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(Fwd) British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This comes from the FTC Privacy List, and is somewhat relevant.... (The the "Crypto" in the title isn't, oddly...). Some thoughts... (er, questions): 1. What are the implications for log-on systems that rely on recognition of faces (supposedly impossible for hackers to describe and exploit)? 2. Legal implications for witnesses? ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Sun, 7 Apr 1996 08:24:18 -0700 From: taxhaven(a)ix.netcom.com (Adam Starchild ) Subject: British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work To: privacy(a)ftc.gov "Crypto-ID" Cards Not Effective Recent studies into the effectiveness of photo credit cards have cast doubt over their ability to cut fraud. Dr. Richard Kemp, of the Department of Psychology at Westminster University, London, organized an experiment involving a London supermarket to test the cards in "the real world." The supermarket was staffed by six people who were all warned to be on the look out for fraudulent credit cards. Dr. Kemp arranged for 44 of his students to pose as shoppers and test the staffs' ability to spot photo-card misuse. Each student was armed with four cards. One showed the student as they were, one showed the student wearing make-up, one showed an individual who vaguely resembled the student and the last card depicted someone who looked nothing like the bearer. People usually recognize photographs of individuals based on a familiarity of the subject. A photograph captures only one angle and expression out of thousands of different combinations. People will recognize photographs of family, friends and well known individuals easily. But how easy is it to accurately compare a photograph with the face of a perfect stranger? At a recent conference, Dr. Kemp said that matching a photo to a stranger's face was "too difficult." He also said that in a non- experimental situation, such as a supermarket, the incidence of fraud detection would be even lower. The results of Dr. Kemp's supermarket experiment proved very interesting. In all, the majority of fraudulent cards were accepted. Amazingly, 35 per cent of the cards bearing a photograph of someone completely different from the student were accepted. A massive 64 per cent of cards bearing a similar individual were also accepted. Another factor which seems to further prove Dr. Kemp's point is that 14 per cent of cards bearing a true likeness of the student were rejected. A few British banks are already offering customers the opportunity to have their photograph etched onto their cards. They claim a reduction in fraud has resulted from this. Dr. Kemp's findings would seem to contradict this belief. Dr. Nicky Towell, one of Dr. Kemp's researchers, said "There is a widely held assumption that photo credit cards are a cheap and effective way of stopping fraud. But this is not the case." No one can tell how well photo credit cards will catch on. But with the majority of people carrying at least one, if not more cards of some sort, how long will it be before photos become compulsory? The government knows that the introduction of ID cards is a political hot potato, but how many people would notice if they turned the cards we already have into crypto-ID cards? Reprinted from The Mouse Monitor, The International Journal of Bureau-Rat Control, a periodical published by Scope International for its customers. Scope International is on the Worldwide Web at http://www.britnet.co.uk/Scope/ Posted by Adam Starchild The Offshore Entrepreneur at http://www.au.com/offshore The privacy list is run automatically by the Majordomo list manager. Send a "help" command to majordomo(a)ftc.gov for assistance. Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

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Re: the cost of untracability?
by Frank O. Trotter, III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> FWIW, I think that there is no capital-gains-type tax on currency > conversions. In other words, if I take dollars and buy yen today, and the > interconvert rate changes and I convert back and make a "profit," that is > not considered income. If that's the case, then ecash has an excellent > precedent behind it to avoid any taxes on interest, especially if that > interest is, in effect, paid by increasing the inherent value of the currency. > > And most of the "interest" will simply be the avoided inflation loss that > would have otherwise occurred. Buying ecash may be equivalent to buying an > absolutely non-inflating currency that the government can't manipulate. > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > There is a tax event that occurs when one converts from one currency to another (be it capital or current). In your example the purchase of Yen and later sale may result in a gain if the Yen appreciates, or a loss if it drops. This is a taxable event. You actually refer to the method that was used in the 14th - 16th century in europo to pay interest when it was against church (really "Church") law. Early banks would do currency or metals-to-currency trades with people and imply a rent or interest rate. It was also the begining of the discount trade bill (I'll give you 90 cents today and get your dollar in a year from the person you sold those chairs to). I'll still cling to my Ecash is curency not a currency agument as well BTW. Frank O. Trotter, III - fotiii(a)crl.com www.marktwain.com - Fax: +1 314 569-4906 --------------------------------------------

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Re: CypherPunks -- The Early Years
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Cordian wrote: > > Might I ask why several prominent Cypherpunks have begun reposting > "News of the Weird" through sympatico.ca? Is this some sort of > Pod thing? Close examination of fossil mosquitoes from 40 million years ago show they look just about the same as that one dining on your arm. ============================================== LMBoyd Web Site / U. S. Newspapers / Start Email / Stop Email http://www.LMBoyd.com/postscript.htm

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do it to them. they deseve it.
