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Re: Destabilizing China's Government with Strong Crypto
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:01 12/07/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote: >On 12 Jul 96 at 9:40, Arun Mehta wrote: >[..] >BTW, similar problems in Iran fro what I've heard. I remember >hearing a blurb that VOA Chinese Programs explained how to make a >setellite dish out of aluminum foil, so pick up special VOA >boradcasts I'm sure... (That's rather intersting, because you can >crumple it up or wrap leftovers in it immediately.) Is there a good hacker handbook, telling you how you can do things your government won't let you, something along the lines of a modern-day Abbie Hoffman "Steal This Book"? <grin, salivate> >I'm told by some friends that the Chinese, in large part due to the >writing system, prefer FAXs over the internet. That's something to >keep in mind. > >Hm... interesting project: a graphics program that works with PGP or >PGPlib. One can import scanned images or draw onto the screen and >then encrypt it for mailing. Excellent project. One reason that e-mail is picking up in popularity is that sending a fax to the office address is like sending a postcard. >> 1) Collect the e-mail addresses as Allen suggested (including those in >> Hongkong), and send them a single, short message offering to teach them free >> of cost how to use pgp and all the goodies at >> http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/cbsw.html > >Might be condescending. 'Civilized white man brings PGP to the >barbarians...' Look around you: while "civilized", "white" and "man" might characterize the vast (?) majority on this list, I'm sure that's not the universe on cypherpunks. And how does it matter? I'm suggesting an e-mail course that people may subscribe to if they wish. I'm currently attending a course on Cyberspace-Law for Non-Lawyers, presented by the Cyberspace Law Institute and Counsel Connect with thousands of others <http://www.counsel.com/cyberspace> -- I'm sure there are people from all continents on that course, and the question of it being condescending hasn't arisen. > They may well know about PGP, but not in a position >to make that knowledge widely known. That's no good to the rest of the world. Forget them: the question is, are *you* in a position to share your knowledge? >And if I were in a 'totalitarian' or restrictive country I'd be damn suspicious, >maybe frightened by this ('are the secret police setting me up?' or 'will the >notice if I reply?'). Maybe lesson 1could be on how to use an encrypting anonymous remailer, and those who succeed get lesson 2 onwards untraceably. If they are suspicious, they don't have to join or can unsubscribe. >What if that person like the way their country is? They >could inform the local authorities and set in motion a crackdown that >would not have happened, perhaps. We say *nothing* during the course about what we feel about the political situation in Singapore, the work situation in multinationals or Bill Clinton. We restrict the course to a sharing of knowledge on crypto in the Internet spirit of a free economy. >I'd leave the specifics to activists who are already familiar with >the respective cultures, societies, politics, etc.... I'm one. Be glad to tell you more,... >chances are they >are already doing things along those lines. If they are, its only in pockets, and they are doing an awful job of telling people about it if none of us has heard. The Internet is still very new here, most people don't know much about it except how to click the porn bookmarks. >Otherwise, if you don't >know what you're doing, you can unintentionally mess up somebody >else's life, if not your own. It's only crypto, not the Bible or Koran. And let them be their own judges? You seem to want to protect people in the Third World the way the US government wants to keep cyberporn from kids. From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Destabilizing China's Government with Strong Crypto Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >At 4:40 AM 7/12/96, Arun Mehta wrote: ... >>2) Encourage the production of simple, cheap devices such as a PGP phone <cited material snipped> >>3) Find people who beam radio transmissions into China (Rupert Murdoch via >>his Star TV satellite is one ;-) and ask them to devote an "Internet hour" <cited material snipped> >Good ideas, all. And deploying steganography is a natural fit to this situation. Thanks, mate. What's the use of all the theory you develop and software you'll write if it is inaccessible to those who need it most? Just think: you work in a sensitive job, have a bad conscience about all the forests that are being cut on account of collusion