- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [tahoe-dev] verification of subset of file == proof of retrievability
by Brian Warner 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 6/12/12 10:57 PM, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote: > Folks: > > Over on the Bitcoin discussion forums (warning: wretched hive of scum > and villainy), someone was asserting that they wanted a "proof of > retrievability" protocol and saying that, while they hadn't looked, > they were pretty sure Tahoe-LAFS didn't do it right: > > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2236.msg847771#msg847771 > > I was mildly annoyed by this, because actually we have some extremely > strong features along those lines. Well, we've never implemented a POR because we've never really wanted one. "Proof-of-retrievability" is achieved by just retrieving the data. What the cryptography literature calls proof-of-retention (or -retrievability, -data-posession, or -ownership) gives you is a way to *cheaply* (i.e. using less storage and bandwidth than the whole file) assert that some remote server still has the data they claimed to have, and haven't found some clever (i.e. cheaper) way to just pass the test without really holding the whole file. There's a number of protocols already out there. In general the verifier can assert that either the server is holding the full original file, or a collection of calculated verification data that is at least as large as the original file (so if they want to pass the test, they might as well be honest). http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=3357 is one example. The simplest way to do this, however, is for the verifier to hold the whole file too. When we've discussed this in the Tahoe "one grid to rule them all" context, we've talked about "share buddies": two non-collaborating servers, each purportedly holding a copy of the same share. They check up on each other by asking for keyed hashes of random sections of the share (or the whole thing, if they're willing to spend the disk IO on it). The idea was part of a larger server-driven-repair thing we were thinking of: servers check up on the files they're helping to store, and if they notice problems, they can trigger repair all by themselves. Distributed reputation measurements are involved too: servers can boost their reputation by delivering POR proofs on a timely basis, and share-buddies can vouch for each other. Anyways, it's sort of a neat idea, but we probably need some more extensive accounting / server-reputation frameworks in place before it'll be super useful in the Tahoe context. cheers, -Brian _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] hardware options for a computer phone, not a mobile phone...
by John Case 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I'm interested in finally responding in some ways to the vulnerabilities and privacy implications of the mobile phone and its networks. For my own comms, that is. In addition to the problems with privacy and tracking, I am also worried about problems at lower layers - like rogue BTS abusing my radio to exploit the phone. We first saw real evidence of this at defcon 2-3 years ago when there was a rogue BTS attempting android exploits (see coderman posting to cypherpunks around that time). I think there are two broad strategies to pursue here. The first is the obvious one - a totally open, free software firm, from layer 1 all the way up. The major problem with this strategy is that it is a long way off from existing - osmocombb still barely has a working model of a phone that can place an actual call, and this is ONLY on a very limited chipset that is 2G only, and voice only. It appears that osmocom is moving forward in a lot of ways, but they are not graduating to other, or better chipsets (ie., to 3G, and to fast data) - and even if they were, we're years and years away. But there's another strategy that has all of the components already in existence, and that is to use a handheld computer that *happens* to contain a GSM or CDMA *module* (or both) in addition to WIFI. With this setup, you can behave as a SIP device (using WIFI as much as possible) for all calls - you never make a call, or perform any action using the phone network directly. All phone activity is tunneled through SIP/VOIP to your own server at a fixed datacenter, where you have either a hosted SIM in a pci card, or you have a POTS uplink. This is very appealing because it means that most of the time (depending on where you live) you are just using WIFI. When you are forced to failover to (for instance) GSM, you are using a very, very simple, modular modem that you can easily control (ifconfig xx0 down) and that caontains an anonymous, prepaid SIM. You don't care about the number, or the ID, or about any of the contraints of prepaid SIMs, since you just need network access. > From the outside world, all calls come from the same fixed point, no matter where you are in the world. Further, if you have colocation, you control that fixed point. Finally, while you don't have total layer 1 control over the GSM modem, you do have *some* control over it - you can ifconfig it down, you can disable it, you can *physically remove* it, and presumably you can interact with it in much more profound ways, since its a modular modem inside of a unix system you control (your handset). So the question ... what is the handset ? If a handheld linux computer (archos ? old compaq ipaq ?) wasn't designed as a mobile phone, it won't have speaker at the ear and mic at the mouth as you would expect, so that's difficult. OTOH, if you use a handheld computer that was designed as a phone, you have a problem with the tight integration of the mobile modem with the device, and you lose some control over the modem and its attack vectors (although if you are running a completely open OS, perhaps not ?) I am looking at some of the later HP Ipaq models, like the HP Ipaq 910c, which has GSM built in (it's a phone) ... honestly, I'm at a loss - I know all about modern phones like nexus, etc., which will not fit here, and I know all about modern android-based handheld devices like nook and kindle fire and so on ... but who makes a handheld, phone sized (not tablet sized) linux capable computer that I can easily insert one or more mobile modems into ? Since all we need is a linux computer, perhaps other devices, like a mp3 player (as long as it has a SD card for a modem) would work ? Comments / advice appreciated ... -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?