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tuesesday March 10, 1998 3/10/98 E-mail Federico.F.Pena(a)hq.doe.gov and mail Federico F. Pena The Secretary of Energy United States Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585 Dear Secretary Pena: Purpose of this letter is to appeal a denial of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request. I wrote on Tuesday February 17, 1999 15:11 e-mail and mail Ms. Elva Barfield Freedom of Information Office U. S. Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office/OIEA POB 5400 Albuquerque, NM 87185-5400 EBARFIELD(a)DOEAL.GOV Dear Ms. Barfield: VP Al Gore is in the crypto business. Information SuperSpyWay Al Gore Approved Encryption for China in Return for Campaign Donations by Charles R. Smith Portions of the above document posted on Internet at http://www.us.net/softwar/ and http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ states 1. Gore charged with encryption policy according to PDD-5 and PRD-27 on April 16, 1993. 2. Government officials represent themselves on Al Gore's behalf for RSA patent purchase negotiations in Feb. 1994. 3. RSA chairman Bidzos meets with Chinese officials at the same time as Ron Brown in Oct. 1995. 4. RSA Chairman Bidzos enters into merger negotiations with Security Dynamics, a company backed by Sanford Robertson, in Nov. 1995. 5. VP Gore calls Sanford Robertson from the White House for a donation in Nov. 1995. 6. Robertson delivers $100,000 donation ($80,000 soft - $20,000 directly into the Clinton/Gore campaign) in Jan. 1996. 7. RSA signs deal with China in Feb. 1996. The administration previously prosecuted similar deals but this time does nothing. 8. Justice Dept. approves RSA merger with Security Dynamics in April 1996 for $280 million dollars, netting Sanford Robertson's company a cool $2 million just to write the deal. In 1991 I was in involved with Sandia National Laboratories Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty seismic data authenticator. At that time Sandia director Tommy A Sellers had assumed responsibility for directorship from Robert Clem. Sandia supervisor Tom Wright replaced my supervisor, John Holovka, who was the supervisor for the CTBT seismic data authenticator. Wright brought in Ph.D. Steven Goldsmith to supervise me. Sellars, Wright, and Goldsmith were new to crypto-type projects. Much of this is documented at http://www.jya.com/whp021598.htm. This is evidenced by Sellar's attached SEP 24 1991 memorandum, which Goldsmith help author, addressed to Dr James J Hearn at the National Security Agency. The SEP 24 memorandum contained a number of technical errors. I corrected these errors in my attached December 20, 1991 memorandum. Department of Energy and it predecessors have a well-documented history of not requiring technical expertise for pursuit of interests. Stewart Udall, The Myths of August, writes, Any cover-up must be implemented and enforced by designated agents, and one man emerged in 1953 as the quarterback of the AEC's damage-control effort. His name was Gordon Dunning. Although the personnel charts of the 1950s list him as a low-level "rad-safe" official in the Division of Biology and Medicine, documents demonstrate that he was clothed with authority to manage and suppress information about the radiation released by the testing of nuclear weapons. ... About the time Sellers and Sandia Ombudsman gave me a directed transfer to break electronic locks for the FBI/ERF [engineering research facility], Goldsmith and Wright, certainly with the approval of Sellers, placed a contract with RSA Inc [http://www.rsa.com/] I was told. Ms Barfield, we think the American public needs to know more about RSA's work with Sandia National Laboratories. Therefore, Under the provision of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 552, I am requesting access to: 1 ALL purchase requisitions, including any attached statement of work, issued by Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratories, or DOE/ALOO between January 1, 1991 and February 17, 1998 to RSA Inc. 2 Copies of all invoices from RSA Inc received by Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratories, or DOE/ALOO between January 1, 1991 and February 17, 1998 If there are any fees for searching for, or copying, the records I have requested, please inform me before you fill the request. As you know, the Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees when the release of the information is considered as "primarily benefiting the public." I believe that this requests fits that category and I therefore ask that you waive any fees. Your office agreed to waive fees before. This request is surely of "public interest." December 13, 1994 DOE/AL FOIA officer Gwen Schreiner waived fees for the reason, "We have considered your request and have determined that release of the requested records is in the public interest, that disclosure of this information is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government, that you or the organization you represent have little or no commercial interest in the material contained in the records, that you or the organization you represent have the qualifications and ability to use and disseminate the information, and that the records are not currently in the public domain. A waiver of fees is therefore granted." This waiver of fees was, undoubtedly, issued as a result of former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary's Openness initiative. Heart of America paid my way to hear Secretary O'Leary's celebrated whistleblower speech. If all or any part of this request is denied, please cite the specific exemption(s) which you think justifies your refusal to release the information and inform me of your agency's administrative appeal procedures available to me under the law. I would appreciate your handling this request as quickly as possible, and I look forward to hearing from you within 20 working days, as the law stipulates. I received no response to the above FOIA. Therefore I appeal as a result of non-response. As you may be aware (6)(A) Each agency, upon any request for records made under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection, shall-- (i) determine within ten days \1\ (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination; and And you may also be aware ------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Under section 12(b) of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-231; 110 Stat. 3054), the amendment made by section 8(b) of such Act striking ``ten days'' and inserting ``20 days'' shall take effect on October 3, 1997. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- (ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of such appeal. If on appeal the denial of the request for records is in whole or in part upheld, the agency shall notify the person making such request of the provisions for judicial review of that determination under paragraph (4) of this subsection So I expect a response to this appeal within the time allotted to you by law. Much of this unfortunate matter is appearing on Internet. http://www.jya.com/whp021598.htm http://www.jya.com/cylinked.htm Letter from Bill Payne Regarding Cryptography at Sandia http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ Crypto AG: The NSA's Trojan Whore? http://caq.com/CAQ/caq63/caq63madsen.html NSA, Crypto AG, and the Iraq-Iran War http://www.aci.net/kalliste/speccoll.htm How Secure is America's Nuclear Arsenal? http://www.aci.net/kalliste/nukearse.htm And, of course, we continue to seek settlement. Sincerely, William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias Albuquerque, NM 87111

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Re: the cost of untracability?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:53 PM 4/7/96, Jim Gillogly wrote: >jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> writes: >>FWIW, I think that there is no capital-gains-type tax on currency >>conversions. In other words, if I take dollars and buy yen today, and the > >I bounced this off a CPA, who said she would be very suprised if this is >really the case: in general the IRS considers increases in wealth to be >taxable, and unless there's a specific exclusion for currency transactions >that she doesn't know about, she suspects this is not the case. As a >conceptual counterexample she points out that you are responsible for any >profit you make from selling your car for more than you pay for it (but, >as you might expect, you don't get to take a loss if you sell it for less). I think your CPA is clearly misinformed, or one of us has misunderstood the conditions under which her statement is true. For example, I read a fair number of corporate earnings reports, and can assure you that many companies report gains and losses on currency conversions. (Many companies use derivatives to hedge themselves against fluctuations in foreign currencies....) Similarly, if I consult the "Wall Street Journal" I find page after page of listings for currency prices, futures on currency prices, derivatives involving said currencies, and so on. I can easily be a "currency speculator" by calling my broker. It may come as a surprise to this CPA (and Jim Bell, from his later message), but gains in this market are taxable, and losses can offset gains, subject to the usual mumbo jumbo rules. It is certainly true that if one converts $300 into yen for a trip to Japan, to have to buy a few beers for cash (Tokyo is expensive), and upon returning to the U.S. their has been some slight gain (yes, a "profit"), that the IRS is not interested. This is a matter of practicality, given that such minor conversions are usually done in cash form, are too small to worry about (minimal gains...a few bucks in the example shown, and usually more than erased by the conversion rate differential). Try speculating _seriously_ in the dollar-yen conversion rate, through the various options listed in financial newspapers, and then telling the IRS that a $100,000 profit, say, is not taxable because of what a CPA said. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Spinners and compression functions
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received this via private email, and have been asked by the sender to post to cpunks. >Subj: Re: Spinners and compression functions >Date: 96-04-08 12:49:29 EDT >From: eli+(a)GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU >Sender: eli+(a)GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU >To: JonWienke(a)aol.com > >In article ><+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+clNRbLm00UfAE109Nf(a)andrew.cmu.edu> you >write: >>Run the spinner output through a PKZip type compression >>function, and then seed a PRNG with the output from that. This would >provide >>a means of gauging the amount of entropy that has been fed into the PRNG, >>(count the bytes output from the compression function) which will allow the >>program to disallow any output from the PRNG until a sufficient amount of >>entropy has been fed into it. > >If pkzip were a perfect compressor (which doesn't exist), this would >work well. What you're doing is measuring entropy with respect to >pkzip's model of the input language, which can be arbitrarily far off >from the entropy you'd get with a more powerful model. This means >that an attacker who understands the video retrace (or whatever) can >get an edge on you. You really can't tell if data is random by >looking at it -- for example, Nisan published a generator based on >universal hash functions that provably passes all space-bounded tests, >which most statistical tests are. > >Compressing the data probably won't hurt (*probably*, and assuming you >take the header off!). But Unix compress won't make data look >statistically random, and I doubt pkzip will either. Neither one will >give you a useful estimate of the entropy in the data stream. You >have to guess that yourself, and then use a strong hash function to >get it down to that point. > >-- >. Eli Brandt usual disclaimers . >. eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu PGP key on request . >. violation of 18 U.S.C. 1462: "fuck".

