched signature certificate going to a notary, the detatched session key does not give the escrow agent any knowledge of the content of the message itself. Another option is to put the whole creation of S" and S"' on to Carol, which requires a public key that specifies E and {B, R}, as well as the particular escrow protocol involved. This could be tricky to implement. Also, Carol needs to be able to specify to Alice that she is retaining a copy of the communication, encrypted to self, and therefore Alice need not escrow the session key for this particular message. Comments? * "All authority belongs to the people" -Thomas Jefferson --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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Rivest's response to Denning Newsday Editorial
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded with permission... ------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: research!theory.lcs.mit.edu!rivest Received: from big.l1135.att.com by codex.UUCP (4.1/4.7) id AA18940; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:22:24 EST Received: from research (research.research.att.com) by big.l1135.att.com (4.1/4.7) id AA18303; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:22:22 EST Posted-Date: Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:24:20 EST Received: by ninet.research.att.com; Fri Feb 25 16:21 EST 1994 Received: from SWAN.LCS.MIT.EDU by theory.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2S) id AA24342; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:23:04 EST From: rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu (Ron Rivest) Received: by swan.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2C) id AA01277; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:24:20 EST Date: Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:24:20 EST Message-Id: <199402252124.AA01277(a)swan.lcs.mit.edu> To: denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu Cc: efbrick(a)cs.sandia.gov, hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu, Rivest(a)mc.lcs.mit.edu, silvio(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu, smb(a)research.att.com, mab(a)research.att.com, jim(a)rsa.com, diffie(a)eng.sun.com Subject: Newsday Editorial Hi Dorothy -- Thanks for sending me a copy of your editorial. But I find the reasoning you present misleading and unpersuasive. First, you argue that the clipper chip will be a useful law enforcement tool. Given the small number of currently authorized wiretaps per year (under 1000) and the ease of using alternative encryption technology or superencryption, it seems plausible to me that law enforcement could expect at most ten "successful" clipper wiretaps per year. This is a pretty marginal basis for claiming that clipper will "block crime". Second, you seem to believe that anything that will "block crime" must therefore be a "good thing" and should therefore be adopted. This is not true, even if it is not subject to government abuse. For example, a system that could turn any telephone (even when on-hook) into an authorized listening microphone might help law enforcement, but would be unacceptable to almost all Americans. As another example, tatooing a person's social security number on his or her buttocks might help law enforcement, but would also be objectionable. Or, you could require all citizens to wear a bracelet that could be remotely queried (electronically, and only when authorized) to return the location of that citizen. There are all kinds of wonderfully stupid things one could do with modern technology that could "help" law enforcement. But merely being of assistance to law enforcement doesn't make a proposal a good thing; many such ideas are objectionable and unacceptable because of the unreasonably large cost/benefit ratio (real or psychological cost). The clipper proposal, in my opinion, is of exactly this nature. Third, you seem unnecessarily polly-annish about our government and the potential for abuse. The clipper proposal places all trust for its management within the executive branch; a corrupt president could direct that it be used for inappropriate purposes. The unspecified nature of many of the associated procedures leaves much room to speculate that there are "holes" that could be exploited by government officials to abuse the rights of American citizens. Even if the proposal were modified to split the trust among the various branches of government, one might still reasonably worry about possible abuse. Merely because you've met the current set of representatives of various agencies, and feel you can trust them, doesn't mean that such trust can be warranted in their successors. One should build in institutional checks and balances that overcome occasional moral lapses in one or more office holders. Fourth, your discussion of "searching your home and seizing your papers" is misleading. You seem to imply that because law enforcement can be issued a warrant to search your home, that we should adopt clipper. Yet this analogy only makes sense if individuals were required to deposit copies of their front door keys with the government. I can build any kind of house I wish (out of steel, for example), and put any kind of locks on it, and wire up any kind of intrusion detectors on it, etc. The government, armed with a search warrant, is not guaranteed an "easy entry" into my home at all. The appropriate analogical conclusion is that individuals should be able to use any kind of encryption they want, and the government should be allowed (when authorized, of course) to try and break their encryption. Finally, you argue (elsewhere, not in this editorial) that