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Re: Geodesic Payment Systems? (was Re: Meeting notes from ANSI X.9 Meeting onElectronic Payment)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Once again, Hettinga shoots from the hip, and hits an expert instead... ;-) At 9:07 AM 12/5/95, Nathaniel Borenstein wrote: >There are some interesting unspoken assumptions here. To calculate >anyone's "cost" on a transaction requires the complex amortization of >costs over many transactions, with assumptions/projections about the >transaction volume. I have no idea where you came by either of your >numbers, MTB's or FV's, but I can tell you that your guess about FV is >off the mark. And I'm sure that MTB is no more eager than we are to >publicly dissect all the underlying cost structures, so I have no idea >what the 50 cents that you cite really means. The 50 cents actually comes from this week's InfoWorld, Bob Metcalfe's column. I have know idea where he got the 50 cents, but he did say digital cash, so i expect that he means MTB. >To be perfectly clear: our minimum service charge is 30 cents, not 5 >dollars. If we didn't think it was worthwhile to take transactions that >small, we wouldn't do so. Fine. Are we including the cost of the credit card transaction to the consumer? Fees, interest, that stuff? There are lots of hidden costs in a book entry system. With a bearer-certificate system, the price is the spread between the certificate's bid and asked prices for (a traveller's check, for instance, is asked at a primium, and redeemed at face value, for instance. That's all the cost of using them.) >A true geodesic structure is self-supporting and self-structuring. A >cryptographic infrastructure can and should be similar, I agree >completely. However, a *monetary* infrastructure needs convertability, >and the points of conversion are always the best targets of attack for >criminals. (I've been casting about for an analogy to physical >geodesics, and it's hard to find one. The best I can come up with is to >imagine that in order to convert a carbon buckyball to a more >conventional set of carbon molecules, you had to do it through a service >bureau that was capable of error, fraud, or subversion by outside >criminals. This would ONLY matter if you ever wanted to do such >conversions, but it would matter a lot then, especially if you had to >suffer a serious financial loss if you got the wrong carbon molecules at >the end of the process.) Sometimes I feel like I'm beating this geodesic metaphor like a dead horse sometimes... ;-). > >IF you wanted to settle for a totally non-convertible economy (like >rubles in the old Soviet Union, or like the LETS system on the net >today, as I understand it) then you could build it geodesically. Really? > But if >you want to be able to convert back and forth between Internet payment >systems and non-Internet payment systems, it can never be truly >geodesic. It will always be attackable at the points of conversion. >(You may "trade digital certificates", but how do you know the ones >you're receiving were obtained for legitimate real-world value?) >Because of this, the underwriting financial institutions, who have a >very reasonable desire to limit their own risk, will inevitably seek the >protection-by-traceability offered by something less than perfect >anonymity. We may not like it, but it's a very natural position to be >taken by those who are actually bearing the financial risks at the point >of conversion. That may be true, Nathaniel, but just because the people who bring the money off the net need to be identified to the digital cash underwriter's (actually the underwriter's bank's) satisfaction, doesn't mean that the trades on the net can't be totally anonymous. We've gone over this before. Let's build a model to talk about this, and then you'll see what I mean. Suppose I open an anonymous bank account with ATM card. Then, on the net, I buy digital cash from a digital cash underwriter. The web-page reads my ATM swipe and PIN, and then pumps it (without the underwriter being able to read it) through to my bank, who says to the underwriter, "Yup, there's money here, send it to him, and I'll wire it you (now/overnight/whatever)." The digital cash underwriter then issues me my digital cash, and I put it on my hard drive. I buy stuff on the net. I sell stuff on the net. Sometimes I go online with the trade to check my buyers' cash, sometimes I don't. Element of risk there, but this risk can be made accountable. It's probably always going to be cheaper to do offline transactions, but there's the possibility that when I cash in that money, it has been spent already. Fair trade. It's probably quantifiable and thus can be dealt with. We won't know till we have data. Being an astute businessman (you can tell this is a model, right?), I end up with positive cashflow. So, that money I don't