- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: "And who shall guard the guardians?"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:57 PM 7/31/96 -0700, Martin Minow wrote: >This question is also relevant to escrowed encryption: how to >prevent misuse of escrowed keys by file clerks and other people >who need access to the keys as part of their legitimate duties. >Since these keys will protect a very large amount of money (consider >the encryption keys used for interbank clearing) and since we >know from the Aldrich Ames case that $3,000,000 can buy a >high-ranking CIA employee, there are significant problems that >need to be addressed. I would suspect that a Baysian analysis >would indicate that the risk of holding (and losing) a key is >greater than the risk of not holding (and needing) a key. However, even that is a somewhat skewed analysis. Most of us realize that the kinds of advanced surveillance systems that are being promoted these days have nothing to do with crimes that are, statistically, the most common and feared among ordinary citizens. Will a wiretap ever solve a burglary? Rarely. Will a Clipper-type decrypt bring a rapist to justice? Fairly unlikely. How about a carjacking? A strong-arm robbery? An arson? Sure, it's always possible, but we know what's really going on. Governments are afraid that technology will not only replace the protections we've traditionally been told only came from government (and thus make them unnecessary), but also that technology will allow us to force those governments to shrink and possibly to disband. In other words, to a government-type most of the benefits of a Clipper system are to the government itself, certainly not to the person who owns the phone and not even to society as a whole. That's one reason, I suspect, why those secret talks given to various people to convince them to support Clipper "usually" work if the person is a government-type, but will almost never work to an unbiased private citizen. That's also why the lecture is secret: That way, the government can push two different stories without a contradiction being obvious to the rest of us. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Jewell is the Militia Bomber!!!!
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 31 Jul 96 22:40:46 -0800, tcmay(a)got.net wrote: >The security guard Jewell is now confirmed to be the prime suspect. While >NBC News is reporting that no evidence _directly_ links him to the bombing, >the evidence against him is overwhelming: > >1. He is overweight. With the exception of The Unabomber, most perps in >cases like this are fat. After all, who could *not* want to conform with crowd? Anyone who isn't obsessed with being thin must have something wrong with him. There ought to be a law against people like him! >2. They found a _shotgun_ in his cabin. Only a criminal would have a reason for that! After, what legitimate use could a citizen have with one? If he wants to hunt, he should use a rifle! >3. He had an interest in guns. (Back issues of "Guns and Ammo" are bad >enough, but possession of even a single issue of "Combat Handguns" is >sufficient to convict in 39 of the 50 states.) Particularly for a cop! Why would anyone in his position need *that*! >4. News sources are reporting that authorities who searched his apartment >and his cabin "came up empty," which surely implies that he planned this >crime with the help of others. We can take prime examples of this: The Whitehouse hiring dilemna - if they can't figure out who hired him, there must be someone in on the job! Maybe it's the dead guy. Maybe it's those evil Internet users... ___ Sorry about breaking your sarcasm-meter... ___ >(P.S. I, too, was convinced Jewell was the guy. But in recent hours it is >looking like a "rush to judgment" could be involved. There is strong >pressure to "solve the crime" by the close of the Olympics on Sunday.) I think we could track this to the replacement of literature and culture with TV - if everyone from T.J. Hooker to Agents Sculley and Mulder solve a mystery in 30 minutes, surely they can do it in real life, too. How much do you want to bet that if it is a frame and it is successful, they'll "find" a PGP encrypted file with plans and use it to promote GAK? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> - Webpages for sale! Se habla JavaScript! # Automatically receive my resume or PGPKEY by sending email with a subject # of 'send PGPKEY' or 'send resume'. Capitalization counts so be careful! # Web site: http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htm

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Cracking RC4/40 for massive wiretapps