by Patrick Sinz 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The whole question seems to be a way to hide the proverbial white elephant. Why would the border police want to look at my PC's content anyway (apart from proving that it really work and is not just a cleverly disguised bomb, or drug stash). If I would smuggle illegal "whatshamacallits" the only reason to do it on my PC and travel through the border instead of using the internet would be because the internet "borders" would be watched "better" than the physical borders. So it seems that either: "Whatshamacallits" smuggler are better informed than I am and KNOW that the <your favorite big brother> is reading ALL their encrypted anonymised e-mail. (and of course mine and yours and everybodys, because how would they know otherwise). Or it is not an efficient way to stop "Whatshamacallits" smuggler and then it seems it is just a way to hassle random people, since booting your PC letting the officer sniff around to find "Whatshamacallits" will take a significant amount of time, probably enough the make you miss your plane, train connection or what ever. (I guess using non Microsoft OS will be a way to agravate the nice officer that has not been trained on your platform). It also prompts a question: If I have a virtual "on-line" disk somewhere (lets say just to seem really suspicious it is hosted in transdniestrian moldova) I go to the US with my "clean PC", and then sit down and remote mount my "on-line" disk. Does it mean that now the US border control can legally inspect my data as it enters the US without any warrant ? Since it would actually be just a "continuation" of the search that they "might have made" on my PC when I crossed the border. [ps] ------------------- - In truth we are not moving to a "big brother state" it is just a conspiration launched by the pharma industry to sell more anti paranoia pills - but of course "they" would say that ;-) Le dimanche 30 juillet 2006 ` 18:04 -0400, David Farber a icrit : > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: Andrew Grosso <Agrosso(a)acm.org> >Date: July 30, 2006 4:58:41 PM EDT >To: dave(a)farber.net >Subject: Re: [IP] Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: >Police Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd] > >As a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, allow me to comment. > >Information may be obtained by the government from a person in one of >four ways: (1) it is voluntarily provided; (2) by regulation in a >heavily regulated industry; (3) by subpoena; and (4) by a search and >seizure warrant. We are concerned with number 3, the subpoena. > >A person can refuse to produce incriminating information in response >to a subpoena under the Fifth Amendment. Please note that the >password is not protected. If it is written down somewhere, the >document on which it is written is not protected by the privilege. >The *act* of producing the document or the password itself *may* be >privileged, if such an act is itself incriminating. For example, if >the password was used in a crime, and the fact that you have the >password in your possession tends to show that you participated or >conspired in the crime, and then the Fifth Amendment privilege is >applicable to protect you from implicating yourself in the crime. >The Government *can* immunize you to the limited extent necessary to >obtain the password - it cannot then use the fact that it got the >password from you in order to prosecute you. This is known as "Doe" >immunity, and there is an extensive line of cases that has developed >in this area. Webster Hubbell, the former Associate Attorney General >who was convicted of tax fraud by Ken Starr's IC Office, eventually >had his conviction vacated because Starr's legal team failed to >follow the rules when they obtained, from him (by subpoena), his tax >records. > >If the government is not investigating a crime, then it may use an >administrative or civil subpoena to try and get the password. If the >witness invokes the Fifth Amendment, then the government can immunize >that person and compel production. > >The second point, above, concerning a regulated industry, applies to >such areas as Medicare and Medicaid, Government contractors for >procurement matters, industrial health and safety mattes, >environmental concerns, etc. The same analysis as above would apply. > >Border searches are a different animal, since the government has the >right to inspect items crossing the border without a warrant. >However, if the password is in the traveler's head, then that is not >an "item" that can be inspected at the border. The information on >the laptop might very well be such an item, however, and if the only >way to convince the government to allow you to cross the border is to >show the border guards what is on the laptop, then the traveler might >very well face the choice of turning on the laptop and opening >files,, using the password, or not crossing the border. I do not >believe that, even here, the traveler would have to produce the >password itself. > > >Andrew Grosso, Esq. >Andrew Grosso & Associates >1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 200 >Washington, D.C. 20036 >(202) 261-3593 >Email: Agrosso(a)acm.org >Web Site: www.GrossoLaw.com >----- Original Message ----- >From: David Farber >To: ip(a)v2.listbox.com >Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 2:26 PM >Subject: [IP] Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: Police >Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd] > > > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick(a)ianai.net> >Date: July 28, 2006 2:11:45 PM EDT >To: dave(a)farber.net >Cc: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick(a)ianai.net> >Subject: Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: Police >Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd] > >On Jul 28, 2006, at 1:32 PM, David Farber wrote: > >>I don't believe it is a crime in any US Federal or State law, or in >>Canadian law, to set passwords and use encryption. In the US, I >>believe that a warrant would be necessary for law enforcement to >>ask for your password, but I don't know if you have to comply. >IANAL. > >That is a good question - Can you be compelled to give up a >password? Would you mind posting it to IP, I am interested in the >answer. > >Seems there might be some 'self-incriminatory' arguments here. >Perhaps even an "unreasonable search" argument. But IANAL. > ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: Police Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd]
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [tor-talk] Can one make money running anonymity services?
