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More on the latest Surveillance Bill...
by jseiger＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The outline below is from a document produced by the House Republican Conference. It is ONLY A SUMMARY of the proposed bill and is NOT actual legislation. No one I have spoken with has seen any specific legislative language yet. The outline is confusing on several points, particularly the "FBI DIGITAL TELEPHONY" Section, which says: "The bill authorizes the FBI to use enhanced telephone technology to investigate suspected terrorist activity. Funding for equipment purchase was provided in the 1996 omnibus appropriations measure enacted earlier this year." The first sentence above is not at all clear, and probably won't be until we can get our hands on the actual text of the bill. It could be additional wiretap authority (ie, roving wiretaps), or it could be nothing. As far as the funding goes, the "1996 omnibus appropriations measure" DID NOT contain funding for implementation of the law - but it did appropriate $37 million to cover new equipment for the FBI. The rest looks like it is a scaled back version of a measure the Administration and members of Congress were pushing earlier this week, but the scope of the new bill depends a lot on what the actual text says. I will post additional information as soon as I get it. Jonah -- Bipartisan Antiterrorism Initiative HR__ Committee on the Judiciary No Report Filed To Be Introduced Floor Situation: The House is scheduled to consider HR__ on Friday August 2, 1996. On Thursday August 1, the Rules Committee granted a rule to allow the bill to be considered under suspension of the rules. It is debatable for 40 minutes, may not be amended, and requires a two-thirds vote for passage. Summary: HR__ includes several bipartisan initiatives intended to bolster federal efforts to combat domestic terrorism in addition to those already enacted earlier this year as part of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132). The bill contains the following counter-terrorism provisions: Aviation SECURITY MEASURES: The bill enables domestic airports to aggressively search for and prevent explosives from causing destruction and harm to individuals or property through enhanced explosive detection procedures, baggage and passenger screening, and FBI authority to improve airport security training and standards to ensure that provisions of the 1990 Aviation Security Act (P.L 101-604) are implemented expeditiously. Specifically, the bill (1) requires the FAA to implement increased explosives section methods immediately, (2) strengthen the level of training and expertise possessed by security personnel who are assigned to domestic airports, (3) allows airports to use available funding to reinforce such training for security personnel, and (4) extends criminal background requirements to include a greater number of airport employees. IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS: The bill urges implementation of provisions enacted in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132), such as designating and freezing the assets of foreign terrorist organizations and implementing expedited removal procedures for aliens convicted of a crime. BIPARTISAN "BLUE RIBBON" COMMISSION: The bill establishes a special commission to review all aspects of U.S. anti-terrorism policy and make legislative recommendations about methods to most effectively establish a long-term defense against terrorist threats, including enhancing the nation's human intelligence capabilities. PRIVACY ACT AMENDMENTS: The bill includes provisions which grant a cause of action against the U.S. if in the course of a wiretap investigation damaging information is willfully disclosed to the detriment of an innocent party by the federal government. The cause of action includes monetary damages to the plaintiff if a favorable decision is rendered in federal court. EXPLOSIVES STUDY: The bill authorizes a study on black and smokeless powder by an independent agency selected by the National Institute of Justice. FEDERAL RACKETEERING STATUTE CRIMES: The bill permits federal prosecutors to deem those acts determined to be terrorist in nature as substantial enough to invoke criminal prosecution under existing criminal racketeering (RICO) statutes. FBI DIGITAL TELEPHONY: The bill authorizes the FBI to use enhanced telephone technology to investigate suspected terrorist activity. Funding for equipment purchase was provided in the 1996 omnibus appropriations measure enacted earlier this year. -- ** THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH ONLINE CONTINUES TO THE SUPREME COURT ** It's not too late to be a part of history -- Join the Lawsuit <http://www.cdt.org/ciec> -- <ciec-info(a)cdt.org> -- Jonah Seiger, Policy Analyst Center for Democracy and Technology <jseiger(a)cdt.org> 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 PGP Key via finger (v) +1.202.637.9800 http://www.cdt.org/ (f) +1.202.637.0968 http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

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Information gathering by news servers
by Scott McGuire 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How much information about what someone reads can be gathered by a news server? Is there an anonymous way to read a public news server, or would a server have to be set up intentionally to allow anonymous reading? Scott

