- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: "White 'Punks on Dope" (w apologies to The Tubes)
by mike＠fionn.lbl.gov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jul 10, 10:12pm, Timothy C. May wrote: > And perhaps worse, _parents_, such as the example I provided, are using it [Ritalin] > to control children. Where once they would've paddled the kid for using > obscene language, or refusing to get dressed for school, now they pop a > pill in the child's mouth. There are certainly legitimate arguments about the level of use of Ritalin or other drugs, their benefits & their costs, but this straw man is just ridiculous, & betrays the author's lack of knowledge. Unfortunately a similar misunderstanding is reflected in the writings of 1 or 2 others on this topic too. Parental (or other) control is not at issue at all with add; self control is the main problem.

2 1

Re: Can the inevitability of Software privacy be used to defeat the ITAR?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:06 AM 7/11/96 +0000, Paul Elliott wrote: >What is to prevent a U.S company to licence a foreign company >to sublicence and distribute a Crypto product abroad, if that >foreign company obtains that product on the pirate market? > >I am not a lawyer, but I look at the definition of "export" >on page 612 of Applied Cryptography and nothing seems to >obviously apply. > >The scenario I imagine is this: U.S. company produces a crypto >product. To be generally useful, the product supports all languages. >(Those CDROMs really do hold a lot of data.) >After all, Americans do need to do business with foreigners. >The company licences and distributes the product in the U.S. >taking special care not to distribute the product to any foreign persons. >When inevitability, the product appears in the pirate market outside >the U.S., the company makes a contract with a foreign company >allowing it to distribute it and sublicence it. The foreign company >can get their copy from the pirate market, being authorized to get >the copy by the U.S. company. When this deal is cut copies >have already been exported and are already being sold by the >pirates, against the will of the U.S. company. I raised this type of idea on CP, twice, and didn't hear a peep about it! (As recently as a couple of days ago.) It doesn't entirely eliminate the illegality; it merely transfers that illegality to an unknown and thus unprosecutable person. But yes, it appears that nothing would prevent this technique from working very well. Any attempted prosecution would fare even less well than the example of Zimmermann and PGP 1.0: There would be no illusion that an encryption product sold in hundreds of stores nationwide could be kept within the borders of the US, so the domestic manufacturer is safe. The foreign distributor isn't violating any of his own country's laws, and probably not arguably any of the US. Both companies could enthusiastically invite the USG to prosecute whoever actually exported the software, laughing all the way to the bank. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Irony on strong encryption in Australia
by Richard Charles Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Australian Broadcasting Authority's report on Internet regulation issues recommends that ISPs be required to support unescrowed strong encryption for their users' privacy and security. Electronic Frontiers Australia is opposed to this idea because it puts too much of a burden on the ISP. http://www.efa.org.au/ -rich

1 0

Green Paper on PICS from ALA
by Kip DeGraaf 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone still have a copy of the Green Paper on PICS usage in a library setting by Magpantay that was yanked from the ALA web site? I would be interested in reading a copy of it.

1 0

test
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone please post the correct syntax to remove unwanted keys from the secret ring (if there is a way)?

1 0

New Mac Web Server Security Hole Discovered
by Cyberdog 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Try adding /M_A_C_H_T_T_P_V_E_R_S_I_O_N to any of the URL's at http://www.netcraft.co.uk/Survey/Reports/960701/ALL/WebSTAR.html and each server will leak information like --- http://europa.nadc.navy.mil//M_A_C_H_T_T_P_V_E_R_S_I_O_N --- WebSTAR, Copyright ©1995 Chuck Shotton, Portions ©1995 StarNine Technologies, Inc. and its Licensors. All rights reserved. PowerPC (CW) version totalCon 343, maxCon 30, listening 29, current 1, high 8, busy 0, denied 0, timeout 0, maxMem 1140640, currMem 1117024, minMem 1090208, bytesSent 1218888, port 80, maxTimeout 300, verboseMessages false, disableLogging false, hideWindow false, refuseConnections false, upSince 07/11/96:10:48, version 1.2.5(PowerPC (CW)) -- Anyone can use this for denial of service becase this backdoor is so well hidden it won't show up in the logs! The vendor has not commited to an instant fix, but they have told their users not to discuss this on public lists lest their obscurity become unsecure. p.s. The copyright part was their lawyer's idea!