invest with a portfolio manager on the net by buying anonymous bearer certificates for his mutual fund, ;-), I decide to take off of the net and buy Netscape puts, March 1996, $10. So, I go to the underwriter's page (maybe I go to multiple underwriters' pages, or maybe there's an enterprising third-party money changer who honors all comers for a cut), and I cash out. I swipe my ATM and punch my PIN, and my bank says to the underwriter "OK, I know that account, how much are you sending me?", and the underwriter says how much, and how and when the money would arrive (wire? Rollerblade messenger? bunch of militia types in a purple Hummer?, anyway...). And there's money back off of the net. In this model, there's no reason why I can't send an anonymous software agent to buy stuff for me, why I can't buy anonymously or sell anonymously. So, given that model, what's the problem? Now, I've also been thinking about something else. Wei Dai has been talking about how anonymity will always cost more, and certainly, in the model above, there's a certain risk with doing off-line transactions. You don't know if the cash in the transaction is double-spent, like I said above, but that "special stuff" has to be done to accomodate anonymity, which will always cost more. I'll come back with a whole blather on this next week when I get back from the CyberDog Kitchen (I'm here, and Gromit says "hi"), but I think it comes from what the default mechanism for commerce is going to be, threaded, audit-trailed x.blabla or anarchic, geodesic, bearer-certificates. I bet you can guess where I'm going to come down on this... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Kill Files and Plonking
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A predictable round of "Public Plonkings" and "You're in my kill file, nyah, nyah, nyah!" postings. Personally, I regret ever mentioning adding anyone to my filter file, as it then generated the expected "But Tim won't see this...." nonsense. I shouldn't have done it. Public plonkings rarely accomplish anything. I move names and topics in and out of my filter files as the mood strikes me. I have the option of looking at the mail that's ended up in one of my various filter files, and deciding to move someone out of that file and back into the main list file. (With Eudora, I filter _every_ incoming message into one of a dozen or so files. It's just a question of which one. For a few really obnoxious people, I filter their stuff into Eudora's "Trash" file; when I empty the trash (Macintosh TM), their message is irretrievably gone.) I think it's best _not_ to publicize who is in one's filter or kill file for a couple of reasons: 1. It cuts down on the acrimonious plonkings and couter-plonkings. 2. It leaves open the door for gracefully reversing the process. 3. The filtered or killfiled person never really knows if he's being filtered, so there's a "random reinforcement" element which may, I am guessing, have an effect on posts. To satisfy any curiousity aroused, at this moment there are 12 names which I filter into a file called "Kill File" (but which is persistent, and can be looked at by me at any time) and only 2 names which I filter into "Trash" (which gets emptied fairly often, usually without my having looked to see what went into it). (No name I have ever mentioned publically in this context is in this Trash file.) Some people who write to me and get no response may of course be left wondering....this is the beauty of random reinforcement. --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: The Problem With Blaze And Weinstein
by Bob Bruen, MIT Lab for Nuclear Science 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> MIT is practically floating on government subsidies. It's funny how the grass is always greener somewhere else... Bob

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radikal: raid in the netherlands
by tank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PRESS-DECLARATION 14-12-96 After the German authorities tried to force their censorship on people's thoughts and writings worldwide on the Internet, Germany now tries to prosecute a person who lives in the Netherlands for the making of the left-wing newspaper Radikal. In the morning of the 11th of December there was a houseraid in the village of Vaals (The Netherlands). In the raid ten local police-officers, a high officer from the Maastricht-court, two LKA (Landes Kriminal Ambt) German officers and two BKA (Bundes Kriminal Ambt) German officers took place. The 16 German and Dutch officers forced themselves into the house with the help of a lock specialist. The only person at home during the raid only noticed it after some time when the room next to her was already being searched. The german and dutch police refuged to explain the reason for this raid. German autorities refered to the dutch ones for explanations and the