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:13 AM 7/30/96 -0700, frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) mused paranoidly: >I combine the above with Whit Diffie's observation that, while crypto users >are interested in the security of *each* message, organizations which >monitor communications want to read *every* message. A TLA interested in >monitoring communications would need to crack RC4-40 much faster than >1/week. When we discussed using FPGA machines to crack RC4/40 last year, someone calculated the cost of cracking a message at 8 cents if you're doing enough to amortize your machine, and Eric had designed a system that should be able to crack it in about 15 minutes for $25-50K. The two basic search approaches are to take a cyphertext and decrypt it trying many keys to see if you get a likely plaintext, or to take known plaintext and encrypt with many keys to see if you match the cyphertext. But those designs are for one-at-a-time cracks. An interesting question is whether you can speed up performance substantially by cracking multiple messages at once. For instance, if you've got known plaintext, such as a standard header format saying "FooVoice" or "BEGIN DSA-SIGNED..", you can try many keys and compare them with _many_ cyphertexts, which may not slow down the FPGA very much. Also, even for unknown-plaintext, since key scheduling is a relatively slow part of RC4/40, you can split the key-schedule and the block-encryption phases, feeding one keyschedule output to multiple decrypt-and-compare sessions in parallel. So the cost per victim of cracking many sessions may be much lower. >Now expensive specialized cracking equipment can certainly speed up the >process, but there may be a better way. If cryptanalysis of RC4 yields >techniques which make the process much easier, then it is the ideal cypher >to certify for export. >The paranoid conclusion is that there is a significant weakness in RC4. Just keeping the key length down to 40 bits on a fast cypher is a good start. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Jewell is the Militia Bomber!!!!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:53 AM 8/1/96, Rich Graves wrote: >Ferchrissakes, guys, take a step back and look at yourselves. You're playing >the spin control game just as fast and furious as the "bad guys" (?). First >the glee over how easy it was to find bomb-making instructions anywhere, >then saying it was a provocation by the government, now it becomes a ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >conspiracy against fat people who read gun magazines. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Rich, maybe you're spending too much time amongst the Zundelsite Neo-Nazis. You no longer recognize humor even when it's pretty damned obvious. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: A Libertine Question
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:12 7/31/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >Most demands for ID and conformations with police involve the operation of >motor vehicles. I have never been "IDed" except at border crossings and >when I was operating motor vehicles. Clean and dressed up people are rarely >IDed on foot. Maybe you should mention some of the specific practices in >Seattle that disturb you. I have been IDed numerous times for no other reason than walking on the sidewalk at a late hour in an area where most people use cars to go to the 7/11 down the block. Southern California is especially bad in this regard. A friend, who had the same problem, finally got a dog. After that the cops left her alone. Seems walking your dog is a legitimate reason to be out at night... -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: Violation or Protection? [OLYMPICS]
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:03 7/31/96, David Rosoff wrote: [...] >On the local news I saw footage of a couple schmoozing in the Olympic >(Centennial?) Park after its reopening. The voice-over said that all >bags are being searched, and the couple said that rather than be >alarmed or nervous, they "appreciated" it. > >I'm not quite sure what to think about this. I don't have enough >experience to form a well thought-out opinion. I'd like to hear some >of everyone's thoughts on this: Is this bag-searching a violation, >(which was my immediate reaction) or is it not, because you have to >already be going into the controlled area to get searched? You are confused because you wonder how it could be that the couple could appreciate having their bags searched, something you intuitively regard as a violation of their rights. The very simple answer is that, generally speaking, individuals enjoy to have their rights violated, provided that they are given a (often false) sense of security in return. Surveys from a few years ago showed that a majority of Americans would approve of warrantless house-to-house searches, including their own, to combat the use of narcotics. ObCrypto: The public will cheer the day that strong, non-escowed crypto is outlawed. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: Smart cards "a giant leap backwards" - Canadian Privacy Commissioner
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:12 7/31/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >At 02:23 PM 7/30/96 -0400, Richard Martin wrote: >>Very little that might be new or enlightening to the world; attendees >>of CFP '96 will remember [fuzzily, in my case] the closest thing to >>Bruce's counterpart in the states admitting that the USA doesn't actually >>have much of a counterpart to the privacy commissioner. > >Most Central European countries have both privacy commissioners and legal >requirements that everyone register their addresses with the police. I'll >do without the former if I can also avoid the latter. I remember a time when Privacy Commissioners were a new thing. Their primary purpose seemed to be to sanction government access to (and keeping of) large databases on the activities of the population. Their secondary purpose was to prevent the private sector competition from doing the same. Eliminating access to such data by the individual in the process. Things may have changed for the better, but I doubt it. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defc
