- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:58 AM 7/15/96 -0400, Raph Levien wrote: >4. Thus, the best leverage for the TLAs to win is to guide the >development of a key management infrastructure with the following >property: if you don't register your key, you can't play. I believe that >this is the true meaning of the word "voluntary:" you're free to make >the choice not to participate. > >5. This is _important_. If you can't get the keys for your >correspondents, you can't use encryption. If they build a key management >infrastructure that actually works, people will use it. The obvious counter is to use the key management infrastructure for authentication, but use a technique like Diffie-Hellman to decide on a session key. I see two problems with this approach: (1) It still allows traffic analysis. (2) It will be difficult to implement for one-way transmissions (e.g. email). A more complex structure would overcome (2) above. Use you GAK key to sign your PGP key. Post your PGP key on the MIT server (or successors), and people who want non-GAKed communication with you would use your PGP key, with the benefit of government approved authentication. I still think this whole GAK thing is going to fail on the, "Which government?" question. I don't see either multi-nationals or their governments wanting to share their secrets with each other, and I don't see how to set up universal GAK to prevent that form of industrial espionage. Also, the key which decodes the GAKed data is just too valuable and too easy to steal. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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WashPost: A "hate speech" horseman of a different color
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Search July 15th www.washingtonpost.com for "massive armamentarium" [sic]. With Innovative Use, the Web Empowers the First Amendment By John Schwartz Washington Post Staff Writer Monday, July 15 1996; Page F19 The Washington Post [...] Lately, though, I've gotten a nice, big dose of hope from watching hatemongers on the Net as they duke it out with the truth-squaders. In any intellectual combat, those who can support their arguments with facts are better armed. And guess what? The Internet gives us a new kind of arsenal. That might go against what you've been reading. A lot of journalists are discovering "hate speech" on the Internet -- racism, antisemitism, the whole vile package. It's the cover story for the current issue of Emerge, with the arresting image of a mouse cord tied in a noose. Such groups as the Simon Wiesenthal Center in California try to persuade publications to run stories on this loathsome trend, and they urge governments to drive those who spread messages of hate off the Net. [...] The on-line guest book at Nizkor is an evolving testament to the power of free speech. One visitor wrote: "As the child of survivors of the Holocaust I am particularly dismayed when intelligent and reasonable people are influenced by revisionist pap. I'm often frustrated to the point where I'd sooner tolerate censorship than the promulgation of neo-Nazi lies. Your work restores my faith in reasoned debate and the drive of honest people to find and spread the truth." Memo to the Founders: Thanks, guys. You got it right. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMeqQV5NcNyVVy0jxAQF8vAIAlGyi91nOxj1qhRN7GPXcChO9FOraJSc1 h/WyEC01HJj/W5uj51AxZbJIHjkz/eCcMb2AmjclfGeKIThrsSoY9A== =Olej -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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re: Organized Crime Home Page - Four Horsemen, No Waiting
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Well, with the UCMJ ( Uniform Code of Military Justice ) and the Oath >of Allegiance Military Personnel take on induction being re-written >to Support and defend the United Nations and to accept direct and >lawful orders from UN personnel, this doesn't surprise me.Soon, UN >Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, or someone like him will >repeal more of the amendments to our constitution. First our guns, >then our code. > >I'll give up my pass phrase when > they pry it from my cold dead fingers ! Charley Sparks Booz Allen & Hamilton http://www.clark.net/pub/charley/index.htm Public Key Available

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Someone can't read
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- So, I'm a member of something anyway... could be worse... I could be a politician... being a geek, at least requires "some" brains !! {Snip snip } > >As I recall the NRC members in DC said, in *EXPLICITLY* rejecting >the "If only you know what we know..." mantra, that if there was >something the [NRC] did not know, it wasn't cuz that had not asked >everyone involved. (Or words to that effect) > >So it appears the Admin was withholding data from the Congress.... > > I have here in front of me, documented proof that there > are crypto-carrying members of the Cypherpunk Party... > > >-- >A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com >& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX >Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 >is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCXAwUBMeq/9+J+JZd/Y4yVAQGmHgQKAmooJ6NLnY3CF08TmYPOYvS9nDIMsYvL cLDC7wGPo1nnWFmGHVgJzalDJgip2gDQZUdt4i96kCy4E4w1epJxerVkJW0b2edY BF8HaZGLRlqDGNQIJwl+18gupV0g9DuchSiNgG5hodxrS8n/bLlRPGKeAKabKJY5 jvSyqR+tg6nUpA== =L5pp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >

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Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:30 PM 7/15/96 -0400, Mark M. wrote: >Nowhere in the Constitution does it say that firearms (or crypto in this case) >are a threat to national security. In fact, the second amendment explicitly >dictates that people have the right to own firearms. No, it says "arms," not "firearms." Firearms are a subset of "arms," which a nearby dictionary defines as "objects used as weapons." By that definition, chemicals and biologicals, as well as explosives of all sorts, are "arms." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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(fwd) krypt13i.zip Enkryptonator: Homonymous key encryption system, R. Newton
