- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:47 PM 7/15/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >>Despite trying to hide behind the smokescreen of calling the >>government's GAK position "voluntary," we all know that they are trying to >>misuse their influence to gently force us to use GAK, if by no other means >>that forcing the taxpayer to pay for the system as they have done already. > >I agree, though I would not have phrased it in such an offensive way. Please explain why you think my comment above is phrased "in such an offensive way." Hint: If I'd really wanted it to be "offensive," I could have easily done that. >This isn't some conspiracy of evil but people with a legitimate policy >disagreement. I notice your insertion of the term "legitimate." As opposed to what? Do you mean that you acknowledge that there is such a thing as an ILLEGITIMATE policy disagreement? How can we tell the difference? And there goes that word, "policy," again! Containing with it, the assumption that governments (despite ostensible freedom of speech) have some sort of authority to regulate encryption. >>The opponents of GAK, on the other hand, are not denying to anyone the >right >>to implement a truly voluntary "key-escrow" system, or more likely many >>privately operating ones. > >I disagree again. It is evident from the effort to shoot down Clipper I, >which WAS voluntary, that this is another case of your version of >"voluntary". If an offeror, even the government, offers something voluntary >and you don't like it, you attempt to suppress it. It's kinda like "freedom >of speech only for those who agree with me". Huh? Developed in secret (secrecy, not merely for the technical details, but also for the broad overall concept: the former might have been justifiable to some people, the latter was not!), using stolen tax dollars, and presented as a fait accompli to the public. Oh, one more thing: Apparently designed to NOT be able to talk to non-escrowed encryption systems, in an obvious attempt to freeze out competition. The government was trying to misuse its influence here. Obviously some new strange usage of the word "voluntary" that I wasn't previously aware of. >> However, such systems will be a service for the >>customer, not the government, and the key will almost certainly not be >>provided to the government on request, and in fact the key will likely be >>stored in an encrypted form that the government won't be able to use. > >To the contrary, business records are always available on legitimate >subpoena by the government, There you go again with that word, "legitimate." Give me an example of an "_illegitimate subpoena_," will you? One that someone is not obligated to fulfill. What?!? You can't? Then why did you use the term in what is obviously (to you) a redundant fashion? > and this would include escrowed keys. YOU don't >have to like it, but it's the law. Not currently it isn't. Laws concerning "escrowed keys" haven't been written, and in any case since they don't have to be stored in the same legal jurisdiction, cooperation with a given set of authorities is not only not guaranteed, but isn't wise. Besides, the only thing I see in the US Constitution which compels a person's participation in and cooperation with a trial is a right of defendants to have witnesses appear in their _defense._ I see no corresponding right on the part of the prosecution to compel ITS witnesses to appear. And you ignored the part about the ENCRYPTED stored keys. If they're encrypted, then even if they're presented to the police, they won't be able to use them, law or no law. Given a choice, I think most people would prefer to use an "escrow agent" (if they chose to use one at all; which I doubt) that is either guaranteed to be uncooperative to the government, or one which CAN'T be cooperative, because the material it has is not in a form useful to the cops. As long as key-escrow is TRULY "voluntary," in the broadest and most accurate sense of the word, market forces will migrate to a practice which is best for individual customers as individuals. >>Quite simply, we do not require your "assent." You should be trying to get >>OURS. > >"Silence does not constitute assent" to your personal attacks, your policy >assertions, and what I think to be your misrepresentations of fact. I was >not speaking of assent to GAK in that sentence. > >I think your attempt to pseudospeciate me and create an "us and him" >situation in this group is bound to fail with those who have paid attention >to what I think and say, particularly my most recent thinking. On many >matters we are agreed at bottom. However, I place high value on policy There you go again with the word, "policy." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: My impending death
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:22 PM 7/14/96 EDT, you wrote: >> Since Vulis decided to drag in a disagreement from elsewhere, I have a brief >> invitation. > >The cripple is lying again, as usual. Twice he reposted to cypherpunks >his Usenet lies with no cryptographic relevance just to slime me. Since >not even Perry told the demented cripple to quit, I'll respond in kind. > I don't want to seem overly squemish, but wouldn't you agree, that stuff that get's so "personal" as this discussion doesn't really belong here? (Personally I even think, that such primitive mudslinging doesn't belong anywhere) Calm down, relax, have a cigar and be a nice boy. ----------< fate favors the prepared mind >---------- Remo Pini Fon 1: +41 1 350 28 82 mailto:rp@rpini.com Fon 2: +41 1 465 31 90 http://www.rpini.com/remopini/ Fax: +41 1 350 28 84 --------< words are what reality is made of >--------