the decision rests in part on "classified" information. Such an argument only makes sense if there is a specific law-enforcement situation that makes such classified information timely and relevant. (E.g., if there was a current investigation as to whether the Department of the Treasury had been infiltrated by organized crime.) The use of "classified information" is otherwise generally inappropriate in discussing communications policy that will last over decades. This hardly covers all of the relevant issues, but it covers the points that came immediately to mind in reading your editorial... Cheers, Ron P.S. Feel free to pass along, quote, or otherwise re-distribute this... - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Return-Path: <@axp1.acc.georgetown.edu:denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu> Date: Wed, 23 Feb 1994 16:16:09 -0500 (EST) From: Dorothy Denning <denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu> Subject: Newsday Editorial To: efbrick(a)cs.sandia.gov, hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu, Rivest(a)mc.lcs.mit.edu, silvio(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu, smb(a)research.att.com, mab(a)research.att.com Cc: denning(a)guvax.acc.georgetown.edu Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT ====================================================================== | Newsday, Tuesday, February 22, 1994, Viewpoints | ====================================================================== The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime By Dorothy E. Denning Hidden among the discussions of the information highway is a fierce debate, with huge implications for everyone. It centers on a tiny computer chip called the Clipper, which uses sophisticated coding to scramble electronic communications transmitted through the phone system. The Clinton administration has adopted the chip, which would allow law enforcement agencies with court warrants to read the Clipper codes and eavesdrop on terrorists and criminals. But opponents say that, if this happens, the privacy of law-abiding individuals will be a risk. They want people to be able to use their own scramblers, which the government would not be able to decode. If the opponents get their way, however, all communications on the information highway would be immune from lawful interception. In a world threatened by international organized crime, terrorism, and rogue governments, this would be folly. In testimony before Congress, Donald Delaney, senior investigator with the New York State Police, warned that if we adopted an encoding standard that did not permit lawful intercepts, we would have havoc in the United States. Moreover, the Clipper coding offers safeguards against casual government intrusion. It requires that one of the two components of a key embedded in the chip be kept with the Treasury Department and the other component with the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. Any law enforcement official wanting to wiretap would need to obtain not only a warrant but the separate components from the two agencies. This, plus the superstrong code and key system would make it virtually impossible for anyone, even corrupt government officials, to spy illegally. But would terrorists use Clipper? The Justice Department has ordered $8 million worth of Clipper scramblers in the hope that they will become so widespread and convenient that everyone will use them. Opponents say that terrorists will not be so foolish as to use encryption to which the government holds the key but will scramble their calls with their own code systems. But then who would have thought that the World Trade Center bombers would have been stupid enough to return a truck that they had rented? Court-authorized interception of communications has been essential for preventing and solving many serious and often violent crimes, including terrorism, organized crime, drugs, kidnaping, and political corruption. The FBI alone has had many spectacular successes that depended on wiretaps. In a Chicago case code-named RUKBOM, they prevented the El Rukn street gang, which was acting on behalf of the Libyan government, from shooting down a commercial airliner using a stolen military weapons system. To protect against abuse of electronic surveillance, federal statutes impose stringent requirements on the approval and execution of wiretaps. Wiretaps are used judiciously (only 846 installed wiretaps in 1992) and are targeted at major criminals. Now, the thought of the FBI wiretapping my communications appeals to me about as much as its searching my home and seizing my papers. But the Constitution does not give us absolute privacy from court-ordered searches and seizures, and for good reason. Lawlessness would prevail. Encoding technologies, which offer privacy, are on a collision course with a major crime-fighting tool: wiretapping. Now the Clipper chip shows that strong encoding can be made available in a way that protects private communications but does not harm society if it gets into the wrong hands. Clipper is a good idea, and it needs support from people who recognize the need for both privacy and effective law enforcement on the information highway. ====================================================================== | Copyright Newsday. All rights reserved. This article can be freely | | distributed on the net provided this note is kept intact, but it may | | not be sold or used for profit without permission of Newsday. | ====================================================================== ------- End of Forwarded Message

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