by frogfarm＠yakko.cs.wmich.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Anyone know more about this one? "Homonymous" in this context sounds a tad oily.] >From: mjk(a)reimari.uwasa.fi (Mika Koykka) Newsgroups: comp.archives.msdos.announce Subject: krypt13i.zip Enkryptonator: Homonymous key encryption system, R. Newton Date: 15 Jul 1996 11:32:39 +0300 Lines: 82 Thank you for your contribution. This upload is now available as 60605 Jul 2 22:10 ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/pc/crypt/krypt13i.zip : Date: Sun, 14 Jul 1996 15:10:55 -0500 : From: Enkryptonator <enkrypt(a)flash.net> : To: pc-up(a)uwasa.fi : Subject: krypt13i.zip Homonymous key encryption uploaded : : I mailed a previous Email today, but it contained a typo in the file name : uploaded. : this message contains no such typo. : : File name: : KRYPT13i.ZIP : Enkryptonator: Homonymous key encryption system. : Replaces: : KRYPT12.ZIP : Suggested Garbo directory: : crypt : Uploader name & email: : Richard Newton, enkrypt(a)flash.net : Author or author company: : Richard Newton : Email address: : enkrypt(a)flash.net : Surface address: : Box 866292 Plano Tx 75086 USA. : Special requirements: : Developed on MS-DOS 386 platform. : Math co-processor recommended, but not required. : Shareware payment required from private users: : Yes, but not from students. : Shareware payment required from corporates: : Yes. : Distribution limitations: : None : Garbo CD-ROM distribution allowed without extra preconditions: : Yes. : Demo: : No. : Nagware: : No, Displays none of the behavior described in your : instructions. : Self-documenting: : Yes. : External documentation included: : Yes, about 70Kb (unzipped). : Source included: : No. : Size: : 60kb zipped. : 10 lines description: : : Enkryptonator is a newly developed encryption system based on the : principles of homonymous key cryptography invented by Enkryptonator Co. : Homonymous key systems are an exiciting, new breakthrough, that solve : the 'key management' problem without resorting to 'public key' : cryptography. No more unwieldy, impossible to remember, binary keys. : Enkryptonator is easy to use. Because of Enkryptonator's unique design : no one who intercepts your encryption in an unauthorized manner can : decrypt your file -- even if he knows the key of encryption! Everyone : has a right to privacy and Enkryptonator will provide you a means of : securing your personal and private concerns from unwanted intruders. : : Long description: : : This is the 1.3 International Shareware version of Enkryptonator. : The international version will only allow a single key of encryption : in order prevent running a-foul of US export control regulations on : the export of encryption technology. : : Version 1.3 introduces a 5% speed improvement and minor changes in : messaging. Version 1.3 is incompatible with version 1.2 and version : 1.1. These are the only code changes. The most significant reason for : releasing 1.3 is to provide users with more comprehensive and updated : user documentation. ................................................................. Mika Koykka, mjk(a)uwasa.fi http://www.uwasa.fi/~mjk/ Moderating at garbo.uwasa.fi http://garbo.uwasa.fi/ FTP archives Computer Centre, University of Vaasa, Box 700, FIN-65101 Finland -- "Your wish is my command, if you know what's good for you, bitch." - William Shakespeare (Or perhaps it was his brother Fred who said that.)

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Re: Word lists for passphrases
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:33 PM 7/15/96, David Sternlight wrote: >It is pretty easy to defend against dictionary attacks by using an expanded >character set--mixed caps and lower case; numbers substituted for some >letters according to easily-remembered personal rules. > >"Da5id" in "Snow Crash" by Neal Stephenson is an obvious example, since the >"v" is a roman numeral 5. Another is the "Compuserve method" of inserting >punctuation characters between words making up a password or key. Since the >length of the words used is unknown to the cracker, this makes his job >harder. > >That is--a dictionary which accomodates such things as the above will be >pretty large. With the number rule, there would have to be 10 additional >versions of the one-letter word, 10 versions of each leading character >making up a two letter word, and then it starts increasing combinatorially. >Might as well use brute force. In a "universe" of n-character passwords, whatever length n is, the use of English, German, Elvish, Klingon, whatever words can be looked as "galaxies." (That is, clusters in an otherwise uniform space.) Thus, "David" is one of the galaxies, and ""Da5id," "david," "Daphid," etc. are just some of the stars in this galaxy of "nearby" strings. Calculations of entropy and all. Be very careful. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 Jul 96 at 9:58, Raph Levien wrote: [..] > Thanks to Dave for posting this URL. This is a _very_ important > document, and I would recommend that all concerned cypherpunks read it > carefully. Unlike many of its predecessors, it is clearly written and > quite upfront about the "administration's" goals. >From the document: "This framework will encourage commerce both here and abroad. It is similar to the approach other countries are taking, and will permit nations to establish an internationally interoperable key management infrastructure with rules for access appropriate to each country's needs and consistent with law enforcement agreements. [...]" With differing rules, I can't see how such a system can work. What happens when one country wants the keys from the citizen of another who is 'favored' by the other's government? (ie, say the US gov't wants keys that a drug cartel kingpin uses when he chats with the brother of the president of some other country...) And can one be sure that a country's LEAs request keys because a citizen is involved with 'organized crime', or is really a political activist of the unwanted kind? What's to prevent cooperation of the FBI with foreign LE's (such as in Russia) with looser search-and-seizure rules? Who is going to manage such systems? Private corporations in various countries? Will users have a choice as to which to use? (It would seem the institutions of some countries are less trustworthy than others for different people around the planet.) How many people would trust the UN? (ObHumor: I hear in the year 2000 the Olympics will have black helicopter races...) Global key management, even with universal rules, would seem unworkable. Managing BILLIONS of keys will involve a lot of complexity, in terms of locating keys, data integrity and preservation, authentication, etc. Methinks it's time for the administration to inhale... oxygen is good for the brain. I think the potential of import controls has a bit more hype than the admin makes it out to be. There's already a lot of strong crypto out there... so how much political strong-arming can the Admin do? I wonder how the Microsoft C[r]API fits in to this, since it mentions "export of cryptography-ready operating systems". Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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d.Comm: Your Login Information (fwd)
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

password, limited to 8 characters is "cypherpu" Has anyone set a psuedo-standard for these things? Adam ----- Forwarded message from hotlists(a)d-comm.com ----- Login: cypherpunks Passwd: 107084 URL: http://www.d-comm.com/ Note: If you wish to change your allotted password, Password management is available at : http://www.d-comm.com/s-bin/hl_passwd ----- End of forwarded message from hotlists(a)d-comm.com ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: #E-CASH: PRODUCT OR SERVICE?