1 0

Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:13 15/07/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >actions in the Netherlands, the UK, and in the European >Parliament suggest that an independent European escrow initiative might >happen within a year. When it does it will be a trivial matter to harmonize >it with some US offering. The mills in various countries are grinding too >coincidentally for my taste. I don't doubt that the Europeans are quite likely to toe the American line -- they not seldom do in international negotiations, plus they share the NATO mentality. However, that does not constitute international agreement. GAK basically requires companies and individuals to trust their government, and here in India people across the political and economic spectrum would laugh in your face at the suggestion. Also secrecy from the government is crucial to most businesspersons, and I cannot imagine anyone in a country with a repressive, inept or corrupt government agreeing to this (And further, trusting the far away US government, which might misuse its powers to help its own industry in international bids). You might say that repressive governments are not likely to ask their citizens before agreeing internationally to GAK, but then, citizens are not likely to ask their government either before using good crypto. The matter will land up before the courts, and that will keep the situation confused for a while. With digital commerce seriously hindered by lack of security, I doubt the business community will stay patient, and want to opt for a hassle-free, tried and tested, secure and transparent system such as pgp. Governments cannot for long ignore the wishes of big business. > >Given the glacial pace with which standard integrated crypto has appeared >on the Internet, with Navigator only going to offer the final >link--encrypted e-mail--later this year, the above timing isn't necessarily >one which will be left behind by independent Internet developments. And >given the glacial pace of PGP movement toward integrated internet standard >products, it hasn't a hope of beating the above timing to the punch. While I share your view on the need for urgency in integrating PGP into Internet standard products (and wish the programmers on these projects God-speed!) I don't think end of this year is too late for them to come out. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/

2 1

C'punks T-shirt idea?
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Currently reading John Keane's biography of Tom Paine,] Picture of Paine with superimposed text Atlanticus [crossed out] Forrester [crossed out] Common Sense [crossed out] Common.Sense(a)alpha.c2.org --- Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. And after all | Email address remains unchanged You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet.........

1 0

Re: Metered Phone
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:45 AM 7/15/96 -0700, you wrote: >At 01:19 PM 7/7/96 +0800, you wrote: >>Does anyone have any ideas about this metered phone? >>I am from Philippines and heard some news that it will be >>existing in 1997. Quite a big problem! Every dial will be counted, >>every seconds will be measured... > >That sounds like you're getting newer telephone technology. >In the US, most areas with newer telephone switches offer you >the choice of flat rate service (you pay a constant price per month >... >Bill Stewart Well, in Switzerland all telephon-switches (including the ones the company I work with manufactures) record: 1. start of call 2. destination of call 3. source of call 4. end of call After all, you can get a detailed list of all your calls by the end of the month (the phonenumbers of the destination are somewhat obscured -> only the first 4 digits). So, hellcome to the new age of transparent customers! As soon as you get digital switches (POTS or ISDN) your phonelife is measured, stored and statistically evaluated. ----------< fate favors the prepared mind >---------- Remo Pini Fon 1: +41 1 350 28 82 mailto:rp@rpini.com Fon 2: +41 1 465 31 90 http://www.rpini.com/remopini/ Fax: +41 1 350 28 84 --------< words are what reality is made of >--------

2 1

Re: Sternlight on C'punks
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Dave: You are a helluva fine debater but you are also an unbelievably irritating, sanctimonious son-of-a-bitch. A CoWaRD On Tue, 16 Jul 1996, David Sternlight wrote: > At 10:54 AM -0700 7/16/96, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > > >a suggestion: get a pseudonym! > > In my opinion (it's not "the truth") using a pseudonym except in force > majeure circumstances such as a rape counseling group is cowardly. I think > people should stand behind what they say, and the notion of Detweiler's > having arguments with himself pseudonymously would be hilarious if it were > not pathetic. > > In any case it wouldn't work for me since I suspect my literary style is > sufficiently distinctive (at least for this sort of group) that I'd be > spotted in a short time and then be the victim of a bunch of nasty "what > have you got to hide" posts. > > And I'm not going to twist myself into a pretzel, stylistically speaking, > just so some thug's nastiness can be avoided. I trust the good sense of > wiser readers, and as Harry Truman said... > > David > > >

1 0

Making encoding out of an authentication cipher
by EVERHART＠Arisia.GCE.Com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Had an interesting thought, maybe worth passing on for commentary. (...since "authentication" ciphers are considered "harmless" by those interested in spying on your info...) Suppose you have a secure hash function H(msg) that delivers a random long period set of hash bits for msg, which is computationally infeasible to invert and such that the value of H(msg) depends very sensitively on all bits of msg. These things are used for authentication and tend to be all over the world. Now suppose I have a key and apply the following transform, where "+" will mean binary exclusive OR. Cipher: H(key) + M(1) = C(1) H(key+M(1)) + M(2) = C(2) H(key+M(2)) + M(3) = C(3) and so on where M(n) is the message and C is the enciphered message. Decipher: H(key) + C(1) = M(1) H(key+M(1)) + C(2) = M(2) H(key+M(2)) + C(3) = M(3) and so on. If the hash function is cryptographically strong, is this or is this not a strong cipher? Are there fast hash functions around? Note that in doing disk encryption, one has also the disk block number available, and even the offset in block, to be stuffed into the hash function if one wants. In a serial message one has offset in message also. The only piece of nontrivial software needed to implement it is the hash function itself, which has been claimed to be useful only for authentication. If this scheme is at all strong, the distinction is shown to be fairly useless. I thought of this a couple days ago...thought I might ask if anyone knows any of the answers. I do not, and am not knowledgeable in this area, save VERY casually.