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Since they were speakers, could they be part of the Spot The Fed contest? They said that every other time their comrades had come to defcon, they had tried to come incognito, and got caught every time. This time, they wore FBI t-shirts, and the only response was "Hey! Where'd ya get the T-Shirt?!?". They said "We hacked 'em from the FBI" and that was it, noone suspected... =) //cerridwyn//

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NSA/ARPA/DISA joint research office Memo of Agreement
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I found this at the ARPA web site while looking up the programs there that are trying to deploy crypto in the Internet. You can read it as plain text, the HTML crud peters out after the first page. If you look at it on the web, they have reproduced the signatures from the signature page in a GIF file. -- John] <BASE HREF="http://www.ito.darpa.mil/ResearchAreas/Information_Survivability/MOA.html"> <HTML> <HEAD> <TITLE>MOA - Information Systems Security Research Joint Technology Office</TITLE> </HEAD> <BODY> <CENTER> <H3>Memorandum of Agreement<BR> Between<BR> The Advanced Research Projects Agency,<BR> The Defense Information Systems Agency, and<BR> The National Security Agency<BR>Concerning<BR> The Information Systems Security Reseach Joint Technology Office</H3> </CENTER> <H3>Purpose</H3> The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) agree to the establishment of the Information System Security Research Joint Technology Office (ISSR-JTO) as a joint activity. The ISSR-JTO is being established to coordinate the information systems security research programs of ARPA and NSA. The ISSR-JTO will work to optimize use of the limited research funds available, and strengthen the responsiveness of the programs to DISA, expediting delivery of technologies that meet DISA's requirements to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability of data in Department of Defense information systems, provide a robust first line of defense for defensive information warfare, and permit electronic commerce between the Department of Defense and its contractors. <H3>Background</H3> In recent years, exponential growth in government and private sector use of networked systems to produce and communicate information has given rise to a shared interest by NSA and ARPA in focusing government R&D on information systems security technologies. NSA and its primary network security customer, DISA, have become increasingly reliant upon commercial information technologies and services to build the Defense Information Infrastructure, and the inherent security of these technologies and services has become a vital concern. From ARPA'S perspective, it has become increasingly apparent that security is critical to the success of key ARPA information technology initiatives. ARPA's role in fostering the development of advanced information technologies now requires close attention to the security of these technologies.<P> NSA's security technology plan envisions maximum use of commercial technology for sensitive but unclassified applications, and, to the extent possible, for classified applications as well. A key element of this plan is the transfer of highly reliable government-developed technology and techniques to industry for integration into commercial off-the-shelf products, making quality-tested security components available not only to DoD but to the full spectrum of government and private sector users as well. ARPA is working with its contractor community to fully integrate security into next generation computing technologies being developed in all its programs, and working with the the research community to develop strategic relationships with industry so that industry will develop modular security technologies with the capability of exchanging appropriate elements to meet various levels of required security.<P> NSA and ARPA now share a strong interest in promoting the development and integration of security technology for advanced information systems applications. The challenge at hand is to guide the efforts of the two agencies in a way that optimizes use of the limited research funds available and maximizes support to DISA in building the Defense Information Infrastructure.