- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

www.anonymizer.com
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had occasion to try www.anonymizer.com recently, and noticed that it does not make SSL connections to other Web servers, nor does it seem to accept them from the user. Is there some technical reason for this? If I wish to grep the Web without my browsing habits becoming known to someone monitoring my Net connection, https://www.anonymizer.com with 128 bit encryption would probably be a good thing to connect to. I realize that the anonymizer does perform its stated function quite nicely, namely that of preventing Web sites from collecting information on people who visit them. It just seems that this additional functionality would be useful and not particularly difficult to implement. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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INTERESTING ADS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Today while thumbing through POLICE CHIEF magazine, I saw some ads that have at least peripheral Cypherpunk interest. Two were for mobile communications software/hardware. One even had a Web page (though when I browsed it with lynx, there wasn't anything to see). Both give direct access to NCIC, NLETS, motor vehicle records, local police databases, etc. They both make a point of saying they offer encrypted links. In the words of one, "And unlike conventional radio communications, all transmissions are totally secure and unavailable to eavesdropping perpetrators AND INQUIRING REPORTERS." (My emphasis added.) Cerulean http://www.cerulean.com 508-460-4000 Premier MDT 800-966-7722 for brochure and free demo disk. ^^^^^^^^^ The other ad was for computerized polygraph equipment. It looks like a laptop with input units for respiration, galvanic skin response and blood pressure. It uses something called the "Johns Hopkins Polyscore Analysis Algorithm. US$5,700. Axciton Systems 800-460-2645 S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Anonymous Web Services Inc.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Assuming your excerpt is accurate, it's either a bad joke, a scam on dumb users (possibly by equally dumb operators) or a sting. My $.02 worth. (Hey, imagine a day when eca$h for two cents is posted with a comment like that?) Rob On 26 Jul 96 at 0:17, J. Kent Hastings wrote: > Cpunx, ecashers, and others: > > Oh joy, these guys are good publicity for our side. :^( > Arghh!!! > > http://www.angelfire.com/pg1/digicrime/index.html > > Anonymous Web Services Inc. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's > how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy > suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If > 50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted. > Otherwise they kill the first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2 > to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply. I don't know the final outcome, but I do have a couple of observations... - The person at the front of the line, making the suggestion, will always vote for his own proposal, if only to save his own life. This is obvious. - The second-to-last person is in an interesting position. If everyone before him is dead and he gets to the front of the line, he will decide that he gets _all_ of the money for himself. If there's only two people left, his own Yes vote for his own proposal makes 50% and he automatically gets all the money. This is the best possible deal for him. So, I think the second-to-last person will vote No to every proposal except his own, in an effort to force this situation. Now that I think about it, solving this 'game theory' scenario has some parallels to cryptanalysis (disclaimer: I am not a cryptanalyst). By pointing out the above properties, I've removed a couple of 'bits' from the 'search space'. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)

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Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- CLARIFICATION