1 0

Re: Sternlight on C'punks
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hy guys, I have no idea, who this david is, but it's kind of funny: someone says: when this guy shows up, you get a mail flodd then someone replies to that... And suddenly you notice, that the first guy was right, but I think he had to be, after all, he was the first wave. (And I'm another one). So, who is this david? I don't care, and as long as he posts stuff the way he/she/it did until now, I won't. (Wouldn't you agree, that we have a lot worse to worry about? - i.e. tonights fight, "Rottwiler" vs. "Cripple") ----------< fate favors the prepared mind >---------- Remo Pini Fon 1: +41 1 350 28 82 mailto:rp@rpini.com Fon 2: +41 1 465 31 90 http://www.rpini.com/remopini/ Fax: +41 1 350 28 84 --------< words are what reality is made of >--------

1 0

[flaming] Why <jf_avon@citenet.net> was blocked.
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 16 Jul 96 at 19:43, The Deviant wrote: > Umm.. when telling other ppl that they do not know how to read, it > might be usefull to use sentances with a subject AND a predicate. I > know that this is something they taught you _way_ back in second > grade, but you should still remember it. Sorry to say, but I did not get english classes up until grade 4 and since I had no occasions to practice it before age 18, I don't remember anything of my english classes. A major brain trauma probably helped too. Although I write french much better than most of the university educated francophone population here, I don't even remember any french grammar. As for the word 'predicate', would you please deign tell me what it means? I don't have an english dictionnary handy. As for my true question regarding realdeal.exe /per used on top of SecureDrive 1.4a, do you have any comments? JFA The brave dies only once, the coward (who uses anon remailer for flaming) dies a thousand death. -old adapted arab proverb. - -- DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies R&D consultants: physicists technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: PGP Public key: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon iQEVAgUBMeuTHciycyXFit0NAQHY5AgAiki+95PrT1VO6FEJrCG1tYjvg5/I6OoL 9cFIvVIsKJiN7AjVE029Y/Sc5xEsTQSCg3yAxfEWWRy054IZYdO098znKDYoeh/9 3Fs+xKjLN1L7m3XiQH8AAL0GMWZz31ft95eKcnb7wermwzHXAhVbW3BoSwYWBYD2 o584rm7ahrriWA4Z+nnPB60w/OY5SYZl95aeGQbudJG0fRklvBjh1j5GVRudSinb I2InlbrH5QbVpKlaJ1FpJt//X39CJnOCMx4iK8QwjMLekJAtyHZGZxafuUz6T2+r RpL3slRCygt6vCJeSJAwlE+LVaM8I1rRUIk3GCdIIxX5FTLyMpr2pw== =bw9v -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