other way around. It was only after insisting that they explained the search warrant came from the german authorities in Karlsruhe. During the two hour raid two personal computers, floppy-discs, foto's, a pamflet and some Radikal stickers were seized. During this whole operation it was not clear against who or what this action was aimed and why this house was searched. It only became clear after the raid when another person came home from his work and phoned his mother in Aachen (Germany). At his mothers house there was also a house raid going on, nothing was taken there. At this house-raid six LKA officers took part and in a paper they declaired to have reasons for this raid because of evidence found in the raid in Vaals. "During the raid at the suspect's house evidence was found (...) that show the suspect (...) is using the house of his mother as well". This evidence consisted of his mother's car papers. The declaration paper alsow showed the purpose of the raid: " The search for Radikal publications, subscribers lists and financial information". The suspect is being charged with the making and distributing of the left wing newspaper Radikal. A newspaper that is forbidden only in Germany . The supposed involvement with a political magazine, forbidden in Germany, apparently is enough for the Dutch authorities to work for the German juridical apparatus. This means that the German idea of law and order concerning magazines leads to the joint persecution of a Spanish citizen living in the Netherlands. Although the magazine is entirely legal in the Netherlands. The dimension of the German-Dutch cooperation within the framework of the new "European Security Policy" is shown here in a very clear way. It shows that an attempt is made to completely redefine the persecution, across all borders, of politically unwanted people. Solidaritygroup Political Prisoners P/o box 3762 1001 AN Amsterdam The Nertherlands <tank(a)xs4all.nl>

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Re: PGP
by DANIEL CHARPENTIER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 6 Dec 1995, david d `zoo' zuhn wrote: > Also, you can have keys that are too large. Do you want to take hours to > encrypt a simple file, just because you have a 30000 bit key? Do you > expect your recipients to take the same amount of time (or more) to > decrypt it? > The tradeoff between cost & security is probably too high in that case (I > surely wouldn't bother to decrypt anything you sent me if I had to wait > hours or more). Now be practical. You do have options. Just because you have the capability to encrypt with a 30000 bit key does NOT mean that it is mandated that you encrypt with a 30000 bit key. The reason that cypherpunks is even in existence is that sometimes privacy is a must. Sometimes you want to make sure that a common thief can not read your files and others you want to make sure the N.S.A. can not read your files. This is not in dispute. We all know this. Having the option is comforting ( in my opinion of course ).

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Re: PGP
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:54 PM 12/6/95 -0500, you wrote: > I've tried to find out the answers to my >questions myself but I haven't been very successful. >Actually, I haven't been successful at all. First of all, >I've been using PGP on my computer but when I tried to port it >over to my unix account it didn't work. I took the source code >and tried to compile it using the unix g++ compiler but it gave >me all of these errors. Where can I find PGP that is already >compiled for unix or at the very least will compile for unix? >Secondly, if I create a program that makes using PGP more >user friendly can I let other people have it ( for FREE )? >Lastly, what is considered overkill with cryptography? >I don't believe anything is. My programs accept what the user >inputs for how large prime numbers should be ( my public >key programs ) but I make them able to accept values that go >up to 30720 bits ( I don't believe a number can ever be large >enough ). You can never be to safe...never. Firstly - and don't take this personally - how much computer knowledge do you have? The PGP sources use all sorts of #ifdefs and other kludges. A fair amount of C coding ability is needed to get the damn things to do much of anything. (Hell, I can't read most of it - my precompiled MSDOS version does what I need it to do.) If you make PGP more user friendly... well, PGP 3.0 is still coming Real Soon Now (TM) and it will include an API that will make hooking into it ridiculously simple. Beyond that, there are already a number of good DOS and Windows shells for it, and nobody on unix-flavoured systems expects a clean user interface anyway :) (Well, except for XWindows...) But, if you write it - and I'm cautioning you to be sure you don't reinvent the wheel - you can distribute it