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Tim May is a fine person.
by anonymous＠miron.vip.best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May's razor sharp wit and excellent accurate analyses have added much to this group. His early support of the cypherpunk concept has helped advance the cause of cypherpunkdom. In short, Tim May is the top of the top, the best of the pest. His impeccable tolerance with totally unwarranted scurrilous attacks is truly mind boggling. I think we should all pay Tim may tribute for his fine contributions!

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Re: Fuck Cyberpromo
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:38 PM 10/12/96 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >and sent it on to this wallace(a)cyberpromo.com address, those, er, >caprophageous cretins, (thanks, DCF; don't sue me for copyright violations >;-)) would get the hint in a hurry. Unfortunately, I need a new spell checker. The correct spelling is coprophagous cretin. Remember coprolite (fossilized dung). DCF

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Not That Smart Cards
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New Scientist, 12 October 1996, p. 21. Smart, but not that smart By Mark Ward Credit card companies are turning to smartcards to help them fight fraud. But manufacturing problems may mean that they are no more secure than existing cards. Conventional credit cards hold information in a magnetic strip that typically holds about 200 bytes of information -- enough for the card and version number, expiry date and owner's name. Smartcards have a built-in microprocessor that can handle several kilobytes of data, equivalent to pages of information. Having the tiny computer on board means that each card can have a unique identity, and this ought to help to protect the information held on it. But to give a card an individual electronic signature, its built-in processor has to do a long calculation. This is a time-consuming process, so some card manufacturers intend to issue cards with one of several thousand preprogrammed identities. Each card will therefore have thousands of duplicates, all of which will be vulnerable if a criminal cracks the code for any one of them. In 1994 the credit card companies Europay, Mastercard and Visa got together to draw up a common specification for smartcards, known as EMV The cards will rely for security on the RSA encryption algorithm. This uses two very large numbers, called keys. One is passed around in public and the other remains hidden in the card's memory. The keys are 155-digit prime numbers which are multiplied together to make an even larger number which is then used to code and decode the data on the card. The problem for card manufacturers is working out the large prime numbers in the first place. "Companies making smartcards turn one out every 15 seconds," says Dmitri Markikis, a security analyst at Mondex, a London-based company that is experimenting with smartcards as electronic purses. "But it takes longer -- estimates range from 6 to 30 seconds -- for the card to generate its RSA keys." To speed things up some manufacturers are considering generating 10,000 preset keys and inserting one as each card is made. Louis Guillou, a researcher at France Telecom's Commercial Centre for the Study of Television and Telecommunications highlighted the problem this summer at the Crypto 96 conference in California. The three EMV partners circulate over 800 million credit cards between them, yet are likely to use a limited population of keys. "Trying to reuse the keys several times is very dangerous," says Guillou. Card manufacturers say the problem will be solved as smartcards become more powerful. "Soon the processing power of a smartcard will be such that it will be able to overcome that kind of issue," says Cyril Annarella, a technical consultant for the French company Gemplus, which makes cards for the EMV members. [End]

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Re: LET'S MEET DIMITRI
by Z.B. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 12 Oct 1996, Ross Wright wrote: > On or About 12 Oct 96 at 11:28, Steven L Baur wrote: > > Tim's message: > > > Well, to one who inserts "(spit)" after nearly every name he cites, > > and critiques Hayek as "fucking unreadable. Shit.," I suppose Hayek > > must indeed seem unreadable. Shit. > > > > After all, Hayek rarely writes things like: "The senile Von Mises > > (spit) and his Sovok Cabal plotters...." > > > > As to "forcing" your students to read Hayek, just who is in charge? > > If you're the instructor, they can choose to read what you tell them > > to read, or be unprepared on the exams you give and possibly flunk > > the class. What part of "Required Reading" do you or your students > > not understand? > > > > --Tim (spit) May > > I had almost forgotten what started this war of flame. That's not so > bad. > Not very bad at all, considering all of the subsequent messages Vulis posted in response to that one. All of the (spit), (fart), and so on got annoying REAL fast, not to mention the anonymous Tim-bashing messages which he is probably doing as well. Zach Babayco zachb(a)netcom.com <-------finger for PGP public key http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Park/4127 ----- If you need to know how to set up a mail filter or defend against emailbombs, send me a message with the words "get helpfile" (without the " marks) in the SUBJECT: header. I have several useful FAQ's and documents available.