WW II Cryptography
by Richard Pekelney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This came to me recently. It should be of interest to people here. Bruce Dear Mr. Schneier, If you have an interest in cryptographic history, I am working on a WW II technology project you might be interested in. The primary US cipher system during WW II was the SIGABA a.k.a. ECM Mark II or CSP-889. This machine that was created in 1940 was used until the early sixties when it was finally retired because it was too slow. This technology was more important to the war effort than the incredibly valuable cryptanalytic successes on Enigma and Purple. The details of this machine were classified until April of this year. This machine is significantly different from the classic Hagelin or Enigma derivative rotor cipher machine. It was one of the top ten most important technologies of WW II, right up there with radar and proximity fuses but virtually nothing has been written about it because it remained classified. I work on USS Pampanito a WW II submarine on display in San Francisco, CA. We have the only SIGABA ever to be in private hands on display, the only other place one can see this machine is at the National Cryptologic Museum at the NSA. In addition, I have collected about 2,000 pages of declassified documents on the machine and its context. This information, with the access to the real machine has provided the information necessary to create an algorthmic description of the machine. The next logical step is to create a software emulation of the machine. Pampanito is creating a web site that should be up sometime in the next two weeks that will include the enclosed description of the machine. I am also including a short report on the machine we have that includes some additional detail. The web page by the way will be the first meaningful description of this machine ever published. I would like to create a Java application that allows people to operate a virtual SIGABA. The core of its functionality will probably be about 100 lines of code. However doing a reasonable user interface will require quite a bit more code. 1- Would you or anyone you know be interested in collaborating on the Java software project? I would like to include at least some cryptographic analysis of the machine in my description of the machine. The NSA historians have told me that properly implemented this would be a formidable algorithm even today (something I doubt.) I have all the information needed to describe the machine. 2- Would you or anyone you know be interested in creating an analysis of the machine. I would like this for my web page, and would love to see a couple of papers on the technology created. Publication could be in a wider range of publications than are normally interested in cryptologic issues. This may be one of the very last of the really important WW II technologies to be disclosed. That combined with the recent interest in cryptography in public policy might make it a hot for some pretty broad journals. Your thoughts would be appreciated. Yours truly, Richard Pekelney ======== <html> <head> <title>USS Pampanito - ECM Mark II </title> <meta name="GENERATOR" content="Mozilla/2.01Gold (Win32)"> </head> <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> <h2>Electronic Cipher Machine (ECM) Mark II</h2> By Rich Pekelney <hr width="100%" > <h3>WHAT IS THE ECM MARK II AND WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT:</h3> The ECM Mark II (also known in the Navy as CSP-888/889 or SIGABA by the Army) is a cipher machine. It was used aboard USS Pampanito to encipher messages from ordinary, or what cryptologist (people who study secret communications) call plain text, into secret language, which is called cipher text, under the control of a key (encipherment). A cryptographic system consists of the combination of cipher machine, operating procedures and management of keys. If the system is well designed and implemented correctly, cipher text can only be converted back to plain text (deciphered) by someone with all three elements of the system. In early September 1944 U.S.Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPAC) in Hawaii recorded a Japanese cipher radio message that originated from Singapore. Unknown to the Japanese, U.S. forces had analyzed many Japanese messages and as a result of much brilliant and hard work were able to reproduce their enemy's inadequately designed and implemented cryptographic system. This is called cryptanalysis or "breaking the system". FRUPAC deciphered (and decoded) the message that announced the route of an important Japanese convoy from Singapore to Japan. The timing and expected path of the convoy from the message was enciphered on an ECM in Hawaii and sent to Pampanito where it was deciphered on an ECM. Although Pampanito's crew did not know how FRUPAC got its information, they were able to go directly to the convoy's path and attack with great efficiency. Pampanito's attack was kept secret by the superior U.S. cryptographic system that revolved around the ECM Mark II. The ECM Mark II based cryptographic system was never broken by an enemy and was secure throughout WW II. The system was retired by the U.S. Navy in 1959 because it was too slow to meet the demands of modern naval communications. Axis powers (primarily Germany) did however periodically break the lower level systems used by Allied forces. Early in the war (notably during the convoy battle of the Atlantic and the North Africa campaign) the breaking of Allied systems contributed greatly to Axis success. In contrast, the Allies were able to break Axis communications for most of the war supplying many of the targets attacked by Pampanito. Intercepted messages provided not only the location of potential targets, but often insight into the thinking of enemy commanders. In the Pacific, this information was critical to success in the battles of Midway and the Coral Sea in 1942. The combination of secure U.S. cryptographic systems and vulnerable Axis systems directly contributed the success of the Allied powers during WW II thereby shortening the war by years and saving countless human lives. A picture of an ECM (labeled SIGABA) may be found on the National Cryptologic Museum web site <a href="http://www.nsa.gov:8080/museum/big.html">The "Big" Machines Exhibit</a> . Note this is a large (613K) color picture. <h3>THE ECM MARK II'S DEVELOPMENT: </h3> The ECM Mark II's critical cryptographic innovation (the Stepping Maze) over Hebern's and other precursors was created by Army cryptologists Frank B. Rowlett and William F. Friedman shortly before 15 Jun 1935. During October and November of 1935 Friedman disclosed