freely. I suggest using the terms of the GNU GPL. And the key values - well, you can give it 32k bits, but 1. generating a key pair could take a prohibitively long time; 2. nobody else can use it (the default PGP distributions are capped off at 2047 bits). Good luck. Dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMMXoSwwyfvCScyE5AQEwtQQA0IHRhQiBej05B8KfFMJh95+XVvzW5ax1 SgQGrNABIdnyOkDSgPLA97vQ04agU8ytOyaDMW/X4IuI/zZgsqOzegsb57+TEcAz sB7mvzmW0tTrEEdMRjBkaZRAnf0wTrf2EqtR3lshJCgzK1MB6szG3w4N8yb26YKD 2VyBrX10nRY= =sRw4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1210 Towers South, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63701-4745 +1(573)339-3814, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0x92732139 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/

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Re: Solution for US/Foreign Software?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:21 PM 12/6/95, jim bell wrote: >NO! You didn't read my commentary carefully enough. These "hooks" (your >words) will, in effect, already be connected to encryption software weak >enough to make NSA happy. You know, 40 bit keys or something like that. >But instead of being in one large file, embedded into a program, it'll be >TWO files. Simple programming change. Everything that >implements/defines/limits the encryption to 40 bits will be in the smaller >file. >This really isn't a "hook," it's an internal connection between two >portions of the same program. (actually, it wouldn't need to be in two >separate files; a file which implements a patch for the first file would >work great.) > >It'll be exportable, because its key size is "acceptable." At the time >the export license is requested, the replacement module to increase key >size probably won't even exist, in order to avoid giving the USG an >excuse to deny the export license. After the license is obtained, the >replacement module is written and shipped to domestic users. > >I fully realize the USG won't "like" this kind of thing. But if they are >trying to take the position that certain kinds of encryption software CAN >be exported, and some can't, they're going to have to approve SOME >programs for export, using criteria which at least pretend to be >objective. Yes, I read your proposal. The "hooks" term is not my coinage, but refers to this general idea. I urge you to read what others, including companies, have had to say on this matter. Much of the debate on "interoperability" revolves around details of entry points to crypto modules and such hooks. No point in arguing with Jim on this anymore, so I won't. Good luck, Jim, in introducing such a product. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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more keys
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK here's some more keys: [1] for "Magic Circle" [2] for "Necessarily Knott, ME" Again were these keys used to sign anything interesting? Key [1] was preceeded, perhaps meaningfully by this text in the long (22k) Epilogue 5: : Now: : : Go home, kick your fucking door in, place a disk in the floppy drive, and : type 'pgp -kxa "My KeyID" a:\secring.asc secring.pgp'. : Mail the disk to Louis J. Freeh : : Does your copy of PGP ask for a password before spitting out the KeyID : to any one of a thousand monkeys who sits at your keyboard and : randomly types in the above? : : My copy doesn't. : : Below is a copy of a key pulled off of my computer by 19 different people. : : It was pulled off of my hard drive by the first individual, who : proceeded to inform a second individual of the method used, and : challenged them to do the same thing, using a different method. The : second did so, and passed all the information along to a third person, : etc., etc. : : Nineteen people, nineteen different methods. if Toto apparently speaks in parables, and via fiction etc. is he saying that the RCMP or someone else pulled his keys off his computers? How does this correlate with his posts on the subject of hassles with the RCMP, and confiscation of some of his machines? Adam [1] ====================================================================== This one has userid: Magic Circle -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 lQHgAzHiUJEAAAEEAP1slPSwrVd90NVBqfsw6+JP64icmuSrztzyCgaPcXHRiy/J Kbgi9/gy1iCnWcQh1ATaSzblATSU24Xw+4Ow4s5xOvdxFGoIop6EXwTNfwRa2EZr 6ZZ41Glr9g1g9H0RJwJlkldUcunVNekXel1MYA8VJJynvtZVuntA11SbF0AdAAUT Ab7sJWrM/6azA/vV2wq4sdyfngUgUHq8Hlo5NHvEjyh2cSoMMNxnpKR3+XYRbYTd HhwfbOvji1cWnVJF6GBxe3nLvbkbHJU+K3hNNYOT9JKMahu+5wKMbHkwToSsLzyQ kgn2JlKDJugoycdjInlQs7NiyoOrIYWQzSi4yGbhl2t1Au+67UY/r57J9AIA8V/6 J5x1wH7MACSWU91jXXxpJvSud053nrSgnupEUbFX3dXm0GXf6vdhbQW9eYsIJmCI pZLrqwBcFe2GWhk9AAIActyoxAgCvFyGSJHHzJVVoKfWk/gjmKs/r7+J9vWnBAkc Pg0wqUn66Hmq0op28gEXU3qKJiJ8rAQETAxBhfpnJgH83CrrEZDcBY8IKsFI2A19 KahohyDXmsEHIWqKZLSwzjsYcf049RCUxNDPJZchuoMEPkK9414KyPqlJbStsFaE