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CIA & Espionage
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a german weekly news magazine (Focus 34/1995, p. 178-181) I read an article about industrial espionage. It is said that the secret services have lost their main task when the east/west cold war had gone. Their new task is the industrial espionage. The russian, french, and american services were referenced in the article. It was said that Pres. Clinton had given a speech while visiting the CIA HQ in Langley/Virginia. He allegedly said in this speech that obtaining industrial informations has the highest priority and this were the new task for the spies. Can anyone confirm the quotation? Hadmut

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Re: O.J. ObCrypto: Fuhrman's Folly Fans Fakery Fears...
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RA> separate step/pass) Encrypt the Signed Message (IOW is E+S just a short cut RA> for the two processes done in sequence using the same key for both The only way that -es uses the same key for both the encryption and signature is if I have EncryptToSelf turned on, or I explicity specify my signature key as one of the recipients. My privkey is used for the signature, but =your= pubkey is used for the encryption. * A dork with a modem can become a dork with a modem and an Internet address. --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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Re: Modern Journalism (was: All about Bernstein) (fwd)
by Peter F Cassidy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry, folks, I thought I'd cc:ed this to the list. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 27 Aug 1995 20:08:22 +0059 (EDT) From: Peter F Cassidy <pcassidy(a)world.std.com> To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Modern Journalism (was: All about Bernstein) I agree. Some editors refuse to let actors be engaged as professionals only. My philosophy is people's stories are their own and they are in control of them to the extent they inform these stories. WIRED likes to find crusaders and campaigners for their profiles. Sometimes they're not the swashbuckling types that make for engaging personality pieces. That's why I went for the issues around ITAR and a speculation on the case's merits in relative case law and the judicial environment it will enter. DJB got eloquent where I thought it was important in terms of the technology and research running up against a law that is itself full of negotiable loopholes, quiet on everything else. Most everyone who's met him tells me he's really retiring. Which lead me to conclude the guy might have the kind of reserve and restraint required for protracted litigation with the government which is essentially becomes an endurance contest. Now, saying that, is it weird to think that people would be interested in a fellow like that? Wrong? I've written about large scale bank frauds, organized crime, charities frauds, etc. and even when I'm writing about gangsters, personal detail isn't used for "spice" as much as it is narrative coherence. Who introduced the arsonist to the drug dealer to do the condo deal? Is that gossip or an essential detail? In science writing the personal detail illuminates sometimes, not always, the actors involved in great discovery. Is it prying to learn that Maslow felt better after he married his goofy fourth cousin and came up with theory of the heirarchy of needs? No, but it makes the story of the science more resonant. That's not a bad thing. There is undoubtedly a peoplemagazinification of journalism in the states which is why I gravitate toward the analytic or investigative publications like the Economist, Covert Action Quarterly or the Texas Observer, The Progressive and good trades like CIO. Yet even in these publications, the examination of protagonists is not considered out of bounds. I think it's not in your interest to be sniffing at the press. Tell them exactly what you wrote here and take these guys for a ride. Freeh has managed to make himself out to be this tower of virtue and civil leadership - well, up until recently and, you'll remember, led a successful charge for passage of the digital telephony bill which will be the model for crypto legislation, at least in terms of lobby tactics if not language. He did this partly by force of personality and his credibility. He didn't gain these by being precious about himself or his enterprise or, finally, by being a good cop or jurist. He did it with great PR and a sense of how the press works, not by wingeing when an interview opportunity came around. - Levy, if anything, is doing all cryptodom a favor if average schmucks pick up his book and say, gosh, is *that* what is at stake here? His NYT piece was clear and straightforward - engaged the science of crypto seriously and at the level of the reader could handle - and made the protagonists and antogonists accessible. Right now, crypto is not even on the map. Creating a barricade around the people that are driving this defining technology does no one any good. In fact, when it comes down to the end-game, legislating a ban on non-escrowed crypto, the first thing the Justice department will do is characterize you guys as amoral eggheads who are building technologies to hide the crimes of terrorists, rapists, genocidists and maniacs. At that point, I should think you would like to be appreciated as scientists with principles you act on in daily life and in your work, gosh, even personal philosophies, real personal stuff like that.