the details of the "Stepping Maze" to the Navy's cryptologists including Lt. Joseph N. Wenger. Aside from filing secret patent application 70,412 on 23 Mar 1936 little additional development was performed by either the Army or Navy until Lt. Wenger discussed the patent with Cmdr. Laurence Safford during the winter of 1936-37. Cmdr. Safford recognized the potential of the invention and the Navy began sponsoring and financing a new machine including the "Stepping Maze". Additional innovations by Cmdr. Safford, Cmdr. Seiler and the Teletype Corporation including Mr. Reiber and Mr. Zenner added to the security, reliability and manufacturability of the ECM Mark II. Prototypes were soon delivered, and in February 1940 the machine's details were disclosed to the Army. Amazing as it may seem, the Navy had kept its continuing development of the machine secret from the Army. With minor changes suggested by the Army the machine was accepted as the primary cipher machine for use by both Army and Navy. The joint Army-Navy ECM Mark II cryptographic system became effective on 1 Aug 1941, and the two services had the common high-security cryptographic system in place and in use prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The use of a common system was of great military value, particularly during the early stages of the war when the distribution of machines and codewheels was incomplete. By 1943, over 10,000 machines were in use. The "Stepping Maze" and use of electronic control were a generation ahead of the systems employed by other countries before and after WW II. No other country is known to have ever broken the ECM Mark II cryptographic system. <h3>WHERE IS THE ECM MARK II TODAY:</h3> After newer, faster cryptographic systems replaced the ECM Mark II the machines were systematically destroyed to protect the secrets of their design. Today probably less than a dozen ECMs still exist. The <a ref="http://www.nsa.gov:8080/museum">National Cryptologic Museum</a> (a part of the National Security Agency) has 6 machines, one of which is on display in their Fort George Meade, MD museum. The U.S. Navy has 2 machines, one of which is displayed aboard Pampanito in San Francisco, CA. When recently contacted the US Army historians did not believe they had any machines. The ECM Mark II aboard Pampanito may be the only fully operable ECM Mark II today. This machine was built in June of 1943 as a CSP-889, and sometime ca. 1950 it was modified into a CSP-889-2900. The minor modifications added one switch and a knob that allow operation compatible with CSP-889 machines, or enhanced security when operated as a CSP-2900. <h3>WHAT CIPHER EQUIPMENT WAS ABOARD PAMPANITO DURING WW II:</h3> Just before leaving on each war patrol, one officer and one enlisted man armed with a machine gun would draw the cipher equipment from its secure storage. There were two lists of cipher equipment and manuals, List A included an ECM Mark II and associated documents, List B did not include the ECM. For most patrols List A was used, if the patrol was particularly dangerous and in shallow waters List B was used. CSP-888/889 = ECM Mark II = M-134-C = SIGABA. This was a first-rate, electro-mechanical, rotor wheel cipher machine and the physical component of the primary cryptographic system used by the United States. First-rate cryptographic systems are those that you believe cannot be broken by an enemy in a useful period of time even if they are in possession of the physical elements of the system, provided the other elements of the system are preserved (i.e. keys are kept secret, operating procedures are well designed and followed, number and size of messages per key are small, etc.) The CSP-888 model lacked plugs necessary for tandem operation, but was otherwise identical to the later CSP-889 model. CSP-890 is a pluggable rotor that was carried for use in the CSP-888/889. Pampanito did not use any Second-rate cryptographic systems such as the British Type-X or U.S. CCM. CSP-845 = M138A = CSP-1088. This was a third-rate, paper strip cryptographic system that was used by U.S. Submarines when they were on such dangerous missions that they could not risk the capture of an ECM. It was also used to communicate with forces that did not have an ECM. Third-rate cryptographic systems can be read by an enemy in possession of the physical elements of the system, even if the other elements of the system are preserved. CSP-1500 = M-209 = C-38. This is a fourth-rate, Hagelin derivative, mechanical cryptographic system. Over 140,00 of these were used by Allied forces during the war and they were regularly broken by the enemy. Pampanito would have used this to communicate with forces that did not have an ECM. Fourth-rate cryptographic systems can be broken by an enemy by purely cryptoanalytical means without possession of any parts of the system. CSP-488 = M-94. This is a low level, fourth rate, rotary disk, Jefferson type cipher. It was used to communicate with forces that did not have an ECM. CSP-1270 Chart style authentication cipher, CSP-1272 are its instructions. CSP-1286 Two card style authentication cipher, CSP-1521 are its instructions. CSP-1750 Call sign cipher, CSP-1751 are its instructions. CSP-1300 Weather cipher. <h3>DETAILS OF THE ECM MARK II CIPHER UNIT:</h3> Prior to the ECM Mark II many cipher machines incorporated encipherment by means of an electric current passing through a series of cipher wheels or rotors. A character is typed on a keyboard, passed through the rotors and either printed or displayed in a light board for the operator. The rotors are thin disks with contacts on each side that are wired at random to the other side one wire per contact. Typically a rotor will have 26 contacts on each side, each contact representing a letter of the alphabet. A current passing through the rotor disk might enter in the position of letter B and exit in the position of letter G. Encipherment occurs by passing the current through several rotors that are side by side and rotating one or more of the rotors between each character enciphered. If the deciphering machine starts with rotors of the same design and in the same positions as the enciphering machine, it will repeat the motion of the rotors thereby deciphering the text. The most important difference between previous machines and the ECM is how the enciphering rotors are stepped. The "Stepping Maze" uses rotors in cascade formation to produce a more random stepping of the cipher rotors than existed on previous electromechanical cipher machines. The ECM has fifteen rotors arranged in three rotor banks. The five rotors in the rear are the cipher rotors that convert a plain-text letter into a cipher-text