- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

HipCrime as MetaSPAM
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Hippie Of Crime <robert(a)precipice.v-site.net> also asked that remailer operators not block HipCrime SPAM deliveries and all mail to HipCrime because people might be interested in his cool fractals and Java neural net lotto-predicters and anarchist pages. If he wants to advertise to people about his other cool products, he doesn't need to do it anonymously. Furthermore, he doesn't provide any method in his web pages for users to anonymously request information, or to have information delivered anonymously. So blocking him from the remailers won't lose him anything. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Judge Kozinski Responds
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Sep 16 17:18:36 1996 cypherpunks: I have been having a private e-mail conversation with Judge Alex Kozinski of the 9th circuit. Today he said: >Jim: Feel free to clarify my position to your comrades >(excuse the term) if you think it will be useful. I guess >I'll keep thinking about this stuff and may change my mind >on some things. ... In a previous message to me in response to cypherpunks messages mentioning him which I forwarded, he said: >The statement about anonymous remailers was largely >accurate. I'm not sure that the fact that you (or some of >your associates) are willing to block people from getting >anonymous mail is a sufficient safeguard. Some may not be, >and it only takes one or two who do not adhere to the code >to make life miserable for the rest of us. > >We agree about the need for privacy, but I'm not at all sure >why the right to send messages anonymously trumps the >recipient's right to know who's addressing him. Getting an >anonymous message--even one that is not harassing or >threatening--is an invasion of my privacy. As for Me: [Please note, this statement caused me to block his address from WinSock messages, but _NO_ I will not give you his e-mail address, so please do not ask me to unless I _know_ you are a remailer-operator, and you send me a PGPmessage including your key and asking for it for blocking reasons ONLY. So far, nobody has been stupid enough to try to use the remailers to harass him. I DON'T want this man harassed, and having him understand "our" point of view will be a "big cypherpunk win"(tm) IMNSHO, so please trust me to represent you fairly. Thanks.] On with the Judge: >Halloween, it only really works when the people dressed up >are about four feet tall. In the rare instances where there >have been adults at my door that were so disguised you >couldn't tell who they were, I felt threatened--kept my >Glock handy before opening door. > >The quote about morphed children's images was sort of >botched, as was my assessment of the Third Circuit's case. >What I said about children is that morphed images did not >involve normal exploitation of children so it would not >clearly fall in the unprotected category, but that there may >be other harms I'd have to think about before deciding. >As for the Third Circuit's opinion, I said at the outset >they got it right in the bottom line; what I criticized was >their use of analogies to deal with the problem. I find >that much thinking about the net is analogy-driven and that >analogies are inherently imprecise and can be misleading. > >Anyway, thanx for bearing with me. There's a lot of this >stuff I have not made up my mind about and I find talking >about it helps shape my thinking. Folks, we have a chance to win or lose, depending on list.maturity and common sense. If this man is harassed, convincing him will become harder for me, and I will be very annoyed. If you make a coherent comment that covers ground that I have not already covered with him, I will forward it on to him. Alex Kozinski is IMO, by far, the closest thing to a libertarian that Reagan ever appointed, and in both messages he has mentioned having an open mind. Let's try not to give him a reason to close it. Thanks for trusting me, and thanks in advance for behaving nicely and respecting the judge's privacy. JMR Regards, Jim Ray -- DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy "As govt.s grow arithmetically, corruption grows exponentially." -- Ray's Law of official corruption. Defeat the Duopoly! Stop the Browne out. Harry Browne for President. Jo Jorgensen for Vice-president. http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ http://www.twr.com/stbo ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. <mailto:liberty@gate.net> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMj3ENG1lp8bpvW01AQEOBAP+IExjfTO6DnrBvF8/xNFWLDcYTgIid5tI Gpya0oRKRFIgYm2v3pjw2y649QxC8bGryy15wi72s6p4f1Sf6pqKbOz6ANcHNkOK JoenVAMBxKK4wwoDIzqkxPBBIBmQO/KzJBw5ymfhGMZNN+NN6nwS9JnlSKeDwFtO 94BZLZ2fec4= =IS+5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Unsolicited email advertising already illegal in US?