between the Forest Department and the illegal loggers -- now you can maybe talk to someone about the weather or the greatness of Kim Jong Il, and in the process upload all you know about the scandal, untraceable to you. From: "Peter D. Junger" <junger(a)pdj2-ra.F-REMOTE.CWRU.Edu> >: 1) Collect the e-mail addresses as Allen suggested (including those in >: Hongkong), and send them a single, short message offering to teach them free >: of cost how to use pgp and all the goodies at >: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/cbsw.html > >Unfortunately for those of us in the United States or who are >otherwise subject to its jurisdiction such an offer would require a >license or a waiver of jurisdiction under the International Traffic in >Arms Regulations before it could safely be carried out. That >particular highly worthwhile project would seem to fall under the >definition of performing defense services as well as involving the >disclosure of technical data relating to an item on the United States >Munitions List. Did you let that stop you in the past? Suppose the course were conducted from outside the US? The packages can in any case be downloaded legally from outside. I'm sure there is no law against your telling me how to use a particular software package? Anonymously, if you must? What I have in mind is as follows: "Building a Cryptobook" lists a number of software packages: SecureDrive PGP Private Idaho PGPfone Wipe Utilities S-Tools Joel provides also the configuration steps needed to get it all working, which is an excellent starting point. Suppose we do an e-mail course telling people in simple language *why* they need this, what benefits they would get as a result, how to download (idiot-proof instructions all through), and how to set up *for basic, minimum security*. I'm sure the software packages will have all sorts of bells and whistles that the novice doesn't need, not right away. Maybe some or all of this instructional material is already available. Could we pick up a set that is easy to understand and concise? That could be packaged together as a course or a book, a sort-of "Crypto for Dummies." Would people like to select individual software packages, and put the material together? Everyone gets due credit, of course. Think for a moment: Just as Nelson Mandela stood today at the corner of Trafalgar Square in front of South Africa House, where I'm sure many of us have shouted ,"Free Nelson Mandela!", some day soon we might get similar thanks from some Chinese or heavens knows whom... >From: Alan Olsen <alano(a)teleport.com> >Another thing to do is get more web sites containing information of interest >to people living in such regimes on SSL enabled web servers. This, and the encrypted fax would help greatly. I'm sure others have good ideas too. Please send them. How does one go about facilitiating their implementation? Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://mahavir.doe.ernet.in/~pinaward/arun.htm The protestors of Tiananmen Square will be back. Next time, the battle will be fought in cyberspace, where the students have the more powerful tanks...

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Re: "White 'Punks on Dope" (w apologies to The Tubes)
by mike＠fionn.lbl.gov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jul 11, 11:15pm, snow wrote: > > man is just ridiculous, & betrays the author's lack of knowledge. > > No, the POINT IS MIS-DIAGNOSIS. Children who are either brighter > than their classmates and figured out the assignement with in minutes These are not the people who are being talked about here > of the teacher giving it, or children with _no_ boundries implemented > by their parents (people are like fractals, very subject to initial > conditions) hence they keep pushing and pushing so the parents respond > by instituting chemical control. Well, like I said earlier, in the old days very hyperactive boys probably did have the tar whipped out of them. This does work, for short periods. In the long run, it's ineffective. Totally ineffective for a medical condition. Do you think, for example, that it is effective to tell a person suffering from depression to "cheer up", or someone suffering from some forms of schizophrenia to "ignore the voices & stop acting silly"? No amount of your cajoling is going to get a person with a heart deficiency up El Capitan, & there's no chance you can guilt trip someone with severe emphysema to run a marathon with you. I'm sure there's plenty of misdiagnoses, but unless you're willing to lay your md or your epidemiological credentials on the table, I'm not giving you any credit. Your argument sounds like some kind of reactionary victorian moralizing to me (parents setting boundaries .... sheesh).

