- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 30 Sep 96 at 0:55, Moroni wrote: > I never cease to be surprised by the interest that gentiles show in > working mormon communities while totally neglecting their own failing > areas. <rant on> I never cease to be surprised by Mormon apologists who refuse to look in the mirror at problems in so-called "working Mormon communities." I moved to Utah 2 years ago from Texas. Even though I am nominally Mormon (I haven't been to Church in years), it was still a huge culture shock to me. I think the thing that bugs me the most is the way the political system is dominated by a 500 lb. elephant known as the LDS Church. We Utahns sit in a room with this elephant that eats and s**ts and yet we don't talk about the fact that it's there. This is Utah for you...Utah where during the first legislative session I was here (1995) the legislature spent 42 out of 45 days talking about whether they were going to have tightened ethics laws. Where during the last legislative session (1996) the legislature spent 42 of 45 days discussing what to do about the fact that a few kids in one of the Salt Lake high schools wanted to have a gay/lesbian/straight club. NO MATTER that the schools are horribly overcrowded and that in some elementary grades 40-plus students per classroom is the norm. NO MATTER that teachers are horribly underpaid in a state with California-style costs. NO MATTER that despite a $100 million surplus the governor and the legislature can't see clear to get rid of the sales tax on *food*. NO MATTER that if anything terribly controversial (or even not so controversial) comes up, someone in the legislature feels like they have to sound out the Church to make sure that they don't cross Gordon B. Hinckley or Boyd K. Packer and endanger their Church membership. In the meantime, our legislators (with Church approval, these are Church "callings") run down to the prison at Point of the Mountain to "counsel" convicted child abusers and then pass laws to get rid of minimum mandatory sentencing. The roads are falling apart here, the schools are overcrowded. Gang violence is prevalent up and down the Wasatch Front. I heard about a gang-related murder in Layton last weekend. Up until a month ago, when the mayor of Salt Lake City closed the place and forced them out, there was a well-known open-air drug supermarket going on in Pioneer Park. Legislative leaders think that they're above the Open Meetings law. And liquor laws still are pretty backwards. (Gee, just last week places that sell beer actually got permission to put signs that say "BEER" instead of "BEE?" on their premises.) Thing is, Utah is generally a wonderful place to live. As I said, I used to live in Texas. It's great to live in a place where the economy is booming and there are jobs available. The crime rate is pretty low for an urban community (but there are sore spots, as I indicated above). The scenery is downright spectacular. And Salt Lake City proper is a pretty cool place. But I don't believe that Utah is immune to the problems that beset other cities. One thing that would help is for Utah opinion-makers to admit that not everyone who lives in this "pretty, great state" is a devout Mormon and/or a Republican. Not everyone shares the same values as the dominant religion, and they shouldn't have to. I apologise to the cypherpunks mailing list for this rant, but not everyone in Utah agrees with the view expressed by Moroni above. Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: What about making re-mailers automatically chain?