YZ6itAxNYWdpYyBDaXJjbGU=3D =3DGEo6 -----END PGP MESSAGE----- and it was posted in a message dated 20 Oct. 97 with Subject: InfoWar Epilogue 5 / TEXT ====================================================================== [2] ====================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 lQD4AzRmZWoAAAECAMnJrqd/TERCLeFscdgNvwVxrVG4tRm0VThMEXXkctCGMaUD jcETxcV0ZseRUcyUKfqlLd3CRsIwClozlWHHR7EABREAAfwJ5D1Ecilit/Mwsn4N GcWZXWpg3mM6/Epzs2pEhi3I926ZiWPB1DKmdZR4nVemsnwv47SWLJyCnE4sben5 h8oHAQDTFaJDJSN7+9NToOE4NFiruAXXMIHEQ6ZH21oW1sYSiwEA9LmhvfahDVKo 1/CMtxxozAtG8rWycBYVIVrkDKiVgjMBAKeB2VY/f7tzmv7KxUUtN9607+CQlWPp E3HBLTlwtuRAUxC0FU5lY2Vzc2FyaWx5IEtub3R0LCBNRQ== =caeb -----END PGP MESSAGE----- posted in a message dated 10 Nov. 97 with Subject: Key Signing ====================================================================== Adam

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Re: News on Congressional Debate on Exon
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> (Controlling Web page accesses is a much tougher problem, of course. so I > wouldn't expect much action on this at first.) > > By the way, I recently discovered a new twist on "age credentials": the use > of credit cards to prove age. One image site is asking for a "valid credit > card number" to be given...not to use for charges, but just to do a quick > verification (they claim a few minutes or less) that the card is valid and > in the name of the person accessing their site. > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, Actually, I've been thinking about this quite a bit recently. I'm building an SSL enabled server, and clent-side authentication may provide some help. I could see a user getting his or her public key certificate signed with different CA keys which assert any number of conditions, such as: Key holder was born before (some particular date). Key holder has access to sales data for XYZ corp. Key holder is an adult who takes the first amendment seriously. ... and the server would recognize different CA signatures as permitting different levels of access. If your browser permitted you to select the key certificate used in setting up the encrypted link (and different certs or sets of certs could be protected with different passphrases), then Mom or Dad could use their I-am-an-adult credential to read www.xxx.com, while Junior could not. There *is* a loss of anonymity in this scheme, however. I realize that digital credentials are old hat on this list. The point I am making is that the pieces for doing this are here - we just need to assemble them. (This is not to suggest that I am in favor of Exon/Coates in any way - I am not. ) Speaking for myself alone.... Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Inherent Insecurity of Internet Commerce! (was RE: Secret Clearance)
by Pete Loshin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK, I'll try again. First, as I recall, SECRET clearance is actually not very high: when I got it, I had to answer a bunch of questions (do you abuse illegal drugs? are you now or have you ever been a member of any organizations? have you ever been _arrested_ for anything?) and fill out some forms and get fingerprinted. They probably did a credit check, and that was about it. Nobody I knew got any calls asking about my habits (that is reserved for higher clearances). So now I'll rename the thread again: "Inherent Insecurity of Internet Commerce" -- <sarcasm>maybe now the NYT will feature me on the front page for "discovering" this inherent flaw in the Internet.</sarcasm> My purpose in renaming the thread in the first place was to start another thread relating to the types of security in places like, say, Netscape or Spyglass or CyberCash or First Virtual or Interramp or any other ISP or software company. Because I want to know how susceptible these companies are to hiring the wrong people. So, here's the "bug": if some agency of crime/espionage wants to subvert any of these systems, all they need do is employ the same blackmail/bribe techniques used to recruit actual spies on some employees of these companies. They then slip in some hacked versions of the software with the good ones, or modify distribution servers, or slip code into servers that forwards every tenth credit card number somewhere. Or how about getting a janitor to plug a wireless tap into one of the major Internet backbones to sniff for cc#s as well as interesting e-mail? Also, since there's enough noise here already (and even I don't see that much crypto-relevance) I won't post again on this topic, but I am very interested in hearing concrete examples of how Internet companies are protecting themselves, and also in hearing about specific instances of security failing (e.g., has anyone ever found a tap on a backbone?) -Pete Loshin pete(a)loshin.com

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