letter as they are irregularly stepped. Electrical currents passing first through the control (middle) rotor bank and then through the index (front) rotor bank determine which cipher rotor(s) step. The center three of five control rotors step in a metered fashion. Control rotor 3 is the fast rotor and steps once for each character typed. Control rotor 4 is the medium rotor and steps once each time control rotor 3 completes a full rotation. Control rotor 2 is the slow rotor and steps once each time control rotor 4 completes a full rotation. Control rotors 1 and 5 do not step. The index rotors are positioned once each day and do not move while operating. The 10 cipher and control rotors are large 26 contact rotors that may be used interchangeably in the cipher or control bank and are reversible. The five smaller, 10 contact, index rotors are only used in the index bank. Four contacts are energized on the first rotor of the control rotor bank. The connections between the last rotor of the 26 contact control bank and the first rotor of the 10 contact index bank are in 9 groups of between 1 and 6 wire(s) each. One of the index bank contacts is not used. The 10 outputs of the last index rotor are attached in pairs to 5 magnets that step cipher rotors when energized. Between 1 and 4 cipher rotors are stepped for each character enchiphered. To properly encipher a message, the three banks of rotors must be arranged and aligned in such a way that they can be reproduced by the deciphering operator. The particular arrangement and alignment of the rotors selected by the enciphering operator and transmitted to the deciphering operator in disguised form constitutes the keying instructions. The design of the ECM limited the erratic stepping so that at least 1, and not more than 4 cipher rotors step at a time. Even so, a crude, exhaustive search would require an enemy to check around 10 to the 14th permutations of code, index and control rotor starting positions. The combination of modern algorithms and the availability of high speed computers mean this system is no longer secure, but during its term of service it provided an unprecedented level of security. <h3>KEYING (OPERATING) THE ECM MARK II:</h3> This outline of the June 1945 (SIGQZF-2) keying procedure describes how key lists were used to assemble and align the rotors before enciphering a message. The first instructions from July 1941 (SIGQZF) were changed in June 1945 (SIGQZF-2) and again November 1945 (SGIQZF-3). For example, SIGQZF-3 uses a totally different method of determining message indicators that eliminated the need for a daily rotor alignment of the control and cipher rotors. Changes were made to minimize operator errors, enhance security and speed up the operation. Although the index rotors were reassembled (changing the order of the rotors) once a day during most of the war (SIGQZF), starting with SIGQZF-2 they were kept in a fixed order not requiring daily reassembly. The operator consults the secret daily keylist and aligns (rotates) the index rotor wheels differently for secret, confidential and restricted messages. The index rotor alignment is only changed when either the day ends, or the classification of message to be encrypted changes. Control and cipher rotors are also reassembled once a day from the secret daily keylist, their alignment however, was changed with each message. After the daily assembly of all rotors and the alignment of the index rotors, a check group is used to verify the initialization and operation of the machine before any real messages are encrypted. The rotors are zeroized, (cipher and control rotors positioned on "O") and the letter A is repeatedly encrypted until 30 cipher text characters are printed. Then the 26th-30th letters are matched with the check group supplied in the secret daily keys. For each message, the secret daily keylist is consulted, and the control and cipher rotors are aligned to an initial position depending on the classification of the message. Now the operator selects a group of any five letters, except Z, at random to be the internal message indicator. This internal message indicator is then enciphered and the external message indicator (enciphered internal message indicator) is printed on the tape and transmitted with the message. The control and cipher rotors are then aligned without printing to the internal message indicator. The rotors are never aligned to the external message indicator (the letters printed on the tape), but always to the internal message indicator. Now the body of the message may be enciphered and transmitted with the external message indicator. If the plain text exceeds 350 5-letter groups, the plain text must be divided into 2 or more equal parts so that no part exceeds 350 groups. For each part a new internal message indicator is selected. <h3>COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATING PROCEDURES:</h3> The security of a cryptographic system relies as much on the operation of the cipher machine as the machine itself. During WW II the U.S. created organizations to formally train operators and to monitor U.S. operators compliance with procedure. When an error was found the first response was often a memorandum such as the one replicated below. It provides a list of the most common errors that could compromise the security of the cryptographic system. <tt>Navy Department Office of Chief of Naval Operations Washington, D.C. </tt> <tt>CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL Date: 27 Dec 1943</tt> <tt>MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATION IMPROVEMENT ITEM</tt> <tt>From: Director Naval Communications To: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District</tt> <tt>The principles of communication security cannot be overstressed, for such security is vital to the success of operations. Errors which seem minor in themselves may, when accumulated, offer to the enemy an entering wedge for the eventual compromise of a system. The object of this memorandum is to enlist your cooperation in protecting our cipher systems and hence our national security. </tt> <tt>THE PRICE OF SECURITY IS ETERNAL VIGILANCE. </tt> <tt>A communication such as COM 112 222105 DECEMBER may endanger our interests because it appears to violate security principles in the following respect(s): </tt> <tt>DRAFTING: Plain language reference to encrypted dispatches.