by tor＠lists.grepular.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 30/06/12 12:06, Eugen Leitl wrote: >> But are there anonymous payment tools in this days of control? I >> just > > Anonymous prepaid cards, or BitCoin over Tor would come to mind. Does anyone know a method of obtaining BitCoins anonymously, other than mining them yourself? - -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ http://cardwellit.com/ OpenPGP Key 35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F XMPP OTR Key 8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1 BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGGBAEBCgBwBQJP7vm4MBSAAAAAACAAB3ByZWZlcnJlZC1lbWFpbC1lbmNvZGlu Z0BwZ3AuY29tcGdwbWltZTgUgAAAAAAVABpwa2EtYWRkcmVzc0BnbnVwZy5vcmdt aWtlLmNhcmR3ZWxsQGdyZXB1bGFyLmNvbQAKCRCdJiMBwdHnBKYwB/97blKzGaIe dE6RdRpFFwGxrnRPZCrSaxL2pr35tmHGlECv6fa3cGOLb3ThczkJpZDWQOkgpO3b fAEaC5R2aeLE9tBlRkURBx+pY1Kr/+4MUh3VTRX5ggUswPE1Nts6ygrdyP8ga3v2 UO4njvyRZHlcr8HTiZaO7D75tus/K4iI1gwIMyf0jGUzIBPAMjQ80qoIhHcoXOc4 IbQY8gkFwjrVRJPHKUhZI4Xg+9uDNpPBuZO3b1QLvm7M2EaLars+kUiF1ZPUgHJ5 PTHPlkhHJo44iw0Nucn4iManK2v6DxDaPxbCw/+Qufk9KYnVz9C2rFjBTVwq5WHN iTz6vnqp0XFx =MY4s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?
by Patrick Sinz 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The whole question seems to be a way to hide the proverbial white elephant. Why would the border police want to look at my PC's content anyway (apart from proving that it really work and is not just a cleverly disguised bomb, or drug stash). If I would smuggle illegal "whatshamacallits" the only reason to do it on my PC and travel through the border instead of using the internet would be because the internet "borders" would be watched "better" than the physical borders. So it seems that either: "Whatshamacallits" smuggler are better informed than I am and KNOW that the <your favorite big brother> is reading ALL their encrypted anonymised e-mail. (and of course mine and yours and everybodys, because how would they know otherwise). Or it is not an efficient way to stop "Whatshamacallits" smuggler and then it seems it is just a way to hassle random people, since booting your PC letting the officer sniff around to find "Whatshamacallits" will take a significant amount of time, probably enough the make you miss your plane, train connection or what ever. (I guess using non Microsoft OS will be a way to agravate the nice officer that has not been trained on your platform). It also prompts a question: If I have a virtual "on-line" disk somewhere (lets say just to seem really suspicious it is hosted in transdniestrian moldova) I go to the US with my "clean PC", and then sit down and remote mount my "on-line" disk. Does it mean that now the US border control can legally inspect my data as it enters the US without any warrant ? Since it would actually be just a "continuation" of the search that they "might have made" on my PC when I crossed the border. [ps] ------------------- - In truth we are not moving to a "big brother state" it is just a conspiration launched by the pharma industry to sell more anti paranoia pills - but of course "they" would say that ;-) Le dimanche 30 juillet 2006 ` 18:04 -0400, David Farber a icrit : > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: Andrew Grosso <Agrosso(a)acm.org> >Date: July 30, 2006 4:58:41 PM EDT >To: dave(a)farber.net >Subject: Re: [IP] Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: >Police Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd] > >As a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, allow me to comment. > >Information may be obtained by the government from a person in one of >four ways: (1) it is voluntarily provided; (2) by regulation in a >heavily regulated industry; (3) by subpoena; and (4) by a search and >seizure warrant. We are concerned with number 3, the subpoena. > >A person can refuse to produce incriminating information in response >to a subpoena under the Fifth Amendment. Please