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Tao Renji Public Key system
by Jean-Paul Kroepfli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Bruce, I was testing the Raike's Public Key software, when I remembered a section of your excellent book. In Applied Cryptography, second edition, section 19.10 (page 482) you present the Renji's work about a public key algorithme based on finite automata. Where could we found the FAPKC1 and FAPKC2 algorithms, their implementations, and executable versions (you mention an Intel486 test). Many thanks, With kindest regards Jean-Paul ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~- Jean-Paul et Micheline Kroepfli (our son: Nicolas and daughter: Celine) eMail: JeanPaul.Kroepfli(a)utopia.fnet.fr Also Compuserve and MSNetwork Phone: +33 81 55 52 59 (F) PostMail: F-25640 Breconchaux (France) or: +41 21 843 27 36 (CH) or: CP 138, CH-1337 Vallorbe Fax: +33 81 55 52 62 (Switzerland) Zephyr(r) : InterNet Communication and Commerce, Security and Cryptography consulting PGP Fingerprint : 19 FB 67 EA 20 70 53 89 AF B2 5C 7F 02 1F CA 8F "The InterNet is the most open standard since air for breathing"

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Re: Bombs & bomb threats in LA
by Conrad Walton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >and everyplace else all the news.answers FAQs are stored. What, precisely, is >an acid bomb? Also note the standard blame-the-Internet (not, say, increased >irritation with government after the Republicans failed to reduce it) >rhetoric. i'm not exactly sure what an acid bomb is, but according to my book, The Anarchist Cookbook, that I bought in 1972 (was the internet around back then?), there is a compound called "picric acid" that is "more powerful than TNT, but has some disadvantages". if you'd like the recipe, I'll be more than happy to mail you it through the US Postal system. Wouldn't want to give the Internet any more of a bad name for distributing subversive materials. There is also instructions on using an inverted vial of sulpheric acid, that will then eat thu the stopper at the top (bottom) of the vial. when the acid makes it thru, then is mixes with Potassium Chloride and causes a small explosion which sets off the larger explosion in the dynomite packed around it. just thot you'd like to know. thanks, conrad __________I_N_D_U_S_T_R_I_A_L___A_R_T_W_O_R_K_S__________ Conrad Walton http://www.industrial-artworks.com/ POB 2815, El Segundo, CA 90245 1-310-640-3365 ---------------------------------------------------------

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URGENT: Surveillance Bill Gets New Life - House Vote lLikely TODAY!
by jseiger＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(please forward where appropriate) It's not over yet.... The House has scheduled a vote on "suspension" for a 'counter-terrorism' bill TODAY (Friday). Despite media reports that the negotiations had stalled out, house Republicans have apparently worked out their differences and are set to vote on the bill today. The Senate may or may not vote on the measure on Saturday. No one I've talked to knows for sure what's in the bill, though I have heard that there are no encryption provisions and that some of the wiretap proposals have been scaled back. I will post details as I get them. In the mean time, keep those calls coming into Congress. Jonah ** THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH ONLINE CONTINUES TO THE SUPREME COURT ** It's not too late to be a part of history -- Join the Lawsuit <http://www.cdt.org/ciec> -- <ciec-info(a)cdt.org> -- Jonah Seiger, Policy Analyst Center for Democracy and Technology <jseiger(a)cdt.org> 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 PGP Key via finger (v) +1.202.637.9800 http://www.cdt.org/ (f) +1.202.637.0968 http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