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Re: exporting signatures only/CAPI (was Re: Why not PGP?)
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote: >The problem however, is finding a non-US site to hold the hot potato >once it has been exported. For example 128 bit Netscape beta was >exported a while ago. I don't see it on any non-US sites. You didn't look vary hard.

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Re: NSA/GCSB spying shown on NZ television [RANT]
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clint Barnett wrote: > has anyone seen the Mike Myers flic "So I Married An Axe Murderer"? > His "father" in the movie has an awesome theory about a group of the > 5 most powerful epole in the world running everything, including the > newspapers, known as the Pentavaret. The Vatican, the Queen, the > Gettys, the Rothchilds, and Colonel Sanders before he went tits up. > Not to discredit your information, but you just reminded me of it and > I thought it was funny enough to mention. And I thought this was well worth mentioning on the list: I am always amused (when I'm not absolutely hysterical) at how certain people can sit back and smirk at conspiracy "theories" like the "Bilderberg" agenda et al, then you look around and you see: 1. No major daily newspaper in the U.S. takes any interest at all when these most powerful and influential people meet to discuss the fate of the world. What a surprise, huh? 2. The same people who get on TV a lot and smirk at conspiracies that might be believed in by the little people, don't have any trouble believing in the wildest, craziest, most unbelievable conspiracy of all, as long as it's politically correct, and brings in lots of cash. Screw 'em.

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CAG_eng (Crypto AG)
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous has provided an English translation of the recent article on Crypto AG and NSA in Der Spiegel. http://jya.com/cryptoa2.htm (English) http://jya.com/cryptoag.htm (German) CAG_eng --------- Recall that The Baltimore Sun published a similar report at the end of 1995, as first noted here by Peter Wayner, I believe. See the c'punk archives for more on The Sun article (try Altavista for "Crypto AG").