</tt> <tt>No reply to this memorandum is necessary, but your cooperation in supressing dangerous communication practices is earnestly solicited. </tt> <tt>CARELESS COMMUNICATIONS COST LIVES</tt> <tt>The following is a list of some of common violations of security principles: </tt> <tt>DRAFTING: </tt> <tt>Unnecessary word repetition Unnecessary or improper punctuation Plain language reply to encrypted dispatch Classification too high Precedence too high Cancellation in plain language of an encrypted dispatch</tt> <tt>ENCRYPTION: </tt> <tt>"XYX" or "X"'s for nulls "XX" & "KK" to separate padding from text Same letters at both ends to separate padding from text Continuity of padding Seasonal and stereotyped padding Repetition of generatrices Systematic selection of generatrices Using plain text column for encryption Proper strips not eliminated as prescribed by internal indicator (Ed. Note: CSP-845) Improper set-up according to date Using system not held by all addressees Failing to use system of narrowest distribution</tt> <tt>CALLS: </tt> <tt>Enciphering indefinite call sign Enciphering call signs of shore activities CODRESS might have been used</tt> <tt>TRANSMISSION: </tt> <tt>Classified dispatch transmitted in plain language by wire or radio, when not specifically authorized. Dispatch might have gone to some or all addressees by mail. </tt> <h3>SOME ECM MARK II SPECIFICATIONS:</h3> Input: Keyboard or electric via tandem plug. Output: Printed tape or electric via tandem plug. Speed: 45 to 50 Words per minute. Power Supply: 40/70 cycle, 105-125 VAC or 105-125 VDC or 24 VDC 2 amps at 120 volts AC or DC, 3 amps at 24 VDC. Approximate Size: In operation: 15" x 19.25" x 12" or 2.1 cubic feet In carrying case: 17.125" x 23" x 15.5" or 3.5 cubic feet Packed for long term: 19.5" x 27.5" x 18" or 5.6 cubic feet Approximate Weight: In operation: 93.5 lbs. In carrying case: 133.5 lbs. Packed for long term: 195 lbs. Cost: By 1943, 10, 060 ECM Mark II's were purchased at an estimated cost of $2,040 a piece. This does not include the cost of spare parts; additional code wheel sets, code wheel wiring that was done by the military; modifications and upgrades, precursor machine development, etc. <h3>REFERENCES:</h3> The information enclosed here relating to the ECM Mark II was edited and excerpted from: Army Signal Security Agency (1946) History Of Converter M-134-C (Sigaba) Vol I, II And III This is available from the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); NSA Historical Collections 190/37/7/1, Box 799, F: 2292, pp 468. Safford, L.F. (1943) History of Invention And Development of the Mark II ECM (Electric Cipher Machine) This available from NARA. SRH-360 in RG 0457: NSA/CSS Finding Aid A1, 9020 US Navy Records Relating to Cryptology 1918-1950 Stack 190 Begin Loc 36/12/04 Location 1-19. In Feb 1996 the version at NARA was redacted, but the full document is now declassified. Specifications for an ECM Mark II are from: Army Security Agency (1948) Historical and Cryptologic Summary of Cryptosystems; ASAG 23; Vol 1. ECM Mark II Keying, Operating and Maintenance instructions are in: War Department Office of The Chief Signal Officer (1941) Operating Instructions for Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGBWJ) War Department Office of The Chief Signal Officer (1941) Operating Instructions for Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGLVC) Department of the Army (1941) Crypto-Operating Instructions for Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGQZF) Department of the Army (1945) Crypto-Operating Instructions for Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGQZF-2) Department of the Army (1946) Crypto-Operating Instructions for Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGQZF-3) Department of the Army (1949) ASAM 1/1 Crypto-Operating Instructions for ASAM 1. Note the new designation of ASAM 1 for the ECM Mark II after the war. War Department (1942) Maintenance Instructions for Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGKKK) War Department (1945) Maintenance Instructions for Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGKKK-2) SIGQZF, SIGBWJ, SIGLVC, SIGKKK, SIGKKK-2 are available from NARA; NSA Historical Collections 190/37/7/1, NR 2292 CBLL36 10622A 19410300. General information including security of the ECM Mark II are in: War Department (1945) General Instructions For Converter M-134-C (short title: SIGBRE-1) This is available from NARA; NSA Historical Collections 190/37/7/1, NR 4588 ZEMA35 13909A 19450600 A list of cipher equipment carried by submarines in the Pacific is in: Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (1944) Cryptographic Aids Check-Off List This is available from NARA, Pacific Sierra Regional Archive, 181-58-3201, S1313, S372, A6-3/N36 Cryptographic Aids. Information on the overall history of Naval Communications during WW II may be found in: US Naval Administration in WW II, History of Naval Communications, 1939-1945. Op-20A-asz, A12, Serial 00362P20, 7 Apr 1948. This is available from the Naval Historical Center; WW II Command File CNO; Communications History; Microfiche No. F3561. Compliance with Operating Instructions notes are from: Office of Chief of Naval Operations (1943) Memorandum Communication Improvement Item. This is available from the NARA, Pacific Sierra Regional Archive, RG 181-58-3224, 12th ND Commandants Office General Correspondence, A6-2(1) Complaints - Discrepencies, Security-etc. Descriptions of the the Authentication Systems may be found in: Survey Of Authentication Systems 1942-45 (1945) This is available from NARA; NSA Historical Collections 190/37/7/1, NR 3526 CBRK24 12960A 19420728. <h3>ADDITIONAL READING:</h3> History of cryptology: Kahn, D. (1967) The Codebreakers. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company. Bamford, J. (1982) The Puzzle Palace. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. Background on the history of intelligence in the Pacific may be found in: Holmes, W.J. (1979) Double-Edged Secrets. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Layton, E., Pineau, R., Costello, J (19 ) And I Was There. New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc. Prados, J. (1995) Combined Fleet Decoded. New York, NY: Random House. On the subject of Cryptanalysis of rotor systems: Andleman, D., Reeds, J. (1982) On Cryptanalysis of Rotor Machines and Substitution-Permutation Networks. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-28(4), 578-584. Deavours, C., Kruh, L. (1985) Machine Cryptography and Modern Cryptanalysis. 