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Licensing, Permits, and Freedom
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:23 PM 8/2/96, Cerridwyn Llewyellyn wrote: >Jim Choate <ravage(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com> argued: > >>As long as they have a license to operate a food dispencing facility (in >>other words they are certifying they are aware of the correct processes for >>such operations) then nobody should have the right to interfere with their >>operation unless with probable cause (ie proof of danger such as bad weenies >>in their hot dogs). This would not apply to individuals or families making >>such food in the same place for their own and NOT public consumption. > >I believe the issue with Food Not Bombs is they didn't get the appropriate >permits, etc, or were denied them, or something. However, I disagree with >you on this point. I think they shouldn't be required to obtain a license, >but everyone whom they serve food to should know that they don't have such a >license. This would equal informed consent. Also, with Food Not Bombs, many >of the people that the food is being served to is also involved in cooking, >distributing food, and cleaning up. I've been told it's exactly like a big >picnic, except for anyone is invited to help and/or eat. It was in fact "Food Not Bombs" which I was referring to in my post a few days ago. My point to the City Council was one of inconsistency (picnic groups not similarly hassled). Also, the use of "permits" to harass/muzzle a group. "Permits" are often used to stop speech and acts which are not considered acceptable. Drawing on my own community for an example, Santa Cruz tried to regulate palm readers, astrologers, mystics, and seers. This eventually fell apart, possibly when the implications became clear to the bureaucrats (the future was already clear to the Cassandras, but nobody believed them). My "Licensed Ontologist" line in my .sig was added during one of the debates about the claimed need to license and regulate persons in various professions. (There are of course the usual other examples, where job unions and cartels stop "outsiders" from participating. Often for ostensibly good reasons, but "guilds" nonetheless. The implications of crypto anarchy for these guilds are left as exercises for the student.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Freeh slimes again: Digital Telephony costs $2 billion now ...
by Dave Farber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

And I testified in front of the House that their estimate was grossly understated. I think it is more like 4-5 Billion . I called it the Software Full Employment Act of 94. (copy of testimony available). djf At 08:52 AM 8/2/96 -0700, Brock N. Meeks wrote: > >On Thu, 1 Aug 1996, Ernest Hua wrote: > >> Louis Freeh is now asking the Congress for $2 billion to fund >> Digital Telephony. Yes, that is FOUR TIMES what he said it >> would cost the taxpayers to give up their own privacy. Score >> one for the cynics who said $500 million was not enough. > >I broke the story about how much Digital Telephony would *really* cost in >CyberWire Dispatch more than two years ago. The price tag in my piece: >"... at least $2 billion..." In that Dispatch I wrote that the Clinton >White House had made the decision to support the bill based on a flawed >cost/benefit analysis study the FBI had done. > >--Brock > >

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Re: Let's Say "No!" to Single, World Versions of Software
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:16 PM 7/31/96 -0700, Tom Weinstein <tomw(a)netscape.com> wrote: >The only thing they can revoke is their permission to provide it for >download over the internet. They can't revoke our permission to sell >it in stores or via snail mail. They _could_ refuse to give export permission for new RC4/40 versions, and threaten prosecution if it's placed on the Internet. It would be highly bogus, of course, but that's one of the "benefits" of using selective enforcement and having the export strength limitations be an individual-case-basis rather than a defined law they can be held to. Tim wrote: > Actually approving of disapproving a piece of software for sale > to U.S. citizens is not currently possible. Sure. The Commerce Klaus of the Constitution lets them do it if they want to, though that required Congressional cooperation. TRUST NO ONE!

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Re: "And who shall guard the guardians?"
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Cyperpunks recently, Tim May wrote: > >>The Latin maxim "And who shall guard the guardians?" has some relevance to >>the headlong rush into converting the U.S. into even more of a security >>state than it is now. The English-Only bill just passed in the House bans the use of non-English languages by government officials. Does Tim's sudden avoidance of the Latin mean that _he_'s the Fed?? At 02:57 PM 7/31/96 -0700, Martin Minow <minow(a)apple.com> wrote: >I would suspect that a Baysian analysis >would indicate that the risk of holding (and losing) a key is >greater than the risk of not holding (and needing) a key. Cui bono? Or, in this case, risk to _whom_? The damage from losing a key is done to the key's owner, who's a mere Subject, while the dangers of needing a key that one doesn't have are interference with the Custodians doing the jobs they want to do. Sounds like a no-brainer, from the Government's viewpoint. TRUST NO ONE!

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Re: [off-topic] roving wiretaps
by Brian T Hancher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>P.S. Do police really need a search warrant to wiretap cellular phones? It is my understanding that police need a warrant to tap *cellular* phones, but not *wireless* phones. One should understand that monitoring cellular traffic is *much* more difficult than tapping a conventional phone, because as the user moves around in the service area the phone switches to different repeaters, often several times during a conversation. I am curious as to the language of the proposed law, as it is also my understanding that the government already has the (technical) means to monitor cellular traffic (but it requires a warrant, just like tapping a regular phone). Brian T. Hancher http://rio.atlantic.net/~briant briant(a)ocala.com briant(a)atlantic.net Brian.Hancher(a)lmi.fdles.state.fl.us

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