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Re: SPA sues C2, other ISPs and users
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:45 PM 10/12/96 -0400, Matthew Ghio wrote: >gbroiles(a)netbox.com (Greg Broiles) wrote: > >> The SPA has apparently adopted two relatively aggressive litigation >> strategies - putting ISP's in the position of disclosing otherwise >> confidential customer information or being sued themselves, and treating >> peripheral data about copyrighted works like copyrighted works themselves >> (e.g., serial numbers). Particularly interesting is that they seem to be >> claiming that a *link* to a pirate FTP site is itself infringing >> (potentially contributory infringement). > >Claiming that a link to a pirate FTP site is illegal, is a fairly difficult >position to defend. It's not illegal to say "someone is selling stolen >property on the corner of First Street downtown". It's just a statement of >fact. They could try to argue that there was some intent to commit a >crime... but they'd have to have some real proof of that. We're not talking about a crime here, but a civil action. There is a doctrine in copyright law called contributory infringement, whereby a party who intentionally helps another party infringe on a third party's copyright can be held liable as a contributory infringer. In the Ninth Circuit, the standard for contributory infringement is "[o]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer". _Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction_ 96 C.D.O.S. 517 (CA9, 1996) <http://ming.law.vill.edu/Fed-Ct/Circuit/9th/opinions/9415717.htm>, citing to _Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp_, 659 F.2d 963, 975 (CA9, 1981), rev'd on other grounds 464 U.S. 417 (1984), adopting the standard from _Gershwin Publishing v. Columbia Artists_ 443 F.2d 1159 (CA2, 1971). California is within the Ninth Circuit; I presume that the suit against C2 was filed in California (probably Oakland), but I might be wrong. >Their claim that "peripheral data" is illegal is a rather novel idea, and >not supported (to my knowledge) by precedent. I don't think anyone could >argue that a serial number or password is by itself worthy of copyright >protection, since it lacks any creative expression, so they are claiming >it is "indirect infringement". Yes, this is the basic thrust of contributory infringement liability - that the defendant had an important part to play in the fact that infringement took place, without being the direct infringer. Contributory infringement (and its kissing cousin, vicarious infringement, whereby a person under the defendant's control infringes to the benefit of the defendant) are supported by precedent and have been for several years. For example: _Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction_, supra, where defendant swap meet operator leased space to vendors who sold illegitimate copies of musical works, and defendant was aware that those sales were taking place, plaintiffs had stated a claim for contributory infringement sufficient to survive Fed.Rul.Civ.Pro 12(b)(6) motion. _Sega v. Maphia_ 857 F.Supp. 679 (N.D.Cal. 1994), where defendant BBS sysops' role in "copying, including provision of facilities, direction, knowledge and encouragement" was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of contributory infringement; _ITSI TV Productions v. Cal. Auth. of Racing Fairs_ 785 F.Supp. 854 (E.D.Cal. 1992), finding no domestic contributory infringement where plaintiff had no evidence of defendant's mental state or knowledge with respect to direct infringements allegedly facilitated in Mexico, and hence no subject matter jurisdiction; _Demetriades v. Kaufmann_ 690 F.Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), adopting the _Gershwin_ standard, indicating ".. just as benefit and control are the signposts of vicarious liability, so are knowledge and participation the touchstones of contributory infringement", rejecting a theory of contributory infringement against defendants who only made two phone calls to ask about copying of architectural plans and did not provide the means or facilities for the actual copying; _Gershwin Publishing v. Columbia Artists Management_ 443 F.2d 1159 (CA2, 1971), finding contributory infringement where concert promoter generated demand for concerts, collected fees from performers who foreseeably performed copyrighted works without license, and collected payments from independent organizations it created to produce those shows; The famous (well, sort of :) _Universal City Studios v. Sony_ case where the Supreme Court ruled that "time-shifting" videotaping of TV shows was not an infringement was based on a contributory infringement theory. It would have been impractical for Universal City Studios to find and sue individuals who taped occasional TV shows for later viewing; so instead they went after someone worth suing, the people who made the VCRs. The language in the SPA's press release - "Piracy has taken many forms on the Internet. These include making unauthorized copies of software available for download, the posting of serial numbers, cracker and hacker utilities and links to pirate FTP sites. Although many believe piracy is limited to "warez" or illegal copies of software, it extends beyond that narrow definition. Under the law, anyone who knows -- or should have known -- of the infringement and who assists, encourages or induces the infringement is liable for indirect infringement. In each of the actions SPA filed, at least two of the above infringements were present." seems to imply that they may be thinking of contributory contributory infringement - e.g., if (directly) distributing serial numbers or cracking software is contributory infringement*, materially contributing to that material contribution is also infringement. But this seems awfully attenuated from the actual harm. (I don't see much controversy about the idea that putting copyright-protected software up for FTP without the copyright holder's permission is illegitimate; and the notion that merely providing a link to someone else's site is infringement (or even a "material contribution") seems to go much too