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This piece from RISKS looks interesting. My computer certainly _is_ "equipment which has the capacity to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a regular telephone line onto paper." Now, are HipCrime et al. liable for $500 in damages for each piece of spam? If so, where do I sign up? - Ian - ---8<---8<--- Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 19:46:42 -0400 From: Dan Franklin <dan(a)copernicus.bbn.com> Subject: Sometimes junk e-mail is already a fax, legally speaking I've been using the following legal information, which I picked up from another mailing list (Keith Bostic's /dev/null list), in my responses to junk e-mail these days. So far I haven't yet received junk e-mail on my home computer while it had a printer attached, but one of these days... Under US Code Title 47, Sec.227(b)(1)(C): "It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine" A "telephone facsimile machine" is defined in Sec.227(a)(2)(B) as: "equipment which has the capacity to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a regular telephone line onto paper." Under this definition, an e-mail account, modem, computer and printer together constitute a fax machine. The rights of action are as follows. Under Sec.227(b)(3)(B): "A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State -- (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph." For the full legal text USC Title 47, Section 227, see: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/227.html Dan Franklin dfranklin(a)bbn.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMj3MlEZRiTErSPb1AQFSIgP/SKn68eix0cgOMa2QgOsAJ7IePBZitECs 1KflgL0ziSW9D5JBhYmjAfl3UoFF7UJ1vyROFUV7sgBB1PSXGAvBGycSqrIhciPh Fm/73HUT0pr4foyTAPOndhAOx3ls61+kT497TUx+BecPhtfI41Mu0zTdPaZdWogP vaxfu97SuWw= =OC/R -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: > By spreading the risk you minimize the cost. m5(a)tivoli.com wrote: >Yea right. Actually, yes. Canada has a single payer system and we spend about two thirds as much as the U.S. on health care as a percentage of G.N.P. We manage to insure all Canadians while about 35% of people in the U.S. have *no* health insurance. Yes, the insurance premium is not optional. Yes, it *is* cheaper. Ciao, James

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Free RSA chip
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I secured a 30 page data sheet for the new NTT (actually NLC, a subsidiary of NTT) RSA accelerator chips. The NLC0048 LSI chip can handle keys up to 1024 bits. The secret key can be stored on-chip. If you want a copy of the data sheet, email me your fax number. Furthermore, I have *one* sample chip that I am willing to loan to somebody in the SF Bay Area with sufficient hardware knowledge to put the chip to good use. If you think you qualify, let me know who you are and why you think that you should get the chip. I apologize in advance to the qualified candidates that do not get the chip. There is only one (that I can loan out). --Lucky

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RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:00 AM 9/16/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >As to the "social safety net," things are far, far beyond a simple safety >net. When 14-year-old pregnant inner city girls are given money to set up >their own households (cf. Charles Murray's "Losing Ground"), this is not a >"safety net," this is subsidized breeding. A friend of mine (who can be just as coarse as I) calls them "Welfare-powered bastard factories." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Edited Edupage, 15 Sept 1996
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"educom(a)educom.unc.edu" 16-SEP-1996 10:15:59.50 >To: IN%"edupage(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu" "EDUCOM Edupage Mailing List" >************************************************************ >Edupage, 15 September 1996. Edupage, a summary of news about information >technology, is provided three times a week as a service by Educom, >a Washington, D.C.-based consortium of leading colleges and universities >seeking to transform education through the use of information technology. >************************************************************ >SATELLITE BROADCASTERS MUST PROVIDE EDUCATION, TOO >A federal appeals court in Washington has ruled that any company providing >direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services must "reserve a portion of its >channel capacity, equal to not less than 4 percent nor more than 7 percent, >exclusively for noncommercial programming of an educational or information >nature," in compliance with regulations drafted by the FCC to enforce laws >enacted in 1984 and 1992. The unanimous decision rejected arguments by Time >Warner and other broadcasters that the law interfered with their First >Amendment rights. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the >right of the broadcasters, which is paramount," said the court, quoting a >1969 Supreme Court ruling. (Chronicle of Higher Education 13 Sep 96 A29) Bloody socialist Supreme Court... sell the _full_ rights, then use the money to reduce taxes. >SYSTEM CRACKER GOT RECIPE FROM HACKER MAGAZINE >The person who disabled New York's Panix Internet service probably followed >the line-by-line instructions for doing so that appeared in the latest issue >of 2600 magazine, the Hacker's Quarterly. "We need to educate the community >that it's very, very simple to cause massive mayhem," says 2600's editor, >who defended his editorial judgment. "A lot of companies subscribe to us so >they can learn before they're victimized." Panix's co-owner says he >supports 2600's right to publish such information: "As a matter of >principle I don't think they should have been stopped," but adds that unlike >most other recipes for breaching security published in the magazine, this >one has no known technical defense. (Wall Street Journal 13 Sep 96 B5) Helpful to quote Panix on it. >Edupage is written by John Gehl <gehl(a)educom.edu> & Suzanne Douglas ><douglas(a)educom.edu>. Voice: 404-371-1853, Fax: 404-371-8057. >Technical support is provided by Information Technology Services at the >University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. >*********************************************************** >Edupage ... is what you've just finished reading. To subscribe to Edupage: >send mail to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu with the message: subscribe edupage >Henry R. Luce (if your name is Henry R. Luce; otherwise, substitute your >own name). ... To cancel, send a message to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu with >the message: unsubscribe edupage. (If you have subscription problems, send >mail to manager(a)educom.unc.edu.)

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Re: Snake Oil FAQ 0.4 [comments appreciated]
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those not-yet-in-the-know: I no longer have the time to manage it and asked for somebody (and Matt agreed to) to take the Snake Oil FAQ's care and feeding. Note that this is not cc'd to coderpunks. I don't think it's appropriate for coderpunks. On 16 Sep 96 at 9:56, C Matthew Curtin wrote: [..] > --------------------------- snake-oil-faq ---------------------------- > > Snake-Oil Warning Signs > Encryption Software to Avoid [..] > The Snake Oil FAQ is (to be) posted monthly to cypherpunks, sci.crypt, > alt.security, comp.security, and comp.infosystems. We're targeting those who Does it need to be posted monthly? Better to post pointers to it most of the time, possibly to other places as well (alt.2600 comes to mind...). Perhaps when the first 'non-beta' of this document is released a History could be added. [..] > Different products will serve different needs, and it's rare that a product > will serve every need. (Sometimes a product won't be needed: it may be Nitpick: Hm. Change that to "no product will serve every need". > better to use a utility to encrypt files, transmit them over a network using > standard file transfer tools, and decrypt them at the other end than to use > a separate encrypted utility in some cases.) Or more clearly: is encryption THE feature of the utility, or is it an added feature? It's better to use separate utilities made for that purpose rather than one that tries to do everything. [..] > Key Sizes > > Some ciphers, while currently secure against most attacks, are not > considered viable in the next few years because of relatively small keysizes > and increasing processor speeds (making a brute-force attacks feasible). The Change to "making brute force attacks--that is, trying every possible key--feasible". [..] > Symmetric and Public-Key Lengths With > Similar Resistance to Brute-Force Attacks > > Symmetric Key Length Public-key Key Length > 56 bits 384 bits > 64 bits 512 bits > 80 bits 768 bits > 112 bits 1792 bits > 128 bits 2304 bits That's a controversial comparison. I've read references (from a couple of years ago) saying that a 3k-bit RSA key is as strong as a 128-bit IDEA key. Trying to compare the two (symmetric and assymetric) is like running through a tar pit. > Some Common Snake-Oil Warning Signs > > The following are some of the "red flags" one should watch for when > examining an encryption product > > * Technobabble [..] > A sign of technobabble is a descrption which drops a lot of technical > terms for how the system works without actually explaining how it > works. Often specifically coined terms are used to describe the scheme > which are not found in the literature. Of course, how is an amateur supposed to know if these terms are found in the literature? That was a recurring comment that people sent me when I first posted the FAQ. [..] > Just because software uses to different method of computation Typo! "uses to different method..."