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: ichudov(a)algebra.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Jul 25 20:12:45 1996 > > I forgot to say what the GOALS are. The goals of every individual > cypherpunk are (in from highest to lowest priority): > > 1. Stay alive > 2. Get as much money as possible > 3. Keep as many cypherpunks alive as possible, all other things being > equal. Well, the existence of "3" changes the problem entirely, as does a system of prioritization. Under these rules, Robber 1 would propose an even split, eleven ways, and it would probably be accepted. That keeps a majority alive, and a majority get some money (~2M each). Without that, I'd tend to concur with the other answers (19 & 20 each get $10M). If we have to actually give a damn about each other... :) dave - ---- David E. Smith POB 324 Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 dsmith(a)prairienet.org http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith send mail of 'send pgp-key' subject for my PGP public key "I'm only a social smoker, just a few packs a day really" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Automagically signed with Pronto Secure for Windows. iQEVAwUBMfgbozVTwUKWHSsJAQE+jQf+OwCOcoyX9nyMO1ihLr/Jzzqr4c+FXDLl xWsAGKtr9Qr7afzCxeYRMjN5w5wGhSpXcNLa9oXgPlGRV0L2tH9vPvLifHWzzv7K nvOQIC8mBK6O7rbHY8koD6E32D1BQE6SiTRVo3b3L7HOceCIxeT40RvEQfhDKj7B RFaWehB4s1Aw1IdMh2rnIFpwY/vLDRx8/q8vXy6mAugOJmAvdoaeGQfbrKLIWSE0 D3X8F3O7fjQ3dda9oEE3xVhsJoRwuQ/Hcbk2eqrIomeLWSqeQO/OQl/vNHkNMAmX MrkdHNYlXZRhtwHS3mKfcli+iekFLKzXRpyhurUN8g3Ni14Q8I6BSQ== =eaX7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CD Prices and Inflation
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:14 AM 7/26/96, jim bell wrote: >At 05:06 AM 7/26/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >>So, while I "wish" CD prices were even lower, I'm paying a lot less in >>"real dollars" for more music today than I was paying 15 years ago or 30 >>years ago. > >I think you're trying to hide a 5-year effect by immersing it in 30 years of >change. Yes, we've had inflation, but the large spurt of post-Vietnam >inflation was basically over by about 1983, when the CD was introduced. At No, I'm not "trying" to hide anything. What I said is what I meant: CDs today offer more music/dollar than LPs did in 1967. And, in 1975. And, in 1983. (In 1983 I bought my last "audiophile" LP, a direct-to-disk half-speed-mastered album that cost me something like $12.) The complaint that CD prices have not fallen faster than some would like, since 1983, is a different kettle of fish from what my point was, that CD prices in 1983 or in 1996 are a better "deal" than LPs were in the period I described. As for prices not dropping, if customers stopped buying, prices would drop very rapidly. That they are not, and that "mega-stores" are sprouting up all over place tells us that CD sales are exploding. Finally, and most convincingly, nothing in U.S. law prevents Jim Bell or anyone else from setting up his own CD company and undercutting the prices of the Biggies. Hey, if you think you can supply CDs to customers for a lot less money, go for it! --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cyber Rights Non! -- French Net-Censorship
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 20:38:22 -0500 To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu From: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) Subject: FC: Cyber Rights Non! -- French Net-Censorship Sender: owner-fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Attached is a portion of the lead article from today's HotWired on the French government's net-censorship. I'm pleased to say I just received word from a French correspondent that the French "Conseil Constitutionnel" has blocked the part of the law creating "Le Conseil SupÈrieur de la TÈlÈmatique" to decide what should be blocked online. (From what I've been able to gather, that court reviews laws to ensure they're constitutional. On June 27, the Conseil heard arguments from senators that the law violated articles of the French constitution.) I have more on other international net-censorship attempts at: http://www.eff.org/pub/Global/Dispatches/ http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/international/ -Declan ----------------------------------- Read the full article at: http://www.netizen.com/netizen/ HotWired The Netizen Cyber Rights Non! by Jerome Thorel Paris, 24 July Early last month, at a time of day when typical netsurfers are just hitting their mouse-clicking stride - around 3:30 in the morning - the French Senate voted on the final version of the new Telecommunications Regulation Act. A little-remarked section of the act, introduced as an amendment a few days before, represents the French legislature's first plunge into the digital ocean. It creates a kind of administrative oversight of Internet speech, Web sites, and online services. The law's effect is to create a council - le Conseil SupÈrieur de la TÈlÈmatique (CST) - to dictate or arbitrate guidelines regarding Internet content. It turned out, however, that the move by Telecommunications Minister FranÁois Fillon, sponsor of the French Telecom Act, was a little hasty. France had been shaken this spring by two investigations into pedophilia and Holocaust revisionism (both considered