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RE: rc2 export limits..
by Surya Koneru 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RC2 uses a effective key size, so is it ok to use a key of 128 bits size with a 40 bits effective key size for export. Thanx --Surya >---------- >From: Simon Spero[SMTP:ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu] >Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 8:33 PM >To: Surya Koneru >Cc: 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' >Subject: Re: rc2 export limits.. > >It's the usual - if you want commercial jurisdiction, > 40 bits unescrowed > 64 bits (16 escrowed) > >Above that, you'll have to go through state on a per customer basis >(which I don't think is that easy to get if software is being shipped >outside the US, and is definitely going to be expensive.) > >Simon > > >--- >Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina >you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. >And after all | Email address remains unchanged >You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet......... >

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cypherpunks
by Chris Steinke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

subscribe cypherpunks

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Secure remailers, was Race Bit: C
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 04 Sep 1996 15:21:54 -0800, jim bell wrote: >Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an >investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, >but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not >being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or >sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that >won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such >a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all >remailers, >not just the ones that have been "stung." > Yes, that is why there needs to be a move to place all 'critical' portions of remailers and other important servers inside trusted hardware which is highly resistant to compromise. All access to sensitive information (e.g., keys) inside these modules should require multiple parties in several countries (not just the operator of the server) to cooperate. Properly structured (such controls could effectively thwart law enforcement compromise. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Paladin Publishing suit dismissed
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you; my memory isn't the best in the world (obviously). -Allen

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Re: Letter to the Observer [re: Internet paedophile]
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 4 Sep 96 at 14:44, Declan McCullagh wrote: > Jean-Francois, your comments are inspired! > > As a member of "such media" in that I still publish articles on dead > trees -- I have articles in fall issues of Wired and Playboy, for > instance -- I rejoice in your reasoned suggestion that you deny me > and my ilk access to the Net. > > But wait! I connect through wired.com, eff.org, or *.edu accounts. > How do you plan to kick me off my "ISPs?" > > No, you're not out to lunch. Well, I did not expect nor want to bar all of the ink spreader community, only, by giving some individual or some rags some trouble, they might get the message. *I* don't plan to kick any net-smearer scumbag off his ISP, I suggest/-ask if- ISP themselves would have advantage to do that./? I simply don't pretend to know it all, so I ask questions... jfa Jean-Francois Avon DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants: physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Re: Reputations
by gregburk＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: > Briefly, think of "restaurants" when thinking about reputations. If one > arrives in a new city, most restaurants may have the same baseline > reputation, e.g. "none." A few may be known by name, for their > "reputation," either good ("You have to eat at Louie's--the laser chicken > is incredible") or bad ("Blecch!). Positive reputations and negative > reputations are self-explanatory. And the reputations of others may affect > the reputations of restaurants ("John Gilmore says he likes the Burma > Burger on Castro Street."). Bad recommendations may affect the "reputation > capital" of John, for example. (We speak of "reputation capital" because it > can in some sense be "spent.") That part of the "reputation capital" theory has always seemed suspicious to me. "reputation capital" doesn't behave linearly. There's too much incentive to bottom-feed and too little incentive to shoot for the heights. As an "asset", it is extremely non-liquid. It is hard to spend it in a controlled manner. Too much incentive to bottom-feed: For example, let's say there's someone well-known who frequently speaks nonsense on crypto issues. We'll call her "Norothy Nenning". She makes a recommendation on some particular crypto issue, say "The government's Nipper chip is a safe and effective form of crupto". Plenty of naive people will credit her to some degree. True, fewer people than if she had carefully husbanded her reputation, and to a lesser degree, but still a lot more than zero. Notice that that's a zero cost/benefit ratio. She never does anything to husband her reputation, she just spends it every chance she gets. And while no single expenditure rewards her as much as it would if she made the same expenditure with a good reputation, she spends so much more freely that it is a good strategy for her on the whole. "Reputation capital" is hard to spend down to absolute 0 because it is significant work to distinguish valid "reputation capital" from worthless counterfeit, and it is easy to counterfeit... just talk. I anticipate the answer "Well, the work pays off". But that misses the point. Frequently the work required to tell the good "reputation capital" from the worthless is as much as would be required to find the straight dope yourself. Too little incentive to shoot for the heights: Suppose you judge that you've accumulated twice as much "reputation capital" as Joe. How do you get twice as much payoff? It seems to me that above the threshhold of credibility, minor side issues make more difference than your two-fold "reputation capital" differential. As an "asset", it is extremely non-liquid: How exactly would you "convert" your reputation into other capital? Would you accept bribes and tell lies? Seems to me you would only get a one-shot "conversion" and it couldn't possibly hope to equal your investment. As soon as you leave the information-broker business, you discover that your "asset" cannot be converted, sold, auctioned off, or much of anything else of value to you. It is hard to spend it in a controlled manner: See above. The single bribe-and-lie will spend your "reputation capital" down to below the threshhold of credibility, no matter how much you started with. Human discourse often tends to be absolutist. It is often very difficult to make people understand and retain a message of partial support or qualified support. Particularly on hot issues. Restaurants, sure, you can give 1 to 5 stars, but in many subject areas there is no such system. And any system you yourself invent tends to be ignored. So I think the latter part of the analysis is wishful thinking, or at least restricted to a small subset of subject-matter. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQBVAwUBMi4omrMyVAabpHidAQGGPAIAizIOktCC4B5gtVYPblaTi9FL6ZtwTfkP sAFHT626mMLz1f/ZKa2SLq3pdag09ACCklJLJ1djFwSFP4bvoijMfw== =rFti -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Steganography -- Tell-tale signs?
by makof＠alias.cyberpass.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi there! I'd appreciate some help from you experts in steganography. 1) If I hide some PGP encrypted data in a gif, jpg or wav file will there be any tell tale signs to the naked eye of an expert? If yes, what are they? 2) Would it better to hide the data in a jpg with black and white image rather than a color one? 3) Are there any tools at the moment to expose (not crack) the hidden encrypted data? If none. are there tools in development? If this appears twice please accept my apologies. I didn't see the first posting and so I assumed it was lost in transit. Please email replies to me directly if this is off-topic. Thank you. Makofi