? [..] > grounded in mathematical theory. The security is based on problems that > are believed, if not known to be hard to solve. Hm. How about "that are widely believed"? [..] > A OTP system is not an algorithm. It works by having a "pad" of > random bits in the possession of both the sender and recipient. [..] > never again be used. The bits in the pad must be truly random, > generated using a real random source, such as specialized > hardware, radioactive decay timings, etc., and not from an > algorithm or cipher. Anything else is not a one-time-pad. Although it is(?) mentioned below, I'd emphasize here in some way that the users of the OTP generate the key. Somebody else sending you a supposed OTP that he generated is not secure. > The vendor may confuse random session keys or initialization vectors > with OTPs. Explain random session keys and initialization vectors. A glossary at the end of the document would be a good thing. > Sometimes attacks are theoretical or impractical (requiring special > circumstances or massive computing power running for many years), and > it's easy to confuse a layman by mentioning these. Oh yeah. These need to be explained. What I had in mind was timing attacks against RSA or IDEA, or factoring of public keys. > * Keys and Passwords > > The "key" and the "password" are often not the same thing. The "key" "often" not?!? (oops...was that my wording?) They aren't the same, though often they are confused in snake oil. [..] > If there's a third-party utility that can crack the software, > avoid it. > > If the vendor claims it can recover lost passwords (without using a > key-backup or escrow feature), avoid it. > > If there is a key-backup or escrow feature, are you in control > of the backup, or does the vendor or someone else hold a copy > of the key? That is, if you lose the key, you don't want a third party to have as much a chance to recover it as you do. [..] > > If the vendor is unaware of export restrictions, avoid the software: > the vendor is not familiar with the state of the art. Also... if the vendor does not understand export restrictions, avoid the software. I'm thinking of a certain snoil-vendor who said 128-bit IDEA keys were'nt secure since they could be exported. > Because of export restrictions, some legitimate (not-Snake Oil) > products may have a freely exportable version for outside of the USA, > which is different from a separate US/Canada-only distribution. Also Such exportable versions are not as secure, of course. [..] > Other Considerations > > Interface isn't everything: user-friendliness is an important factor, but if > the product isn't secure then you're better off with something that is > secure (if not as easy to use). > > No product is secure if it's not used properly. You can be the weakest link > in the chain if you use a product carelessly. Do not trust any product to be > foolproof, and be wary any product that claims it is. I wanted to add some sort of 'non-guru hacks' to test a product. One example might be to actually examine 'encrypted' files to see if they are really encrypted. (I'm thinking of the AMG archiver, which only encrypted the CRC; CODEC archiver also only encrypted the CRC is a file is not compressed.) Thanks again for taking over the FAQ. A good job! Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Diffie Hellman - logs in Galois fields
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, A question for the matematicians out there: I am looking at the Diffie Hellman public key exchange protocol and am trying to find out why it is computationally hard to take logs in a finite (Galois) field. My maths tutor has told me a bit about the construction of Galois fields (If I`m correct the construction is Z mod N, N some integer, then a transformation F(x) on the residue classes already in the field) I know also the definition is that there are P**k elements, p a prime. My questions are as follows: 1. How can a field be finite, as by definition it has to be closed under addition, subtraction, multiplication and division???? (sorry if this one is a bit of a no brainer, maybe the definition is different but I can`t seem to see how) 2. Why is taking logs in a finite field computationally hard? - Me and Alec (My maths tutor at college) guessed that it is because exponentiation and logs are each others inverse functions, and somehow this becomes a one way function in a finite field. 3. Are the Galois fields used in Diffie Hellman specially constructed in any way or are they just normal GF???? Thanks for any help anyone can give me.... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ 9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= =CMZA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: The Living and the Dead
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 PM 9/16/96 -0400, Brian Davis wrote: >On Sun, 15 Sep 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> .... >> How would an AP-type system treat Robert McNamara? He'd be dead in a >> second. To those who say, "What good would this do?" I respond: Anyone in > ^^^^^^ >Kind of kills the betting pool, doesn't it? > >EBD Okay, it was just an expression... It would probably take a couple weeks. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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