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Re: CIA & Espionage
by dsc＠swcp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In responding to Hadmut John Young seems to have quoted IWR Daily Update in writing, > UNITED STATES - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) > > President Clinton has ordered the CIA to make economic >espionage > against our trade rivals a top priority. [sources: Los >Angeles Times- > Washington, by James Risen, 7/23/95; Kyodo - Los Angeles, >7/23/95] Are we to assume both black and white? Will the CIA have access to escrowed keys in exported software? ---Dar (list newbie) =========================================================== Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 <--- 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com Fax: +1 505 898 6525 http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html My preference for attached files are in this order: AOL, Mime, Binhex4, PGP, UUencode ===========================================================

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Ajax
by nobody＠valhalla.phoenix.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A source for links to the Intelligence Community: URL: http://www.interport.net/~sagal/ajax.html ---------- AJAX UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACCESS Last update: 16 AUG 95. All accesses verified at time of inclusion. Certain locations or sections thereof may be closed to unauthorized use. Please read access warnings, if any, and abide by them. _______________________________________________________ United States Government Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agency Servers ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms) BOP (Federal Bureau of Prisons) CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) COPNET FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) FINCEN (Federal Crimes Enforcement Network) FLETC (Federal Law Enforcement Training Center) HEROES (U.S. Department of State Diplomatic Security Service Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program) MARSHALS (U.S. Marshals Service) NLETC (National Law Enforcement Technology Center) SS (Secret Service) United States Military Branch Servers NATGUARD (Army and Air National Guards) USA (United States Army) USAF (United States Air Force) USCG (United States Coast Guard) USMC (United States Marine Corps) USN (United States Navy) United States Military & Defense Agency Servers ACC (Air Combat Command) AFIN (U.S. Air Force InterNet) AFOS1 (1st Security Police Squadron, Langley Air Force Base) CHIEFS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) DEFENSE (Defense Department) DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency) DRMS (Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service) NEW (8/16/95) DTIC (Defense Technical Information Center) NAVWAN (Naval Aviation Systems Team Wide Area Network) NAWCWPNS (Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division) NCS (National Communications System) NSWC (Naval Surface Warfare Center) United States Military & Defense Laboratory Servers AHPCRC (Army High Performance Computing Research Center) ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Test Data Centers) LABLINK (U.S. Department of Defense Laboratory System) NRL (The Naval Research Laboratory) RL (USAF Rome Laboratory for C41 Technology) International Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agency Servers FORENSICS (The Forensic Web, Canada) UKPFW (UK Police and Forensic Web) RSB (Home Office Research and Statistics Department, UK) UNCPCJ (United Nations Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice) NATO and International Military Agency Servers DRA (Defence Research Agency, United Kingdom) DREO (Defense Research Establishment, Ottawa, Canada) NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic) United States Regulatory Agency Servers EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) FAA (Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center) FCC (Federal Communications Commission) FTC (Federal Trade Commission) NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) United States Government Agency Servers CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) CENSUS (U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census) CONGRESS (U.S. House of Representatives) CUSTOMS (U.S. Customs Service) DHHS (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) DOE (U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories & Programs) DOSFAN (Department of State Foreign Affairs Network) EXECUTIVE (The White House) FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) GPO (U.S. Government Printing Office) GSA (U.S. General Services Administration) HPCC (NOAA High Performance Computing and Communications) IRS (Internal Revenue Service) JUSTICE (Justice Department) NARA (National Archives and Records Administration) NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) NIMH (National Institute of Mental Health) NOAA (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration) NSF (National Science Foundation) NTIS (National Technical Information Service) SBA (Small Business Administration) NEW (8/16/95) SEL (Space Environment Laboratory) TREASURY (Treasury Department) USCODE (U.S. House of Representatives Internet Law Library U.S. Code) _______________________________________________________ AJAX maintained and monitored by Sagal Computer Systems. E-Mail suggestions, additions, comments or corrections to sagal(a)interport.net

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CIA & Espionage
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by danisch(a)ira.uka.de (Hadmut Danisch) on Wed, 30 Aug 2:46 PM >It was said that Pres. Clinton had given a speech while >visiting the CIA HQ in Langley/Virginia. He allegedly >said in this speech that obtaining industrial >informations has the highest priority and this were the >new task for the spies. > >Can anyone confirm the quotation? Hadmut, This is excerpted from: http://www.awpi.com/IntelWeb/IWR/Updates/2/181.html ---------- IWR Daily Update Vol. 2, No. 181 JULY 24, 1995 _________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) President Clinton has ordered the CIA to make economic espionage against our trade rivals a top priority. [sources: Los Angeles Times- Washington, by James Risen, 7/23/95; Kyodo - Los Angeles, 7/23/95]