far. Is a link to a site which links to a site which infringes an infringement? How many links is enough to escape liability? How many links are there between any two web pages, cf. "six degrees of separation"? :) * (because it "materially contributes" to the creation of an unauthorized copy, since the copy of a program being executed in RAM is distinct from an on-disk copy and without cracking software or serial numbers there will be no RAM copy and potentially no initial infringement. _MAI v. Peak_ 991 F.2d 511, 518 (CA9, 1993) cert dismissed 114 S.Ct. 671 (1994) and _Triad Systems v. Southeastern Express_ 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11821, 95 CDOS 6890 (August 31, 1995), also see <http://www.io.com/~gbroiles/triad.html> for my own crankiness about _Triad_) >A few months ago I saw Sameer grumbling about people "not paying for >Apache-SSL". Now SPA claims he's operating an ISP to promote piracy. So >first he's a software publisher and now he's a software pirate. Uh, yeah, >whatever. Obviously SPA is on a PR campaign here which defies all >conventional logic. It looks to me like they're trying to achieve results through fear and intimidation that they can't reach via persuasion; e.g., they are trying to create a climate where ISP's turn over user information without a fuss because they don't want to be sued themselves; and where users (and home page "publishers" or authors) are afraid to even discuss infringement, or do anything even close to the conceptual lines between fair use, noncommercial alterations of works (a la _Galoob v. Nintendo_ 964 F.2d 965 (CA9, 1992), where defendants' marketed a "Game Genie" which altered the play of Nintendo cartridges used in concert with it, held to be noninfringing), and infringement. There are some situations where "cracker" software cannot be characterized as inherently illegitimate - many people may want to disable copy protection on software they've legitimately purchased (or "licensed", if that's your view on the shrink wrap question) because it's annoying or incompatible with their hardware configuration. A person with a legitimate copy of software on CD-ROM may want to use it on their non-CD capable laptop, or use it over a nonstandard network. For example, my legitimate copy of Warcraft II won't run unless it sees its parent CD in my CD-ROM drive; which means I can't start a music CD of my choice in the CD-ROM drive and then run my legal copy of Warcraft. (But I probably should be working anyway.) Assuming the user is otherwise playing nicely (e.g., one license per user, blah blah blah) there's no reason to think that disabling copy protection is somehow illegitimate. But it's getting late. More tomorrow. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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RE: RE: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to
by everheul＠mail.rijnhaave.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To explain the backround of "binding cryptography" once more; with respect to (interoperable, worldwide) security in the information society socities/governments have to achieve two tasks: 1. stimulating the establishment of a security structure that protects their citizens, but which does not aid criminals. 2. Coping with the use of encryption by criminals outside of this framework. An inherent problem with these tasks is that different socities/governments have different views on the matter. So to achieve the first task you'll need a concept behind the security structure that is flexible enough to incorporate *any* crypto policy, i.e. from liberal (Japan) to non-liberal (France). We believe that "binding cryptography" is flexible enough to achieve this: a liberal crypto policy might use no Trusted Retrieval Parties at all, while a very non-liberal country might want one (government controlled) TRP, a compliance check on all network traffic and a ban on other crypto. With binding cryptography the issue on a crypto policy becomes non-technical and politically debatable: which features does a country want and what implementation? Adam Back[SMTP:aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk] wrote: > This much is the same as clipper I, just the parties have been > renamed (TRP = split escrow key database holders, TTP = US > government). No it is not. Among other things: it is a international solution, it is based on Pub. Key. Enc. and it is flexible enough to follow private-sector developments. It is not a key-escrow solution, as *you* have (in principle) a very large choice in who to trust with your communication. Hal Finney[SMTP:hal@rain.org] wrote: >Another flaw with schemes of this time (in terms of failing to meet >their goals) is that they cannot detect superencryption and other >forms of non-standard encryption of the message body proper. All >they can really do is verify from the outside that the same session >key is encrypted for the two recipients (the intended recipient and >the Government Access to Keys Party - let's not abuse the term by >calling him a Trusted Third Party). But they can't be sure that the >session key is sufficient information to decrypt the message. We offered a solution for the *first* task not for the *second*; the point is that criminals(!) do not gain any real advantage from using the system in that way as they - among other things - still face the key-management problem. The above dicussions are only relevant in countries where the use of crypto outside the structure would be prohibited. BTW, it is by such discussions that I believe such a ban is ineffective and in fact counterproductive. Adam Back[SMTP:aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk] wrote: > The paper suggests that in one plausible implementation, the > checkers referred to could be network service providers: > > from the summary of the paper posted here: >: The idea is that any third party, e.g., a network or service >provider, > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >: who has access to components 2, 3 and 4 (but not to any additional >: secret information) can: : a. check whether the session keys in >components 2 and 3 coincide; : b. not determine any information on >the actual session key. > > This would allow for instance for a software only implementation of > a madatory key escrow system. The government in question could then > deputize ISPs to do their mandatory GAK compliance checking for > them. (Deputizing companies is a recent trend in law enforcment > techniques anyway). > > This would allow for instance IP level encryption, with > non-conforming encrypted packets being dropped by all ISPs in the > country in question. Something the Singaporeans might find useful. > The checking functionality could also be added to a key escrow > enabled router. > > For this kind of application, binding cryptography is spot on. Jim bell[SMTP:jimbell@pacifier.com] wrote: > I think the biggest problem with allowing "anyone" to check the > correctness of a key is that what is a technical possibility today, > will become a legally-mandated requirement tomorrow. What if > Internet backbone companies and/or ISP's were told that they had to > implement software check these keys, and if they discovered an > "incorrect" escrowed key, they were legally obligated to either > refuse to forward that message, and/or forward a copy of that > message to someone like Spooks(a)NSA.gov or Thugs(a)DOJ.gov. The information society is international by nature; we want to securely communicate with Singapore. If Singapore, a democratic country!, has such a crypto policy that they want the above control, then so be it. Don't blame "binding cryptography" for making that possible, but start a dialogue with your politicians on what features of the proposal are acceptable in your country. Some countries seem to have the philosophy that "law-abiding" citizens should have nothing to "hide" from their government, so should not use encryption at all. I think that that is not acceptable. The concept behind the third-party checking is that no "law-abiding" citizen should have any problem that abuse - and only that - of a *voluntary* system can be "seen" by many parties. If and *how* checking is done, is a matter of each society. The same concept holds for many things in life and is well accepted. For instance that is why cars have registration plates: if a car drives through after an accident on a *public* road, then by-standers (third parties) can observe that. I for one don't the information society to be the wild west, where anything goes. Of course, people are rightfully worried that such a checkable system might be abused by a totalitarian regime to control their citizens. However, as long as such a system is voluntary I see no problem. Signs in the USA indicate (cf. the NRC study & remarks of the president) that use of other systems will always be possible. Also, the above discussions already showed that if such a system is voluntary, then there are lots of way to go around it. Adam Back[SMTP:aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk] wrote: > As your paper describes, your system allows anyone to check the > correctness of the escrowed session key. Have you considered > modifying it so that the only person who can check is the owner of a > designated private key of a public/private key pair? This would > allow say for the TTP to check correctness, and not the TRP, nor the > public. I'm not sure of the usefulness of this, but it allows you to > select from the full spectrum according to requirements: > > a) no one can check, PGP second recipient (Carl Ellison, Bill > Stewart) b) recipient only can check (my suggestion) c) holder(s) of > designated keys can check d) anyone can check (your proposal) > > c) should be easy to acheive: restrict d) by having the sender > encrypt the escrowed session key a second time to this public key. Point a) can be circumvented too easily. How do you envision point b? Sending all keys (or a selection) to the recipient for checking is: impractical & dangerous (you want the distance between the actual communication and the guy that can decypher as large as possible). If you don't send keys, then abuse will only show up during a warrant. But that abuse will show up anyway.. So what is the use? Point c is a nice suggestion. Although I for one have no problem that anyone can see that I comply with the rules (..unless of course it is a non-voluntary system etc..). Adam Back[SMTP:aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk] wrote: > My assumption was that a TRP is a government front. (All of the > proposed clipper I escrow agents have been major US defense > contractors/government agencies, in addition the clipper I documents Bring in to action your politicians ("the voice of the people") to let the regulation on Trusted Retrieval Parties be as liberal as you find acceptable. Peter M Allan[SMTP:peter.allan@aeat.co.uk] wrote: > 1) What's in it for the user ? > 2) What happens when the Feds recover meaningless data? 1) They get *one* system set up by governments that will make it possible to securely communicate (and do with business) with the whole (democratic) world. Instead of several partial systems set up by private companies where responsibilities will be vague. I consider a certified public key as a digital passport; setting up the structure for passports is a task of governments. 2) Only during a warrant policemen will see that; what then happens must every society on his own decide. Probably nothing happens, as otherwise the investigation will probably be to disturbed. Best regards, Eric

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Re: SPA sues C2, other ISPs and users
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:34 AM 10/13/96 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote: >In the Ninth Circuit, the standard for contributory infringement is "[o]ne >who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or >materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held >liable as a 'contributory' infringer". _Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction_ 96 >C.D.O.S. 517 (CA9, 1996) But how will a civil action be effective as soon as millions of people have 10 mb/s full-time net connections and can be their own ISPs and judgment proof at the same time? DCF

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