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Re: FW: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"blancw(a)accessone.com" "blanc" 10-JUL-1996 06:04:36.86 > As Tim said, the selective application of drugs or persecution = >regarding their use points to a great hypocrisy (and deterioration of = >character), and the more widespread the acceptance of hypocritical = >double-standards, the higher the rate-o-meter goes up in favor of = >statism. At the very least, all the confusion surrounding drug use will = >create "disrespect for Authority" (which in turn will inspire statists = >to propose further crack-downs, pardon the pun, on "criminals"). Actually, my Ritalin was one of the things that led me to come to the conclusion that drug laws were nonsense. It's a Schedule II drug that I never felt _any_ addiction to; I was off it on evenings, weekends, and during holidays. So at least in my case it had a pro-libertarian effect. > It makes me think of those Communist countries (remember them?) where = >political dissenters were been labelled insane - the protesters were the = >ones identified as having the problems, not the State. The imprisoned = >troublemakers were then drugged, thus taking care of their "irrational" = >behavior and lack of appreciation. The matter is that Ritalin isn't acting as a mind control pill, or whatever the hysterics are claiming. Indeed, I nominate it as one of the more transhumanist drugs I know of (for adults with ADHD and children), and I've done somewhat of a study of the subject. -Allen

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asking for beeing in your mailing list
by Victor M. Hernandez 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would ask for being include in your mailing list How can I do that? thanks in advance -- //// ~O¿O~ pgjeags(a)infosel.net.mx

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Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? (fwd)
by gimonca＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: David Mazieres <dm(a)amsterdam.lcs.mit.edu> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? > > My last phone bill said that Nynex is now giving out people's names in > addidtion to their phone numbers over caller-id. I therefore called > Nynex and told them to block caller-id on my phone line. > > They said no problem, but... They said nothing I can do will block it > when I call 800 numbers. "The people with 800 numbers have special > software, and there is nothing you can do to block your identity when > calling them. Not even *67." > > Wow. Maybe I'm not paranoid enough, but I never expected this. I can > never again call an 800 number anonymously to get information about > something unless I go out to a pay phone. What an incredible > inconvenience, and how truly depressing. > This has been true for years. On 800 numbers, the receiver gets ANI, not CID. Check newsgroups like alt.dcom.telecom, comp.dcom.telecom, etc.: there's always somebody talking about CID and ANI. In the back of my mind, I remember hearing about an anonymizer for 800-number calls. Maybe at WilTel. Check the search engine of your choice. Personally, I like Caller ID, because it gives individuals a service that formerly only governments and corporations could get. --gimonca(a)skypoint.com

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Re: Destabilizing China's Government with Strong Crypto
by t byfield 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:10 PM +0000 on 7/12/96, Deranged Mutant wrote: > On 12 Jul 96 at 0:04, Timothy C. May wrote: > [..] > > And this is yet another example of the negative effects of the U.S. > > restrictions on crypto export: where widespread crypto tools might be used > > to destabilize repressive governments, the lack of these tools integrated > > into common applications makes it harder for freedom-fighters in China, > > Burma, Iran, France, etc., to use them. > > The US has a sad history of supporting its own 'friendly dictators' > though. Makes it hard to support flow of decentralizing tech to > destabalize countries like Iraq but keep countries like El Salvador > in the fold. Me too. In fact, citing "freedom fighters" to justify relaxing ITAR is neither more nor less disingenuous than citing "international arms traders" to justify maintaining or tightening it; and given the litany of imbecilic, corrupt, rump, and reactionary regimes and factions the US has supported over the past decades, it isn't exactly going to win over hearts and minds in the agencies that have a strong hand in ITAR. Ted

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Re: Another bad idea
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com" "Deranged Mutant" 10-JUL-1996 05:02:42.84 >Great idea. Get some (possibly) innocent techie in an oppressive >country thrown in jail or executed. If these countries didn't value their technical people and what they can do, they wouldn't be allowing them on the Internet (even in a restricted way) in the first place. The above would only be a likely scenario if the effort wasn't big enough - didn't cover enough people. China almost collapsed (pity it didn't) with the Cultural Revolution; I doubt many in government there who remember that time want to go through it again, particularly considering the current level of instability there. >Or perhaps s/he gets offended, >contributing to the notion that all Westerners are evil perverts >out to corrupt them. This is a possible problem with the pornography approach, yes; some form of human rights information may be more suitable, even in countries in which one of the main crackdowns on the Internet is anti-sex. >> An extension of this for web sites, which I understand as possible >> but difficult, would be to swap anyone from such a country trying to get >> acces to a