<P> NSA acts as the U.S. Government's focal point for cryptography, telecommunications security, and information systems security for national security systems. It conducts, approves, or endorses research and development of techniques and equipment to secure national security systems. NSA reviews and approves all standards, techniques, systems, and equipment related to the security of national security systems. NSA's primary focus is to provide information systems security products, services, and standards in the near term to help its customers protect classified and national security-related sensitive but unclassified information. It develops and assesses new security technology in the areas of cryptography, technical security, and authentication technology; endorses cryptographic systems protecting national security information; develops infrastructure support technologies; evaluates and rates trusted computer and network products; and provides information security standards for DoD. Much of the work in these areas is conducted in a classified environment, and the balancing of national security and law enforcement equities has been a significant constraint.<P> ARPA's mission is to perform research and development that helps the Department of Defense to maintain U.S. technological superiority over potential adversaries. At the core of the ARPA mission is the goal to develop and demonstrate revolutionary technologies that will fundamentally enhance the capability of the military. ARPA's role in fostering the development of advanced computing and communications technologies for use by the DoD requires that long term solutions to increasing the security of these systems be developed. ARPA is interested in commercial or dual-use technology, and usually technology that provides revolutionary rather than evolutionary enhancements to capabilities. ARPA is working with industry and academia to develop technologies that will enable industry to provide system design methodologies and secure computer, operating system, and networking technologies. NSA and ARPA research interests have been converging in these areas, particularly with regard to protocol development involving key, token, and certificate exchanges and processes.<P> One of the key differences between ARPA's work and NSA's is that ARPA's is performed in unclassified environments, often in university settings. This enables ARPA to access talent and pursue research strategies normally closed to NSA due to security considerations. Another difference is that while NSA's research is generally built around developing and using specific cryptographic algorithms, ARPA's approach is to pursue solutions that are independent of algorithm used and allow for modularly replaceable cryptography. ARPA will, to the greatest extent possible, allow its contractor community to use cryptography developed at NSA, and needs solutions from NSA on an expedited basis so as not to hold up its research program.<P> DISA functions as the Department of Defense's information utility. Its requirements for information systems security extend beyond confidentiality to include protection of data from tampering or destruction and assurance that data exchanges are originated and received by valid participants. DISA is the first line of defense for information warfare, and needs quality technology for detecting and responding to network penetrations. The growing vulnerability of the Defense information Infrastructure to unauthorized access and use, demonstrated in the penetration of hundreds of DoD computer systems during 1994, makes delivery of enabling security technologies to DISA a matter of urgency. <H3>The Information Systems Security Research Joint Technology Office</H3> This MOA authorizes the ISSR-JTO as a joint undertaking of ARPA, DISA, and NSA. It will perform those functions jointly agreed to by these agencies. Each agency shall delegate to the ISSO-JTO such authority and responsibility as is necessary to carry out its agreed functions. Participation in the joint program does not relieve ARPA, DISA, or NSA of their respective individual charter responsibilities, or diminish their respective authorities.<P> A Joint Management Plan will be developed to provide a detailed definition of the focus, objectives, operation, and costs of the Joint Technology Office. The ISSR-JTO will be jointly staffed by ARPA, DISA, and NSA, with respective staffing levels to be agreed upon by the three parties. Employees assigned to the JTO will remain on the billets of their respective agency. Personnel support for employees assigned to the JTO will be provided by their home organization. The ISSR-JTO will be housed within both ARPA and NSA, except as agreed otherwise by the three parties. To the greatest extent possible, it will function as a virtual office, using electronic connectivity to minimize the need for constant physical co-location. Physical security support will be provided by the party responsible for the specific facilities occupied. Assignment of the ISSR-JTO Director, Deputy Director, and management of other office elements will be made by mutual agreement among the Directors of ARPA, DISA, and NSA upon recommendation of their staffs.