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Re: Why the Poor are Mostly Deserving of their Fate
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:32 PM 5/18/96, Sean Gabb wrote: >On Sat, 18 May 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > >> It was understandable to be poor when all the world was poor. It is >> understandable to be poor in those nations today that make the >> accumulation of wealth a crime for most people. It is not understandable >> to be poor (for long) in the US where one can reliably get out of poverty >> simply by doing three simple things: >> >> 1) get a high school diploma >> 2) get married >> 3) get any job >> >> Only about 2 tenths of 1% of those who satisfy those three requirements >> incomes below the official poverty line. >I've done all these things - and rather more in the way of education. But >while I don't fall on or near the poverty line, I'm still poor as a church >mouse. What am I doing wrong? * Point Number One: Sean Gabb <cea01sig(a)gold.ac.uk> ^^ * Point Number Two:"...not understandable to be poor (for long) in the US" ^^ Q.E.D. Actually, I think Duncan's "high school + marriage + any job" point is a bit simplistic, and I'm surprised about the ".02%" estimate. As someone else noted, there are a lot of folks in the rural South, Appalachia, and other places, who graduated from high school, are still married, and have some sort of job, and yet who make $6-8 an hour or less. I think more is needed. I would have added "savings/investment" and "hard work." Those who can force themselves to set money aside for investment get the compounded returns later on. And of course hard work--including taking a second job, having the extended family work, etc.--is also key. (Many immigrant Asians arrive penniless in the U.S., then get help from immigrant Asian who arrived earlier, live in crowded houses and apartments, have 4-6 wage-earners in a household, save as much as they can, and then open a small business. Success is almost inevitable. Hence the cycle continues. This tradition of the various Asian subcultures is almost completely lacking in certain other subcultures in America. More's the pity.) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cathy - Sunday, May 19
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Cathy" cartoon today has a bit of positive(?) well, at least it's not negative, PR about anonymity. Funny

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rsa2d.gif - machine readable rsa for printing in magazines etc
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I now have a cute 2 inch wide by 1 inch high graphic that is the 3 line RSA Perl program in a 2D barcode. When printed on anything (postcard, magazine, etc) you have a machine readable encryption program, or to the US government, a munition! http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/rsa2d.html Now what to do with this? Anyone want to place an add in a newspaper or magazine? How about selling munitions postcards? Another T-shirt? Should be fun for something. -- Vince

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'Excommunication'
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. Nor was "excommunication" a political posting: There was no indication in the posting as to whether the Burmese regime was left or right or fascist or whatever. What the "Excommunication" post was about was the fact that good communications undermine the state, and repressive states fear them for that reason. This is exactly the sort of post that should be on cypherpunks. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Apple Newton specs: RAM, infrared, speed
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a friend who's one of the best Newton developers around. An unsolicited plug: check out his company's web site at http://www.newts.com/ -Declan ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Date: Sun, 19 May 1996 11:56:52 -0700 (MST) To: "Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+(a)CMU.EDU> From: dan(a)newts.com (Dan Rowley) Subject: Re: Fwd: Is Chaum's System Traceable or Untraceable? >>Does anyone on cpunks or ecash have an Apple Newton? I know that they come with infrared-- what are the specs on that communications device? And about the Newton itself: can it compile ANSI C code? How much RAM? Permanent storage? Speed of crypto operations? Dec - The Newton's infrared is essentially the SHARP "ASK" protocol, which is the same as used by the sharp wizard. It is *not* IrDA compatible, and Apple claims that it's a hardware problem not a software problem. The Newton cannot currently compile ANSI C unless you have very close ties to Apple (internal code development is in C), but they will be releasing C tools for the Newton within a couple of months. The C, of course, is not directly compiled on the Newton, but on a host Mac. The Newton ships with between 1 and 2 megs of internal RAM, but can be expanded with FLASH or SRAM cards, but there's only one slot, so putting in a modem could be tough.. ;) The permanent storage *is* RAM. It's all flash. As for speed, it depends on whether you do it in NewtonScript or C. NewtonScript is compiled to P-Code that runs on a virtual machine, and is really not too bad. you can also compile to straight ARM code if you want. The next Newton to come out will be based on the DEC StrongARM which I understand is blindingly fast.. Hope this helps Dan -------- Dan Rowley Innovative Computer Solutions Developers of fine software for the Newton Now, also developers for Be!

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No Subject
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. From: camcc(a)abraxis.com X-Sender: camcc(a)smtp1.abraxis.com Date: Sun, 19 May 1996 11:40:11 -0400 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: News from Burma Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ASIA 'Excommunication' An anglo-Burmese businessman friendly with pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to thre years in jail for owning unauthorized telephones and fax machines. James Leander Nichols, also known as Leo Nicholas, was punished for having two fax machines and a telephone switchboard with nine lines in his home, a spokesman for Suu Kyi's political party said. In an effort to discourage contact between Burmese citizens and the outside world, Burma's military government requires people to get permission to own a fax machine, satellite dish, or sophisticated phone system. News Services The Atlanta Constitution/The Atlanta Journal Alec