technical web site to instead receive "subversive" information or >> pictures. (The pornography mentioned above would probably be more effective >> in picture format; other pictures might include information on human rights >> abuses). >Damn aggrevating for that user, and it could get him/her in trouble. Yes. One possible solution for the aggrevation problem would be to include material on human rights, cryptography, etcetera _and_ the tech info that the person was looking for. While this would still give these countries easy access to the technical info (a bad outcome), it would also lead to the people getting information that the country's government didn't want. >On a wide-scale it could provoke responses from those countries. >Imagine this list being bombarded with propaganda, or perhaps >somebody here looking at an anti-censorship web page getting >pro-censorship messages from religious fundamentalists. If you look at someone's web page and A. they haven't made a contract with you to do otherwise and B. you haven't been smart enough to go through an anonymizing web server or an anonymous account, you need to realize that they are likely to keep info on you. I customarily don't use my own account for web viewing for that reason. Bombardment of lists like these with propaganda, etcetera, is an admitted possible problem. We're currently seeing something of the sort on alt.religion.scientology, but (according to what I've gathered) they seem to be dealing with that pretty well. I have my doubts how effectively the Chinese, etcetera governments are likely to be in carrying out such attacks; they aren't noticeably good at Internet-awareness. >Or it could encourage them to use special firewalls which filter >content and disallow graphics... (probably many US-based companies >would be all-too-happy to sell them the software to do it), or even >close themselves off from the Internet altogether, perhaps form >separate, unconnected Family/Islamic/Chinese-values networks. How, precisely, is one going to filter out graphics from web sites in Chinese? Ascii text and ideographs don't exactly get along. One interesting option would be text, possibly varied to disable practical OCR, in the form of graphics. This is more of a problem for web sites in English, although simple denial of such to such countries has its advantages (as per some earlier discussions). In the latter case, they aren't going to get the technical information that's their reason for getting on the Internet in the first place. These countries are largely third-world in locally understood technology, anyway; the exception is for those who have gotten training in the West - note that one of the biggest trade _surpluses_ of the US is in graduate education in technical fields. -Allen

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RE: FW: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: E. ALLEN SMITH Actually, my Ritalin was one of the things that led me to come to the conclusion that drug laws were nonsense. It's a Schedule II drug that I never felt _any_ addiction to; I was off it on evenings, weekends, and during holidays. So at least in my case it had a pro-libertarian effect. ........................................................................

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CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates Support for Key Escrow
by editor＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 27 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 27 July 12, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) No New News on Encryption - VP Gore Reiterates Support for Key Escrow (2) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe (3) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ** This document looks best when viewed in COURIER font ** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) NO NEW NEWS ON ENCRYPTION - VP GORE REITERATES SUPPORT FOR KEY ESCROW Despite the growing pressure from Congress, privacy advocates, the computer industry, and the public for the reform of US encryption policy, the Administration continues to embrace its Clipper III key-escrow encryption proposal. In a written statement issued Friday (7/12), the Vice President announced that the Administration will continue to push for the adoption of a massive public key infrastructure to enable law enforcement access to encryption communications and continue to rely on cold war-era export controls. [The full text of the announcement is available on CDT's Encryption Policy Issues Page: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/] CDT is disappointed that the Administration's latest statement offered no new solutions to what is becoming a critical policy issue for the future of the Internet and the development of a secure and trusted global information infrastructure. Friday's announcement comes amid growing concern from bi-partisan members of Congress, computer industry leaders, privacy advocates, and the public. Recent calls for changes in current US encryption policy include: * Bipartisan legislation in both the House and Senate designed to relax US encryption export controls and encourage the widespread availability of strong, easy to use encryption technologies. * The Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Forum, held on July 1st, where members of Congress, computer industry leaders, privacy advocates and the public discussed the need to reform US encryption policy. * The recent report by the National Research Council which criticizes current policy as failing to address the needs of an information age society. These developments represent a growing consensus among members of Congress, the computer industry, and privacy advocates that current US encryption policy is harming the competitiveness of US industry