note that the >password is not protected. If it is written down somewhere, the >document on which it is written is not protected by the privilege. >The *act* of producing the document or the password itself *may* be >privileged, if such an act is itself incriminating. For example, if >the password was used in a crime, and the fact that you have the >password in your possession tends to show that you participated or >conspired in the crime, and then the Fifth Amendment privilege is >applicable to protect you from implicating yourself in the crime. >The Government *can* immunize you to the limited extent necessary to >obtain the password - it cannot then use the fact that it got the >password from you in order to prosecute you. This is known as "Doe" >immunity, and there is an extensive line of cases that has developed >in this area. Webster Hubbell, the former Associate Attorney General >who was convicted of tax fraud by Ken Starr's IC Office, eventually >had his conviction vacated because Starr's legal team failed to >follow the rules when they obtained, from him (by subpoena), his tax >records. > >If the government is not investigating a crime, then it may use an >administrative or civil subpoena to try and get the password. If the >witness invokes the Fifth Amendment, then the government can immunize >that person and compel production. > >The second point, above, concerning a regulated industry, applies to >such areas as Medicare and Medicaid, Government contractors for >procurement matters, industrial health and safety mattes, >environmental concerns, etc. The same analysis as above would apply. > >Border searches are a different animal, since the government has the >right to inspect items crossing the border without a warrant. >However, if the password is in the traveler's head, then that is not >an "item" that can be inspected at the border. The information on >the laptop might very well be such an item, however, and if the only >way to convince the government to allow you to cross the border is to >show the border guards what is on the laptop, then the traveler might >very well face the choice of turning on the laptop and opening >files,, using the password, or not crossing the border. I do not >believe that, even here, the traveler would have to produce the >password itself. > > >Andrew Grosso, Esq. >Andrew Grosso & Associates >1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 200 >Washington, D.C. 20036 >(202) 261-3593 >Email: Agrosso(a)acm.org >Web Site: www.GrossoLaw.com >----- Original Message ----- >From: David Farber >To: ip(a)v2.listbox.com >Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 2:26 PM >Subject: [IP] Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: Police >Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd] > > > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick(a)ianai.net> >Date: July 28, 2006 2:11:45 PM EDT >To: dave(a)farber.net >Cc: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick(a)ianai.net> >Subject: Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: Police >Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd] > >On Jul 28, 2006, at 1:32 PM, David Farber wrote: > >>I don't believe it is a crime in any US Federal or State law, or in >>Canadian law, to set passwords and use encryption. In the US, I >>believe that a warrant would be necessary for law enforcement to >>ask for your password, but I don't know if you have to comply. >IANAL. > >That is a good question - Can you be compelled to give up a >password? Would you mind posting it to IP, I am interested in the >answer. > >Seems there might be some 'self-incriminatory' arguments here. >Perhaps even an "unreasonable search" argument. But IANAL. > ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password? [was: Police Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd]
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [tor-talk] Can one make money running anonymity services?