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Re: (Fwd) British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work
by David Loysen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:58 AM 4/8/96 +0000, you wrote: >This comes from the FTC Privacy List, and is somewhat relevant.... >(The the "Crypto" in the title isn't, oddly...). > >Some thoughts... (er, questions): >1. What are the implications for log-on systems that rely on >recognition of faces (supposedly impossible for hackers to describe >and exploit)? Does anybody know how well these systems work? If I don't shave over the weekend will my computer know who I am Monday morning? Is my credit card going to have my face digitized and encoded onto the mag stipe for comparision with a video camera image at the time of sale? >2. Legal implications for witnesses? > I think many eyewitness accounts are already taken with a grain of salt, at least as far as picking a suspect. Certainly in court the lawyers say whatever makes their case look better. >------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- >Date: Sun, 7 Apr 1996 08:24:18 -0700 >From: taxhaven(a)ix.netcom.com (Adam Starchild ) >Subject: British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work >To: privacy(a)ftc.gov > > "Crypto-ID" Cards Not Effective > > Recent studies into the effectiveness of photo credit cards >have cast doubt over their ability to cut fraud. Dr. Richard >Kemp, of the Department of Psychology at Westminster University, >London, organized an experiment involving a London supermarket to >test the cards in "the real world." Most if not all credit card issuing banks use some form of fraud detection software. The next generation of these products will be analyzing transaction data from the card clearing banks in real time to stop fraudulent transactions before they are complete. Expect to see more "may I see your ID" questions as these systems flag transactions as possible fraud. I have had a credit card with my photo on it for several years, I can't ever remember a sales person who seemed at all interested in comparing the photo to me. > The supermarket was staffed by six people who were all >warned to be on the look out for fraudulent credit cards. Dr. >Kemp arranged for 44 of his students to pose as shoppers and test >the staffs' ability to spot photo-card misuse. Each student was >armed with four cards. One showed the student as they were, one >showed the student wearing make-up, one showed an individual who >vaguely resembled the student and the last card depicted someone >who looked nothing like the bearer. > People usually recognize photographs of individuals based on >a familiarity of the subject. A photograph captures only one >angle and expression out of thousands of different combinations. >People will recognize photographs of family, friends and well >known individuals easily. But how easy is it to accurately >compare a photograph with the face of a perfect stranger? At a >recent conference, Dr. Kemp said that matching a photo to a >stranger's face was "too difficult." He also said that in a non- >experimental situation, such as a supermarket, the incidence of >fraud detection would be even lower. > The results of Dr. Kemp's supermarket experiment proved very >interesting. In all, the majority of fraudulent cards were >accepted. Amazingly, 35 per cent of the cards bearing a >photograph of someone completely different from the student were >accepted. A massive 64 per cent of cards bearing a similar >individual were also accepted. Another factor which seems to >further prove Dr. Kemp's point is that 14 per cent of cards >bearing a true likeness of the student were rejected. > A few British banks are already offering customers the >opportunity to have their photograph etched onto their cards. >They claim a reduction in fraud has resulted from this. Dr. >Kemp's findings would seem to contradict this belief. Dr. Nicky >Towell, one of Dr. Kemp's researchers, said "There is a widely >held assumption that photo credit cards are a cheap and effective >way of stopping fraud. But this is not the case." > No one can tell how well photo credit cards will catch on. >But with the majority of people carrying at least one, if not >more cards of some sort, how long will it be before photos become >compulsory? The government knows that the introduction of ID >cards is a political hot potato, but how many people would notice >if they turned the cards we already have into crypto-ID cards? > > >Reprinted from The Mouse Monitor, The International Journal of >Bureau-Rat Control, a periodical published by Scope International >for its customers. Scope International is on the Worldwide Web >at http://www.britnet.co.uk/Scope/ > > >Posted by Adam Starchild > The Offshore Entrepreneur at http://www.au.com/offshore > > > >The privacy list is run automatically by the Majordomo list manager. >Send a "help" command to majordomo(a)ftc.gov for assistance. > >Rob. > >--- >Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" >to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key. > > dwl(a)hnc.com David Loysen 619-546-8877 x245

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Re: They're running scared.