and endangering the privacy of computer users. Our understanding of this consensus does not match the conclusion the Vice President reaches that: "A consensus is emerging around the vision of a global cryptography system that permits the use of any encryption method the user chooses, with a stored key to unlock when necessary". CDT sees no evidence of broad support for a key escrow approach. While the Administration seems to acknowledge the importance of encryption for privacy and electronic commerce, neither the current policy nor its predecessors have met the needs which virtually all involved in this debate now see. Since 1992, the Administration has continued to offer solutions which fail to recognize the privacy needs of individual computer users and the realities of the global economy. While law enforcement and national security considerations are important factors which must be addressed, the Administration's current proposal, along with Clipper I and Clipper II, continues to put law enforcement and national security concerns above the privacy and security needs of the American public. SUMMARY OF VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S STATEMENT While putting forward an initiative ostensibly designed to make encryption more available to computer users, the Administration would do so at a high price: Individuals would be required to place their most private personal encryption keys in the hands of third parties. Today's statement is essentially a re-statement of the Clipper III proposal released in May. Among other things, the Vice President: * Called for the liberalization of export controls provided computer users participate in a "global key management infrastructure" designed to make personal encryption keys accessible to law enforcement. * Reiterated the Administration's opposition to the bipartisan encryption legislation introduced this Spring in the House and Senate, which would ease export controls. * Announced that a Cabinet Committee will send detailed recommendations regarding implementation of this proposal to the President by early September. * Indicated that the Administration "is considering" interim measures until a key escrow system is in place, including: - Liberalizing export controls for certain industries, - Developing performance standards for key recovery systems that will be eligible for export. - Launching key recovery pilot projects. - Moving jurisdiction over encryption export licenses from the State Department to the Commerce Department (The Burns/Leahy Pro-CODE bill contains a similar provision). The full text of the Vice President's Statement, along with the Clipper III proposal, the text of the Pro-CODE bill and other legislation, and detailed background information on the encryption policy debate, is available on CDT's encryption policy resource page: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ CDT believes that a far more sensible approach to encryption is offered by the bipartisan legislation introduced this Spring to ease export controls, including: S. 1726, the Pro-Code Act introduced by Senators Burns (R-MT), Leahy (D-VT), Pressler (R-SD), Lott (R-MS), Wyden (D-OR), Simpson (R-WY), Murray (D-WA), and others; S.1567, authored by Sen. Leahy with many of the same co-sponsors; and H.R. 3011, introduced by in the House of Representatives by Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Tom Campbell (R-CA) Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), and a bi-partisan group of over 20 others. NEXT STEPS CDT will continue to work with Senators Burns, Leahy, Pressler, Wyden and Reps, Eshoo, Goodlatte, and others to encourage the widespread availability of strong encryption by pushing for passage of legislation to relax export controls on encryption. The full Senate Commerce Committee, chaired by Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD), is expected to hold hearings on the Pro-CODE bill during the week of July 22. CDT is working to cybercast that hearing live on the Internet. Please continue to visit CDT's encryption policy issues page for the latest information on this issue. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (2) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by nearly 10,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.27 7/12/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: I@Week on crypto export loophole 6/24/96
by Will Rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >As I see it, the most important issue is not the legal status of the one >actually doing the export/mailing, but in fact the organization which is the >recipient and thus, the beneficiary of this act. _THAT_ organization will >be well-identified, yet will not have done anything obviously illegal. Is >there any indication that Baker was trying to distinguish between the one >physically mailing it, and those receiving it? Yup. He was speaking only of the US company. As you mentioned, odds of anyone getting caught are fairly low in many cases, but even lower for anyone outside the US. The odds the US would go after a foreign company would seem pretty remote, unless based in a country that strongly suppported US policy. The UK comes to mind, but few others. I'll leave it others to decide who else should be on that list. Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMebLF0cByjT5n+LZAQF3Owf5AbJCUK/9sbaUGDVV4eZcqggSuOgH+ubr fbx3W7HXaXcAlqvATFRt+mw5h6GMubNrRCC+Ka6CJYC60QESWnHCw8/XX000I2UQ ucBwRMTID+KZuNHN9vD4/hE+JBLkWDQyu2S4IDWkCR0+7UJDFQQ9z3kSVmqgczlB jGyOtUwVpNHETg0yGreuQVCMz6gzxX1eZf0Hv38BJQqD8ROOLVCmYC1grRlrltRV VJqRohsVustzqgu35OoKKzZES3hJxqvmXaNHIDMKhZmnbeHiZeAKs0tQ9hJz7Znp oNAGcwIugB7S7mANIr6bd0EPHiljOP2Ipe13LgMAtkhidipTDQgtRQ== =6+G6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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