by tor＠lists.grepular.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 30/06/12 12:06, Eugen Leitl wrote: >> But are there anonymous payment tools in this days of control? I >> just > > Anonymous prepaid cards, or BitCoin over Tor would come to mind. Does anyone know a method of obtaining BitCoins anonymously, other than mining them yourself? - -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ http://cardwellit.com/ OpenPGP Key 35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F XMPP OTR Key 8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1 BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGGBAEBCgBwBQJP7vm4MBSAAAAAACAAB3ByZWZlcnJlZC1lbWFpbC1lbmNvZGlu Z0BwZ3AuY29tcGdwbWltZTgUgAAAAAAVABpwa2EtYWRkcmVzc0BnbnVwZy5vcmdt aWtlLmNhcmR3ZWxsQGdyZXB1bGFyLmNvbQAKCRCdJiMBwdHnBKYwB/97blKzGaIe dE6RdRpFFwGxrnRPZCrSaxL2pr35tmHGlECv6fa3cGOLb3ThczkJpZDWQOkgpO3b fAEaC5R2aeLE9tBlRkURBx+pY1Kr/+4MUh3VTRX5ggUswPE1Nts6ygrdyP8ga3v2 UO4njvyRZHlcr8HTiZaO7D75tus/K4iI1gwIMyf0jGUzIBPAMjQ80qoIhHcoXOc4 IbQY8gkFwjrVRJPHKUhZI4Xg+9uDNpPBuZO3b1QLvm7M2EaLars+kUiF1ZPUgHJ5 PTHPlkhHJo44iw0Nucn4iManK2v6DxDaPxbCw/+Qufk9KYnVz9C2rFjBTVwq5WHN iTz6vnqp0XFx =MY4s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[rael-science] Amnesty International on terror laws: Dangerous. Ill-conceived. An assault on human rights
by selected by Rael 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Source: The Independent http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article324062.ece Amnesty International on terror laws: Dangerous. Ill-conceived. An assault on human rights Tony Blair's plans for tough new anti-terror legislation have been subjected to a damning critique by Amnesty International, as MPs prepare to debate the measures today. In a submission to MPs, Amnesty International denounced the proposals to increase police powers of detention and make a new offence of the glorification of terrorism. It called them "ill-conceived and dangerous" , amounting to an attack on "the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law". The organisation's onslaught - in the strongest language it has deployed against the Blair Government - came as ministers braced themselves for sustained opposition to the Terrorism Bill when it is debated in the Commons from today. The Bill has already been condemned by senior judges, lawyers and civil liberties groups. A potentially powerful combination of opposition and rebel Labour MPs are preparing to vote against plans to give police powers to hold suspects for up to 90 days without trial - denounced as effective internment. They also plan to oppose the creation of an offence of "glorifying"' terrorism. Amnesty's attack comes after a recent warning from Lord Carlile of Berriew, the Government's terror watchdog, that 90-day detention could breach human rights law. The submission to MPs states: "Since the war on terror was declared by the US government in 2001, the UK authorities have mounted a sustained attack on human rights, the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law." It warned that the Bill contained "sweeping and vague provisions that undermine the rights to freedom and expression and association, the right to liberty, the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the rights to the presumption of innocence and fair trial". Amnesty International added: "One proposal is to introduce a crime that involves the 'glorification of terrorism'. Such terms are broad, vague and subjective. They have no legal clarity and can, therefore, be used arbitrarily to restrict human rights, including freedom of expression." It said the measures proposed after the bombings in London on 7 July were " inconsistent with the UK's obligations under domestic and international human rights law and that, if enacted, they would lead to severe human rights violations". The organisation made clear its alarm at the potential for new powers to be abused. It said: "Once any government begins to 'sacrifice' human rights in the name of security, it is not long before individuals pay the price." It said the anti-terror measures across the world had led to dissent being stifled and allowed the state to commit human rights abuses. Its report said evidence of that trend was already apparent in Britain "with peaceful protesters who have been subjected to police action under legislative provisions originally introduced to purportedly counter terrorism". Amnesty condemned Mr Blair's 12-point anti-terror plan, saying: "Every element of which signalled further assaults on human rights, particularly for those identified as Muslims, foreign nationals and asylum-seekers." It said government statements linking the terrorist threat with foreigners were "encouraging xenophobia, racism and faith-hate crimes". "There is a real danger that a range of the proposed additional measures will further alienate the very communities the Government needs on its side." The Bill's critics will denounce the detention plans today as draconian and protest that the proposed ban on the "glorification" of terrorism is too widely drawn. The Government's case for 90-day detention was supported yesterday by Andy Hayman, Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Mr Hayman, who is leading the hunt for al-Qa'ida sympathisers in Britain, said: "We should not allow a premature guillotine to frustrate or prevent the gathering of best evidence." He urged the Home Office not to barter down the length of the detention period "as you would buy a second-hand car" and there was little sign ministers were preparing to offer a compromise on that at this stage. They are expected to delay any concessions until next week - and before the Bill reaches the Lords - after the Government has assessed the strength of opposition to the proposals. Ministers have already conceded that judges more senior than originally proposed would approve the renewal of detention