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Re: CIA & Espionage
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> because of the source of confirmation, but because it fits right into the > direction most of the intelligence agencies have been taking since the > revelation that the French had won out a multi-billion $ contract for air > traffic control because the French service had, through various espionage > methods, determined the U.S. bidding position and such. We have a similar story in Germany. Some time ago, an asian country (South Korea if I remember well) was looking for a high speed passenger train. They had to choose between the german ICE and the french TGV. Both trains have nearly the same quality from technical point of view. Korea decided to take the cheaper one. The germans gave an offer and just half an hour later the french gave an offer slightly (just a little bit) cheaper than the germans. France got the order (over 10^9 D-Mark). The german headquarter had instructed their asian office to give the offer with a certain price through unprotected fax. It is said that the fax was wiretapped by the french secret service (allegedly)... Hadmut

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Article in the Guardian (UK) about Hal2 not bad ....
by Piete Brooks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An article by Azeem Azhar on page three of today's "The Guardian Online" (he tells me it is available only in paper form !) is fairly positive. He puts over the main point: "since US government regulations prevent the export of software that uses stronger cryptographic techniques".

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Re: Mixmaster Security Issues
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 6:17 PM 8/30/95, hroller Mixmaster wrote: >Apart from thwarting traffic analysis attacks, how does the security >of a Mixmaster Type II remailer packet compare to that of a >PGP-chained Type I message? > There is no way in which the security of Mixmaster messages is LESS than that of type I (cypherpunk) remailers. >For example, is each remailer in the path limited to knowing only >the next remailer in the path? Is there any way for a remailer >(except for the first and last in the chain) to know how many hops >have already occurred or how many remain? Is there a session key >chosen via an RNG? If so, how random is the RNG? Is it seeded from >a pseudo-random source that's at least as secure as measuring >keystroke latencies, as PGP does? Yes, each remailer is limited to knowing the previous and next destinations. A Mixmaster remailer can only tell if it is first, last, or somewhere in the middle. No information is leaked about position in the chain. There is a hard limit of 20 hops. >Lance Cottrell's original "remailer essay" which proposed the Type >II concept envisioned, if I'm not mistaken, the use of PGP >technology to do the actual encryptions. Now it seems that another, >seemingly proprietary, implementation of RSAREF was used, instead. >What was the reason for this change? Version 1.0 (which was released but not widely used or promoted) used PGPTools by Pr0duct Cypher. This is a library which provides hooks for most of the major PGP routines. The main problem with PGPTools is that I could not get it to compile on anything but a SUN. The other problem was that it was difficult to control the encryption so I could avoid any change in the size of information when it was encrypted. RSAREF is very portable, robust, supported, easy to work with, and was easy to use for fine control of the encryption process. RSAREF is also much less of a black box to me. I can understand what it is doing in detail. > >Would any security be lost if Type I and II technology were combined >and a PGP-chained Type I packet were initially sent via Mixmaster? >This would would seem to provide the necessary protection against >traffic analysis while bypassing any *POSSIBLE* hidden weaknesses in >Mixmaster. IOW, if the outer Mixmaster "envelope" were "steamed >open", perhasps based on some hidden weakness in Mixmaster, the >inner, nested PGP envelope(s) would remain intact. > Because of the message size limitations there are some advantages to sending the mixmaster chain through some type 1 remailers first, rather than sending a type 1 message in a Mixmaster packet. >BTW, what volume of message traffic is the Mixmaster network of >remailers currently handling? Is much cover traffic necessary to >minimize delays while providing enough reordering to thwart traffic >analysis? (IOW, so a remailer with a reordering pool size of five >messages, and averaging one REAL message a day, wouldn't have to >keep a message for an average of five days before sending it on its >next hop, as a worst-case scenario). > It is very difficult to know what fraction of the traffic I see is cover. I generate some cover traffic my self, and I know some others do as well. Right now a reordering pool of 5 messages results in a latency of about 30 min. Mixmaster is no longer