crimes in France) on the Internet. For months, Fillon had promised French Internet service providers that they would no longer bear responsibility for the content they transmit. The law does settle that question. But no one imagined that this guarantee would include as its condition the creation of the CST. To be safe from indictment, ISPs will be obliged to follow CST's guidelines - a policy typical of France's strong tradition of centralized administration. [...] The French Net-regulation bill became law on 7 June - the same week that US federal judges declared the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional.... [...] Jerome Thorel, a Paris-based freelance reporter, writes frequently about technology and society. Andy Oram, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, contributed to this article. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- fight-censorship is archived at http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/

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Re: Produce 7 Hertz Frequency
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:18 PM 7/25/96 +0800, Jerome Tan wrote: >Does anyone know how to produce a 7 hertz frequency? Find an establishment that deals in peircing equiptment. Ask him to give you a "Prince Albert". This will give you the tone you seek. (You will also never lose your carkeys again.) You may need a tesla coil for repeated tones. Enjoy! --- |"Computers are Voodoo -- You just have to know where to stick the pins."| |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Princeton University muzzles students
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 25 Jul 1996 20:33:38 -0500 To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu From: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) Subject: Princeton University muzzles students, from HotWired Sender: owner-fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Kudos to Brock for writing about Princeton University's attempt to muzzle student online speech -- by citing IRS regulations. Sure, Princeton isn't bound by First Amendment strictures since it's not a state university and there is no state action. Nevertheless, it should abide by the fundamental and long-standing principles of academic freedom. Especially as a supposedly leading institution of higher education, Princeton should stand head and shoulders above the rest in fighting for free expression on its campus. To its shame, it didn't. The university attorneys should have at least read the two relevant IRS revenue rulings (they didn't) before announcing such a restrictive policy. And this isn't the first overbroad censorial policy that Princeton has on the books. Carl Kadie comments on another one at: gopher://gopher.eff.org:70/00/CAF/policies/princeton.edu.critique The Justice on Campus Project (http://joc.mit.edu/) has similar info. When Princeton administrators claimed they followed the letter of the law, in truth they used the law as an excuse to muzzle their students. -Declan ----------------- Read the full article at: http://www.netizen.com/netizen/96/30/campaign_dispatch3a.html HotWired The Netizen Poison Ivy Campaign Dispatch by Brock N. Meeks Washington, DC, 24 July Princeton University is apparently prohibiting students from exercising their First Amendment rights by going after folks who set up Web pages in support of presidential candidates, Dispatch has learned. Princeton launched its preemptory strike against free speech on 19 July in a statement issued by its general counsel's office, which warns that a violation of the school's policy against politicking "will result in appropriate disciplinary action." [...] Small problem: the IRS disagrees. Although there is no direct IRS ruling involving the use of a university's computer resources by its faculty, staff, or students to set up political Web pages, agency spokesman Wilson Fadely said there are two previous rulings "that may apply." The first deals with a student newspaper that directly endorsed one candidate for office over another. Despite the fact that the newspaper was published with university resources, "that was deemed not to be intervention," Fadely said. [...] So where does Princeton get off riding its tax-exempt hobby horse as a de facto means to trample free speech? "No comment at this time," said Howard Ende, a Princeton attorney and co-author of the 19 July statement. When informed of the IRS rulings, Ende's reply was an enigmatic, "Oh, really." [...] The one saving grace of the scenario is the perverse pleasure one can take in realizing that an elitist Ivy League school is so anal-retentive that it makes the IRS look reasonable. Go figure....