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Internet Tax in Tacoma cancelled
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An excellent case of considering regulatory arbitrage effects. -Allen > _________________________________________________________________ > webslingerZ > _________________________________________________________________ > TACOMA, WASH. CITY COUNCIL REPEALS TAX ON INTERNET PROVIDERS > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 Reuter Information Service > TACOMA, Wash. (Sep 4, 1996 01:17 a.m. EDT) - Tacoma City Council > members voted Tuesday to exempt Internet service providers from a 6 > percent telecommunications tax that had attracted nationwide > attention. > With only one dissenting vote, the council approved the exemption at > the urging of Mayor Brian Ebersole, who said Tacoma's reputation as a > good place to do business outweighed the estimated $200,000 in annual > revenue the city stands to lose. > The tax had been imposed on Internet companies in March by Tacoma's > tax and license department as part of a broader levy that affects > users of cellular telephones, pagers and other equipment who get > billed at addresses within the city, about 30 miles south of Seattle. [...] > Tacoma is one of many cities and states who have seized on the rapid > growth of the Internet as a potential for raising needed tax revenues. > West Virginia, Tennessee, Texas, New York and Ohio have similar taxes > in place, and California, Florida, New York and Washington state are > considering them. [...] > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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ASEAN nations generally pro-censorship
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The interesting "cultural sovereignty" variation on the usual "national sovereignty" excuse for censorship and other such unethical actions. I'm reminded of another Asian state that used it... after Tianenmin Square. At least one member (the Phillipines) is making, at the minimum, lip service for freedom of speech. US control over them does appear to have done some good. -Allen > _________________________________________________________________ > The Peanut Roaster > _________________________________________________________________ > ASEAN FORUM AGREES ON NEED TO POLICE THE NET > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 Reuter Information Service > SINGAPORE (Sep 4, 1996 11:41 a.m. EDT) - Southeast Asian broadcasters > and officials agreed on Wednesday to police the Internet and block off > sites that run counter to Asian values. > A statement issued at the close of the three-day Internet forum in > Singapore also said there was a need for nations in the West to > understand concerns about the Internet in the region. > It said the meeting "affirmed the importance of having safeguards > against easy access to sites which ran counter to our cherished > values, traditions and culture. ASEAN would encourage other nations, > especially the West to understand its concern." > The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) groups Brunei, > Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. > Earlier this year, ASEAN information ministers met in Singapore to > discuss the darker side of the information technology revolution and > agreed to set up a regulatory body to oversee the Internet invasion. [...] > But the statement suggested there was no agreement on a uniform > approach to policing the Internet. > The ASEAN officials had agreed that regulatory frameworks would depend > on each country, and said they would continue to meet regularly "to > help each country formulate and fine tune its regulatory approaches," > it said. > Policing of the Net in ASEAN varies from Singapore's stance of strict > controls by licensing only three Internet service providers who have > to screen all material accessed by clients. > Other ASEAN members encourage more self-regulation, and the > Philippines says freedom of speech is a critical factor. > "Political control would not be on the Philippines' agenda," Glenn > Sipin, deputy executive director of the Philippines Council for > Advanced Science and Technology, told Reuters at the start of the > conference. > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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Re:
by Joey Grasty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bugged: > Subject: How to send bogus mail to mislead traffic analysis? > > Hi > > How can I send messages to remailer so that they will get lost? > I want to generate a more or less steady flow of remailer-processed, encrypted mail. > > Can I send to nobody(a)some_remailer.net? > What are the guidelines for that? > What are the best remailers to send to? > > Cheers > > Bugged Set your final destination to "null:", e.g. ============================== :: Request-Remailing-To: null: This message gets trashed. ============================== This works for mixmaster remailers, WinSock Remailer, and probably most other cypherpunk remailers. Regards, -- Joey Grasty jgrasty(a)gate.net [home -- encryption, privacy, RKBA and other hopeless causes] jgrasty(a)pts.mot.com [work -- designing pagers] "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin." -- John Von Neumann PGP = A7 CC 31 E4 7E A3 36 13 93 F4 C9 06 89 51 F5 A7

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