orders every seven days. Left-wing Labour MPs, the Tories and Liberal Democrats have all attacked the detention proposal, saying it breaches human rights. They also argue that it risks radicalising Muslims who are arrested. David Winnick, a Labour MP, has tabled a proposal suggesting the period be set at 28 days. He said such a move would win support across the Commons and the Lords would find it hard to overturn. Opposition parties and civil liberties groups have also claimed that the " glorification" proposal is so vaguely worded that it could, for instance, make criminals of people who criticise brutal regimes in Burma or Zimbabwe. Mark Oaten, the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman, said: "As this Bill stands, it will do more harm than good in the fight against terrorism in this country. "Detention without charge for three months goes against the fundamental principles of justice and I hope Labour backbenchers will recognise it as such." Shami Chakrabarti, director of the human rights group Liberty, said: " Criminalising free speech and introducing internment are dangerously counter-productive to fighting terrorism." A Home Office spokeswoman said last night: "We believe this Bill is compliant with human rights requirement under the European Convention. All the proposals that have been made in the Bill allow prosecutions through the normal court process." 'The rules of the game have changed' TERRORISM ACT 2000 Introduced new powers for police to hold terror suspects for up to seven days without charge - increased to 14 days in 2003 - and widened powers to ban international terror organisations. It created new offences of inciting terrorist acts, providing training for terrorist purposes and providing instruction or training in the use of firearms, explosives or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Government says: Replaced anti-terror legislation that dealt mainly with Northern Ireland to reflect the new international nature of the terrorist threat. Amnesty argues: The Act introduced a "dangerously vague and broad definition of terrorism" and made temporary anti-terrorism legislation from the 1970s a permanent feature of British law. ANTI-TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 Gave the Home Secretary powers to hold foreign terrorist suspects indefinitely without trial if they could not be deported for human rights reasons. Suspects were not given full evidence against them. Seventeen were eventually held at Belmarsh and other prisons. Government says: Tough new measures required in the wake of the 11 September attacks; reflected concerns that Britain was a haven for terrorism. Amnesty argues: The Act "violated a wide range of human rights" , and introduced powers tantamount to a minister charging, trying and sentencing people without fair trial. Detainees were thrown into a " Kafkaesque world", and interned under "harsh conditions" using secret evidence. PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005 Repealed powers to detain foreign terror suspects without charge, after they were ruled illegal by the law lords. Introduced powers to impose " control orders" limiting the movements and communications of suspects. Powers were extended to all British and foreign nationals. Government says: Fresh laws urgently needed to keep track of potentially dangerous foreign terrorists. Amnesty argues: The legislation was "hastily passed" to implement control orders restricting the human rights of suspects and their families. Most suspects were later imprisoned pending deportation on national security grounds. Amnesty says the cumulative effect of the detainees' treatment "amounts to persecution". TERRORISM BILL 2005 Creates a new offence of glorifying or inciting terrorism, attending a terrorist training camp and preparing terrorist acts. It also gives police powers to hold suspects for up to 90 days. Government says: The rules have changed after the July bombings in London. Existing legislation contains a number of loopholes that need to be closed. Amnesty argues: The Bill "contains further sweeping and vague provisions that undermine the rights to freedom of expression and association, the right to liberty, the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the rights to the presumption of innocence and fair trial." ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Hello War, Goodby Amateur Radio
by Jack Unger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Israel imposes tough rules on amateurs <http://www.arrl.org/?artid=6658> The Israeli authorities have imposed draconian new rules on radio amateurs. From January 2007, many of the countrybs radio amateurs will not be able operate their radio equipment unless it has been checked and authorised by government inspectors. This follows the ratification of a new law that aims to prevent harmful radiation from radio equipment. The only amateurs who are exempt from the new law are those who use only VHF and UHF equipment with an output of below 20W. Amateurs will also have to obtain a permit for the erection of antenna towers. Permits will only be granted if the installation can be proven not to cause harmful radiation. Operation of amateur radio equipment without the proper permits will be considered a criminal offence. According to a spokesman for Israeli amateurs, the harsh new rules were pushed through by government following public concern over the safety of mobile phone masts. He said: b It seems that all this has come about from the public near-hysteria over the presence of cellular telephone installations in residential areas.b There have been similar fears in the UK about mobile phone masts. However, no study has shown any evidence of harmful ionising radiation from these or amateur installations. Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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