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:30 09/29/96 -0800, you wrote: >At 4:14 AM -0500 9/29/96, David E. Smith wrote: > >>I dunno about that one. Even if the message itself is encrypted, >>every remailer has to have the address of the final recipient for >>your plan to work. And if you have cleartext for that message >... > >Actually, as I read the original proposal, it was to only _insert_ >additional links. Thus, imagine the following remailer chain, with Alice >sending to Zeke through a chain, represented in parentheses (like LISP): > That's what I was going for. The re-mailer would only add links if the recip that it sees is another mailer. If it doesn't recognize the destination as a remailer, it must assume that it's the last link and should send the mail. If that doesn't happen Dave's right. Multiple mailers would know the final dest. The question I was heading for on this is: Does this add anything useful? Removing knowledge of the path from the sender is a plus. This prevents anyone, even the sender, from being able to give up any useful info even if under court order. Adding "random" traffic is helpful 'cause many people (including myself) use pre-fab anon scripts and therefore use the same anon paths all the time (I should stop that). This opens those messages up to some analysis and the possibility of the sender being revealed. Granted, these are not major items. The real question is: Is this worth implementing? As gbroiles(a)netbox.com said: >All of this (adding remailer status tracking based on frequent updates of >digitally signed information from a trusted third party) can be done, but >it's a pain in the ass to code... G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at http://www.pb.net/~wizard | | and on a plethora of key servers around the world. | | Key ID = 0E818EC1 | | Fingerprint = A6 7B 67 D7 E9 96 37 7D E7 16 BD 5E F4 5A B2 E4 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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ADJ_ust
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9-30-96. NYP: "National Security Experts Plan for Wars Whose Targets and Weapons Are All Digital." Is the threat real, or is this just another way to win scarce funds? Military and intelligence officials believe that enemy nations, terrorists and criminal groups either already have the capability to mount information warfare strikes or soon will. Criminals are quickly progressing beyond the vandalism and petty theft associated with teen-aged hackers and into robbery and extortion schemes ranging up to millions of dollars, corporate executives and private investigators say. Others reply that the worst threats mentioned are mostly speculation. "Information warfare is a risk to our nation's economy and defense," said Martin Libicki, a senior fellow at the National Defense University. "But I believe we will find ways to cope with these attacks, adjust and shake them off, just as we do to natural disasters like hurricanes." ----- http://jya.com/adjust.txt (14 kb) ADJ_ust

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Re: [AP] Afghanistan
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:57 PM 9/29/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >"Wayne H. Allen" <whallen(a)capitalnet.com> writes: > >> At 04:10 AM 9/29/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >> >Afghanis publicly hanged their former president, Najibullah [no last name]. >> >Other countries should follow their example. >> > >> >> And this would accomplish???? And this has what to do with cryptography?? > >Nothing, of course - neither do Timmy May's stupid rants, lies, and personal >attacks. > >By the way, your abuse of your native language suggests that you're probably >a product of U.S. public education. > > And you would be far off base once again. Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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Re: GCHQ releases Venona files (from UK Telegraph)
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone in the UK cares to get the GCHQ Venona releases, we'll be pleased to scan them for distribution. Or put them on our Web site. Our fax: 212-799-4003 (US) Vox: 212-873-8700 Or if someone else scans them and needs a Web site, ftp them to: ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming

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Another briefing in Atlanta on the NRC crypto report,...
by CRYPTO 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Another briefing in Atlanta on the NRC crypto report, October 21, 1996 Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society A Public Briefing in Atlanta, Georgia Monday, October 21, 1996, 1:30-3:30 pm There will be a public briefing in Atlanta, Georgia by the National Research Council on this report. The briefing will be held at the Manufacturing Research Center on the campus of the Georgia Institute of Technology on Monday October 21, from 1:30 to 3:30. Dr. Herbert Lin, director of the NRC study will conduct the briefing. Questions from the audience will be entertained. For further information, please contact Dr. Myron L. Cramer (404) 894-7292, <myron.cramer(a)gtri.gatech.edu> at the Georgia Tech Research Institute. The event is open to the press and the public. Directions: From I-75/85 exit on Tenth Street and head West. Turn left on Hemphill Street and follow it to where it ends on Ferst Street. The Manufacturing Research Center is the modern building in front of you. Parking is limited; use public transportation or allow yourself extra time. If you have suggestions about other places that the committee should offer a public briefing, please send e-mail to crypto(a)nas.edu.