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Re: Remailers vs Nyms - conflicting assumptions?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Refreshing deals with the long-term problem, but not with the short-term >one. Maybe I need to settle for a higher level of mail loss than I'm >comfortable with, but precisely because I'm not comfortable with it, I do >remain interested in alternatives. The alternative is constant monitoring, though of course this risks traffic analysis. If you ping yourself daily, using some random-path random-delay chain of encrypted remailers, then you can tell if your nym still works. To reduce traffic analysis, the remailer system needs lots of remailers and lots of cover traffic, and you need to use the remailers a lot so your mail to them doesn't look regularly scheduled. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: crosspost re remailers
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:00 AM 5/16/96 -0700, Rich Graves <llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu> wrote: >The entry points into the system, though, have value. You need to be able >to locate and trust them. Remailer reputations are valuable. Otherwise, >you're liable to send your message into the NSA-remailers-are-us system. >You need a web of trust among remailers at the very least, which means >some level of exposure (at least by "social analysis" by observing the >relationships among the various remailer nyms). There are two ways around this problem - chaining remailers, and encryption. As long as one remailer on the chain from your source to your destination is not compromised, you can send mail encrypted to each remailer in the chain (i.e. send Alice's Remailer the message E(Alice, E(Bob, E(Carol, message)))) and the message won't be compromised, though it may be blocked. For reply-style remailers, chaining is much harder, at least if you use a non-stealth encryption system like PGP or RIPEM which reveals the recipient's public key in the headers, and if the remailers don't include a public key to encrypt the message contents with as well as a key to encrypt the connection to the next remailer with. (Otherwise, if the sender encrypts a message to NymA@Alice, and Alice encrypts it with Bob's key and sends it to Bob, Bob decrypts it, encrypts with Carol's key, and sends.... Zed decrypts it, encrypts it with your key, and sends it to you, then any node compromised by Bad Guys will see a message encyrpted to NymA. >Chaos within the system is good. Moving remailers around could be good, >provided that a service location infrastructure is established. >Raph's list is a good start, but it needs to be more automatic and dynamic -- >which to me (perhaps wrongly) suggests formalization, which means points >of failure. It would be much easier if there were a DNS hack that lets you connect to dns.remailer.net:registry, which takes your IP address and serves it as remailerN.remailer.net until you log off (using a short DNS expiration time). This does provide a large number of interesting attacks on the system - denial of service is easy (make lots of connections, filling all ports), and it's easy to add subverted remailers (just connect!) It also doesn't spoof reverse lookups unless your system is able to handle multiple IP addresses (which requires cooperation from your ISP's routers, unless remailer.net is also running a packet laundry, which increases its targetness.) Signed DNS responses would help some attacks, once that's standardized. Does anyone have any ideas on how to do this correctly? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Burmese Excommunication
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, you wrote: >Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. > I agree; I am concerned, however, when I read that any government, theirs or ours, acts or prepares to act to stop or stifle the free traffic of information. Your point is well taken; my post was intended for information and perhaps discussion value. Take it as you choose. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ/M2CKJGkNBIH7lAQHZZAP+KVLlk6REEaL4sskjV7mM28uMOOzGLxxf 3lf3UZGheizpgx6Ms3QpOyJpAADg365R4Lsgusynih49PM2EF+LLs1fNu6dUxbTm beXwK1UJBiBQhglL6pG5tKbjf8vQTdZWOBkEIVLjw4vsPQJlsRlAc8jkijJ/sq/+ uYd0Rof3boY= =adoY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Too cheap to meter
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 07:09 PM 5/15/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >> One problem with the development of such high-end technologies is that >>they tend to increase economies of scale to the point where it's impractical to >>have anything but a monopoly or ogliopoly. As well as concerns about the degree >>of control such an organization may be able to exert in and of itself (acting >>like a government, in essence), there's also that such an organization is >>easier to pressure than a lot of small providers. Anyone have a suggested >>solution, or reasons that I shouldn't be so worried? The nice thing about economies of scale is that they make it possible to do things that used to be too expensive with older technology. For instance, the Internet has problems now because the Network Access Point capacities are really too low to let everyone connect to them, so there are limited numbers of powerful ISPs feeding the rest of us: the DEC Gigaswitches handle 16 users, and the FDDI-based systems don't have the capacity to support more than a couple T3-capable ISPs. Faster technology may let more people on. Faster technology also changes the balance between communications and computing - it's really hard to _do_ anything with 1Tb/s other than shove packets around between multiplexers. On the other hand, if the NSA (or NASA or Yoyodyne or some other surrogate) is on a FDDI NAP, they can promiscuously receive all the packets that go by and sniff for interesting addresses. Jim Bell: >You might as well forget about this 1 Tb/s fiber, for example. In order to >justify such a thing, you need to have 1 Tb/s of information that you want >to take from "here" to "there". A city of 1 million people would have to It's true that that's about 10 million simultaneous voice calls, which is enough for about 60 million typical business phones if they all went through the fiber, which they wouldn't, since they're mostly local. It's alternatively enough for 10,000 uncompressed TV-quality video streams, if you like variety in your television networks. Or 20,000 T3s. One major effect that happens if bandwidth becomes cheap (and I'm not sure that the mux costs for a system that size would really let it be cheap) is that it becomes cost-effective for far more people to get into the phone basis, bypassing the current local phone companies. The last mile to your house may still be expensive (that's also changing), but the last mile to any large office building or apartment complex isn't, for voice. > ....eggs in one basket... For redundancy, you'd probably use 4 fibers in a FDDI-like ring. Most of the major long-distance carriers are deploying their SONET as fully redundant rings, though one or two of them may still be considering non-fully-redundant SONET configurations, and even the carriers who are doing the Right Thing may do the Cheap Thing transitionally. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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