<P> <H3>Functions</H3> By mutual agreement of ARPA, DISA, and NSA, the ISSR-JTO will perform the following joint functions: <OL> <LI>Review and coordinate all Information System Security Research programs at ARPA and NSA to ensure that there is no unnecessary duplication, that the programs are technically sound, that they are focused on customer requirements where available, and that long term research is aimed at revolutionary increases in DoD security capabilities. <LI>Support ARPA and NSA in evaluating proposals and managing projects arising from their information systems security efforts, and maintain a channel for the exchange of technical expertise to support their information systems security research programs. <LI>Provide long range strategic planning for information systems security research. Provide concepts of future architectures which include security as an integral component and a road map for the products that need to be developed to fit the architectures, taking into account anticipated DoD information systems security research needs for command and control, intelligence, support functions, and electronic commerce. The long range security program will explore technologies which extend security research boundaries. <LI>Develop measures of the effectiveness of the information systems security research programs in reducing vulnerabilities. <LI>Work with DISA, other defense organizations, academic, and industrial organizations to take new information systems security research concepts and apply them to selected prototype systems and testbed projects. <LI>Encourage the U.S. industrial base to develop commercial products with built-in security to be used in DoD systems. Develop alliances with industry to raise the level of security in all U.S. systems. Bring together private sector leaders in information systems security research to advise the JTO and build consensus for the resulting programs. <LI>Identify areas for which standards need to be developed for information systems security. <LI>Facilitate the availability and use of NSA certified cryptography within information systems security research programs. <LI>Proactively provide a coherent, integrated joint vision of the program in internal and public communications. </OL> <H3>Program Oversight and Revisions</H3> The Director, ISSR-JTO, has a joint reporting responsibility to the Directors of ARPA, DISA, and NSA. The Director, ISSR-JTO, will conduct a formal Program Status Review for the Directors of ARPA, DISA, and NSA on an annual basis, and will submit mid-year progress reports between formal reviews. Specific reporting procedures and practices of the JTO to ARPA, DISA, and NSA will be detailed in the Joint Technology Management Plan. This MOA will be reviewed at least annually, and may be revised at any time, based on the mutual consent of ARPA, DISA, and NSA, to assure the effective execution of the joint initiative. Any of the parties may withdraw from participation in the MOA upon six months written notice. The MOA is effective 2 April, 1995.<P> <IMG SRC="http://www.ito.darpa.mil/ResearchAreas/Information_Survivability/sigs4.gif" ALT="Signatures of Dr. Gary L. Denman, Director ARPA; LtGen Albert J. Edmonds, Director, DISA; VADM John M. McConnell, Director, NSA; Dr. Anita K. Jones, Director, DDR&E; Emmett Paige, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence"><P> <P> <address> <HR> <A HREF="http://www.ito.darpa.mil/ResearchAreas/Information_Survivability.html">Return to Information Survivability Page</A> <BR> Direct comments concerning this WWW site to: <A HREF="mailto:Webmaster@ito.darpa.mil">Webmaster(a)ito.darpa.mil</A></address> </BODY> </HTML>

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Re: FPGAs and Heat (Re: Paranoid Musings)
by Scott Schryvers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 12:42 AM 7/31/96 -0700, David Wagner wrote: >>Those estimates assume that a single FPGA can break RC4 in hours. I think >>that is an extremely optimistic assumption, given the available public >>information. But perhaps NSA is orders of magnitude ahead of us in chip >>design (unlikely) or orders of magnitude ahead of us in RC4 cryptanalysis >>(and we're back to paranoid musings). > >>> If we assume a machine designed to break *every* message, NSA's response >>> makes more sense. > >I feel like I'm leaning over backwards to defend NSA's response, an >extremely uncomfortable position (and I could crack my skull when I fall) >:-). The most important issue is, what is NSA's state of the art. If we >accept their $1000/FPGA chip, then they are indeed at the bleeding edge, >and suffering from the associated low chip yields. If they are at the best >cost-performance point for 2-3 years ago or whenever they started approving >the export of RC4-40, then they are certainly subject to David Wagner's >performance limits. Sorry about mangling quotes. :( This was about a year and a half ago. I can't remember the name of it, but this chip fab industry mag was talking about how the NSA was obtaining out side help in fabricating what was at the time a type of ram that did processing off chip in parrallel. If the chip was basically routing the problem to different sectors and the same sectors of ram did their own processing on different parts of the same problem how many powers of processing time would this increase the same amount of acerage?* * NSA term for processing. Side note: Wired just recently talked about IRAM or Intelligent ram, and how it seems to be the future of high speed computation. PGP encrypted mail preferred. E-Mail me for my key. Scott J. Schryvers <schryver(a)radiks.net>

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