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Re: Internet plug pulled on Colombia's guerrillas
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 27 Sep 1996 14:33:42 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which >>has periodically paralyzed half the country with road blocks, >>found its route to the information superhighway barred. >> >>The Communist insurgents, who rose up in arms in 1964, >>embraced new technology last year in their fight to overthrow the >>government by launching a home page on the Internet. > >I couldn't resist smiling when I read this. Not that I want their access >cut; quite the opposite. But it is REALLY reassuring to see the authorities >behave in exactly the fashion you expect them to! Attempting to cut off >dissenting political voices IRL is de rigeur; now, this shows that they >believe "threat" to the government posed by allowing others to voice >contrary opinions on the 'net is real. It's particularly funny when you consider that the main justification for suppression is that insurgents (or rebels or freedom fighters or ...) kill people. Something along the lines of "We don't suppress unpopular views; we're just protecting our citizens". Now, it seems to me that that having a web page is a decidely non-lethal thing. <g> OTOH, it's probably more effective at getting the outside world to find out what's happening. Draw your own conclusions. # Chris Adams <cadams(a)acucobol.com> # <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash ksub latent cut ek mix reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 30 Sep 96 6:45:05 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ************ 14:56 100.00% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *****++**+** 33:36 99.96% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ++-+-++++-- 1:11:40 99.94% winsock winsock(a)c2.org --------..-+ 6:56:13 99.81% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #*+#*# -#*** 12:53 99.79% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ----.------ 7:25:48 99.62% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ************ 5:03 99.40% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net #--*##*#### 13:56 99.17% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----------+ 3:47:17 98.46% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - - +- - + 1:27:49 95.92% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --++++ +++ 1:56:13 92.08% replay remailer(a)replay.com **+****** * 4:11 91.92% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu + ++*++ .-* 2:49:27 91.01% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++++-++--+ 1:53:37 81.18% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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RE: Looking for Qualified Individual/Firm to Contract for Cryptanalysis
by thad＠hammerhead.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw this > > I am looking for one or more people (or firms) who are qualified to perform > > world class cryptanalysis work. Please send mail to me at joswald1(a)msn.com > > call in the U.S. at +1 408.479.7874 > > > > Jack Oswald and then this... > [from alt.religion.scientology, where net-activist Grady Ward is a subject > of a lawsuit from the Scientologists...] > > Grady Ward posted updates in his case of alleged copyright and trade > secret violation. > > "Word as of September 26, 1996 at 10:00 AM is that the technician who has > been trying to 'crack' files apparently encrypted using PGP has admitted > that 'he can make no further progress' after a month of concentrated > effort. > > "The disks will remain in a safety deposit box until the 'ho reveals any > new plans for bringing in cryptography experts to assist in the analysis." [the 'ho here is a nasty name for the religions key lawyer, Helena Kobrin] The trial is happening in San Jose, and I wouldn't be at all surprised if the attempted cryptanalysis is happening there, too. They've been working at it for a few months now. thad -- Thaddeus Beier thad(a)hammerhead.com Visual Effects Supervisor 408) 286-3376 Hammerhead Productions http://www.got.net/people/thad

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the theory of split currency
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Austrian-econ is an academic economists' list focused on so-called "austrian" economics, like Hayek, Von Mises, etc... Notice the last little bit about Patrick Leahy... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 20:13:48 -0700 (PDT) From: Fred Foldvary <ffoldvar(a)jfku.jfku.edu> To: Austrian Economics <AustrianEcon(a)agoric.com> Subject: the theory of split currency Organization: JFK University Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-austrianecon(a)agoric.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: AustrianECON(a)agoric.com Is there a name for a dual or split currency, in which there is one currency for domestic use and another, different appearing, currency for foreign usage? Does anyone know of any country which has had such a split currency? Is there any literature on such split currency? Here some thoughts on how it could function in the U.S.: 1) Domestic currency would not be legal tender outside the U.S. 2) Foreign US dollars would not be legal tender in the U.S. It would be illegal to hold foreign dollars in the U.S. Travelers would be required to convert them at customs. 3) The export of domestic currency would be illegal. 4) All exchanges between domestic and foreign currency would be required to be made in official exchanges, with the amounts recorded and reported to the government. 5) All previous currency would be declared of no value after a certain date. All conversions to new currency would be reported. What would be the implications for banking, international trade, and the market process? Would it affect the measurement of the money supply, and monetary policy? A motive for the government would be to control the underground economy, tax evasion, and the trade in illegal substances. This scenario is not entirely hypothetical. I have read that Senator Patrick Leahy introduced Senate Bill #307 to create such a split currency. The Bill failed to pass the Senate, but this shows the concept is out there. Is this worth investigation and theoretical examination? Fred Foldvary --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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