1 0

Re: Can the inevitability of Software privacy be used to defeat the ITAR?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:03 PM 7/11/96 -0400, Mark M. wrote: >> What is to prevent a U.S company to licence a foreign company >> to sublicence and distribute a Crypto product abroad, if that >> foreign company obtains that product on the pirate market? > >Just because the company didn't break any laws doesn't mean that they aren't >going to be harassed by the government. This is similar to the Philip >Zimmermann case. A grand jury investigation could be carried on for as long >as the statute of limitations dictates and then the prosecutor of the case >decided at the last minute not to indict. This is the reason that Netscape >has not yet made a browser with 128-bit encryption available on the Internet. I think the government's ability to "harass" writers of good crypto software has been severely limited by their failure to indict Zimmermann. Remember, today they pretty much have to accept the fact that anybody can write any software, DOMESTICALLY, without any sort of legal impediment by the laws including ITAR. This is particularly true of a company like Netscape, which presumably has the bucks and/or the political clout to make it a difficult target. Any case against Netscape would probably take years if not decades to resolve, and long before this happened the world would have adopted good encryption regardless. Look what happened when MIT put PGP on the Web: "Nothing." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by Michael Myers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:39 AM 7/9/96 -0500, Rick Smith wrote: >erehwon(a)c2.org (William Knowles) writes: > >>Ritalin has been a godsend, I am able to dialin when I have to. >>Ritalin is not the only drug for treating ADD, Prozac works for >>some. > >I use coffee, or else I just managed to grow out of the worst effects. >In any case, I drink more coffee than just about anyone I know, and it >doesn't "wire" me at all. Coffee usage seconded here...I've tapered down to about two pots or so a day from four or more, due to the tolerance I was developing. It's about the only thing that gets anything done on time. While I can understand and agree with Tim and Mike's points about government control and "making creative people fit in", there is a point where creativity is the only thing possible, to the exclusion of all else, such as paying bills on time, doing necessary work, or just interacting with others. -- /^^^^^^^^^Instead of being born again, why not just GROW UP?^^^^^^^^^^^\ Michael Myers Vote Libertarian....you'll sleep better! Don't like abortion? Don't have one. Don't like guns? Don't buy one. blackavr(a)aa.net E-mail for PGPv2.6.2 public key \____________ http://www.aa.net/~blackavr/homepage.htm ________________/

1 0

Re: A case for 2560 bit keys
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 9 Jul 96 17:46:00 -0800, markm(a)voicenet.com wrote: >> As an experiment generate a 2047 bit PGP key and a 512 bit PGP key. >> Encrypt a file (preferably of a reasonable size) using both keys. >> Depending on the computer you are using, the time difference between the >> two keys will be a matter of few seconds or even a fraction of a second. > >Now try decrypting the file, or signing another file. I have a 486-66 which >is now considered hopelessly sluggish by today's standards. It takes about >5 seconds, while doing the same operation with a 512-bit key takes less than a >second. I sign every one of my messages, so such a time delay gets quite check your setup. I used to run a 386-20 (5MB RAM) and it took about 3 seconds for a 1024 bit key. Given it didn't even have a copro (not sure when/if PGP uses one) and that it was off of a Stackered drive, I'd expect you to have much better times. // Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> - Webpages for sale! Se habla JavaScript! // Automatically receive my resume or PGPKEY by sending email with a subject // of 'send PGPKEY' or 'send resume'. Capitalization counts so be careful!

1 0

Chancellor Group (symbol = CHAG)
by chag＠moneyworld.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://chancellor.stockpick.com Chancellor Group, Inc. (symbol CHAG) just reported big quarterly earnings. SGA Goldstar issued a "buy" recommendation. I understand other investment advisors are looking to recommend CHAG. The company has a strong book value. The short sellers need to cover. This looks like a good situation to me. What do you think? They are located at: http://chancellor.stockpick.com Bob Williams, 206-269-0846 To terminate from my Investment Opportunities, Reply to chag(a)moneyworld.com with "remove" in the subject field.

11 10