by Michael C. Peponis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 07 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: [article snipped] >Articles such as this are interesting because they appear to be written >without any illusion that the interests of governments are anything other >than just that, interests of governments. They are NOT the interests >of the average citizen. Absolutly, and it seems that more and more thinking people are realizing this, as for the non-thinking ones, well we are better off without them, the only thing they contribute are problems Debate works to a point, but there comes a point and time where all that can be said, has been said, and we are past that point. Personally, I love national insecurity such as terrorist attacks and random bombings, wish there were more of them by more people. What they do is sow fear, instensify camps, and pit people against each other. Goverments are use to wars, where there are large, well-defined groups assult one another, they have huge problems dealing with small groups of people attack it or each other. That is what will eventually cause it to collapes, which is a good thing. For those who say that such an event would be catostrophic, that is a myth, I worked with someone from Berut a few years ago, when the goverment there collapesed. He said other than the perpetual mortor fire, and speratic bombings, life went on as usuall. People got up and went to work, people bought and sold, etc. From a microsopic scale, nothing had changed, it was only if you looked at the bigger picture that things were different, and quite frankly, those types of things do not effect us individually. I do not need an x trillion dollar economy to continue living at my standard of living, most of us on this list do not, the only people that benifit are the power brokers and the dumb, weak, and stupid. I have nothing against charity(that's what taxes amount to), but when charity reaches 50%+ of my income, and starts to erode my freedom, well now it's a problem. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMWkWWUUffSIjnthhAQHEiQP/Sp5+UfCFGmvEO/9nRFBLXBm9haPiJC/y oVCoKQi/jeCkXy1HaPjrrObFkV0fvRsHxk5GvHXfX9sIkFi/i9mrGafpXFUuRfkP qua2wYp91Omh39QptHThGgEKl0sdKBzw+/9uHCqwUyViqoZZBO7Y7kUGffT9XL9m 13VTjMTyFz4= =e+UM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Available from MIT KeyServer

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Bank transactions on Internet
by Jüri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Suddenly some banks here in Estonia have decided that they must start offering banking services over Internet already during the next months. What worries me is that some of them are talking about using 40-bit SSL as the main security mechanism. What about banks in US and Europe, how many of them are using Internet and WWW to offer their services already? Is it possible to use WWW forms to make real transactions or can you just view your transaction history and account status? In case the banks are using WWW forms and SSL, are the services limited to 128-bit clients? How is the client authentication handled? Does the client just get a plain username and password? I had a look at some banks like Security First National Bank and some others, and it seems that they use just SSL + username/password for they banking services. Does this really work, especially with 40-bit keys? SSL with client certificates would seem a little bit more secure once it is available, but still not secure enough for real banking on Internet. Just curious (and confused), Juri Kaljundi jk(a)digit.ee

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Bulletin: Cypherpunks say no taxes owed by moneychangers!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:23 AM 4/8/96, jim bell wrote: >At 12:53 PM 4/7/96 PDT, Jim Gillogly wrote: >> >>jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> writes: >>>FWIW, I think that there is no capital-gains-type tax on currency >>>conversions. In other words, if I take dollars and buy yen today, and the >> >>I bounced this off a CPA, who said she would be very suprised if this is >>really the case: in general the IRS considers increases in wealth to be >>taxable, and unless there's a specific exclusion for currency transactions >>that she doesn't know about, she suspects this is not the case. As a >>conceptual counterexample she points out that you are responsible for any >>profit you make from selling your car for more than you pay for it (but, >>as you might expect, you don't get to take a loss if you sell it for less). > >That assumes that there is "profit" from exchanging currencies. On any >given transaction, there is never any "profit." The only thing that might >be called a profit is a difference in exchange rates, and that really isn't >an increase in wealth at any point. Ask that CPA to look it up. There are people and companies who make a nice business in currency exchange, ranging from the large companies one finds in international airline terminals and banks to the smaller, "Mom and Pop" moneychangers one finds in barrios and other such places. These moneychangers attempt to make a "profit" on each exchange (else they'd hardly stay in business). It will probably come as a surprise to them that, according to both a CPA and Jim Bell, no taxes are owed on their businesses, as "no wealth was created." Don't believe everything you read on this list, folks. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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