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IP: NSA RESPONSE TO KEY LENGTH REPORT
by farber＠central.cis.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960718184201.0070667c(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu> Date: Thu, 18 Jul 1996 12:04:27 -0400 From: Matt Blaze <mab(a)research.att.com> July 18, 1996 There is currently being circulated, to members of Congress and possibly elsewhere, a four page document entitled ``Brute-Force Cryptanalytic Attacks'' that calls into question some of the conclusions of the ``Minimum Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers'' white paper [1]. The document bears no author or organization attribution, but we are told that it originated from NSA. The NSA document argues that ``physical realities'' make parallel key search much more expensive and time consuming than our white paper estimated. However, the NSA document appears to have been written from the perspective of general parallel processing or cryptanalysis rather than exhaustive key search per se. It ignores several elementary principles of parallel processing that apply specifically to exhaustive key search machines of the type that our white paper considered. In particular, NSA argues that interconnections, heat dissipation, input/output bandwidth, and interprocessor communication make it difficult to ``scale up'' a key search machine by dividing the task among a large number of small components. While these factors do limit the scalability of more general purpose multiprocessor computers (such as those made by Cray), they do not apply at all to specialized exhaustive key search machines. The NSA argument ignores the most fundamental feature of brute-force key search: the processors performing the search have no need to communicate with other components of the system while they perform their share of the search, and therefore the system has no need for any of the global interconnections that limit scaling. Indeed, there is no reason that all the components of a parallel search machine must be located even within the same city, let alone the same computer housing. We note that one of our co-authors (Eric Thompson, of Access Data, Inc.) designs and builds medium-scale FPGA-based key search machines with exactly this loosely-coupled structure, and regularly uses them to recover keys for clients that include the FBI. The NSA document also calls into question our cost estimates for ASIC components, suggesting that ASIC chips of this type cost NSA approximately $1000.00 each. However, our $10.00 per chip estimate is based on an actual price quote from a commercial chip fabrication vendor for a moderate-size order for an exhaustive search ASIC designed in 1993 by Michael Wiener [2]. Perhaps NSA could reduce its own costs by changing vendors. Finally, the NSA report offers estimates of the time required to perform exhaustive search using a Cray model T3D supercomputer. This is a curious choice, for as our report notes, general-purpose supercomputers of this type make poor (and uneconomical) key search engines. However, even the artificially low performance results for this machine should give little comfort to the users of 56 bit keys. According to NSA, 56 bit keys can be searched on such a machine in less than 453 days. ``Moore's law'' predicts that it will not be long before relatively inexpensive general-purpose computers offer similar computational capability. /s/ Matt Blaze Whitfield Diffie References: [1] Blaze, M., Diffie, W., Rivest, R., Schneier, B., Shimomura, T., Thompson, E., and Wiener, M. ``Minimum Key Lengths for Symmetric Key Ciphers for Commercial Security.'' January 1996. Available from ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.txt [2] Wiener, M. ``Exhaustive DES Key Search.'' Presented at Crypto-93, Santa Barbara, CA. August 1993. ========================================================================= [Transcription of document circulated to various members of congress and others in June, 1996, apparently by NSA] BRUTE-FORCE CRYPTANALYTIC ATTACKS Two published theoretical estimates of cost versus time to perform brute-force hardware attacks on selected cryptography key lengths differ between themselves and differ significantly from what we find when we buy or build computers to carry out such attacks. The differences lie in assumptions made in the theoretical estimates, which are not fully spelled out by the authors, and in scaling up hypothesized small machines to ever larger ones without accounting for physical realities. The factors not accounted for are: o R&D costs for the first machine, typically on the order of $10 million. o As more and more chips are added to a machine, two effects occur: o Interconnections increase and increase running time; o Heat from the chips eventually limit [sic] the size of a machine. o Memory costs are not included. o When get [sic] to the very fast processing speed estimates, machines can become Input/Output bound; so [sic] it cannot achieve the estimated speed. o Assuming every algorithm can be tested in same amount of time and key length is the only difference. Table 1 are [sic] the average time estimates made for a given cost done by Michael Wiener of Bell Norther Research in 1995. These are published in Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography book. Note that these are average times, one-half of the total exhaust time. Table 2 are [sic] the estimates for total exhaust times using Field Programmmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and Application Specific ICs (ASICs) done for the Business Software Alliance by Blaze, Diffie, Rivest, Schneier, Shimomura, Thompson, and Wiener in 1996. In addition to the above factors not accounted for they have assumed ASICs cost as low as $10. We find ASICs more typically cost $1000 and their capabilities can vary considerably depending upon the specific task. Table 3 are out estimates based on our experience with a Cray T3D supercomputer with 1024 nodes. This machine costs $30 million. [Tables 1, 2, and 3 not transcribed here.]

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