a small fraction of the remailer market. A majority of all public remailers support Mixmaster. >Is my math correct in surmising that chaining a message through five >remailers, each with a reordering pool of five messages, could mean >that the message eventually leaves the chain as one of 5^5 (3125) >possible messages? (My math is a bit weak, so please feel free to >correct my methodology, if necessary.) If so, does that work in >reverse? Could a given output message that finally surfaced in the >clear be narrowed down to one of 3125 Mixmaster input messages >through traffic analysis? Or would the fact that the attacker >didn't know the exact number of hops utilized significantly increase >the odds against identifying the sender? What effect, if any, would >increasing the number of available remailers have on traffic >analysis? This is not quite correct, at each hop your message could have gone to any remailer at all. There are now 16 Mixmaster remailers in operation. If you have two good remailers in your chain (not run by the enemy), then a given message into the system is probably one of the messages that emerges between 10 Min and several hours later (with some complex probability distribution over that time). Note that because of the way the reordering is done, messages could stay in the pool forever, but this is exponentially less likely with time. It turns out that this is good security for one message, but is much less secure if you continue to communicate with the same person for some time. Then the attacker can look for correlations between your sending a message, and everyone who receives them. After several messages in one month, you will stand out, unless you send cover messages regularly, so you correlate with everyone all the time (destroying any information about who you actually correspond with). -Lance -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMEVuSvPzr81BVjMVAQGDOAf/RnB3COZyT54zaPZea3dg3DvDRVWDXdTw +vSlTdOO7Znu2EGy2hqr6hbXGFO6ExsR4ZbC/3q8WeBmATtFIkiFYbTGYR1E/plC ujN6G33eCPJayFDQY3D9ETx5jXd0fYJl4O560zRrxWoK8bdD1E2RWeEKCt8ck3mm B0apFL8M9Z5RuSmL4uke7/R3m8vXH2Iq3V28VUMSSIYyFb44ZDwjjaC35Yl91NZv 145QWv7DdyiZIr/nFgyIh+5jifuvynNNJVbIGWSH5WUevpmPTvCbwJSNnsXI78OO uvFgQfupk1tMKbdRRHUofVoDCW1e5LuYieQwk7It2rW9wo63Bx1LUA== =Hyma -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Karl Hess meeting - L.A. area
by J. Kent Hastings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: J. Kent Hastings * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice, and let me remind you, moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." -- Aristotle, and a Goldwater speechwriter, but not Karl Hess. Politically Barry's Boy, Karl was often credited with Goldwater's most famous line, but he denied it when interviewed. Karl did write books: Dear America, Community Technology, and Capitalism For Kids. --- T H E K A R L H E S S C L U B --- now in its second year of almost monthly dinners, presents The Perestroika Deception: The Phony "Collapse" of Communism September's speaker is William (Bill) McIlhany, who will speak on Conspiracy Theory of the Soviet collapse, and may answer some questions about the Chemical Bank Takeover of Chase Manhattan, if we ask real nice. The Karl Hess Club will meet Monday, September 18 at the Marie Callendar Restaurant in Marina Del Rey 4356 Lincoln Boulevard (at the 90 Fwy). The program is free of charge, but if you care to dine, $13.00 covers everything including tax and tip, with the exception of alcoholic beverages. Cocktails at 7pm, Dinner at 7:30pm, Speaker at 8:30pm. Dinner: $13.00 includes all you can eat buffet with Marie's Pot Roast. Vegetable, Salad Bar, Potato, Cornbread, Apple, Lemon and Pumpkin Pies plus (Soft) beverages included. Order alcoholic beverages on your own, cash & carry. No reservations are necessary, but for more information, you are welcome to contact Mike Everling at (213) 225-3405. In order to get to the restaurant, take the Marina (90) Freeway West until it ends at Lincoln Boulevard. Turn right at Lincoln and right again into the parking lot of the restaurant- it's just at the corner. Inside the restaurant, go upstairs to the meeting room. The program for October 16 is still in development. The venue will again be Marie Callendar in MDR, with the tentatively scheduled speaker to be Dr. John Hospers. Want to make sure you are on the Karl Hess Club mailing list? Leave a message at (310) 289-4126, e-mail at agorist003(a)aol.com, or write The Agorist Institute, 291 S. La Cienega Blvd., #749, Beverly Hills, CA 90211. Browse our Web page -- http://www.pinsight.com/~zeus/agorist/ For tax deduction, make donations payable to The Agorist Institute. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMEYh6zTxxI221vktAQFYDwP/chaMpCMb8kxpg2oo/AOi+ybiZFe5KQCY dJa8LKskqz6usBCuClhWfhvsyfwt5LOg3v9B8yRLiQR8kjHuUWNjkxY8WwsRUi3C NKGW33EeplPEg2Rpv/pxWYqNICfYQa6j9xAUVPSPZbJD9HrWM+sJ7uJGuLMY0p48 4u/vppPSyHU= =bvnM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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