35-92. Dedham, MA: Artech House Inc. </body> </html> ======= Not part of the web page, additional information. ==== - The ECM displayed (starting in July) aboard U.S.S. Pampanito is a CSP-889-2900 on loan from the Naval Security Group. It has "12-29-43 BTS" stamped into the bottom, and "CONT. AX? 1728", "ACCEPTED JUN 1943" with an indecipherable mark printed in orange ink. The print unit ENG-108 is serial number 999 which is consistent with 1943 manufacture. There is no name plate on the unit or the rotor cage. The top housing has holes and an outline in the appropriate location and size to hold a the Cleaning Instruction plate added in Dec 1943, these holes have been painted over. Inside the machine were two pieces of paper. The first was a 3x5" card on which was printed in ink "Bacchus / Gorgon". The second is a memorandum of call form revised in 1967 on the back of which was printed in pencil "Baccus CSP 2900", "Basket CSP 2899". The code names Bacchus and Gorgon were used during the 1950s for CSP 2900 based systems. The machine arrived in pretty good condition, after mechanical and electrical safety checks, and a new ribbon we have tested its operation successfully. The cipher and control rotors are test rotors (wired straight through) so the cipher wheel stepping is not very erratic. The index rotors are wired, changing their setup does change the cipher wheel stepping. We will be seeking the loan of a wired set of wheels from the NCM at NSA. If this fails, we may choose to make a temporary and reversible change to several of the Cipher and Control rotors. This will provide an adequate simulation showing random stepping of cipher wheels and unintelligible cipher text. The machine was cleaned and lubricated according to SIGKKK-2, 1945. To minimize realignment the main rotor shaft was lubricated in place and the printer unit was removed, but not separated. The printer unit should be removed, separated, cleaned and the center shaft lubricated. We are trying to find drawings or descriptions of "pawl release rod" 100707, "assembly studs" 100708, and "assembly ring" 100706. We will attempt separating the unit when we have determined if we can find info on these tools that will facilitate assembly. When received, during encrypt the tape was not spacing in 5 character groups, it advanced to the space and stopped advancing. This corrected itself after cleaning and may be caused by a weakened spring. Lubricants were used as described: 100983 oil (SAE 20) - We used SAE 20 synthetic bicycle fork lubricating oil. 100984 grease (light grease). 108607 "Lubriplate #105" Lubriplate #105 has been in continuos production without change in formula by Fiske Bros. Refinery, Newark, NJ (201-589-9150) since 1933. It was in stock at Coast Marine with "space age" printed on the tube. A thin coat of DeOxit from CAIG was used on exposed leaf contacts in the build up switches. Cleaning was done with tech wipes and a non-residual electrical cleaning spray (tested on the plastic first). No abrasives were used. The CSP-2900 model was developed by the Navy ca. 1950 (SRH-360). The unit has two switches in the position that a CSP-889 has only one. The new switch is marked 889/2900. There is also a knob marked 889 F/2900 R extending out on the left of the keyboard. Near the 889 F/2900 R knob the housing looks like it underwent some hand work to fit the shaft, this is all painted. I believe it was built as a CSP-889 and later modified to CSP-889-2900. There is an added (not CSP-889) mechanism that appears to be a counter with a switch that is adjusted so it does not function. Perhaps it was connected to an external device. Floating loose in the machine was a single metal stud that appears to be unrelated to the machine, possibly a piece of construction debris. I have replaced the ribbon with an Okidata printer ribbon (this ribbon is on a plastic spool.) The original ribbon, stud and the notes are in a plastic bag kept with the machine. The machine was received bolted to the bottom of the carrying case, we did not get the top of the carrying case. There were no wooden shims in the case to protect the rubber shock mounts. There is no cover for the print head. The details below elaborate on the general description provided in History Of Converter M-134-C (1949 Army History). I have only included the details that I noticed where different from the description. My convention is to label the rotor contacts when the rotor is in the zeroized position, not reversed, as printed (i.e. counter clockwise). The same for index rotors, i.e. with the units digit zero on top, i.e. 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 showing as the starting position, unit digits increase in a counter clockwise manner. I do not know if these are the conventions used elsewhere. With first switch in the 889 position, the second switch in the OPERATE position, the control switch on E and the knob selecting 889 F: The right of the control rotor bank has the TUVW contacts at 60 VAC, the RS contacts are energized to 16.2 VAC,. I believe the voltage on the RS contacts is unintended leakage from the 889/2900 switch, before cleaning these were at 25 VAC. The connections between the left plate of the index bank (number) and the left plate of the control bank (letters) are below. 1-P, 2-Q, 3-RS, 4-TUV, 5-WXY, 6-ZABC, 7-DEFGH, 8-IJKLMN, 9-O, 0-no connection All cipher rotors turn in a clockwise rotation. With first switch in the 2900 position, the second switch in the OPERATE position, the control switch on E and the knob selecting 2900 R: The right of the control rotor bank has RSTUVW contacts are energized to 60.3 VAC. The connections between the left plate of the index bank (number) and the left plate of the control bank (letters) are below. 1 - P, 2-Q, 3-RS, 4-TUV, 5-WXY, 6-ZABCD, 7-GH, 8-KLMN, 9-O, 0- IJ Cipher rotors 2 and 4 turn counter-clockwise, 1, 3, 5 turn clockwise. The 2900 R knob is mechanically linked to the cams that turn rotors 2 and 4. The knob and first switch both must select either 889 or 2900 to operate. In either position of the first switch (889 or 2900) or knob (889 F or 2900 R), second switch in OPERATE position, control switch on E: The cipher rotor solenoids (first number) are connected to right of the index bank (second number). 1-09, 2-87, 3-56, 4-34, 5-12 The keyboard is wired to the left plate of the cipher bank in a sequential manner with A on top proceeding clockwise. Note this is opposite of the rotors that are labeled in a counter clockwise manner. Z position of the cipher bank is occupied by the spacebar. (During encipher typing Z generates an encrypted X.) When the control switch is in D (decipher) position the right plate instead of left plate of the cipher bank is connected to the keyboard as expected. Probably only a dozen or so ECMs still exist. The NSA has 6 they know of. The Navy has 2, one of which is aboard Pampanito. They Army may have a couple, but NCM did not know. We have the only one that is operated. (NCM estimate Jun 96.) -- Richard Pekelney Internet: pekelney(a)rspeng.com Phone: 1-415-563-5928 Fax: 1-415-563-5787

1 0