by Steven Seyffert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- : From: bryce(a)digicash.com : To: David G.W. Birch <daveb(a)hyperion.co.uk> : Cc: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com>; cypherpunks(a)toad.com : Subject: Re: #E-CASH: PRODUCT OR SERVICE? : Date: maandag 15 juli 1996 15:36 : : : -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- : : I think it would behoove us all to clarify our terms. I call : Ecash(tm) coins "electronic cash" for several reasons. Ecash(tm) : has all of the following characteristics in common with : conventional cash, in descending order of importance: : : : 1. Unforgeability. Ecash(tm) coins have intrinsic value : because they are cryptographically impossible to forge. : forgery is possible in 'real life' and is possible in 'virtual life'(another discussion wright there). It all depends on the amount of control and need of insider knowledge to be able to crack a system. The existence of a system is defined by the possibility of a crack. : : : 2. Finality. Payments are cleared on the spot. No outstanding : payment obligations remain after a purchase. : You are from digicash aren't you? Isn't this the dutch experiment on Ecash?(could be wrong there). I've been asking around and it seems digicash is one system whilst it becomes more and more competitors(for example www.digipass.com) The main difference I've heard is the one about argument between customer and bank about the amount of money that was transferred from bank to ecash to the E-store. Digipass seems to be working with a code generator that includes the amount parameter in the algorythm that generates the code that is send back to the bank or whatever. : 3. Bi-directionality. Payers and recipients use the same : software and the same protocol. It is not necessary for : recipients to be specially trusted by the bank or by the payers. : The fact is, I think, that some major battle is going to take place on the grounds of ecash. We're going to have quite a lot of protocols and software used within different conglomerates of company's. Only time will decide with which protocol we are going to buy our pizza's. : 4. Privacy. The privacy of Ecash(tm) payers is mathematically : unconditional. : Just like the privacy of e-mail and the independance of the WWW once was. : 5. Composability. You can make large Ecash(tm) payments out of : a collection of smaller Ecash(tm) coins. This is in contrast to : a check-based system where you typically draw a check for the : exact amount and transfer only a single check. : You're wright, though I always seem to end up with fewer money than I thought I had at the beginning of each month : 6. Small payments. Ecash(tm) coins are cheap enough to use : that they are practical for small payments. : : (As a note, I do not use the word "micropayments" here, because : I am beginning to think that a good technical definition of : "micropayments" is "payments whose value is less than the cost : of using current electronic coins". This qualifies schemes like : Shamir's and disqualifies, well... current electronic coins.) : : : There might be other angles we should talk about here. : : : I think that the first quality is the defining one, technically. : : : So, could a knowledgeable person e.g. Mr. Birch tell us why : Mondex should be considered to be "electronic cash"? : : : And similarly I would like to hear an informed opinion about : why Ecash(tm) should not be considered "electronic cash". : I tend to agree that Ecash(tm) would be even _more_ cashlike : if it were cleared off-line, but I don't consider that : difference very fundamental. (_Any_ digital money based on : our current understandings will have to be cleared at a : central clearer eventually, since digital information is : perfectly copyable.) : : : Thank you for your correspondance. : : : Regards, : : Bryce : : Ecash 2.x Team : : : : -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- : Version: 2.6.2i : Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 : : iQB1AwUBMepI/UjbHy8sKZitAQEiJwL/VnpQEHL1rOQ6Hm9JIEgAfCGjSKOPaIiC : Jp7EVjvPoFYEsQAS4iUWybNLpxi/23uaqpXMCSNMrEwqd8WeC5ZSISldIEK/BnYE : 2bULeAeMhIqm92bP6o64ok1NBGPfvK5X : =ANO4 : -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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